1. Introduction :
The genesis of the Ombudsman may be traced as far back as 1809 when
the institution was first established by the Swedish which was basically of
Scandinavian tradition with a view to raising the standards of modern
democratic forms of parliamentary administration.
A tribune of the people:
According to Wade (1988) the institution of Ombudsman is “a tribune of the
people”. The word is of a Scandinavian, meaning thereby ‘Officer’ or
‘Commissioner’. Wade contended that :
“An Ombudsman requires no legal powers except powers of inquiry. In
particular, he is in no sense a court of appeal and he cannot alter or reverse
any government decision. His effectiveness derives entirely from his power to
focus public and parliamentary attention upon citizen’s grievances. But
publicity based on impartial inquiry is a powerful lever”.
Similarly, Jain and Jain (1986) observed, ‘Ombudsman acts as an external
agency, outside the administrative hierarchy to probe into administrative
faults. In theory Ombudsman is the projection of legislative function of
supervising the administration.”
Peter Cane (1987) propounded that ‘Ombudsman’ “is an official, independent
of the administration with power to investigate the citizen’s complaints of
maladministration.” The terminology ‘maladministration’ being the formal
point of the institution, needs to be understood in its right perspective. DCM
Yardly (1986) defined ‘maladministration’ as complaints tainted with :
(a) nepotism, corruption or bias;
(b) failure to observe a sound administrative basis;
(c) negligence in carrying out a duty;
(d) misuse of discretion;
(e) incompetence;
(f) loss of documents or papers;
(g) tardiness and delay;
(h) unjust segregation or discrimination;
or (i) any similar matters.
In fine, the main objects to the appointment of Ombudsman are to institute,
according to Balbir Singh(1986),
“… new standards and evolve new and more congenial pattern of
administrative behaviour”, including doing away with corruption of all sorts.
Chronological perspective:
Interest generated in the idea of Ombudsman was of relatively recent
phenomenon which gained momentum by the persuasive publicity given by
Stefan Hurlvitz, the Danish Ombudsman under the statute of 1954.
In England, Justice (1961) came out openly in support of the concept of
Ombudsman in his report on the subject matter known as ‘Whytt Report’. This

2. was soon followed with the institution of various kinds of Ombudsman on
experimental basis to deal with the central and local Government, Northern
Iceland and health service in England. New Zealand closely followed the heels
of England among the Commonwealth countries and created Ombudsman in
1962 enacting the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act, 1962.
Other Commonwealth countries took up the institution of Ombudsman
in quick succession, each country adopting in the manner to suit its own
political, legal and constitutional usage.
Thus, as to whether the Ombudsman, as the instrument of parliamentary
process, press and public debates, redressal of public grievances, etc, is
being effectively used or not, has come to stay in each country wherever the
same has been instituted.
Ombudsman has grown and developed in its legal perspective and public
estimation or acceptability as aneffective institution for redressal of public
grievances and minimization; if not total elimination of maladministration
over the years could be evidenced from various Law journals.
The Commonwealth Law Bulletin, January, 1994 reported that in Hong Kong,
the Commissioner for Administration complaints (Amendment) Bill, 1993
sought to amend its ordinances so as to –
(a) allow public direct access to the Commissioner for Administrative
complaints;
(b) include major statutory bodies within the purview of the Commissioner;
(c) allow the Commissioner to publicize its investigation reports;
(d) the Commissioner may investigate action taken by or on behalf of any
organisation in exercise of administrative functions upon a complain by a
person who claims to have sustained injustice in consequence upon
maladministration in connection with that action;
(e) thereafter if he deems proper and is in the interest of public; may-
i) publish the report; and
ii) that the Commissioner shall not be restrained from disclosing the identity
of the organisation involved on the matter in his report.
In brief, the exercise was to enhance the powers of the Commission for
Administrative Complaints.
Secondly, in the United Kingdom, the report of the Commissioner for
Administration on the investigation of a complain was found not to the
satisfaction of the complainant who filed a complaint in the Court of Law
against the Ombudsman on the grounds that the method of investigation was
not satisfactory, that the Commissioner refused to reinvestigate the Complaint
and that the Commissioner had exceeded his authority. The issue raised
certain legal basic questions as to whether the complainant was entitled to
receive draft report, etc, in pursuance of the parliamentary Commissioner’s
Act, 1967.

3. The main issue in the matter was about the conduct of the Department of
Social Security in connection with the claims for certain benefits by the
complainant. While investigating the case, the Commissioner upheld action of
the Department of Social Security, refusing to re-open the case when
requested to do so.
If petition for a judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner was filed
with the Queen’s Division Bench for which the Court held that :
(1) although there was nothing in the Commissioner’s role or statutory frame-
work within which he operated so singular as to take him outside the purview
of judicial service the Court could not readily be persuaded to interfere with
the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion under the Act of 1967;
(2) that, since the exercise of that discretion involved a high degree of
subjective judgement, it would be difficult to mount an effective challenge to
his decision on the grounds of unreasonableness;
(3) that, the Commissioner was entitled to the exercise of his discretion to
limit the scope of his investigation by selecting which complain he is
addressed and by identifying and investigating broad categories of complaints;
(4) that, the reasons for sending the draft report to the department to allow it
to point out any inaccuracy to give notice of document or information
disclosure of which could be contrary to the public interest and to indicate any
proposed remedy did not apply to the applicant and although the decision of
the Commissioner affected the rights to fairness of the applicant did not
demand the applicant should be shown the draft report; and
(5) that, once the Commissioner’s report had been submitted to the relevant
member of Parliament and the department, he was functus officio and was
unable to re-open his investigation without a further referral under section 5
of the Act.
Thirdly, in Mauritius, the Ombudsman, Mr. S.M. Hatteea, in his 18th Annual
Report covering the period January – December, 1991, stated that in view of
the increasing number of cases that had been received during the year under
report than that of the previous year was indeed an encouraging sign of the
growing faith of the public in the institution of Ombudsman to assist the
public who claim to have sustained injustice as a consequence of
maladministration.
to be continued
The report of Ombudsman highlighted two sensitive areas for improvement of
the performance of the Government in that :
(a) the Ministers and departments should make the required information of
Ombudsman with promptness without requiring them to be reminded; and
(b) though he could not find evidence of proof that officials were communal in
their dealings with the public, such impression should not be created in the
discharge of their duty as public servants.

4. The Ombudsman further observed that for the sake of good administration it
was expedient that the public servants should at all cost be well perceived in
the mind of the public and that in their dealings with the latter they should
always be impartial and just.
Fourthly, the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman, Mr. David Marvell, in his
Second Annual Report, 1992 recommended a public-oriented five point
innovation for better administration and redressal of public grievances to the
Law Society.
Fifthly, in Zimbabwe, the Ombudsman, Mrs. S.G. Chanetasa, in her Eighth
Annual Report covering the period January-December, 1992 gave the
emphasis on radical improvement of their attitude and treatment of the
officials towards the interest and redressal of citizen’s grievances by being
more easily accessible.
Indian Panorama:
The origin, growth and function of the concept of Ombudsman cannot be
studied in isolation. As one of the Commonwealth Countries, the
Ombudsmania certainly had the impact in India, where the root had crept into
the social milieu and administrative mechanism. Nevertheless, in view of its
peculiar social structure based preponderantly on Hindu Caste System with
multi-faceted ethnic diversity and religious pluralism as enshrined in its broad
based secular constitution, the structure and function of the Ombudsman has
to undergo necessarily modifications without loosing, of course, its original
concept so that it may be fitted not only with its democratic and parliamentary
institution but also conformed to their social and economic systems.
The ARC initiative of Lokpal:
Keeping this in view and convinced with the opinion that there is no effective
mechanism to redress grievances of all kinds against the administrative evils,
the Administrative Reforms Commission under the Chairmanship of Morarji
Desai recommended to set up Lokpal similar to that of Ombudsman in India
in its “Interim Report on the Problems of Redressal of Citizen’s Grievances
(1966) most probably as a result of eminent lawyers none other than M.C.
Setalrod, L.M. Singhi etc in the early sixties.
First Indian Version of Ombudsman (1968) :
The first Indian version of Ombudsman Bill 1968 was presented by in the
fourth Lok Sabha. Unfortunately, it got lapsed before its being approved by the
Rajya Sabha to become law due to dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The Bill was
known as “The Lokpal and Lokyuktas, 1968”. It was modeled very closely on
the draft Bill, proposed by the Administrative Reforms Commission in the
Interim Report. It envisaged a Lokpal to monitor the actions of the Ministers
and the Secretaries, and a Lokayukta to consider complaints against the
actions of administrative cadres below the rank of Secretary.
The Second Lokpal Bill (1971) :

5. A Second Bill was introduced in 1971. It was also lapsed due to dissolution of
the fifth Lok Sabha. The Lokpal and the Lokayuktas Bill 1971 did not make any
substantial departure from the earlier Bill, 1968.
The highlight the main features, the Bill envisaged to focus on two kinds of
activity – ‘allegation’ and ‘grievances’. The term ‘allegation’ may be summed
up as in relation to a public servant who is found to have –
(a) abused his position to obtain any gain or favour to himself or to any other
person or to cause undue hardship to any other person or to cause undue
hardship to any other person;
(b) biased by personal interest or improper or corrupt motives, etc, in the
discharge of his official duty;
(c) guilty of corruption, lack of integrity or improper conduct in his capacity.
Likewise, while clause 2(d) of the Bill defined grievance as a claim by a person
that he suffered injustice or undue hardship in consequence of
‘maladministration’ as action taken or purported to have taken in exercise of
the administrative function wherein such action or administrative procedure
or practice governing such action was alleged or found to have been
unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory, negligent,
unduly delayed, etc.
Secondly, clause 9(1)(a) and (b) further explained that while ‘grievance’ can be
brought by a person who was actually aggrieved, ‘allegation’ can be brought by
any person other than a public servant.
Thirdly, except the Prime Minister, complaint could be lodged against all
shades of public servants. The Lokpal, on his part, is obliged to lay his
investigations to the Prime Minister in case of Cabinet Minister and in other
cases before the Officer or Minister who is superior to the public servant
involved.
The Lokpal proposed by the 1971 Bill could have yielded enormous powers and
could have investigated various kinds of cases including maladministration
and allegations of corruption of any sort. The institution was not a
parliamentary creation, could receive complaints directly and also monitor the
action taken by the authority concerned in pursuance of the report of Lokpal.
In case the Lokpal was not satisfied, he might seek the help of the President
and through him of Parliament.
The Lokpal Bill, 1971 would also have been a very effective instrument of
change for improvement and in the nature of administration, but for its being
lapsed before it became a law.
Growth of Lokpal in States :
Despite the fact that the Lokpal Bill could not be created as a national
institution, interest generated in the concept of Ombudsman throughout the
country made its manifestation felt in the enactment of various State

6. Legislations. Orissa was the first State that enacted a legislation in 1970 on the
institution, Lokpal.
This was soon followed by Maharashtra in 1971, Rajasthan and Bihar in 1973,
Madhya Pradesh in 1974 and Uttar Pradesh in 1975; Kerala adopted a policy to
institute a Commissioner to expose corruption in 1976, the Jammu and
Kashmir as Prevention of Corruption Statute in 1975, Tamil Nadu as
Administrative Criminal Misconduct in 1974, Karnataka in 1973, and so on.
Two kinds of Lokpal :
The above mentioned State Legilsatyions may be categorized into two. The
first category consists of statutes which are modeled on the Lokpal Bill 1972,
with modifications to accommodate indigenous elements. The second category
is of the kind that was enacted in Rajasthan and Gujarat which were primarily
concerned with examining and looking into ‘allegation’ aspect only.
Distorted Lokpal at National Level (1977) :
Some state institutions of Lokpal had shown remarkable success in dealing
with ‘grievance’ cases along with ‘allegation’. Despite this, the Janata
Government at the centre preferred the Rajasthan and Gujarat models and
decided that the Ombudsman shall investigate into ‘allegation’ only. Thus, the
1977 Bill is not concerned with the administration at all. It only concerns with
the ‘corruption’ of any member of the Council of Ministers for the Union
including the Prime Minister, the Chief Ministers, and members of Parliament
and of Legislative Assemblies, leaving the Administrative cadres completely
excluded.
The fact that the 1977 Bill had laid emphasis on ‘corruption’ made the Lokpal a
complete departure from the Ombudsman model as was originally
understood.
The Lokpal Bill, 1985 :
The Rajiv Gandhi Government re-introduced the Bill in 1985 in the Lok Sabha
on the 26th August, 1985. It was referred to a joint committee of each Houses
of Parliament. In the Committee several members criticized the Bill to the
effect that the scope of the same was too restrictive. Thus, the joint committee
report on the Bill said,
“It did not provide for the redressal of grievances of citizens but only provided
for a pre-trial inquiry into the cases of corruption.”
Under the situation the Government deemed it proper to re-examine the
whole issue of establishment of a Lokpal, his powers, functions, jurisdiction
etc, and, therefore, withdrew the Bill so as to introduce a more comprehensive
legislation on the subject despite strong protest to do so from the opposition
heavy-weight leaders, such as, L.K.Advani, P. Upendra, V. Arunachalam, K.P.
Unikrishnan, S. Jaipal Reddy, etc. on the ground that the Bill could be adopted
with suitable modification without being withdrawn.
The Lokpal Bill, 1989 :

7. Two years later, the National Front Government introduced the Bill in 1989.
The Bill brought in the Prime Minister within the purview of the Lokpal. In
fact, the Bill was almost a reproduction of 1985 Bill with minor modifications.
The change worthy of mention that had been brought about is in respect of
provision for a troika consisting of a Chairman and two members.
Observations with Comments :
As per the 1989 Bill, the Lokpal is merely to conduct pre-trial enquiry against
persons holding ministerial posts who are alleged to be guilty under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Sathe (1991) contended that this would place the Lokpal in embarrassing
situation. The Government may put up cases before a competent court of Law
against the evidence or finding of the Lokpal and may even get the person held
to be prima facie culpable by the Lokpal acquitted by the trial Court under the
Prevention of Corruption Act and questioned as to the worthwhile purpose of
such an expensive institution of Lokpal, “If it is merely to hold pre-trial
enquiries”. Sathe further commented that
“We do not know how far the Lokpal will be able to unearth cases of
corruption by ministers. This is going to be a very top heavy machinery for
that purpose. But certainty the present Lokpal Bill totally buries the concept of
Ombudsman which the Administrative Reforms Commission has spelt out in
its reports. The Lokpal will not be of any use to the common man whose main
grievances is against maladministration, red tape, callousness and negligence.
We feel that it might turn out to be another cosmetic office to induct a sense of
complacency. What we need is a system which will provide quick relief to
people against administrative action as well as administrative inaction. Going
to the Court is too expensive and many a time one cannot Marshall Evidence
enough to obtain favourable judicial response. So far as corruption is
concerned, the prevention of Corruption Act shall be suitably strengthened
and even a special tribunal or court with appeal only to the Supreme Court on
questions of law could be provided for dealing with those cases. Ombudsman
is not the remedy for that purpose.
All said and done as it stands now in the Indian context, it is a matter to watch
and see how the Lokpal as the Indian version of Ombudsman is to take final
shape to become a Law in the Country so as to raise the standard of
administration which lessens, if not done away with, the grievances of citizens.
Conclusion :
So far, as Dhavan had rightly pointed out, the concept of Ombudsman in the
form of Lokpal particularly that of the 1977 Bill:
“… transparently concerns itself with politics. It does not, in fact, belong to the
Ombudsman idea as we know it. It is a Bill which has been designed by
politicians for political purpose to be used against politicians. It is a Bill which
is a typical product of the aftermath of the emergency. Its object is to promote

8. witch-hunts, not good administration. And indeed, this is exactly how the Bill
was greeted when it was introduced in Parliament by Charan Singh, the Home
Minister.”