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©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Security, is it enough?
How to protect against DNS tunneling and other advanced threats
Patrick Foxhoven, CIO & VP of Emerging Technologies
@pfoxhoven | p@zscaler.com
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
To Ask A Question
• Type your questions into the chat box in the
WebEx panel or email us at
communications@zscaler.com
• We’ll try to get to all questions during the
Q&A session. If we do not get to your
question, we’ll make sure to follow up
afterwards
• At the end of the webcast – please let us
know how we did!
Ask your question here…
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.22 ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
Why Does DNS Security Matter?
DNS Threats Quantified & Mitigation Techniques
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
Why Does DNS Security Matter?
DNS threats are infiltrating networks because, more often than not,
DNS is ignored. It's uncontrolled, not monitored and not well
understood.
DNS is a blind spot
DNS-
driven
DDoS
attacks are
real
Malware is
utilizing
DNS to hide
C2C
networks
Targeted
attacks
exploit DNS
by hijacking
or poisoning
Information
is exfiltrating
networks via
DNS
tunneling
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
It’s Not Just Me
• Arbor Networks 2017 Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report
• 390 Network Operators and Enterprises Responses
• "Network Operators Speak Out on the Status of DNS Security”
16% have
no group
responsible
for DNS
security
25%
witnessed
DNS DDoS
&
13% had no
visibility
18% had
cache
poisoning &
38% lacked
visibility to
know
19% are
operating
OPEN
resolvers -
Identical to
the prior
year
* https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Reflection Attacks
Attacker
IP: 1.1.1.1
Open, Recursive DNS Server
IP: 8.1.1.1
Victim
IP: 2.1.1.1
isc.org Authoritative
DNS Server
Step #1
REQUEST: dig ANY isc.org
@8.1.1.1
(spoof request from 2.1.1.1)
64 bytes out
Step #2
Step #3
REPLY: isc.org type ANY
3223 bytes back
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Reflection Attacks
* http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/03/how-spamhaus-attackers-turned-dns-into-a-weapon-of-mass-destruction/http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-knocked-spamhaus-offline-and-ho
120 Gbps - 100X Amplification,
30,000 Open DNS Resolvers
Need to generate only 750 Mbps
on the attacker side
(Possible with <10 AWS instances)
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Changer (DNS-Focused Malware)
• DNS Changer was a piece of malware that was in operation from 2007 to 2015
• It hijacked (changed the IP address) of recursive DNS servers on clients
• Compromised 4M+ clients
• Generated an estimated $14M+ Revenue* for an Estonian Company
Why was it around for so long? Why was it so successful?
* http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/11/how-the-most-massive-botnet-scam-ever-made-millions-for-estonian-hackers/
** https://forms.fbi.gov/check-to-see-if-your-computer-is-using-rogue-DNS
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Goes Mainstream
• In March, 2014 the Turkish Government implemented a country wide block on
Twitter
• All carriers in the country implemented DNS-level blocking of Twitter domains
• Citizens responded by spray painting Google DNS IP addresses to evade the
blocking
• Traffic to Twitter from Turkey had a net increase of 138%* after the ban!
* http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/turkey-twitter-users-flout-ban-erdogan
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Goes Mainstream
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579473060024750936 http://www.cnet.com/news/google-confirms-turkey-is-blocking-its-dns-service/
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
Network Blind Spot
• Risks
• Mitigation Techniques
• Simple Answer: Gain Awareness and Visibility
• Log resolutions, visualize data, use DNS "Black Art" analysis skills
Zero Visibility
Fast Fluxing
DNS
Tunneling
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS is a Network Blind Spot
• www.vpnoverdns.com
• “In a few words, it lets you tunnel data through a DNS server.
Data exfiltration, for those times when everything else is
blocked.”
• “The main advantage of this type of tunnel is that it does not
require a direct Internet connection; you only need an access
to a DNS resolver”
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Cache Poisoning
• Risks
• Probably the most well known DNS vulnerability
• Dan Kaminsky discovered in 2008 a fundamental flaw in the DNS protocol
• Mitigation Techniques
• Simple Answer: Gain Awareness and Visibility
• Log resolutions, visualize data, use DNS "Black Art" analysis skills
• Use trusted recursive DNS servers
Phishing Attacks
Advanced, Highly
Targeted attacks
Malware Delivery
(Infect users)
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNSSEC
• Risks
• Ironic - A protocol meant to enhance DNS security but can makes it worse in other ways
• Mitigation Techniques
• Good question…
Lack of Adoption
(Weakest Link)
Widespread
Misunderstandings
(False Sense of
Security)
Can Make DNS
Reflection
Attacks Worse
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
Registrar Hijacking/Errors
No one is immune from errors…
• On January 12, 2014 at 3:15PM local time, China TLDs started to resolve
incorrectly
• 1 million requests per second event
• All queries resolved in error to a US-based company Dynamic Internet
Technology (DIT)
* http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/22/us-china-internet-idUSBREA0K04T20140122
** http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/22/world/asia/china-internet-outage/
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
Foot Printing
• Risks
• Discovery and mapping of a network
• Can be very valuable for IP spoofing attacks (discover trusted IP addresses)
• Mitigation Techniques
• Awareness: Understand what data exists publicly
• Configuration: Make sure zone transfers are locked down
dnsenum
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.1616 ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
Is DNS-Based Security Solutions Enough?
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
DNS Only Based Security Solutions…
… Mostly focus on 5 key areas (there’s only so much insight you can gain from a name and a
number)
Domain Age
& History
Recently
registered or
transferred
domain?
Obscurity
Have there
been queries
to the domain
before?
Record
Analysis
How many
records are
returned per
query?
Frequency &
Count
Have queries
to the domain
been seen
before?
Reputation
Are the
domains or
the IP
addresses
resolved safe?
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.18
Web content scanning, Risk based
analysis, App Control
Browser Control
Risk Based Scoring
File, User, Group and QoS Control,
Signature-based AV and IPS
Inline Content Control
Complete Packet ByteScan
Malicious Hosts, Sites, Botnets
Phishing, GEO, Protocol & ACLs
Destination Based Blocking
Dynamic & Behavioral
Analysis of User ContentSandboxing
You Have To Go Much Deeper Than DNS Alone…
Recon and
Creation
Survey defenses
Planning attack
Create Payload
Delivery
Via trusted/untrusted
sites and web content
Exploitation
Payload exploits
unpatched
vulnerability
Installation
Installing malware
onto asset
Command &
Control (C2)
Remote Control.
Additional malware
downloads
Action on
Objectives
Lateral movement,
data exfiltration,
disruption, etc.
DNS
Security
Botnet and
Callback
Detection
DLP
Security
Full SSL Inspection Full SSL Inspection
Find and stop more malicious threats
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
Objectives
Ransom ExfiltratePropagate
.Exe, Archive or
Embedded Script
How Files and Websites Spread Malware
Infection StageHunting Stage
Malware .EXE delivers final payload.
Enables final hacking objectives.
Enables command and control.
4
User browses trusted web page
with compromised content
1
Hackers web servers deliver initial
file and keeps exploit server hidden
2
Exploit Server Creates new malware samples
on demand to bypass signature
detection
3
iFrame
redirect
Exploit &
Call home
125 Total Objects requested
Personalized content from CDN
Content hidden in SSL Traffic
JavaScript, CSS, & Images loaded
125 Potential Threats
Jay Leno on NBC.com
But Are We still Vulnerable?
Trusted Sites are More Dangerous than Expected
It’s Not Just Compromised Trusted Websites
Cisco VNI Report
Estimated to be ~60% (or
greater) of all Internet
traffic
CDNs File Sharing
Box, Dropbox, Google
Drive, etc.
amazonaws.com,
tumblr.com,
wordpress.com etc.
Hosting Providers
DNS Only Security is also blind to…
Modern advanced persistent threats required a “Zero Trust” posture where
every possible byte is scanned to ensure clean pipes to the internet“ ”
SSL Inspection Matters
2018 Google Transparency report
of traffic across Google is
encrypted
91% 54%
2016 ThreatLabZ Research
of advanced threats hide
behind SSL
Ironically, increased use of SSL in attempt to make our online lives more
secure can create ‘blind spots’ that can actually reduce security…
NSS Labs
“ ”
Ignoring the issue is not an option
Sources: 1Google Transparency Report 2018
Source: 2Pirc, John W., “SSL Performance Problems: Significant SSL Performance Loss Leaves Much Room for Improvement,” NSS Labs, 2013.
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.2323 ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.
About Zscaler
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.24
HQ
EMEA
Branch
APJ
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch Branch BranchBranch
Home, Coffee Shop Airport, Hotel
SaaS Open Internet IaaS
Users and Apps left the corporate network
The Internet is the new Corporate Network
How can you secure something you don’t control?
“GE will run 70 percent of its
workload in the cloud by 2020”
Jim Fowler, CIO
“The Internet will be our new
corporate network by 2020”
Frederik Janssen, Head of Infrastructure
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.25
Branch
Branch Branch
HQ
Branch Branch BranchBranch
SaaS Open Internet IaaS
Flip the security model – protect users and apps, not networks
The Internet is the new Corporate Network
How can you secure something you don’t control?
EMEAAPJ
Branch
Home, Coffee Shop Airport, Hotel
Secure Internet Edge
©2017 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. | ZSCALER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION26
Secure
Ongoing third-
party testing
CertifiedReliable
Redundancy within and
failover across DCs
Transparent
Trust portal for service
availability monitoring
Zscaler – the largest security cloud. Reliable. Available. Fast.
45B+
Requests/day
125M+
Threats
blocked/day
120K+
Unique security
updates/day
100 data centers
across 5 continents
Peering in
Internet exchanges
150+
Vendors peered
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.27
PROTECTION
ACROSS COUNTRIES
190
130
125
113
70
LOCATIONS
PROTECTED
30,000
12,000
6,000
900
500
EMPLOYEES
PROTECTED
400K
125K
120K
80K
1.6M
1.3M
OFFICE 365
MONTHLY TRAFFIC
83 TB
44 TB
37 TB
35 TB
Unparalleled Cloud Scale
All users – All traffic
©2017 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. | ZSCALER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION28
Firewall / Intrusion Prevention
URL Filter
Anti-Virus
Data Loss Prevention
Secure Sockets Layer Inspection
Sandbox
Global Load Balancing
Distributed Denial of Service Protection
External Firewall / Intrusion Prevention
VPN Concentrator
Internal Firewall
Internal Load Balancer
Firewall / Intrusion Prevention
URL Filter
Antivirus
Data Loss Prevention
Secure Sockets Layer Inspection
Sandbox
Outbound Gateway
Global Load Balancing
Distributed Denial of Service Protection
External Firewall / Intrusion Prevention
VPN Concentrator
Internal Firewall
Internal Load Balancer
Inbound Gateway
Zscaler
Internet Access
Zscaler
Private Access
EXTERNALLY MANAGED INTERNALLY MANAGED
Open InternetSaaS Public Cloud
Private Cloud
/ On-Premise
Data Center
Securely connects authorized users
to internally managed applications
Any device, any location, on-network or off-network
Securely connects users to externally managed
SaaS applications and internet destinations
Zscaler enables secure IT transformation to the cloud
Fast and secure policy-based access to applications and services over the Internet
HQMOBILE
BRANCHIOT
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. | ZSCALER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION29
What sets Zscaler security apart?
Open InternetSaaS Public Cloud
Private
Cloud / On-
Premise
Data Center
HQMOBILE
BRANCHIOT
FULL INLINE CONTENT INSPECTION
All ports/protocols, native SSL scanning
INTEGRATED MULTI-TECHNIQUES
Correlation with dynamically computed risk
score
CLOUD INTELLIGENCE
Identified once, blocked for all customers;
120 thousand unique security updates a day
40+ INDUSTRY THREAT FEEDS
Partnerships - commercial feeds, open
source, private working groups
Destination based
Payload - Antivirus
Application based
Malicious active content
File Type analysis
Static analysis
Behavior analysis SSL Scanning
DNS security
Browser exploits
XSS attacks
Phishing analysis
Botnet C&C call backs
File type controls
SSL Scanning Data Loss Prevention
1
2
3
4
Zscaler cloud architecture protects users at any location on any device (no VPN or backhaul to data center)
Correlation
&
Risk scoring
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.30
Building a cloud with single-tenant appliances Zscaler built from scratch a highly scalable and
ultra-fast multitenant cloud security architecture
THE ZSCALER CLOUD
• Disparate redundant control, logging, and enforcement policies
• Multiple appliances, multiple hops — slow user experience
• Expensive and complex to scale and manage
• Integrated control, logging, and enforcement
• Single pass architecture — performance SLA and security efficacy
• Infinitely scalable — cost effective
Would you build a power plant
with home generators?
HOME POWER
GENERATORS
POWER PLANT
NY
USER A
(policy
follows)
USA
EU
USER A
Private
London Sydney
ENFORCE
LOG
CONTROL
Sandbox
DLP
LB
Full AV
SSL Proxy
IPS
NGFW
DNS
Increased
latencyX
X
X
Inefficiency
Impaired
performance
Legacy technology cannot be repurposed for the cloud
Zscaler Internet Access
watch the video
Transform the way you
deliver internet and web
security
visit zscaler.com
Learn more about Zscaler
Secure Remote Access to AWS
Your Users Will Love
Transform your Microsoft
Office 365 and MCAS
deployments with Zscaler
Thank You!
Questions and Next Steps
Patrick Foxhoven
Chief Information Officer & Vice
President of Emerging Technologies
p@zscaler.com | @pfoxhoven
Other Webcasts
zscaler.com > resources > webcasts and live demos
Tuesday, Feb 27th, 2018
Americas - 10:00 am PST
Thursday, Feb 22nd, 2018
Americas - 10:00 am PST
©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.

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DNS Security, is it enough?

  • 1. 0 ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Security, is it enough? How to protect against DNS tunneling and other advanced threats Patrick Foxhoven, CIO & VP of Emerging Technologies @pfoxhoven | p@zscaler.com
  • 2. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. To Ask A Question • Type your questions into the chat box in the WebEx panel or email us at communications@zscaler.com • We’ll try to get to all questions during the Q&A session. If we do not get to your question, we’ll make sure to follow up afterwards • At the end of the webcast – please let us know how we did! Ask your question here…
  • 3. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.22 ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. Why Does DNS Security Matter? DNS Threats Quantified & Mitigation Techniques
  • 4. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. Why Does DNS Security Matter? DNS threats are infiltrating networks because, more often than not, DNS is ignored. It's uncontrolled, not monitored and not well understood. DNS is a blind spot DNS- driven DDoS attacks are real Malware is utilizing DNS to hide C2C networks Targeted attacks exploit DNS by hijacking or poisoning Information is exfiltrating networks via DNS tunneling
  • 5. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. It’s Not Just Me • Arbor Networks 2017 Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report • 390 Network Operators and Enterprises Responses • "Network Operators Speak Out on the Status of DNS Security” 16% have no group responsible for DNS security 25% witnessed DNS DDoS & 13% had no visibility 18% had cache poisoning & 38% lacked visibility to know 19% are operating OPEN resolvers - Identical to the prior year * https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
  • 6. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Reflection Attacks Attacker IP: 1.1.1.1 Open, Recursive DNS Server IP: 8.1.1.1 Victim IP: 2.1.1.1 isc.org Authoritative DNS Server Step #1 REQUEST: dig ANY isc.org @8.1.1.1 (spoof request from 2.1.1.1) 64 bytes out Step #2 Step #3 REPLY: isc.org type ANY 3223 bytes back
  • 7. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Reflection Attacks * http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/03/how-spamhaus-attackers-turned-dns-into-a-weapon-of-mass-destruction/http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-knocked-spamhaus-offline-and-ho 120 Gbps - 100X Amplification, 30,000 Open DNS Resolvers Need to generate only 750 Mbps on the attacker side (Possible with <10 AWS instances)
  • 8. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Changer (DNS-Focused Malware) • DNS Changer was a piece of malware that was in operation from 2007 to 2015 • It hijacked (changed the IP address) of recursive DNS servers on clients • Compromised 4M+ clients • Generated an estimated $14M+ Revenue* for an Estonian Company Why was it around for so long? Why was it so successful? * http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/11/how-the-most-massive-botnet-scam-ever-made-millions-for-estonian-hackers/ ** https://forms.fbi.gov/check-to-see-if-your-computer-is-using-rogue-DNS
  • 9. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Goes Mainstream • In March, 2014 the Turkish Government implemented a country wide block on Twitter • All carriers in the country implemented DNS-level blocking of Twitter domains • Citizens responded by spray painting Google DNS IP addresses to evade the blocking • Traffic to Twitter from Turkey had a net increase of 138%* after the ban! * http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/turkey-twitter-users-flout-ban-erdogan
  • 10. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Goes Mainstream http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579473060024750936 http://www.cnet.com/news/google-confirms-turkey-is-blocking-its-dns-service/
  • 11. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. Network Blind Spot • Risks • Mitigation Techniques • Simple Answer: Gain Awareness and Visibility • Log resolutions, visualize data, use DNS "Black Art" analysis skills Zero Visibility Fast Fluxing DNS Tunneling
  • 12. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS is a Network Blind Spot • www.vpnoverdns.com • “In a few words, it lets you tunnel data through a DNS server. Data exfiltration, for those times when everything else is blocked.” • “The main advantage of this type of tunnel is that it does not require a direct Internet connection; you only need an access to a DNS resolver”
  • 13. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Cache Poisoning • Risks • Probably the most well known DNS vulnerability • Dan Kaminsky discovered in 2008 a fundamental flaw in the DNS protocol • Mitigation Techniques • Simple Answer: Gain Awareness and Visibility • Log resolutions, visualize data, use DNS "Black Art" analysis skills • Use trusted recursive DNS servers Phishing Attacks Advanced, Highly Targeted attacks Malware Delivery (Infect users)
  • 14. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNSSEC • Risks • Ironic - A protocol meant to enhance DNS security but can makes it worse in other ways • Mitigation Techniques • Good question… Lack of Adoption (Weakest Link) Widespread Misunderstandings (False Sense of Security) Can Make DNS Reflection Attacks Worse
  • 15. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. Registrar Hijacking/Errors No one is immune from errors… • On January 12, 2014 at 3:15PM local time, China TLDs started to resolve incorrectly • 1 million requests per second event • All queries resolved in error to a US-based company Dynamic Internet Technology (DIT) * http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/22/us-china-internet-idUSBREA0K04T20140122 ** http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/22/world/asia/china-internet-outage/
  • 16. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. Foot Printing • Risks • Discovery and mapping of a network • Can be very valuable for IP spoofing attacks (discover trusted IP addresses) • Mitigation Techniques • Awareness: Understand what data exists publicly • Configuration: Make sure zone transfers are locked down dnsenum
  • 17. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.1616 ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. Is DNS-Based Security Solutions Enough?
  • 18. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. DNS Only Based Security Solutions… … Mostly focus on 5 key areas (there’s only so much insight you can gain from a name and a number) Domain Age & History Recently registered or transferred domain? Obscurity Have there been queries to the domain before? Record Analysis How many records are returned per query? Frequency & Count Have queries to the domain been seen before? Reputation Are the domains or the IP addresses resolved safe?
  • 19. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.18 Web content scanning, Risk based analysis, App Control Browser Control Risk Based Scoring File, User, Group and QoS Control, Signature-based AV and IPS Inline Content Control Complete Packet ByteScan Malicious Hosts, Sites, Botnets Phishing, GEO, Protocol & ACLs Destination Based Blocking Dynamic & Behavioral Analysis of User ContentSandboxing You Have To Go Much Deeper Than DNS Alone… Recon and Creation Survey defenses Planning attack Create Payload Delivery Via trusted/untrusted sites and web content Exploitation Payload exploits unpatched vulnerability Installation Installing malware onto asset Command & Control (C2) Remote Control. Additional malware downloads Action on Objectives Lateral movement, data exfiltration, disruption, etc. DNS Security Botnet and Callback Detection DLP Security Full SSL Inspection Full SSL Inspection Find and stop more malicious threats
  • 20. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. Objectives Ransom ExfiltratePropagate .Exe, Archive or Embedded Script How Files and Websites Spread Malware Infection StageHunting Stage Malware .EXE delivers final payload. Enables final hacking objectives. Enables command and control. 4 User browses trusted web page with compromised content 1 Hackers web servers deliver initial file and keeps exploit server hidden 2 Exploit Server Creates new malware samples on demand to bypass signature detection 3 iFrame redirect Exploit & Call home
  • 21. 125 Total Objects requested Personalized content from CDN Content hidden in SSL Traffic JavaScript, CSS, & Images loaded 125 Potential Threats Jay Leno on NBC.com But Are We still Vulnerable? Trusted Sites are More Dangerous than Expected
  • 22. It’s Not Just Compromised Trusted Websites Cisco VNI Report Estimated to be ~60% (or greater) of all Internet traffic CDNs File Sharing Box, Dropbox, Google Drive, etc. amazonaws.com, tumblr.com, wordpress.com etc. Hosting Providers DNS Only Security is also blind to… Modern advanced persistent threats required a “Zero Trust” posture where every possible byte is scanned to ensure clean pipes to the internet“ ”
  • 23. SSL Inspection Matters 2018 Google Transparency report of traffic across Google is encrypted 91% 54% 2016 ThreatLabZ Research of advanced threats hide behind SSL Ironically, increased use of SSL in attempt to make our online lives more secure can create ‘blind spots’ that can actually reduce security… NSS Labs “ ” Ignoring the issue is not an option Sources: 1Google Transparency Report 2018 Source: 2Pirc, John W., “SSL Performance Problems: Significant SSL Performance Loss Leaves Much Room for Improvement,” NSS Labs, 2013.
  • 24. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.2323 ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. About Zscaler
  • 25. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.24 HQ EMEA Branch APJ Branch Branch Branch Branch Branch BranchBranch Home, Coffee Shop Airport, Hotel SaaS Open Internet IaaS Users and Apps left the corporate network The Internet is the new Corporate Network How can you secure something you don’t control? “GE will run 70 percent of its workload in the cloud by 2020” Jim Fowler, CIO “The Internet will be our new corporate network by 2020” Frederik Janssen, Head of Infrastructure
  • 26. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.25 Branch Branch Branch HQ Branch Branch BranchBranch SaaS Open Internet IaaS Flip the security model – protect users and apps, not networks The Internet is the new Corporate Network How can you secure something you don’t control? EMEAAPJ Branch Home, Coffee Shop Airport, Hotel Secure Internet Edge
  • 27. ©2017 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. | ZSCALER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION26 Secure Ongoing third- party testing CertifiedReliable Redundancy within and failover across DCs Transparent Trust portal for service availability monitoring Zscaler – the largest security cloud. Reliable. Available. Fast. 45B+ Requests/day 125M+ Threats blocked/day 120K+ Unique security updates/day 100 data centers across 5 continents Peering in Internet exchanges 150+ Vendors peered
  • 28. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.27 PROTECTION ACROSS COUNTRIES 190 130 125 113 70 LOCATIONS PROTECTED 30,000 12,000 6,000 900 500 EMPLOYEES PROTECTED 400K 125K 120K 80K 1.6M 1.3M OFFICE 365 MONTHLY TRAFFIC 83 TB 44 TB 37 TB 35 TB Unparalleled Cloud Scale All users – All traffic
  • 29. ©2017 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. | ZSCALER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION28 Firewall / Intrusion Prevention URL Filter Anti-Virus Data Loss Prevention Secure Sockets Layer Inspection Sandbox Global Load Balancing Distributed Denial of Service Protection External Firewall / Intrusion Prevention VPN Concentrator Internal Firewall Internal Load Balancer Firewall / Intrusion Prevention URL Filter Antivirus Data Loss Prevention Secure Sockets Layer Inspection Sandbox Outbound Gateway Global Load Balancing Distributed Denial of Service Protection External Firewall / Intrusion Prevention VPN Concentrator Internal Firewall Internal Load Balancer Inbound Gateway Zscaler Internet Access Zscaler Private Access EXTERNALLY MANAGED INTERNALLY MANAGED Open InternetSaaS Public Cloud Private Cloud / On-Premise Data Center Securely connects authorized users to internally managed applications Any device, any location, on-network or off-network Securely connects users to externally managed SaaS applications and internet destinations Zscaler enables secure IT transformation to the cloud Fast and secure policy-based access to applications and services over the Internet HQMOBILE BRANCHIOT
  • 30. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved. | ZSCALER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION29 What sets Zscaler security apart? Open InternetSaaS Public Cloud Private Cloud / On- Premise Data Center HQMOBILE BRANCHIOT FULL INLINE CONTENT INSPECTION All ports/protocols, native SSL scanning INTEGRATED MULTI-TECHNIQUES Correlation with dynamically computed risk score CLOUD INTELLIGENCE Identified once, blocked for all customers; 120 thousand unique security updates a day 40+ INDUSTRY THREAT FEEDS Partnerships - commercial feeds, open source, private working groups Destination based Payload - Antivirus Application based Malicious active content File Type analysis Static analysis Behavior analysis SSL Scanning DNS security Browser exploits XSS attacks Phishing analysis Botnet C&C call backs File type controls SSL Scanning Data Loss Prevention 1 2 3 4 Zscaler cloud architecture protects users at any location on any device (no VPN or backhaul to data center) Correlation & Risk scoring
  • 31. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.30 Building a cloud with single-tenant appliances Zscaler built from scratch a highly scalable and ultra-fast multitenant cloud security architecture THE ZSCALER CLOUD • Disparate redundant control, logging, and enforcement policies • Multiple appliances, multiple hops — slow user experience • Expensive and complex to scale and manage • Integrated control, logging, and enforcement • Single pass architecture — performance SLA and security efficacy • Infinitely scalable — cost effective Would you build a power plant with home generators? HOME POWER GENERATORS POWER PLANT NY USER A (policy follows) USA EU USER A Private London Sydney ENFORCE LOG CONTROL Sandbox DLP LB Full AV SSL Proxy IPS NGFW DNS Increased latencyX X X Inefficiency Impaired performance Legacy technology cannot be repurposed for the cloud
  • 32. Zscaler Internet Access watch the video Transform the way you deliver internet and web security visit zscaler.com Learn more about Zscaler Secure Remote Access to AWS Your Users Will Love Transform your Microsoft Office 365 and MCAS deployments with Zscaler Thank You! Questions and Next Steps Patrick Foxhoven Chief Information Officer & Vice President of Emerging Technologies p@zscaler.com | @pfoxhoven Other Webcasts zscaler.com > resources > webcasts and live demos Tuesday, Feb 27th, 2018 Americas - 10:00 am PST Thursday, Feb 22nd, 2018 Americas - 10:00 am PST
  • 33. ©2018 Zscaler, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. And enabling SSL inspection further exasperates the problem. Can you inspect SSL-encrypted traffic for all users? Hackers are betting you can’t. As the overall percentage of encrypted traffic explodes to as much as 86% of traffic to Google, it is becoming vital to do SSL inspection to ensure security. Hackers are increasingly using SSL to conceal device infections, shroud data exfiltration, and hide botnet Command & Control communications. Today, as much as 54% of advanced threats hide behind SSL. Firewalls were not designed to handle decryption, and performance grinds to a halt when they try. According to NSS Labs, appliance performance drops as much as 81% when inspecting SSL. And dedicated appliances are extremely costly/require significant CapEx investment. But ignoring the issue is becoming increasingly dangerous.
  2. And enabling SSL inspection further exasperates the problem. Can you inspect SSL-encrypted traffic for all users? Hackers are betting you can’t. As the overall percentage of encrypted traffic explodes to as much as 86% of traffic to Google, it is becoming vital to do SSL inspection to ensure security. Hackers are increasingly using SSL to conceal device infections, shroud data exfiltration, and hide botnet Command & Control communications. Today, as much as 54% of advanced threats hide behind SSL. Firewalls were not designed to handle decryption, and performance grinds to a halt when they try. According to NSS Labs, appliance performance drops as much as 81% when inspecting SSL. And dedicated appliances are extremely costly/require significant CapEx investment. But ignoring the issue is becoming increasingly dangerous.
  3. Let me give you a bit more about what we mean by cloud scale and delivering the largest most reliable and available cloud. Our cloud is deployed in 100 data centers across 5 continents. So for instance, your employees sitting in Brazil go through the Brazil data center and employees sitting in India who go to Mumbai connect to the local data center I only talked about volume of traffic. The number of threats and level of innovation and sophistication is increasing rapidly, so you must be able to evolve your cloud to handle more frequent updates. Appliances were never designed for this frequency of updates. We do about a120,000 unique security updates every day. Imagine trying to update an appliance 120,000 times day. How often do you upgrade your appliances and how do you manage change control? The next thing I want to mention is appearing with Internet exchanges. We peer with all leading Internet exchanges and leading apps, ranging from Office 365, to Azure, AWS, Box and Salesforce. This helps you get the fastest performance because our data center sitting in Chicago and New York are peered with the content, giving you fastest connection from our cloud. We made sure that our cloud is very secure. We do ongoing internal testing and third-party testing and we are very good with redundancy — our cloud is built in from day 1 within our own infrastructure and across data centers where they can fail over. We have nothing to hide and have a Trust Portal which provides full monitoring for full transparency of both Zscaler and third-party partners. We are proud of our cloud and like to show how it’s performing.   Thanks to many of our early large enterprise customers, we’ve received a number of certifications for our cloud, including ISO 7001. These certifications are very important to us and we go through regular audits to maintain compliance. We’ve also received certification from EU-US Privacy Shield (the new agreement between the EU and US for transatlantic exchanges of personal data for commercial purposes).
  4. Zscaler scans 35K+ potential unknown threats daily Two Tier Report High level: why is it malicious Forensics details: what happened – i.e. registry keys were changed/created, network connections initiated, files read/created, etc. Metadata Download the list of files created on the system Packet capture of all network traffic generated Screenshots during program execution APT Protection will scan a range of file types including: EXE, DLL, Office, Flash, PDF, and JAR (Java) Once a file is tagged as malicious, Zscaler generates an MD5 and then that signature is deployed across the cloud. This then ensures the same file does not have to be scanned again. Send all suspicious files to our cloud-based sandboxes All files supported by standard behavioral analysis plus Microsoft Office documents, Adobe PDF files and Flash files, Java apps and applets, ZIP and RAR archives, and Android APK files Malicious files can be instantly blocked, quarantined or flagged based on your policy === Specific Zscaler features include: Outbound scanning Anonymizers/P2P Suspect country/destinations Botnet call home Abnormal traffic analysis Data mining (across 10B daily transactions) DNS Analysis (eg. Fastflux) Suspect country/destinations Botnet call home Forensic analysis Specific details of analysis including: Security Bypass techniques (evading) Networking activity Persistence techniques (to evade destruction attempts) Detection evading techniques System and file configuration changes Memory and process analysis Packet captures for detailed analysis Origin and destination analysis for suspect locations Screen captures as malware is being executed Reporting to summarize information required for remediation APT Protection will scan a range of file types including: EXE, DLL, Office, Flash, PDF, and JAR (Java) Once a file is tagged as malicious, Zscaler generates an MD5 and then that signature is deployed across the cloud. This then ensures the same file does not have to be scanned again. Send all suspicious files to our cloud-based sandboxes All files supported by standard behavioral analysis plus Microsoft Office documents, Adobe PDF files and Flash files, Java apps and applets, ZIP and RAR archives, and Android APK files Malicious files can be instantly blocked, quarantined or flagged based on your policy === Specific Zscaler features include: Outbound scanning Anonymizers/P2P Suspect country/destinations Botnet call home Abnormal traffic analysis Data mining (across 10B daily transactions) DNS Analysis (eg. Fastflux) Suspect country/destinations Botnet call home Forensic analysis Specific details of analysis including: Security Bypass techniques (evading) Networking activity Persistence techniques (to evade destruction attempts) Detection evading techniques System and file configuration changes Memory and process analysis Packet captures for detailed analysis Origin and destination analysis for suspect locations Screen captures as malware is being executed Reporting to summarize information required for remediation
  5. ENGAGE in an open forum with Zscaler engineers and product managers, partners, and customers SHARE your knowledge and learn from experts in cloud security JOIN  the conversation at community.zscaler.com