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Monkey-Spider
Detecting Malicious Websites with
Low-Interaction Honeyclients
Ali Ikinci Thorsten Holz Felix Freiling
ali.ikinci(at)contentkeeper.com
{holz|freiling}(at)informatik.uni-mannheim.de
presented at
Outline
➔ Problem and related work
➔ Challenge and requirements
analysis
➔ Honeypots and honeyclients
➔ Monkey-Spider and its limitations
➔ Preliminary results
➔ Key Findings
➔ Future Trends
Monkey-Spider 2
Malicious Web sites ...
● Are Web sites which could be a threat to the
security of the client computers requesting them
● Even a visit without any other interaction of such
could be a threat (so called drive-by downloads)
● Such Web sites can ...
● host all sorts of malware and malicious code
● exploit browser vulnerabilities
● exploit vulnerabilities of other client software
● install backdoors, spyware or keyloggers
● steal confidential information
Monkey-Spider 3
The Problem continued
● No comprehensive, up-to-date and free
database of threats on the Internet
● Every Web site could serve malicious deeds
even trusted ones
● Manual malware analysis of malicious Web
sites is too slow and too expensive
● Even automatic analysis is often too slow to
cover millions of Web sites
Monkey-Spider 4
Related Work
a) dedicated honeyclient
b) Browsing tool to use
normal Web users
PCs as honeyclients
c) Off line honeyclient
like code analyzer
d) Browsing tool to
control access to
malicious Web sites
e) Database
Monkey-Spider 5
a b c d e
Caffeine Monkey X
Capture – HPC X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X X X
X X
MITRE Honeyclient X
Monkey-Spider X
X
SHELIA X
X
? X X
X X
Web exploit finder X
Explabs LinkScanner
Finjan SecureBrowsing
Firekeeper
HoneyC
Malzilla
McAfee SiteAdvisor
Microsoft HoneyMonkey
Phoneyc
SpyBye
TrendMicro TrendProtect
UW Spycrawler
Challenge
● Fast and broad scope analysis of
millions of resources on the Internet
● Find actual threats and zero-day
exploits on the Internet
● Collect malicious code
● Allow various infection vectors
● Build a database with detailed relevant
information about threats
● Continuous monitoring of suspicious
resources
Monkey-Spider 6
Monkey-Spider simplified
Monkey-Spider 7
Internet
Scanner a
.
.
Scanner z
CrawlerDB
Requirements Analysis
• Overall Requirements
– Performance!
– Modularity and multi threaded modules
– Expandability
– Scalability
– Logging and statistics
• Crawler
– Crawling policies
– Link extraction
– URL normalization
– Efficient storage
Monkey-Spider 8
Requirements Analysis
• Malware scanner
– Multiple malware scanners
– Support for automated malware analysis
tools
– Client side scripting support
• JavaScript, VBScript, ActionScript ...
– Client software support
• Media Players, Office Applications,
Acrobat Reader ...
Monkey-Spider 9
Solution ideas
● Do not reinvent the wheel
● Use existing Free Software
● Use existing honeypot
techniques
● Use extensive prototyping
● Only superficial detection
Monkey-Spider 10
Honeypots
● Honeypots are dedicated
deception devices
● Two types:
– server honeypots or
honeypots
– client honeypots or
honeyclients
• Both can be classified as:
– low-interaction honeypots or
– high-interaction honeypots
Monkey-Spider 11
Our Solution - The Monkey-Spider
● A crawler based low-interaction
honeyclient
● Started as a diploma thesis in 2006
● Available under the GPL at
http://monkeyspider.sourceforge.net
● Written in Python
● Makes use of Heritrix, Postgresql, ClamAV,
Web Services
● Command line tool set for the analysis of
crawled content
Monkey-Spider 12
Monkey-Spider - Setup
Monkey-Spider 13
Monkey-Spider - Queue Generation
● Provide starting point(s) (seeds)
utilizing different approaches:
– Web search seeders (MSN and Yahoo)
– (Spam) mail seeder
– Hosts file seeder
• Future seeders might include
– Monitoring seeder
– Typo squatting seeder
Monkey-Spider 14
Monkey-Spider - Malware Scanner
● ARC-Files are unpacked and
examined
● MW-Scanners are executed on
crawled content
– Found malware is stored for optionally
further research
• Information regarding the malware is
stored into database
Monkey-Spider 15
Sample of extracted file names
Limitations for now
● Analysis is limited to the publicly indexable Web
● Only known malware is recognized and stored
● Drive-by download sites, heavily obfuscated
JavaScript
● Zero-day exploits are not recognized
● Full scan of the Web is not possible with Heritrix
(yet?)
● Two separate jobs are not yet aware of examining
the same sites and contents
Monkey-Spider 16
Preliminary Results
● We have done various crawls over two months
during March and April 2007
● We crawled for various topics and did a hosts file
based crawl
● Defective crawl settings caused incomplete
preliminary results
Monkey-Spider 17
MIME-type distribution of crawled content:
Results
Monkey-Spider 18
Top 10 malware types
487
92
91
22
12
10
9
Dialer-715 8
7
6
HTML.MediaTickets.A
Trojan.Aavirus-1
Trojan.JS.RJump
Adware.Casino-3
Adware.Trymedia-2
Adware.Casino
Worm.Mytob.FN
Adware.Casino-5
Trojan.Hotkey
Top 10 malware sites
487
92
91
15
14
12
12
888casino.com 11
888.com 11
10
desktopwallpaperfree.com
waterfallscenes.com
pro.webmaster.free.fr
astalavista.com
bunnezone.com
oss.sgi.com
ppd-files.download.com
bigbenbingo.com
Topic maliciousness in %
Pirate 2.6
Wallpaper 2.5
Hosts file 1.7
Games 0.3
Celebrity 0.3
Adult 0.1
Total 1
Performance
● Measurements on a standard PC
● Not focused on a Web site but on throughput
● Crawl performance of 1 MB/sec
● Malware analysis (without the crawling) in
0.05 seconds per downloaded content and
2.35 seconds per downloaded and
compressed MB
● Resulting in about 3.35 seconds per analyzed
MB of content
● In comparison:
● other low-interaction honeyclients require a
minimum of 3 seconds per Web site
Monkey-Spider 19
Key Findings
● 1% of all examined Web sites are
malicious
● Adult Web sites are relatively harmless
● Most malware is spread through pirate and
wallpaper propagation Web sites
● A Web site has to be completely crawled
and analyzed to gather representative
results
● The scope of the crawl has to be chosen
carefully
● We know very little about malicious Web
sites and their operators
Monkey-Spider 20
Future Trends
● Attacks are concentrated more and more
from the server to the client
● Client programs other than the Web client
are targeted more often, like Media
Players, Flash and PDF interpreters
● Advanced honeypot, virtual machine and
anti-virus program detection techniques
contained in malware complicates the
detection of such
● Web exploitation kits who build an
infrastructure for Web based attacks are
on the rise
Monkey-Spider 21
Credits
Monkey-Spider 22
This presentation was possible because of the kind support from
http://www.contentkeeper.com
Thank you for your attention
Monkey-Spider 23
Questions?
Further information is available on
http://monkeyspider.sourceforge.net

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MonkeySpider at Sicherheit 2008

  • 1. Monkey-Spider Detecting Malicious Websites with Low-Interaction Honeyclients Ali Ikinci Thorsten Holz Felix Freiling ali.ikinci(at)contentkeeper.com {holz|freiling}(at)informatik.uni-mannheim.de presented at
  • 2. Outline ➔ Problem and related work ➔ Challenge and requirements analysis ➔ Honeypots and honeyclients ➔ Monkey-Spider and its limitations ➔ Preliminary results ➔ Key Findings ➔ Future Trends Monkey-Spider 2
  • 3. Malicious Web sites ... ● Are Web sites which could be a threat to the security of the client computers requesting them ● Even a visit without any other interaction of such could be a threat (so called drive-by downloads) ● Such Web sites can ... ● host all sorts of malware and malicious code ● exploit browser vulnerabilities ● exploit vulnerabilities of other client software ● install backdoors, spyware or keyloggers ● steal confidential information Monkey-Spider 3
  • 4. The Problem continued ● No comprehensive, up-to-date and free database of threats on the Internet ● Every Web site could serve malicious deeds even trusted ones ● Manual malware analysis of malicious Web sites is too slow and too expensive ● Even automatic analysis is often too slow to cover millions of Web sites Monkey-Spider 4
  • 5. Related Work a) dedicated honeyclient b) Browsing tool to use normal Web users PCs as honeyclients c) Off line honeyclient like code analyzer d) Browsing tool to control access to malicious Web sites e) Database Monkey-Spider 5 a b c d e Caffeine Monkey X Capture – HPC X X X X X X X X X X X X X MITRE Honeyclient X Monkey-Spider X X SHELIA X X ? X X X X Web exploit finder X Explabs LinkScanner Finjan SecureBrowsing Firekeeper HoneyC Malzilla McAfee SiteAdvisor Microsoft HoneyMonkey Phoneyc SpyBye TrendMicro TrendProtect UW Spycrawler
  • 6. Challenge ● Fast and broad scope analysis of millions of resources on the Internet ● Find actual threats and zero-day exploits on the Internet ● Collect malicious code ● Allow various infection vectors ● Build a database with detailed relevant information about threats ● Continuous monitoring of suspicious resources Monkey-Spider 6
  • 8. Requirements Analysis • Overall Requirements – Performance! – Modularity and multi threaded modules – Expandability – Scalability – Logging and statistics • Crawler – Crawling policies – Link extraction – URL normalization – Efficient storage Monkey-Spider 8
  • 9. Requirements Analysis • Malware scanner – Multiple malware scanners – Support for automated malware analysis tools – Client side scripting support • JavaScript, VBScript, ActionScript ... – Client software support • Media Players, Office Applications, Acrobat Reader ... Monkey-Spider 9
  • 10. Solution ideas ● Do not reinvent the wheel ● Use existing Free Software ● Use existing honeypot techniques ● Use extensive prototyping ● Only superficial detection Monkey-Spider 10
  • 11. Honeypots ● Honeypots are dedicated deception devices ● Two types: – server honeypots or honeypots – client honeypots or honeyclients • Both can be classified as: – low-interaction honeypots or – high-interaction honeypots Monkey-Spider 11
  • 12. Our Solution - The Monkey-Spider ● A crawler based low-interaction honeyclient ● Started as a diploma thesis in 2006 ● Available under the GPL at http://monkeyspider.sourceforge.net ● Written in Python ● Makes use of Heritrix, Postgresql, ClamAV, Web Services ● Command line tool set for the analysis of crawled content Monkey-Spider 12
  • 14. Monkey-Spider - Queue Generation ● Provide starting point(s) (seeds) utilizing different approaches: – Web search seeders (MSN and Yahoo) – (Spam) mail seeder – Hosts file seeder • Future seeders might include – Monitoring seeder – Typo squatting seeder Monkey-Spider 14
  • 15. Monkey-Spider - Malware Scanner ● ARC-Files are unpacked and examined ● MW-Scanners are executed on crawled content – Found malware is stored for optionally further research • Information regarding the malware is stored into database Monkey-Spider 15 Sample of extracted file names
  • 16. Limitations for now ● Analysis is limited to the publicly indexable Web ● Only known malware is recognized and stored ● Drive-by download sites, heavily obfuscated JavaScript ● Zero-day exploits are not recognized ● Full scan of the Web is not possible with Heritrix (yet?) ● Two separate jobs are not yet aware of examining the same sites and contents Monkey-Spider 16
  • 17. Preliminary Results ● We have done various crawls over two months during March and April 2007 ● We crawled for various topics and did a hosts file based crawl ● Defective crawl settings caused incomplete preliminary results Monkey-Spider 17 MIME-type distribution of crawled content:
  • 18. Results Monkey-Spider 18 Top 10 malware types 487 92 91 22 12 10 9 Dialer-715 8 7 6 HTML.MediaTickets.A Trojan.Aavirus-1 Trojan.JS.RJump Adware.Casino-3 Adware.Trymedia-2 Adware.Casino Worm.Mytob.FN Adware.Casino-5 Trojan.Hotkey Top 10 malware sites 487 92 91 15 14 12 12 888casino.com 11 888.com 11 10 desktopwallpaperfree.com waterfallscenes.com pro.webmaster.free.fr astalavista.com bunnezone.com oss.sgi.com ppd-files.download.com bigbenbingo.com Topic maliciousness in % Pirate 2.6 Wallpaper 2.5 Hosts file 1.7 Games 0.3 Celebrity 0.3 Adult 0.1 Total 1
  • 19. Performance ● Measurements on a standard PC ● Not focused on a Web site but on throughput ● Crawl performance of 1 MB/sec ● Malware analysis (without the crawling) in 0.05 seconds per downloaded content and 2.35 seconds per downloaded and compressed MB ● Resulting in about 3.35 seconds per analyzed MB of content ● In comparison: ● other low-interaction honeyclients require a minimum of 3 seconds per Web site Monkey-Spider 19
  • 20. Key Findings ● 1% of all examined Web sites are malicious ● Adult Web sites are relatively harmless ● Most malware is spread through pirate and wallpaper propagation Web sites ● A Web site has to be completely crawled and analyzed to gather representative results ● The scope of the crawl has to be chosen carefully ● We know very little about malicious Web sites and their operators Monkey-Spider 20
  • 21. Future Trends ● Attacks are concentrated more and more from the server to the client ● Client programs other than the Web client are targeted more often, like Media Players, Flash and PDF interpreters ● Advanced honeypot, virtual machine and anti-virus program detection techniques contained in malware complicates the detection of such ● Web exploitation kits who build an infrastructure for Web based attacks are on the rise Monkey-Spider 21
  • 22. Credits Monkey-Spider 22 This presentation was possible because of the kind support from http://www.contentkeeper.com
  • 23. Thank you for your attention Monkey-Spider 23 Questions? Further information is available on http://monkeyspider.sourceforge.net