1. REPORT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
INVESTIGATING THE
IRANCONTRA AFFAIR
With the Minority Views
Abridged Edition
Daniel K. lnouye, Chairman
Senate Select Commiffee
Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman
House Select Committee
Edited and with an Introduction by
Joel Brinkley and Stephen Engelberg
?
3
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hn BOOKS
3. Minority Report
of
Senator James McClure
Representative Dick Cheney
of Idaho
of Wyoming
Senator Orrin Hatch
Representative William S. Broomfield
of Utah
of Michigan
Representative Henry J. Hyde
of flhinois
Representative Jim Courter
of New Jersey
Representative Bill McCoIlum
of Florida
Representative Michael DeWine
of Ohio
Members, Senate Select Committee on
Members, House Select Committee to Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions Nicaraguan Opposition
with iran
371
4. Minority Staff
Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Director
George W. Van Cleve
Chief Minority Counsel
Richard J. Leon
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
Associate Minority Counsel Robert W, Genzman Minority Editor/Writer Michael J.Malbin
Assistant Minority Counsel Kenneth R. Buck Minority Esecutive Assistant Molly W. Tully
Minority Research Director Bruce Fein Minority Staff Assistant Margaret W. Dillenburg
Associate Staff House of Representatives
Representative Broomfield Steven K Berry
- David S. Addington
Representative Hyde Diane S. Dornan
Representative Courter Dennis E. Teti
Representative McCollum Tina L Westby
Representative DeWine Nicholas P., Wise
Associate Staff Senate
Senator McClure Jack Gerard
Senator Hatch Dee Benson
372
6. CHAPTER 1
hitroduction
President Reagan and his staff made mis they did, it is important to understand the
takes in the Iran-Contra Affair. It is impor context within which they acted. The deci
tant at the outset, however, to note that the sions we have been investigating grew out
President himself has already taken the hard of:
step of acknowledging his mistakes and
reacting precisely to correct what went — Efforts to pursue important U.S. interests
wrong. He has directed the National Security both in Central America and in the Mid
Council staff not to engage in covert opera dle East;
tions. He has changed the procedures for — A compassionate, but disproportionate,
notifying Congress when an intelligence ac concern for the fate of American citizens
tivity does take place. Finally, he has in held hostage in Lebanon by terrorists,
stalled people with seasoned judgment to be including one CIA station chief who was
White House Chief of Staff, National Secu killed as a result of torture;
rity Adviser, and Director of Central Intelli — A legitimate frustration with abuses of
gence. power and irresolution by the legislative
The bottom line, however, is that the mis branch; and
takes of the Iran-Contra Affair were just — An equally legitimate frustration with
that—mistakes in judgment, and nothing leaks of sensitive national security secrets
more. There was no constitutional crisis, no coming out of both Congress and the ex
systematic disrespect for “the rule of law,” ecutive branch.
no grand conspiracy, and no Administra
tion-wide dishonesty or coverup. In fact, the Understanding this context can help explain
evidence will not support any of the more and mitigate the resulting mistakes. It does
hysterical conclusions the Committees’ Re not explain them away, or excuse their hav
port tries to reach. ing happened.
No one in the government was acting
out of corrupt motives. To understand what
375
7. I
The Committees’ Report and the amination of legislative-executive branch re
Ongoing Battle lations in foreign policy was sorely needed. It
still is. Judgments about the Iran-Contra Af
The excesses of the Committees’ Report are fair ultimately must rest upon one’s views
reflections of something far more profound. about the proper roles of Congress and the
Deeper than the specifics of the Iran-Contra President in foreign policy. There were many
Affair lies an underlying and festering insti statements during the public hearings, for
tutional wound these Committees have been example, about the rule of law. But the fun
unwilling to face. In order to support rhetori damental law of the land is the Constitution.
cal overstatements about democracy and the Unconstitutional statutes violate the rule of
rule of law, the Committees have rested their law every bit as much as do willful violations
case upon an aggrandizing theory of Con of constitutional statutes. It is essential,
gress’ foreign policy powers that is itself part therefore, to frame any discussion of what
of the problem. Rather than seeking to heal, happened with a proper analysis of the Con
the Committees’ hearings and Report betray stitutional allocation of legislative and execu
an attitude that we fear will make matters tive power in foreign affairs.
worse. The attitude is particularly regretta The country’s future security depends
ble in light of the unprecedented steps the upon a modus vivendi in which each branch
President took to cooperate with the Com recognizes the other’s legitimate and consti
mittees, and in light of the actions he already tutionally sanctioned sphere of activity. Con
has taken to correct past errors. gress must recognize that an effective foreign
A substantial number of the mistakes of policy requires, and the Constitution man
the Iran-Contra Affair resulted directly from dates, the President to be the country’s for
an ongoing state of political guerrilla warfare eign policy leader. At the same time, the
over foreign policy between the legislative President must recognize that his preemi
and executive branches. We would include in nence rests upon personal leadership, public
this category the excessive secrecy of the Iran education, political support, and interbranch
initiative that resulted from a history and comity. Interbranch comity does not require
legitimate fear of leaks. We also would in Presidential obsequiousness, of course. Presi
clude the approach both branches took to dents are elected to lead and to persuade. But
ward the so-called Boland Amendments. Presidents must also have Congressional
Congressional Democrats tried to use support for the tools to make foreign policy
vaguely worded and constantly changing effective. No President can ignore Congress
laws to impose policies in Central America and be successful over the long term. Con
that went well beyond the law itself. For its gress must realize, however, that the power
own part., the Administration decided to of the purse does not make it supreme. Lim
work within the letter of the law covertly, its must be recognized by both branches, to
instead of forcing a public and principled protect the balance that was intended by the
confrontation that would have been healthier Framers, and that is still needed today for
in the long run. effective policy. This mutual recognition has
Given these kinds of problems, a sober cx- been sorely lacking in recent years.
376
8. WHY WE REJECT THE COMMT[EES’ cord, as Members used the witnesses as ob
REPORT jects for lecturing the cameras? These tactics
had little to do with factfinding, or with a
Sadly, the Committees’ Report reads as if it careful review of policies and institutional
were a weapon in the ongoing guerrilla war processes.
fare, instead of an objective analysis. Evi Our reasons for rejecting the Committees’
dence is used selectively, and unsupported Report can best be understood by sampling
infrencès árè drawn to support politióálly aféw ofits major ébhclusions. By presenting
biased interpretations. As a result, we feel these examples, we hope to alert conscien
compelled to reject not only the Committees’ tious readers—whether they agree with our
conclusions, but the supposedly “factual” interpretations or not—to take the narrative
narrative as well. with a very large grain of salt. Regrettably,
We always knew, of course, that there readers seeking the truth will be forced to
would be differences of interpretation. We wade through a mass of material to arrive at
had hoped at the start of this process, how an independent judgment.
ever, to arrive at a mutually agreeable state
ment of facts. Unfortunately, that was not to
be. The narrative is not a fair description of The President’s Knowledge of the
events, but an advocate’s legal brief that ar Diversion
rays and selects so-called “facts” to fit pre
conceived theories. Some of the resulting The most politically charged example of the
narrative is accurate and supported by the Committees’ misuse of evidence is in the way
evidence. A great deal is overdrawn, specula it presents the President’s lack of knowledge
tive, and built on a selective use of the Com about the “diversion”—that is, the decision
mittees’ documentary materials. by the former National Security Adviser,
The tone of the Report flows naturally Admiral John Poindexter, to authorize the
from the tone of the Committees’ televised use of some proceeds from Iran arms sales to
hearings. We feel strongly that the decision support the Nicaraguan democratic Resist
to air the hearings compromised some intelli ance, or Contras. This is the one case out of
gence sources and methods by broadcasting thousands in which the Committees—in
inadvertent slips of the tongue. But one thing stead of going beyond the evidence as the
television did do successfully was lay bare Report usually does—refused instead to ac
the passions that animated too much of the cept the overwhelming evidence with which
Committees’ work. Who can forget the mas it was presented. The Report does grudg
sive displays of travelers’ checks being shown ingly acknowledge that it cannot refute the
to the country to discredit Col. North’s char President’s repeated assertion that he knew
acter, weeks before he would be given a nothing about the diversion before Attorney
chance to reply? Or the “j’accuse” atmo General Edwin Meese discovered it in No
sphere with which witnesses were con vember 1986. Instead of moving forward
fronted, beginning with the first week’s from this to more meaningful policy ques
prosecutorial confrontation with General Se- tions, however, the Report seeks, without
377
9. major set of
will never testimony become the basis for a
any support, to plant doubts. We assertions about other events
. If these flip-
s shredded
know what was in the document flops could be explained by neu
tral rules of
his last days
by Lt. CoL Oliver L. North in evidence, or if they were random
, we could
s. Of course
on the NSC staff, the Report say treat them more lightly. But som
ething quite
have been
we will not. That same point could different seems to be at work her
e. The narra
orted doubt
made, however, to cast unsupp tive seems to make every judgm
ent about the
own conclu
upon every one of the Report’s evidêñce in favor of the interp
retation that
gled out be
sions. This one seems to be sin puts the Administration in the
worst possible
put his own
cause it was where the President light. Two examples involving
North will
credibility squarely on the line. make the point clearly. The firs
t has to do
sident did
The evidence shows that the Pre with when he first got the idea
for a diver
we discuss
not know about the diversion. As sion.
subject, this
at length in our chapter on the North testified that he first got the
idea for
re than just
evidence includes a great deal mo diverting some of the Iran arm
s sale proceeds
exter was cor
Poindexter’s testimony. Poind to the Contras from Manucher
Ghorbanifar
the President’s
roborated in different ways by at a London hotel meeting in
late January
from North,
own diaries and by testimony 1986. He acknowledged that the
subject of
pson (for
Meese, Commander Paul Thom using the residuals to rep
lenish Israeli
el), and for
merly the NSC’s General Couns weapon supplies, and for relate
d operations,
Staff Donald
mer White House Chief of came up in a discussion with Am
iram Nir, an
President did
Regan. The conclusion that the Israeli official, in late December
or early Jan
ion, in other
not know about the divers uary. North specifically said, how
ever, that
all the infer
words, is one of the strongest of the Nir conversation had nothin
g to do with
dence before
ences one can make from the evi the Contras.
t to suggest
these Committees. Any attemp The Committees also received
a chronol
effort to sow
otherwise can only be seen as an ogy from the Israeli Governm
ent, however,
of reaping a
meiitless doubts in the hope that claimed North told Israel
i supply offi
partisan political advantage. cials in New York on Decem
ber 6 that the
t he intended
Contras needed money, and tha
s sales to
and the to use proceeds from the Iran arm
The idea for the Diversion get them some. When North
was asked
Use of Israeli Evidence about the December 6 meeting, he
reiterated
the Contras
rative’s hun that he did not recall discussing
In the normal course of the nar with anyone involved in the Ira
n initiative
ectivity stems
dreds of pages, the lack of obj before the late January meetin
g with Ghor
s, and makes
more from the way it select banifar.
a scarcity of
questionable inferences, from The Committees’ Report has
used the Is
rate decision to
evidence, rather than a delibe raeli chronology, and the timing
of North’s
becomes most
ignore what is available. This alleged December 6 conversation
, to suggest
s dismissed as
obvious when we see a witnes that the idea of gaining funds
for the Nica
of events, and
being not credible for one set raguan Resistance was an impor
tant consid
uncorroborated
then see the same witnesses’
378
10. don meeting. More importantly, North and
eration that kept the Iran arms initiative
alive, more than a month before the Presi Poindexter both testified that no one else in
dent signed the Finding of January 17. The the U.S. Government was told about a diver
sion before this time. What that means is that
problem with making this important infer
ence is that we have no way of knowing the diversion cannot possibly have been a
consideration for people at the policymaking
whether the Israeli chronology is accurate. It
level when the President decided to proceed
may be, but then again it may not. The Gov
with the Iran initiative in January.
ernmexit Of Israel made its chronology avail
able to the Committees fairly late in our
investigations, and consistently refused to let
key Israeli participants give depositions to Off-the-Shelf, Privately Funded
the Committees’ counsel. Covert Operations
We have no quarrel with the fact that Is
Paradoxically, the Committees seem to have
rael, or any other sovereign nation, may re
had no difficulty swallowing North’s testi
fuse to let its officials and private citizens be
mony that Director Casey intended to create
subject to interrogation by a foreign legisla
a privately funded, off-the-shelf covert opera
ture. The United States, no doubt, would do
tions capability for use in a variety of un
the same. But we do object vehemently to
foreseen circumstances. This is despite the
the idea that the Committees should use un
fact that two people close to Casey at the
sworn and possibly self-serving information
CIA, Deputy Director of Central Intelli
from a foreign government to reject sworn
gence John M. McMahon and Deputy Di
testimony given by a U.S. official—par
rector for Operations Clair George, both
ticularly when the U.S. official’s testimony
denied Casey would ever have countenanced
was given under a grant of immunity that
such an idea. “My experience with Bill Casey
protected him from prosecution arising out
was absolute,” said George. “He would
of the testimony for any charge except per-
never have approved it.”
July.
Even if North did mention the Contras to We have to concede the possibility, of
the Israeli supply officials in early December, course, that Casey might have discussed
such an idea speculatively with North with
however, the inference made from the timing
out mentioning it to others at the CIA. As
would be unfair. The Committees have no
with so many other questions, we will never
evidence that would give them any reason to
know the answers with certainty. Casey’s
believe that anyone other than North even
terminal illness prevented him from testify
considered the Contras in connection with
ing between December 1986 and his death in
the Iran arms sales before the January Find
May 1987. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
ing. Poindexter specifically testified that he
note how much the majority is willing to
first heard of the idea when North asked him
make of one uncorroborated, disputed North
to authorize it in February. North testified
statement that happens to suit its political
that he first mentioned the idea to the Direc
purpose, in light of the way it treats others by
tor of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey,
North that are less convenient for the narra
at about the same time, in late January or
tive’s thesis.
early February, after the post-finding Lon
379
11. The ANegaUon of Systemolic for not turning his fact-finding operation into
Cover-up a formal criminal investigation a day or two
earlier than he did. In fact, the Report
The Report also tries to present the events of strongly tries to suggest that Meese either
November 1986 as if they represent a system must have been incompetent or must have
atic attempt by the Administration to cover been trying to give Poindexter and North
up the facts of the Iran initiative. The reason more time to cover their tracks. We consider
for the alleged coverup, it is suggested, was the first of these charges to be untrue and the
to keep the American people from learning second to be outrageous. We shall show in a
that the 1985 arms sales were “illegal.” later chapter that Meese worked with the
There can be no question that the Ad right people, and the right number of them,
ministration was reluctant to make all of the for a national security fact-finding investiga
facts public in early November, when news tion. Whatever after-the-fact criticism peo
of the arms sales first came out in a Lebanese ple may want to make, it is irresponsible to
weekly. It is clear from the evidence that this portray the Administration, in light of
was a time when covert diplomatic discus Meese’s behavior, as if it were interested in
sions were still being conducted with Iran, anything but learning the truth and getting it
and there was some basis for thinking more out as quickly as possible.
hostages might be released. We consider the
Administration’s reticence in the early part
of the month to have been completely jus The “Ru’e of Low”
tifiable.
However, as November 1986 wore on, Finally, the Committees’ Report tries—al
Poindexter and North did falsify the docu most as an overarching thesis—to portray
mentary record in a way that we find deplor the Administration as if it were behaving
able. The outstanding fact about the late with wanton disregard for the law. In our
November events, however, is that Attorney view, every single one of the Committees’
General Meese understood the importance legal interpretations is open to serious ques
of getting at the truth. Working on a very tion. On some issues—particularly the ones
tight schedule, Meese and three others from involving the statutes governing covert oper
the Department of Justice managed to un ations—we believe the law to be clearly on
cover the so-called “diversion memoran the Administration’s side. In every other
dum” and reported it to the President. The case, the issue is at least debatable. In some,
President immediately removed Poindexter such as the Boland Amendment, we are con
and North from the NSC staff. Shortly after vinced we have by far the better argument. In
wards, he asked for an Independent Counsel a few others—such as who owns the funds
to be appointed, appointed the Tower Board, the Iranians paid Gen. Richard Secord and
and supported the establishment of select Albert Hakim—we see the legal issue as
Congressional investigative committees, to being close. During the course of our full
which he has given unprecedented coopera statement, we shall indicate which is which.
tion. What the Committees’ Report has done
The Committees’ Report criticizes Meese with the legal questions, however, is to issue
380
12. a one-sided legal brief that pretends the Ad company not only with the Committees Re
ministration did not even have worthwhile port’s answers, but with the very questions it
arguments to make. As if that were not identifies as being the most significant.
enough, the Report tries to build upon these There are common threads to what we
one-sided assertions to present a politicized think went wrong with the Administration’s
picture of an Administration that behaved policies toward Central America and Iran.
with contempt for the law. If nothing else Before we can identify those threads, how
would lead readers to view the Report with ever, we will give a.very brief overview of the
extreme skepticism, the adversarial tone of two halves of the Committees’ investigations.
the legal discussion should settle the matter. For both halves, we begin with the context
within which decisions were made, describe
the decisions, and then offer some judg
ments. After taking the parts separately, we
OUR VIEW OF THE IRAN-CONTRA will then be in a position to talk about corn
AFFAIR monalities.
The main issues raised by the Iran-Contra
Affair are not legal ones, in our opinion. This
opinion obviously does have to rest on some NICARAGUA
legal conclusions, however. We have summa
rized our legal conclusions at the end of this The Nicaraguan aspect of the Iran-Contra
introductory chapter. The full arguments ap Affair had its origins in several years of bitter
pear in subsequent chapters. In our view, the political warfare over U.S. policy toward
Administration did proceed legally in pursu Central America between the Reagan Ad
ing both its Contra policy and the Iran arms ministration and the Democratic House of
initiative. We grant that the diversion does Representatives. The United States had sup
raise some legal questions, as do some techni ported the Sandinistas in the last phase of the
cal and relatively insubstantial matters relat dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza and
ing to the Arms Export Control Act. It is then gave foreign aid to Nicaragua in 1979
important to stress, however, that the Ad and 1980, the first years of Sandinista rule.
ministration could have avoided every one of By 1980, however, the Sandinistas had shed
the legal problems it inadvertently encoun their earlier “democratic reformer” disguise
tered, while continuing to pursue the exact and begun to suppress civil liberties at home
same policies as it did. and export revolution abroad. As a result,
The fundamental issues, therefore, have to the United States suspended all aid to
do with the policy decisions themselves, and Nicaragua in the closing days of the Carter
with the political judgments underlying the Administration.
way policies were implemented. When these During the early years of the Reagan Ad
matters are debated as if they were legal— ministration, the Soviet Union and its allies
and even criminal—concerns, it is a sign that dramatically increased their direct military
interbranch intimidation is replacing and support for Nicaragua, and their indirect
debasing deliberation. That is why we part support, through Nicaragua, of Communist
381
13. guerrillas in El Salvador. The Reagan Ad outside assistance from Nicaragua and Cuba.
ministration decided to provide covert sup This Nicaraguan-Cuban contribution to the
port for the Nicaraguan democratic Salvadoran insurgency is long standing. It
began shortly after the overthrow of Somoza in
Resistance in late 1981, and Congress
July 1979. It has provided—by land, sea and
agreed. By late 1982, however, Congress
air—the great bulk of the military equipment
adopted the first of a series of so-called “Bo and support received by the insurgents.
land Amendments,” prohibiting the CIA
Defense Department.from spending
Despite this fiding, House D1Ôäft1
money “for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of Nicaragua or provoking a succeeded in late 1983 in limiting appro
military exchange between Nicaragua and priated support for the Resistance to an
Honduras.” The House voted for this “limi amount intentionally calculated to be insuf
tation” by a margin of 4 11-0, in large part ficient for the full fiscal year. The funds ran
because everyone understood that the Ad out by late spring or summer 1984. By Octo
ministration could continue to support the ber, the most stringent of the Boland
Resistance as long as the purpose of the sup Amendments had taken effect. Paradoxi
port was to prevent the revolution from cally, Congress’ 1983—85 decisions came in a
being exported to El Salvador. context in which it was continuing to pass
This approach left many unsatisfied. Some laws that accused the Sandinistas of violating
within the Administration wanted a broader the non-aggression provisions of the charter
attack on the Sandinista regime. Some within of the Organization of American States—a
Congress wanted to end all support for the violation that the OAS charter says calls for
Contras and begin moving back toward the a response by other member nations, includ
1979—80 policy of providing economic assist ing the United States.
ance to the Sandinistas. Neither side of the
policy debate was politically strong enough
to prevail. Instead, during the course of the Actions
next several years, Congress and the Ad
ministration “compromised” on a series of By the late spring of 1984, it became clear
ambiguous formulas. that the Resistance would need some source
Meanwhile, the Soviet buildup ac of money if it were to continue to survive
celerated, and Sandinista support for the in while the Administration tried to change
surgents in El Salvador continued. In May public and Congressional opinion. To help
1983, the House Intelligence Committee, bridge the gap, some Administration officials
chaired by Representative Edward P. Bo began encouraging foreign governments and
land, reported: U.S. private citizens to support the Contras.
NSC staff members played a major role in
It is not popular support that sustains the in these efforts, but were specifically ordered to
surgents [in El Salvador]. As will be discussed avoid direct solicitations. The President
later, this insurgency depends for its life clearly approved of private benefactor and
blood—arms, ammunition, financing, logistics third-country funding, and neither he nor his
and command-and-control facilities—upon designated agents could constitutionally be
382
14. suggest that the President or other senior
prohibited from encouraging it. To avoid po
ra Administration officials knew about this con
litical retribution, however, the Administ
ns. cealment.
tion did not inform Congress of its actio
In addition to encouraging contributions,
of
the NSC’s North, with varying degrees
authorization and knowledge by National
Judgments
Security Advisers Robert C. McFarlane and
The effort to raise foreign government and
Admiral- John. Poindexter. .,
private funds for the Resistance raised about
.
. ..
-.
Helped coordinate or facilitate actions $35 million between mid-1984 and mid-
taken by private citizens and by certain 1986—virtually all of it from foreign coun
U.S. Government officials to direct tries. In addition, the much discussed and
money, arms, or supplies from private unauthorized diversion orchestrated by
U.S. citizens or foreign governments to North and Poindexter contributed about
the Nicaraguan Resistance; $3.8 million more. Without this support, ac
Provided the Resistance with expert mili cording to uncontroverted testimony the
tary judgment or advice to assist in the Com.rnittees received, there can be no ques
resupply effort; and tion that the Resistance would have been an
Together with others in Government, nihilated. in other words, the support clearly
provided the Resistance with intelligence did make an important strategic difference in
information that was useful in the resup the 2 years it took the Administration to
persuade Congress to reverse its position.
ply effort.
The short-term benefits of the effort are
therefore undeniable. The long-term costs,
Poindexter and North testified that they both
however, seem not to have been adequately
believed these activities were legally permis
considered.
sible and authorized. They also said that the
We do believe, for reasons explained in the
President was kept generally informed of
appendix to this introductory chapter and in
their coordinating role. The President has
our subsequent chapters on Nicaragua, that
said, however, that he was not aware of the
virtually all of the NSC staff’s activities were
NSC staff’s military advice and coordination.
Because the Boland Amendment is an ap legal, with the possible exception of the di
version of Iran arms sale proceeds to the
propriations rider, it is worth noting that
there is no evidence that any substantial Resistance. We concede that reasonable peo
amounts of appropriated taxpayer funds ple may take a contrary view of what Con
were used in support of these efforts. In addi gress intended the Boland Amendments to
tion, the NSC staff believed—as we do—that mean.
the prohibition did not cover the NSC. At no Notwithstanding our legal opinions, we
time, in other words, did members of the think it was a fundamental mistake for the
President’s staff think their activities were NSC staff to have been secretive and decep
illegal. Nevertheless, the NSC staff did make tive about what it was doing. The require
a concerted effort to conceal its actions from ment for building long-term political support
Congress. There is no evidence, however, to means that the Administration would have
383
15. been better off if it had conducted its activi coming unless the public is exposed to and
ties in the open. Thus, the President should persuaded by a clear, sustained and princi
simply have vetoed the strict Boland Amend pled debate on the merits.
ment in mid-October 1984, even though the
Amendment was only a few paragraphs in an
approximately 1,200 page-long continuing
appropriations resolution, and a veto there- IRAN
would have broughtthe Government
a standstill within 3 weeks of a national elec The Iran arms sales had their roots in an
tion. Once the President decided against a intelligence failure. The potential geopoliti
veto, it was self-defeating to think a program cal importance of Iran for the United States
this important could be sustained by deceiv would be obvious to anyone who looks at a
ing Congress. Whether technically illegal or map. Despite Iran’s importance, the United
not, it was politically foolish and counterpro States was taken by surprise when the Shah
ductive to mislead Congress, even if mislead fell in 1979, because it had not developed an
ing took the form of artful evasion or silence adequate human intelligence capability
instead of overt misstatement. there. Our hearings have established that es
We do believe firmly that the NSC staff’s sentially nothing bad been done to cure this
deceits were not meant to hide illegalities. failure by the mid-1980’s. Then, the United
Every witness we have heard told us his con States was approached by Israel in 1985 with
cern was not over legality, but with the fear a proposal that the United States acquiesce
that Congress would respond to complete in some minor Israeli arms sales to Iran. This
disclosure with political reprisals, principally proposal came at a time when the United
by tightening the Boland Amendments. That States was already considering the advisabil
risk should have been taken. ity of such sales. For long term, strategic
We are convinced that the Constitution reasons, the United States had to improve
protects much of what the NSC was doing— relationships with at least some of the cur
particularly those aspects that had to do with rently important factions in Iran. The lack of
encouraging contributions and sharing infor adequate intelligence about these factions
mation. The President’s inherent constitu made it important to pursue any potentially
tional powers are only as strong, however, as fruitful opportunity; it also made those pur
the President’s willingness to defend them. suits inherently risky. U.S. decisions had to
As for the NSC actions Congress could con be based on the thinnest of independently
stitutionally have prohibited, it would have verifiable information. Lacking such inde
been better for the White House to have pendent intelligence, the United States was
tackled that danger head on. Some day, Con forced to rely on sources known to be biased
gress’ decision to withhold resources may and unreliable.
tragically require U.S. citizens to make an Well aware of the risk, the Administration
even heavier commitment to Central Amer nonetheless decided the opportunity was
ica, perhaps one measured in blood and not worth pursuing. The major participants in
dollars. The commitment that might elimi the Iran arms affair obviously had some com
nate such an awful future will not be forth- mon and some conflicting interests. The key
384
16. U.S. hos
to explore helped obtain the release of two
question the United States had tages and did produce high Irania
n officials
leadership
was whether the U.S. and Iranian for the first face-to-face meeting
s between
interest to
actually felt enough of a common our governments in 5 years. At tho
se meet
establish a strategic dialogue. hran in May
ings, one of which was held in Te
ently to
1986, U.S. officials sought consist
in a long-
make clear that we were interested
Actions te.strategicrelationship with Iran tq. pp.
l interests.
ning, the pose the Soviet Union’s territoria
To explore the chance for an ope As concerned as the President had
become
Israeli sales
President agreed first to approve personally for the fate of the hos
tages—in
to sell U.S.
to Iran in 1985, and then in 1986 cluding the CIA’s Beirut station chie
f, Wil
olved were
arms directly. The amounts inv ham Buckley, who was repeatedly
tortured
ng all of
meager. The total amount, includi until he died—the hostages were alw
ays pre
consisted
the 1985 and 1986 sales combined, sented in these negotiations as obstacl
es to be
18 HAWK
of 2004 TOW antitank missiles, overcome, not as the reason for the init
iative.
types of
antiaircraft missiles, and about 200 e misled
But Ghorbanifar appeared to hav
HAWK spare parts. both sides, and the Iranian officials see
med to
nion in
There was a strong division of opi in using
isability of be interested only in weapons, and
the Administration about the adv the hostages for bargaining leverag
e.
er abated.
these arms sales, a division that nev After the Tehran meeting, the
United
pretext for
Unfortunately, this served as a States was able to approach a ver
y high
the Secre
Poindexter’s decision not to keep Iranian official using a Second Cha
nnel ar
about the
taries of State or Defense informed associ
between ranged by Albert Hakim and and his
detailed progress of the negotiations im’s
reason for ates: There is little doubt about Hak
the United States and Iran. One business motives in arranging thes
e meet
e been a
the failure to inform appears to hav ings; there is equally little doubt
that this
ministration
past history in which some Ad channel represented the highest levels
of the
informa
officials may have leaked sensitive h this
which they Iranian Government. DiscussiOns wit
tion as a way to halt actions with channel began in the middle of 198
6 and
inclinations
disagreed. Poindexter’s secretive lted in
all but continued until December. They resu
were abetted by Secretary Shultz, who U.S..
informed the release of one further hostage and
invited Poindexter not to keep him some
used of officials expected them to result in
because he did not want to be acc , e dis
Secretary more. Perhaps more importantly thes
leaking. They also were abetted by tively
was less cussions appear to have been qualita
Weinberger, who—like Shultz— ough
in different from the ones conducted thr
than vigorous about keeping himself nifar,
reason to the First Channel arranged by Ghorba
formed about a policy he had good s of
and included some talks about broad area
believe was still going forward.
vern strategic cooperation.
The first deals with the Iranian Go de
of our As a result of factional infighting insi
ment were flawed by the unreliability was
far. For the Iranian Government, the initiative
intermediary, Manucher Ghorbani were
far exposed and substantive discussions
all of his unreliability, however, Ghorbani
385
17. suspended. Not surprisingly, given the na bona fides were determined. There is no evi
ture of Iranian politics, the Iranian Govern dence that these relatively minor sales mate
ment has publicly denied that significant rially altered the military balance in the
negotiations were underway. Congress was Iran-Iraq war. However, the sales damaged
not informed of the Administration’s deal U.S. credibility with our allies, making it
ings with Iran until after the public disclo more difficult, among other things, for the
sure. The failure to disclose resembled the Administration to enforce its preexisting ef
Carter Administration’s similar deeisions forts to embargo. arms sa].s.
not to disclose in the parallel Iranian hostage The decision to keep Congress in the dark
crisis of 1979—81. President Reagan withheld for 11 months disturbs all Members of these
disclosure longer than Carter, however—by Committees. It is clear that the Reagan Ad
about II months to 6. ministration simply did not trust the Con
gress to keep secrets. Based on the history of
leak we shall outline in a later chapter, it
Judgments unfortunately had good reason to be con
cerned. This observation is not offered as a
The Iran initiative involved two govern justification, but as an important part of the
ments that had sharp differences between context that must be understood. To help
them. There were also very sharp internal remove this concern as an excuse for future
divisions in both Iran and the United States Administrations, we are proposing a series of
about how to begin narrowing the differences legislative and administrative recommenda
between the two countries. In such a situa tions to improve both Congress’ and the ex
tion, the margin between narrow failure and ecutive branch’s ability to maintain national
success can seem much wider after the fact security secrets and deter leaks.
than it does during the discussions. While
the initial contacts developed by Israel and
used by the United States do not appear
likely to have led to a long-term relationship, DIVERSION
we cannot rule out the possibility that
negotiations with the Second Channel might The lack of detailed information-sharing
have turned out differently. At this stage, we within the Administration was what made it
never will know what might have been. possible for Poindexter to authorize the di
In retrospect, it seems clear that this initia version and successfully keep his decision to
tive degenerated into a series of “arms for do so from the President. We have already
hostage” deals. It did not look that way to indicated our reasons for being convinced
many of the U.S. participants at the time. the President knew nothing about the diver
Nevertheless, the fact that the negotiations sion. The majority Report says that if the
never were able clearly to separate the long- President did not know about it, he should
term from the short-term issues, confirms have. We agree, and so does the President.
our instinctive judgment that the United But unlike some of the other decisions we
States should not have allowed arms to be have been discussing, the President cannot
come the currency by which our country’s himself be faulted for this one. The decision
386
18. was Admiral Poindexter’s, and Poindexter’s The diversion has led some of the Com
alone. mittees’ Members to express a great deal of
As supporters of a strong Presidential role concern in the public hearings about the use
in foreign policy, we cannot take Poindex of private citizens in covert operations in
ter’s decision lightly. The Constitution settings that mix private profits with public I
strikes an implicit bargain with the Presi benefits. We remain convinced that covert
operations will continue to have to use pri
.1
dent: in return for getting significant discre
tionary power to act, the President was vate agents or contractors in the future, and
supposed to be held accountable for his deci that those private parties will continue to
sions. By keeping an important decision operate at least partly from profit motives.
away from the President, Poindexter was If the United States tries to limit itself to
acting to undercut one foundation for the dealing only with people who act out of
discretionary Presidential power he was ex purely patriotic motives, it effectively will
ercising. rule out any worthwhile dealing with most
The diversion also differs from the basic arms dealers and foreign agents. In the real
Nicaragua and Iran policies in another im world of international politics, it would be
portant respect: we can find nothing to jus foolish to avoid working with people whose
tify or mitigate its having occurred. We do motives do not match our own. Neverthe
understand the enthusiasm North displayed less, we do feel troubled by the fact that
when he told the Committees it was a “neat there was not enough legal clarity, or ac
idea” to use money from the Ayatollah, who counting controls, placed on the Enterprise
was helping the Sandinistas, to support the by the NSC.
Contras. But enthusiasm is not a sufficient
basis for important policy decisions. Even if
there were nothing else wrong with the diver
sion, the decision to mix two intelligence op THE UNCOVERING
erations increased the risk of pursuing either
one, with predictably disastrous repercus It is clear that officials of the National Secu
sions. rity Council misled the Congress and other
Unlike the Committees’ majority, we be members of the Administration about their
lieve there are good legal arguments on both activities in support of the Nicaraguan Re
sides of the question of whether the proceeds sistance. This occurred without authoriza
of the arms sales belong to the U.S. Govern tion from outside the NSC staff. It is also
ment or to Secord and Hakim. For that clear that the NSC staff actively misled other
reason, we think it unlikely, under the cir Administration officials and Congress about
cumstances, that the funds were acquired or the Iran initiative both before and after the
used with any criminal intent. Nevertheless, first public disclosure. The shredding of
the fact that the ownership seems unclear documents and other efforts at covering up
under current law does not please us. We do what had happened were also undertaken by
believe that Secord and Hakim were acting NSC staff members acting on their own,
as the moral equivalents of U.S. agents, even without the knowledge, consent, or acquies
if they were not U.S. agents in law. cence of the President or other major Ad-
387
19. It is ironic that many have looked upon
ministration officials, with the possible ex
these events as signs of an excessively power
ception of Casey.
ful NSC staff. In fact, the NSC’s roles in the
In the week or two immediately after the
Iran and Nicaragua policies were exceptions
Iran initiative was disclosed in a Lebanese
ic rather than the rule. The Reagan Adminis
weekly, the President did not tell the publ
with tration has been beleaguered from the begin-
all that he knew, because negotiations
fling by serious policy disagreements
the Second Channel were still going on, and
hoping between the SecretatiesofiSta.te and
“heteremained agoodreasonfor-
sed. among others, and the President has too
some more hostages might soon be relea
the often not been willing to settle those disputes
Once the President learned that not all of
at definitively. The press accounts written at
relevant facts were being brought to his
or the time Poindexter was promoted to fill
tention, however, he authorized the Att
McFarlane’s shoes saw his selection as a de
ney General immediately to begin making
cision to have the National Security Adviser
inquiries. Attorney General Meese acted
play the role of honest broker, with little
properly in his investigation, pursuing the
independent power. This image of the NSC
matter as a fact-finding effort because he had
lasted almost until the Iran arms initiative
no reason at the time to believe a crime had
y became public. Poindexter was seen as a
been committed. Arguments to the contrar
n technician, chosen to perform a technical
are based strictly on hindsight. In our opi
job, not to exercise political judgment.
ion, the Attorney General and other Justice
Once the NSC had to manage two opera
Department officials did an impressive job
. tions that were bound to raise politically sen
with a complicated subject in a short time
sitive questions, it should have been no
After all, it was their investigation that un
s surprise to anyone that. Poindexter made
covered and disclosed the diversion of fund
some mistakes. It is not satisfactory, how
to the Contras.
ever, for people in the Administration simply
to point the finger at him and walk away
from all responsibility. For one thing, the
President himself does have to bear personal
COMMON THREADS
responsibility for the people he picks for top
office. But just as it would not be appropriate
The different strands of the Iran-Contra Af
for the fingers to point only at Poindexter,
fair begin coming together, in the most obvi
neither is it right for them only to point to
ous way, on the level of personnel. Both
the top.
halves of the event were run by the NSC,
Everyone who had a stake in promoting a
specifically by McFarlane, Poindexter, and
technician to be National Security Adviser
North. With respect to Nicaragua:, the Bo
should have realized that meant they had a
land Amendment just about ruled all other
responsibility to follow and highlight the po
agencies out of the picture. With respect to
litical consequences of operational decisions
Iran, the other parts of the executive
for the President. Even if the Cabinet officials
branch—from the State and Defense Depart
did not support the basic policy, they had an
ments to the CIA—seemed more than happy
obligation to remain engaged, if they could
to let the NSC be in charge.
388
20. so without constantly arguing Poindexter and North’s apparent belief
manage to do
—
that covering up was in the President’s
the Preside nt’s basic policy choice. Similarly,
have political interest.
Chief of Staff Donald Regan may not
details of
known, or had reason to knOw, the
effort. We emphatically reject the idea that
the Iran initiative or Contra resupply nch
through these mistakes, the executive bra
But he sho uld have known that North’s re-
subverted the law, undermined the Constitu
sponse s to Congressional inquiries generated
tantpo1iti-.tion, orthratened, democrpy. The
by’pressreports.weretooim.por ted
NSC dent is every bit as much of an elec
cally to be left to the people who ran the er
representative of the people as is a Memb
staff. si
ussion of personnel ultimately of Congress. In fact, he and the Vice Pre
The disc
dent are the only officials elected by the
gets around to the importance of political eve
about whole Nation. Nevertheless, we do beli
judgment. We can be more precise the
r the the mistakes relate in a different way to
what that means, however, if we conside y
ads in the decisions we have issue of democratic accountability. The
common thre t
provide a good starting point for seeing wha
already labelled as mistakes. These have in- ve
both sides of the great legislative-executi
cluded:
branch divide must do to improve the way
Bo the Government makes foreign policy.
— The President’s decision to sign the
of
land Amendment of 1984, instead
vetoing it;
e Congress
— The President’s less-than-robust defens
a
of his office’s constitutional powers,
too Congress has a hard time even conceiving of
mistake he repeated when he acceded o
itself as contributing to the problem of dem
read ily and too completely to waive exec r-
es cratic accountability. But the record of eve
utive privilege for our Committees’ inv a
changing policies toward Central Americ
tigation; r
’s decision to deceive Con that contributed to the NSC staffis behavio
The NSC staff g
is symptomatic of a frequently recurrin
—
gress about what it was doing in Central di
problem. When Congress is narrowly
Am erica;
ert vided over highly emotional issues, it fre
The decision, in Iran, to pursue a cov y
quently ends up passing intentionall
—
policy that was at odds with the Ad t
ation’s public expressions, with ambiguous laws or amendments that pos
ministr icy,
pone the day of decision. In foreign pol
out any warning signals to Congress or
those decisions often take the form of restric
our allies;
tive amendments on money bills that are
The decision to use a necessary and con
h open to being amended again every year,
stitutionally protected power of wit e
with new, and equally ambiguous, languag
holdin g information from Congress for
replacing the old. This matter is exacerbated
unusually sensitive covert operations, for
y; by the way Congress, year after year, avoids
a length of time that stretches credulit al
passing appropriations bills before the fisc
Poindexter’s decision to authorize the di
year starts and then wraps them together in
—
version on his own; and, finally,
389
21. a governmentwide continuing resolution Then, instead of seeing occasional actions
loaded with amendments that cannot be turn out to be wrong, we would be increasing
vetoed without threatening the whole Gov the probability that future Presidents would
ernment’s operation. be unable to act decisively, thus guaranteeing
One properly democratic way to amelio ourselves a perpetually paralyzed, reactive,
rate the problem of foreign policy inconsist and unclear foreign policy in which mistake
ency would be to give the President an by inaction would be the order of the day.
opportunity to address the major differences. - I Congress can ie-a-rii somethin•gabout
between himself and the Congress cleanly, democratic responsibility from the Iran-
instead of combining them with unrelated Contra Affair, future Presidents can learn
subjects. To restore the Presidency to the something too. The Administration would
position it held just a few administrations have been better served over the long run by
ago, Congress should exercise the self-disci insisting on a principled confrontation over
pline to split continuing resolutions into sep those strategic issues that can be debated
arate appropriation bills and present each of publicly. Where secrecy is necessary, as it
them individually to the President for his often must be, the Administration should
signature or veto. Even better would be a have paid more careful attention to consulta
line-item veto that would permit the Presi tion and the need for consistency between
dent to force Congress to an override vote what is public and what is covert. Inconsist
without jeopardizing funding for the whole ency carries a risk to a President’s future
Government. Matters of war and peace are ability to persuade, and persuasion is at the
too important to be held hostage to govern heart of a vigorous, successful presidency.
mental decisions about funding Medicare or A President’s most important priorities,
highways. To describe this legislative hos the ones that give him a chance to leave an
tage taking as democracy in action is to turn historic legacy, can be attained only through
language on its head. persistent leadership that leads to a lasting
change in the public’s understanding and
opinions. President Reagan has been praised
The Presdency by his supporters as a “communicator” and
criticized.by his opponents as an ideologue.
The Constitution created the Presidency to The mistakes of the Iran-Contra Affair,
be a separate branch of government whose ironically, came from a lack of communica
occupant would have substantial discretion tion and an inadequate appreciation of the
ary power to act. He was not given the power importance of ideas. During President Rea
of an 18th century monarch, but neither was gan’s terms of office, he has persistently
he meant to be a creature of Congress. The taken two major foreign policy themes to the
country needs a President who can exercise American people: a strong national defense
the powers the Framers intended. As long as for the United States, and support for the
any President has those powers, there will be institutions of freedom abroad. The 1984
mistakes. It would be disastrous to respond election showed his success in persuading the
to the possibility of error by further restrain people to adopt his fundamental perspective.
ing and limiting the powers of the office. The events since then have threatened to un
390
22. S.
protects
ting the other countries he may wish. It also
dermine that achievement by shif agents to
If the the ability of the President and his
agenda and refocusing the debate. untarily
are to be persuade U.S. citizens to engage vol
President’s substantial successes in otherwise legal activity to serve wha
t they
of us who
sustained, it is up to him, and those consider to be the national interest.
That in
e again
support his objectives, to begin onc es to
sion. cludes trying to persuade other countri
with the task of democratic persua ses both
contribute their own funds for cau
ent’the
Otintties support: To whateverext
it such
Boland Amendments tried to prohib
al.
ARY OF LEGAL activity, they were clearly unconstitution
AFTERWORD: SUMM (2) If the Constitution prohibits Congre
ss
CONCLUSIO NS l ac
from restricting a particular Presidentia
riation
tion directly, it cannot use the approp
Nicaragua power to achieve the same unconstitu
tional
under
effect. Congress does have the power
The main per iod under review during these ropria
the Constitution, however, to use app
investigati ons was October 1984 through Oc . Gov
ver tions riders to prohibit the entire U.S
tober 1986. During this period, various ney,
Amendment restricted ernment from spending any mo
sions of the Boland including salaries, to provide covert or
overt
the expenditure of appropriated funds availa s, the
military support to the Contras. Thu
ble to agencie s or entities involved in intelli . sup
Clark Amendment prohibiting all U.S
gence acti vities from being spent directly or 6 was
litary port for the Angolan Resistance in 197
ind irectly to support military or parami gress
ua. In August 1985, constitutional. Some members of Con
operations in Nicarag t may
artment was authorized to who supported the Boland Amendmen
the State Dep hibi
have thought they were enacting a pro
spend $27 million to provide humanitarian t. The
Re tion as broad as the Clark Amendmen
assistan ce to the Nicaraguan democratic ment
1985, the CIA was specific language of the Boland Amend
sistance. In December ever,
nd funds specifically appro was considerably more restricted, how
authorized to spe
equip in two respects.
priated to provide communications
lligence
ment and training and to provide inte
informa
and counterintelligence advice and (a) By limiting the coverage to agencies or
enti
tion to assist militar y operations by the Re ties involved in intelligence activities, Con
gress
sistance. On Oct ober 18, 1986, $100 million chose to use language borrowed directly from
in direct military support for the Contras the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. In the
7. Our ,
was made available for fiscal year 198 course of settling on that language in 1980
prohib i Congress deliberately decided to exclud e the
understanding of the effect of these
tions rests on both statutory and
con stitu National Security Council (NSC) from its cov
i
tional interpretations. erage. At no time afterward did Congress md
e’s
(1) The Constitution protects the pow
er of cat.e an intention to change the languag
self or coverage. The NSC therefore was excluded
the President, either acting him es
age in from the Boland Amendment and its activiti
through agents of his choice, to eng
s with were therefore legal under this statute.
whatever diplomatic communication
391
23. ‘S
(b) The requirement for U.S. agreement before
(b) The Boland prohibitions also were limited
to spending that directly or indirectly sup a country can retransfer arms obtained from
the United States is meant to insure that re
pc)rted military or paramilitary operations in
transfers conform to U.S. national interests. In
Nicaragua. Under this language, a wide range
this case, the Israeli retransfers occurred with
of intelligence-gathering and political support
Presidential approval indicating that they did
activities were still permitted, and were carried
so conform.
out with the full knowledge of the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees. IsTãli ettaifr ad’ ubsquent re
(c) Virtually all, if not all, of the CIA’s activi plenishment made the deal essentially equiva
ties examined by these Committees occurred lent to a direct U.S. sale, with Israel playing a
after the December 1985 law authorized intel role fundamentally equivalent to that of a mid
ligence sharing and communications support clleman. Since the United States could obvi
and were fully legal under the terms of that ously have engaged in a direct transfer, and did
law. so in 1986, whatever violation may have oc
curred was, at most, a minor and inadvertent
(d) If the NSC had been covered by the Boland technicality.
Amendments, most of Oliver North’s activity
still would have fallen outside the prohibitions
for reasons stated in (b) and (c) above. (2) A verbal approval for covert transac
tions meets the requiremerits of the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment and National Security
Act. Verbal approvals ought to be reduced to
Iran writing as a matter of sound policy, but they
are not illegal.
The Administration was also in substantial (3) Similarly, the President has the con
compliance with the laws governing covert stitutional and statutory authority to with
actions throughout the Iran arms initiative. hold notifying Congress of covert activities
(1) It is possible to make a respectable under very rare conditions. President Rea
legal argument to the effect that the 1985 gan’s decision to withhold notification was
Israeli arms transfers to Iran technically vi essentially equivalent to President Carter’s
olated the terms of the Arms Export Con decisions in 1979—1980 to withhold notice
trol Act (AECA) or Foreign Assistance Act for between 3 and 6 months in parallel Iran
(FAA), assuming the arms Israel trans hostage operations. We do not agree with
ferred were received from the United States President Reagan’s decision to withhold
under one or the other of these statutes. notification for as long as he did. The deci
However: sion was legal, however, and we think the
Constitution mandates that it should re
(a) Covert transfers under the National Secu main so. If a President withholds notifica
rity Act and Economy Act were understood to tion for too long arid then cannot
be alternatives to transfers under the AECA adequately justify the decision to Congress,
and FAA that met both of these latter acts’
that President can expect to pay a stiff po
essential purposes by including provisions for
litical price, as President Reagan has cer
Presidential approval and Congressional
notification. tainly found out.
392
24. or private funds
amounted to third-country
Diversion ntras. If they did
being shipped to the Co
ates, there would be
of the funds the belong to the United St
We consider the ownership h not, technically,
Hakim “Enter legal questions (althoug
Iranians paid to the Secord- estions) about using
t. There are re Boland Amendment qu
prise” to be in legal doub rposes not specifi
he made both U.S.-owned funds for pu
spectable legal arguments to e answer does not
funds belong cally approved by law. Th
for the point of view that the , however, asto
e contention seem to us to be so ohvious
th iis Tèaüry an forth tter as if it were
do not belong warrant treating the ma
that they do not. If the funds criminal.
n the diversion
to the United States, the
393
