1. Status of the EU nuclear industry after
Fukushima
Richard Ivens
Director Institutional Affairs
“Ukrainian Nuclear Forum 2012: plans and perspectives of the nuclear power industry
development”, Kiev, 27-28 March 2012
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2. Content
 about FORATOM
 Fukushima: a very specific accident
 safety & risk reassessment: timeline / technical scope /
methodology / some insights
 a set of diversified political reactions
 nuclear developments in Europe
 public opinion
 conclusions
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3. Who are we?
 FORATOM is the Brussels-based association of nuclear industry in
Europe:
 17 national nuclear associations active across Europe
 3 corporate members (PGE Nuclear, CEZ, Slovenska Elektrárne)
 800+ firms represented (vendors, utilities, nuclear fuel cycle,
engineering, transport, waste storage, lawyers, consultants, insurers)
 ENISS (European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards) was set up in
2005 under the umbrella of FORATOM
 ENISS currently represents the nuclear utilities and operating
companies from 16 European countries with nuclear power
programmes, including Switzerland
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4. FORATOM Membership
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5. What do we do?
 act a voice of nuclear energy industry in EU energy policy debate
 enhance relations between nuclear industry and EU institutions
 deliver information on nuclear energy to EU institutions, media and the
public
 inform members about developments emerging from EU institutions
 interact with intergovernmental organisations (IAEA, OECD/NEA, IEA,
WANO, etc.)
 communicate latest science and technology developments in co-
operation with the European Nuclear Society (ENS)
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6. Fukushima accident (1)
 the plant design did not take into account a tsunami of the size of the one
which occurred in March 2011
 the accident resulted in an almost total loss of safety functions:
 electrical supply
 heat sink
 the consequences of the tsunami and the impact of radiation hampered
the accident management
 several reactor units on the same site were directly involved in the
accident
 the cooling of the spent fuel pools (located in each reactor building) was
a special concern
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7. Fukushima accident (2)
 the most striking nuclear-related event since Chernobyl
 a combination of natural and man-made events which questions again our
ability to accept and manage severe hazards and accidents
 global impacts on the economy: in Japan, indirectly in Europe (Germany,
others), worldwide
 contradictory humanitarian outcome: no direct casualties, but
unprecedented human/psychological consequences and a wide set of
political reactions: emotional - hysterical – short-minded – opportunistic -
concerned – balanced – wise?
 a demonstration of the influence of media in crisis situation (Germany vs.
ROW)
 an opportunity to demonstrate industry's ability to learn from experience
through a continuous improvement strategy
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8. EU actions in response to Fukushima
o Decision to undertake voluntary “stress tests” (safety reassessments) of
EU nuclear facilities
o Stress test scope proposed by National Regulators (ENSREG) in co-
operation with industry (FORATOM/ENISS)
o Tests to proceed in two phases:
1. Natural disasters: earthquakes, flooding, extreme cold and heat, snow, ice,
storms, tornados, heavy rain and other extreme natural conditions
2. Man-made failures and malevolent actions: airplane crashes, fires, explosions,
terrorist attacks
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9. Stress Test timetable
• Licensee self assessments, to be reported to national regulators by
15 August 2011
• National reports to be submitted by the regulators to the European
Commission (EC) by 31 December 2011
• Interim EC report, 24 November 2011
• Peer reviews (technical topic and country specific) by multinational teams,
Jan – Apr 2012
• Final report by ENSREG, 30 April 2012
• EC to report to European Council, 28/29 June 2012
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10. Safety reassessment: technical scope
 to focus on issues highlighted by the Fukushima accident: initiating
events, loss of safety functions, accident management
 initiating events:
 earthquake
 flooding and other extreme natural conditions
 consequential loss of safety functions:
 prolonged total loss of electrical power
 prolonged total loss of the main ultimate heat sink
 combination of both situations
 accident management issues:
 prevention of some accident conditions
 core melt accident management
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11. Proposed improvements (1)
 case by case (because of each NPP particularities), better protect the
safety functions (from flood, earthquake):
 protection of buildings (sealed perimeters)
 reinforcement or rising of dams, dikes
 organizational & human factor: even in the case of natural hazards,
human beings stay at the core (which implies to deeply care for design,
training, procedures, emergency planning, etc.)
 possible design improvements:
 further diversify electrical supply
 provide for additional water
 heat sink
 emergency center
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12. Proposed improvements (2)
 portable components / plug and play systems and equipment
 severe accident management: (in particular, keep enough flexibility to be
able to deal with different situations):
 multi reactor unit crisis management (organization and features – e.g.
FARN Nuclear Rapid Action Force in France)
 H2: passive catalytic recombiners
 containment filtered venting
 specific features for spent fuel pool: instrumentation, water sources
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13. the Reports of the National Regulators
 European NPPs have substantial margins and robustness
 the measures implemented so far provide further margins to protect the
public and the environment
 assessment by the Regulators :
 the nuclear installations subject to the Safety Reassessment are sufficiently
safe to continue operation
 the safety level must continuously be improved
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14. European Commission is reviewing the
Safety Legislation
• EC considering:
• Minimum technical requirements (safety margins, siting, design, construction,
operation)
• Independence of the national regulators
• Frequency and scope of peer reviews
• Cross-border emergency response
• 3rd party nuclear liability (e.g. min. insurance levels, claims handling,
harmonisation)
• Possible proposal for revision of 2009 EU Nuclear Safety Directive by
2013
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15. Other EU initiatives in the nuclear field
• EC 2050 Energy Roadmap, Dec 2011 (collection of 7 possible scenarios aiming at
80-95% decarbonisation of the EU economy by 2050)
• Proposal for EU research programme “Horizon 2020” 2014-2020, overall budget
€80 billion, nuclear fusion + fission €1.8 billion
• ITER
• European Nuclear Energy Forum ENEF (broad stakeholder dialogue on the
opportunities, risks and transparency of nuclear energy)
• Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform SNETP (coordinating R&D work
on existing reactors, Generation IV, HTRs/cogeneration, fuel cycle, safety, etc)
• Implementing Geological Disposal Technology Platform IGDTP (R&D work to
support the operation of a first HLW repository by 2025)
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16. Reactors in Europe
• 138 reactors in operation in the EU27 +
Switzerland (+15 in Ukraine)
• 6 reactors under construction (+2 in
Ukraine) (source: PRIS, IAEA)
• 27,8% of EU27’s electricity production
(source: Eurostat)
Reactors in operation
Reactors under construction
(source: Swiss Nuclear Forum)
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17. Nuclear developments, early 2011 (1)
 under construction:
 Finland: EPR-1600 (TVO: Olkiluoto) online by 2014
 France: EPR-1600 (EDF: Flamanville) online by 2014/15
 Slovakia: 2 VVER-440 units (Slovenské Elektrárne/ ENEL:
Mochovce) online by 2013/2014
• Russia: 11 units (VVERs) under construction (8.3 Gwe)
• Ukraine: 2 units (VVER) under construction (Khmelnitsky 3/4)
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18. Nuclear developments, early 2011 (2)
 under consideration/planned:
 Bulgaria: 2 new units considered (Belene/Kozloduy)
 the Czech Republic: tender received for 2 reactors at Temelin
 Finland: two more units online by 2020 (TVO, Fennovoima*)
 France: a second EPR unit online by 2017 at Penly
 Hungary: government wants 2 more units by 2025
 Italy: at least 4 EPR units by 2020
 Lithuania: new unit considered (Ignalina)
 Poland: first NPP by 2022 (Zarnowiec identified)
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19. Nuclear developments, early 2011 (3)
 under consideration/planned:
 the Netherlands: a second unit considered (begin 2015, Borssele)
 Romania: two more units planned (Cernavoda 3 & 4)
 Slovenia: a second unit considered (Krško)
 Slovakia: government and CEZ considering a fifth reactor (Bohunice)
 Sweden: no new units considered yet (replacement policy)
 UK: 8 sites identified in draft Government Policy Statement (the first
unit on line by 2018)
 Croatia, Russia and Switzerland: new units also under consideration
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20. Nuclear developments, early 2011 (4)
 long-term operation:
 the Netherlands: Borssele (10 years)
 Spain: Garoña (4 years), Cofrentes (10 years); legal reference to the
40-year life of nuclear reactors recently removed
 Belgium: Doel and Tihange (10 years); government’s decision
pending
 Germany: 8 more years for older NPPs and 14 years for younger
ones beyond 2021; new fuel tax; fund for the development of
renewable energy
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21. Nuclear developments, early 2012 (1)
o No (significant) change in nuclear policies across 15 EU countries:
 Bulgaria
 Lithuania
 Hungary
 Slovakia
 UK
 Czech Republic
 Netherlands
 Slovenia
 (Croatia)
 Finland
 Poland
 Spain
 France
 Romania
 Sweden
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22. Nuclear developments, early 2012 (2)
 Negative developments:
new Belgium government maintains 2003 decision (law) to start the phase-out of nuclear
power beginning in 2015; also decided to raise a tax imposed on the nuclear energy
industry to 550 M€/year
immediate closure of eight NPPs that started operating before 1980; Germany become a net
importer of electricity; industrial giant Siemens closes its nuclear business
Italy voted against a return to nuclear power, repealing a regulation that would have allowed
for the construction of new reactors in a national referendum (June 2011)
Swiss government announced that it would not replace the country’s five NPPs after they
reached their lifetimes between 2019 and 2034
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23. Public acceptance: support for nuclear industry
Before Fukushima
• 56% of EU citizens wanted nuclear energy to be maintained or increased (Eurobarometer on
Nuclear Safety, April 2010)
After Fukushima
• Impact country specific
• Germany, Switzerland and Belgium: opposition to nuclear has risen
• Other countries like UK, France, Sweden, Poland: support for nuclear held up well
• In 9 (Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden) out of the
27 EU Member States less than 1/5 of those opposed to nuclear have been influenced by the
accident (Ipsos MORI, May 2011)
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24. Public acceptance: recovery in a number of EU countries
• In a number of countries like the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and France, after a
dip just after the accident, public acceptance of nuclear has recovered.
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25. New build worldwide
The total amount of nuclear reactors under construction
• worldwide 66
• European Union 6 (Finland, France, Slovakia, Bulgaria)
• rest of the world 60 (India, Brazil, Argentina, China, Iran, South Korea,
USA, Taiwan, Japan, Russia and Ukraine)
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26. Impact of Fukushima - Germany turns its back on nuclear
“German decision: politically correct? economically sustainable?
environmentally right?” (The Guardian, 1 June 2011)
“Germany's phase-out of nuclear power may compromise the security and
sustainability of the European Union. Power will be more costly, and less
secure, and even greater and more urgent investment in renewables is
needed.” Nobuo Tanaka, International Energy Agency (IEA) Executive
Director (EURELECTRIC annual conference in Stockholm: 13 June 2011)
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27. Impact of Fukushima - Germany turns its back on nuclear
“If [we don't remain] competitive in comparison with other countries, a
company of global stature like Bayer can think about moving its production to
countries where energy costs are lower.” Marijn Dekkers, CEO of Bayer
(France 24, 6 August 2011)
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28. Impact of Fukushima
“There hasn't been a strong debate after Japan (nuclear accident) that we
should change our decision. I think Finns are very rational, pragmatic. We
expect that in the existing plans, the security level is high. And also, on those
which are under process, they will be. Security is an important factor but I'm
not worried. ” Jyri Hakamies, Finnish Economy Affairs Minister (Reuters, 2
September 2011)
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29. Securing the future of new build
• Fukushima represents an opportunity for the nuclear industry to show it
can learn from experience through “continuous improvement strategy”
• Nuclear is a trump card in the EU Energy mix, meeting low-carbon,
competitiveness and security of supply requirements
• EU needs: legal framework for nuclear safety, harmonisation of licensing
procedures and reactor design clearance
• Greater co-operation between industry and international organisations
• Do more to convince the public about safety
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30. Conclusions
• Every human activity involves some risk (forces of nature, medical treatment…)
• No-one can guarantee that accidents will never occur. The industry’s duty and
commitment is to ensure safety, to reduce the possibility of an accident and
mitigate its consequences. The resources committed to safety are huge, but more
will have to be done.
• Stringent, independent nuclear safety regulation is essential
• We cannot afford to lose nuclear energy in Europe – it is a cost effective and low
carbon energy source
• Electricity production and distribution doesn’t stop at EU’s borders - need to
promote a common pan-European energy market
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