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Is There Objectivity In Science?
An Introduction to Perspectivism and Contextualism
by
Tyler York
for
Seminar: Science and Objectivity
Montana State University
Professor Kristen Intemann
December 10, 2013
*Note: The following paper has not been peer-reviewed nor published. It is a work in progress
and intended to be read as such. However, except where otherwise cited, all ideas herein are the
sole intellectual property of the author. Any use of these ideas is subject to copyright, and must be
properly referenced.

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I. Introduction
Is there objectivity in science?
This seemingly simple question has plagued the philosophy of
science – creating much debate in the practicality of scientific pursuit.
Why study science if the knowledge it provides is merely subject to the
thoughts and emotions of those that practice it? Though, I believe it is,
perhaps, too strict of a question. To fully understand the issues, and thus
provide a solution, we must define the terms objectivity and science.
Those definitions can vary widely, thus must be crafted into an agreeable
form fitting of their purpose.
What I will inevitably argue in this paper is there can be no
objectivity in science. That is, in virtue of being a human enterprise,
science can never consider itself objective. However, I will show a way in
which science could better itself, thus approaching but never reaching
objectivity.
To do this, I will first attend to the difficult task I explained above:
defining terms. To those familiar with these terms, such a task might
initially appear complicated, even impossible. However, I am a believer
that the simplest defining qualities are often the strongest. Furthermore, I
believe that only these simplest, strongest defining qualities are needed to
show how they cannot operate together.
Second, I will illustrate the problem of underdetermination as
presented by both Kristen Intemann and Justin Biddle. The problem itself
is enough to question objectivity in science, but the problem of transient
underdetermination specifically strikes the death blow. Biddle offers a
good case for this type of underdetermination, but I will argue that it is
lacking in breadth of scope. It is universally applicable to all science,
which I will explain later. In addition, the arguments presented by
Intemann offer good reasons as to why underdetermination in science is a
problem, as well as why social and moral values can be a positive
influence on science (viz. Feminism). The latter contribution will become

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important in my next section.
In my fourth section, I will outline two closely related
epistemological views of the universe: perspectivism and contextualism.
Perspectivism was formally brought to the foreground by Friedrich
Nietzsche. It posits that all human ways of gaining knowledge are trapped
within their own particular perspectives (think looking at an object from
multiple points of view). This is similar to, and likely a precursor of,
contextualism. This idea is used by Kristina Rolin (via Michael Williams)
as an argument against underdetermination. Specifically, Rolin is
defending Helen Longino's idea of 'social objectivity' – which I will
explain later.
Finally, I will provide a potential solution to the problem. Using
both perspectivism and contextualism, we can achieve an intellectual
consensus that will approach objectivity. As you will see unfold in this
paper, neither perspectivism nor contextualism can cement objectivity in
science. I have said from the beginning that objectivity cannot exist in
scientific practice, but using these two epistemological views, we can
approach it. Thus, we should not be dissuaded from pursuing science,
though nor should we expect to find absolute truth.
II. What Is Objectivity and Science?
Let me first begin with objectivity. As I have said, there are many
opposing views on what exactly this term means, or at least how exactly it
is in relation to knowledge (and science). The most absolute objectivist
would claim that there is objective truth in the world, and through various
practices (i.e., science) we can discern knowledge from that truth. The
most absolute relativist would claim that there in no objective truth in the
world, and that all knowledge is held subjectively valid by any and every
individual. These, I would argue, are the two opposing maximums on a
continuum of “What is knowledge?”.
Where then, does objectivity fit when viewing this continuum? The
answer is quite simple, though somewhat circular: objectivity is objective

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truth. The absolute objectivist believes there is absolute objective truth;
the absolute relativist believes there is absolutely no objective truth. What
are both of these views referring to by “objective truth”? The simplest
answer, and the only I need appeal to, is external truth values. That is, a
truth value that can be assigned to any external phenomena independent of
human observation.
Let us pretend that Mary has just walked outside during midday
and exclaimed, “The sky is green!” Her neighbor John looks up and says,
“No, the sky is still blue.” Who is correct? The objectivist would say that
John is correct, and Mary is wrong. Through scientific practice, we
understand that the reflection of sunlight off our atmosphere toward the
surface of our planet at midday has a certain wavelength that is observed
blue. This is a truth value assigned to the external world: sky = blue, that
to the objectivist exists regardless of our observation. Mary is either lying
or confused.
On the other hand, the relativist would claim that both are correct.
They may not deny that scientific practice has shown reflected sunlight to
be of a particular wavelength. However, the knowledge of blue, green,
wavelength, sunlight, reflection, etc. is all clouded by internal, subjective
truths. By virtue of being a subject, human beings have absolutely no way
of assigning external truth values (objective truths) because they have
absolutely no way of stepping outside their internal truth values
(subjective truths). We simply cannot ignore our feelings, emotions,
beliefs, and internal assumptions when understanding the world.
Therefore, any claims we make about the world are distorted by subjective
truths – objectivity is lost.
The relativist does face a very fatal dilemma though: a paradox to
be precise. If no claim about the world can be considered objective, then
the claim that “no claim about the world can be considered objective” may
not be true. Paradox aside, I still believe the problems presented by the
relativist view are important. It is difficult to deny that subjective truths

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cloud and distort what we would like to call objective truths. It is my hope
that through perspectivism and contextualism, I can at least mitigate, if not
altogether eliminate this problem.
Before we continue, we must also have a clear conception of what
science is. We may be inclined to use the textbook definition: systematic
knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation
and experimentation (Dictionary.com). In other words, it is a type of
knowledge specifically about the external world (eerily similar to
objective truth?). However, I do not believe that provides us with the best
working definition. Science doesn't seem like just a body of knowledge. In
fact, science seems much more like an action. One does science, one
practices science. So what exactly is it?
I find it far more helpful to think of science as a tool. We use
science as an instrument to gain knowledge of the physical or material
world. Science isn't just a body of knowledge about the external world
waiting to be dug up – it is a process by which we can dig up that
knowledge of the external world. This brings to fore that ultimate
question: if science is a tool, a process that involves subjects, how then
can it produce purely objective truths?
III. The Problem of Underdetermination
Now that we have a basic understanding of objectivity and science,
let us examine one of the most detrimental arguments against science as
being objective: underdetermination. Many philosophers have relied on
some version of the underdetermination thesis to argue against a value-
free science. I do not want to get trapped by what “value-free” means, so
for the sake of this paper, it will be used interchangeably with the
“objectivity” defined above.
Kristen Intemann does a great job at defining the problem of
underdetermination (as well as the related Duhem-Quine Thesis); she
refers to this as the Gap Argument (Intemann 2005). “The Duhem-Quine
thesis is that no hypothesis, taken by itself, has any observational

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consequences (Duhem 1954, Quine 1953). . . . Quine's underdetermination
thesis [is] that there will always be multiple hypotheses (inconsistent with
each other) that are consistent with all of the evidence we have at any
point in time,” (Intemann 2005, 1002). Both theses together create a “gap”
between theory and evidence, of which proponents argue must be filled by
ethical or political values (Intemann 2005).
I would take the Gap Argument a step further though. Obviously
opponents of the Gap Argument take issue with the ethical and political
values that proponents want to incorporate. Opponents advocate for a
value-free science, so, by introducing purely subjective values into
science, we are dismantling its attempt toward objectivity. However, there
are some proponents who argue these ethical and political values can
actually contribute to “good” science, and a kind of objectivity (I will not
discuss these here, but see Helen Longino 1990 & 2002, Lynn Hankinson
Nelson 1990, and Elizabeth Anderson 1995).
These proponents argue there is a rationality for incorporating
ethical and political values (especially for feminists). There arguments are
sound enough, but I would argue fail to see – or intentionally ignore – the
full extent of the human element. The relativist above argues that in any
observation, the individual brings with him not just ethical and political
values, but also feelings, emotions, and internal beliefs about the world.
There may be rational reasons for incorporating ethical and political
values in science, but what of emotions, feelings and internal beliefs and
assumptions? Are these not irrational in the pursuit of science? Surely a
value-free proponent would discredit the idea of creationist biology – they
are introducing religious beliefs into science. However, would not a Gap
Argument proponent discredit creationist biology as well? The general
argument is that ethical and political values can serve scientific interests,
but religious values surely not(?). I merely wish to point out here that even
the proponents of the Gap Argument (underdetermination) would likely
not consider such irrational values appropriate to incorporate in science.

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Yet, as the relativist again reminds us, such values are nigh impossible to
leave out of the equation.
If that were not problem enough, there is a further variant of
underdetermination to consider. As I have said, there are many versions of
this problem, and Justin Biddle (via Kitcher 2001) offers three umbrella
categories for them: Global, Permanent, and Transient (2013). Global
underdetermination states that all theories are underdetermined by logic
and all possible evidence (Biddle 2013, 3). Permanent underdetermination
states that some theories are underdetermined by logic and all possible
evidence (Biddle 2013, 3). Transient underdetermination states that some
theories are underdetermined by logic and the currently available evidence
(Biddle 2013, 3).
The focus of Biddle's argument is on transient underdetermination,
and so will mine. At first glance, both global and permanent seem the most
problematic. We would hope that upon investigating all possible evidence,
only one theory would accurately and correctly fit. True enough that is
problematic, but it is an unrealistic expectation. The problem with the
universe is that it is not static. It is ever-changing, largely due to a
dimension known as time.
Global and permanent underdetermination are effective arguments
in an ideal, hypothetical sense. However, to make progress towards a more
objective science, much more emphasis should be placed on transient
underdetermination. The idea of all possible evidence has no place in
reality. The only way to place it in reality is to add a modifier: all possible
evidence at time t. Such a modifier is unnecessary though, as that
statement could be read as all currently available evidence – which is
essentially transient underdetermination.
My reason for introducing transient underdetermination here is
because it acknowledges that evidence and observation change over time.
Not only does it represent a gap between theory and evidence, but also
shows evidence to be unreliable and ever-changing. The apple falling from

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the tree once “proved” Newtonian physics. Centuries later, Einstein shows
the apple falling to be relative to a specific frame of reference. Where will
another couple centuries find us?
IV. Perspectivism and Contextualism
It seems that the problem of underdetermination leaves us in a
troubling – if not depressing – spot. A glimmer of hope may yet exist
though. Nietzsche's theory of perspectivism offers an acceptance of
subjective frames of reference, and presents a theoretical notion of
objectivity and truth in that frame of reference. The theory of
contextualism provided by Rolin (via Williams 2001) is closely related to
Nietzsche's, though firmly directed at science. Through these theoretical
frameworks, I hope to illustrate how science is still useful, and can operate
toward – though never achieve – objectivity.
Let me begin with Nietzsche's perspectivism. I will be enlisting the
aid of Michael Lacewing who has generously summarized the key
elements of Nietzsche's perspectivism from Beyond Good and Evil. As the
term implies, this is an epistemological and metaphysical theory,
metaphorically linked to perspective-optics. Imagine, for example, two
individuals sitting across one another at a table, and there is a coffee mug
between them. There is no question that the coffee mug exists. Both
individuals clearly see it and call it a coffee mug. However, one might
describe the coffee mug as cracked, a light shade of blue, and the handle is
on the left side. The other individual might describe the coffee mug as
smooth, off-white, and the handle is on the right side. Which one is
correct? According to perspectivism, both. Each individual is occupying
her own perspective, and is describing the mug in reference to that
perspective. You might ask, isn't that relativism though? Nietzsche would
argue no. There is no question that the mug exists. There are some external
facts that we can be sure of. What determines this assurance is a tricky
question though.
The example I just provided illustrates many aspects of Nietzsche's

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perspectivism. First, “we take what is near to us (in the foreground) as the
standard by which we interpret the world,” (Lacewing 2012, 1). Second,
“[a]n interpretation is an understanding of the world from a particular
perspective, and so interpretations, like perspectives, relate back to our
values,” (Lacewing 2012, 1). “So Nietzsche is saying that philosophical
beliefs about truth and goodness are part of a particular perspective on the
world, … [b]ut philosophers are wrong to think that it is possible to
represent or hold beliefs about the world that are value-free, 'objective',
'disinterested',” (Lacewing 2012, 1). Even sense-perception, something we
might consider most responsive to how the world is, does not escape our
individual perspectives (Lacewing 2012). It is easier for us to reproduce
images we are familiar with; we are averse to new things, so already our
experience of the world is affected by emotion (Lacewing 2012). Most
important of all, “we cannot take in everything – we do not see every leaf
on a tree, but out of our visual experience, create for ourselves an image of
something approximating the tree,” (Lacewing 2012, 2).
Already it is becoming clear how distorted our experience of the
world is by our perspectives (i.e., values, beliefs, and interpretations).
Nietzsche does offer some hope to salvage truth from the world though.
First, though least convincing, is that, “Nietzsche is an empiricist – he says
that our sense organs can become 'fine, loyal, cautious organs of
cognition',” (Lacewing 2012, 3). In other words, through practice we can
exercise our senses to become more reliable about the truth of the world.
Second, some perspectives can become less distorting than others. There
are a couple ways of doing this. One, a perspective may become aware
that it is a perspective (Lacewing 2012). Two, by assembling many
different perspectives, we will find a less perspectival perspective – this
will become very important in the next section (Lacewing 2012).
“[P]erspectival 'knowing' [is] the only kind of 'knowing'; and the more
feelings about a matter which we allow to come to expression, the more
eyes through which we are able to view this same matter, the more

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complete our 'conception' of it, our 'objectivity' will be (On the Genealogy
of Morals),” (Lacewing 2012, 3).
The implications of perspectivism toward science and objectivity
are apparent. Nietzsche is speaking more of knowledge in general, but its
application to science is clear enough. There is a similar theory though
(likely born from perspectivism), that directly attacks the problem of
objectivity in science. That theory is, of course, contextualism.
This contextualist theory was developed by Michael Williams
(2001), and is used by Kristina Rolin to defend Helen Longino's theory of
'social objectivity'. The specifics of the defense aren't entirely necessary,
but I will provide a quick summary. Longino's theory of social objectivity
is “that scientific knowledge is objective to the degree that a relevant
scientific community satisfies the four norms of public venues, uptake of
criticism, public standards, and tempered equality of intellectual
authority,” (Rolin 2011, 28; see also Longino 1990 & 2002). There are
three criticisms that Rolin takes up: (1) Sharon Crasnow's (2003) view that
this includes dogmatism with respect to standards of argumentation; (2)
Miriam Solomon and Alan Richardson's (2005) view that Longino lacks
naturalistic justification; and (3) Kristen Intemann (2008) and Janet
Kourany's (2005) view that Longino is a relativist with respect to moral
and social values (Rolin 2011).
More or less, all three criticisms attack social objectivity as being
too relative. It effectively allows any view to infiltrate scientific
knowledge. “As [Intemann] explains, 'feminist political commitments will
be no more important in contributing to diversity than anti-feminist
commitments' (2008),” (Rolin 2011, 33). In an attempt to keep Longino's
view of objectivity from being considered relativism, Rolin appeals to
contextualism.
The theory of contextualism is an argument for a certain kind of
epistemic justification. Specifically, it seeks to undermine skepticism –
which is very closely related to relativism. The skeptic believes that

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knowledge is impossible because no one can have justified beliefs (so, a
relativist is basically an optimistic skeptic). Objective knowledge is
impossible because each individual's belief is equally justified.
Contextualism seeks to undermine that argument.
Similar to perspectivism, contextualism rests knowledge among a
sea of contextual assumptions (Rolin 2011). We use these contextual
assumptions (i.e., background assumptions related to the context of a
situation) to justify knowledge claims. Contextualism differentiates itself
from relativism by claiming that these contextual assumptions can act as
epistemic justifications, as opposed to contextual justifications (Rolin
2011). This is done in two important steps.
First, “[a] claimant can be justified in believing that p even though
she does not provide reasons in support of p [because] her believing that p
[is] in virtue of her belief having the status of a default entitlement,”
(Rolin 2011, 35). The key idea is 'default entitlement'. A person can be
epistemically justified in holding a belief without providing a justification
by claiming it as their default entitlement. Alone, that seems dogmatic and
unjustified, but “[a]s Williams explains, in contextualism, epistemic
justification is thought to have a default and challenge structure (2001),”
(Rolin 2011, 35). That challenge structure is the second step.
In order to be epistemically justified in certain beliefs, they must
not only act as default entitlements, but the person must also adopt a
defense commitment toward them (Rolin 2011). In other words, “one
accepts a duty to defend or revise one's belief when it is challenged with
an appropriate argument,” (Rolin 2011, 36). This does not necessarily
mean that when challenged, the challenger is either correct or incorrect.
When default entitlements are challenged, it is only by a
recontextualization of inquiry that involves assumptions of its own (Rolin
2011). This often results in both the challenger and challenged to
recontextualize and adopt new or revised default entitlements.
Recontextualization can go on indefinitely (Rolin 2011).

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This leads to the final idea of epistemic responsibility. The
traditional view of epistemic responsibility claims that a person is justified
in believing p only if that belief has adequate grounds (Rolin 2011). This
traditional view is what allows the skeptic and relativist to have an upper
hand in attacking epistemic justification (Rolin 2011, see also Williams
2001). Contextualists argue that a person is epistemically responsible
when she adopts a defense commitment with respect to her beliefs (Rolin
2011). We can have epistemic justification, and are being epistemically
responsible, so long as we accept the duty to defend or revise our beliefs
when challenged appropriately.
By using this contextual view, Rolin asserts that Longino's idea of
objectivity is not dogmatic nor relative. The scientists and scientific
communities involved must adopt defense commitments toward their
default entitlements, and when appropriately challenged, must defend or
revise their views. Therefore, they are justified in adopting certain
standards and beliefs. In response to Intemann's critique, the anti-feminists
would need either defend or revise their beliefs appropriately when
challenged by the feminists, and both are justified in this instance.
Unfortunately, this still leaves some question as to whether or not
science is being objective by adopting contextualism. Rolin effectively
uses the idea to defend Longino's account of social objectivity, but that is
a far cry from the objectivity I have defined above. The answer to this
question was hinted at in Nietzsche's perspectivism, and more fully
understood in Rolin's Science as Collective Knowledge.
V. Intellectual Consensus
The idea of intellectual consensus is fairly simple, and has already
been described above. It is, essentially, the summation of various
perspectives. Though, it is not quite as simple as addition. To combine
such varying beliefs and interpretations would be a delicate and intricate
process – one that I admit I cannot describe fully. Yet, the idea of it still
makes sense. If there is some objective truth about the world, but we are

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limited in our interpretation of it by our various perspectives, then it is
logical that the more perspectives we combine, the closer we will get to
objective truth. Nietzsche offers that conclusion quite overtly.
Rolin also offers a similar combining of perspectives from the
contextualist view. She offers a way of viewing scientific communities as
organic communities. In other words, though scientific communities will
often have specific areas of interest, there is a division of labor amongst
the individual scientists to save community resources (Rolin 2007). For
example, a scientific community's area of interest might be medicine, but
the individual scientists might specialize in specific medicines (e.g., heart,
diabetic, cancer, etc.). These individual scientists operate in differing
perspectives or contexts of medicine. By creating a collective community,
they are approaching objectivity in contextualist terms.
As I have described above, the contextualist is focused on default
entitlements, defense commitments, and epistemic responsibility. Within
the scientific community of medicine, “[a]n individual scientist's
capability to defend an assumption or to argue against it may be limited
because the assumption is beyond the scope of her specialty,” (Rolin 2007,
121). This is because those assumptions about medicine are default
entitlements held be the entire community, not just the individual
scientists. Thus, “it is rational for a community to develop a division of
labor in defending its default entitlements,” (Rolin 2007, 121).
Furthermore, a community can be epistemically responsible when
some of its members accept the duties involved in a defense commitment,
while others see to it that those duties will be carried out (Rolin 2007). Not
every member must carry the duty of a defense commitment, only those
whose specialties are involved. However, it is up to the community as a
whole to decide on what default entitlements should be held. “Moreover, a
joint commitment guarantees that individual scientists are aware of the
current state of default entitlements in the community,” (Rolin 2007, 121).
This process allows scientific communities as a whole to combine the

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contextual assumptions of individual scientists into default entitlements of
the entire group, viz. combining perspectives toward objectivity.
In a final statement, Rolin claims that epistemic justification of
scientific knowledge is not merely found in the mind of individual
scientists, but through a community wide practice of criticism and
response (2007). “Therefore, scientific communities are the only agents
who can establish a context of epistemic justification. This is why
scientific communities have a strong interest in forming a joint
commitment to treat certain assumptions as default entitlements,” (Rolin
2007, 122).
It is important though – for both the perspectivist and contextualist
– to realize that intellectual consensus or collective knowledge may
approach objectivity, but will never achieve it. It is a probabilities game.
We can continue to add more and more perspectives with one another, and
further and further approach objective truth. Yet, there will never be the
every possible perspective. We can never know when every possible
perspective is accounted for, or even when every necessary perspective is
accounted for. Thus, as I initially explained, science can never achieve
objectivity, but only increase the probability that a claim is objective truth.
VI. Objections
I understand that there are those who would object to the
perspectivist/contextualist view of science. Considering it is essentially a
middle ground between relativism and objectivism, the majority of those
objections would come from one of those two camps. I will briefly attempt
to rebuke the common objections that may be imposed.
First, any skeptic would likely take the view of the relativist. That
is, we must accept that objectivity itself does not exist. It is not a matter of
our inability to achieve it, but that it simply and purely does not exist.
They often use arguments of justification to prove their point. They
continually ask, “How are you justified in believing that truth?” Most of
those that believe in some form of objectivity are thus stuck in infinitely

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circular reasoning. We constantly use background assumptions and beliefs
to justify new beliefs, but the relativist need only ask why we are justified
in believing those background assumptions. To my own argument, they
would deny that objectivity exists in the first place, and that intellectual
consensus is only a conglomeration of equally true beliefs.
To this, Nietzsche would argue that perspectives are not all equal.
As I have already explained, some perspectives are better – closer to the
truth – than others. This is not an entirely desirable response. Nietzsche
offers some ways in which a perspective can be better: acknowledging that
it is a perspective, and combining perspectives are a couple of those ways.
However, there is no concrete escape he offers from relativism. Luckily,
contextualism provides one.
The contextualist theory denies relativism by appealing to default
entitlements and defense commitments. We are justified in believing a
default entitlement so long as we accept a defense commitment toward
that belief. This provides us with epistemic responsibility. The relativist
cannot trap the contextualist into circular reasoning by simply asking how
they are justified in believing their default entitlement. The relativist
would need to field an appropriate challenge against that default
entitlement, thus forcing both sides to defend their view, and ultimately
recontextualize if they fail in their defense. The contextualist can then
argue for some semblance of objectivity through scientific communities'
default entitlements.
On the other hand, the objectivist would attack my argument
claiming that objectivity certainly exists, and science can achieve it. A
value-free science is possible. We should not be concerned with any of the
perspectival or contextual theories, nor should we worry about collective
knowledge. Instead, we should focus on various methods to extract
contextual values from scientific practice. Once that has been done, then
an objective science will have been achieved.
Unfortunately, I cannot directly attack the objectivist objection.

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Fortunately, thanks to contextualism, I can shift the burden of proof to the
objectivists. I believe that there will always be contextual values in
science; that we are all inescapably confined in our own perspectives. I
accept that belief as a default entitlement, and I am committed to defend
my belief. What the objectivist has yet to do (or I have yet to see done) is
provide a proper argument against my view with necessary and sufficient
evidence. The objectivist has yet to provide proof enough of their view to
force me to recontextualize, and I would argue that they will never be able
to. Even if they did, it would only result in a recontextualization between
both parties, and thus still appeal to contextualist theory.
VII. Conclusion
I began this paper by defining both objectivity and science. I
followed by outlining the problem of underdetermination in various ways.
This problem has led us to question whether or not science can be
objective. I then offered both perspectivism and contextualism as
alternative theories with respect to the problem of objective science.
Through these theories, we discover that epistemic justification and
epistemic responsibility are still possible without appealing to objective
truths. Thus, science is still a worthy enterprise. Better yet, through the
process of collective knowledge (or as I have termed it intellectual
consensus), we can approach objectivity through science. To fully
conclude this paper, I want to offer an analogy that should make clear this
argument:
I am typing this paper at a computer desk. Now, let us imagine that
the computer desk is the entire universe. Nothing exists but the computer
desk. Let us now dump a few dozen ants onto the computer desk and
allow them to scurry about. Again, the computer desk is the entire
universe, and now the ants are subjects observing that universe. Perhaps
there is an ant crawling around my notebook; another is climbing up an
empty can of soda; yet another is roaming around a scratched portion of
the wood. Each of these three instances involve very different

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observations: different textures, colors, shapes, and sizes. Any description
given by an individual ant will be underdetermined because each ant is
having its own experience that could be described as incompatible with
another, yet still supported by the observational evidence. The first ant
would say the universe is composed of dashed white lines. The second ant
would describe the universe as smooth, glossy, and red. The third ant
would argue the universe is rugged, gouged, and brown. Which is correct?
Aren't they all, based on their individual observational evidence? Even if
we compare two ants both on the soda can, their individual experiences
will be different.
My desk is still the universe – it exists independent of the ants
scurrying about it, thus it is an objective truth. Yet, if we were to ask each
individual ant to describe the world, we would accrue vastly different
descriptions. Why? Because they occupy their own individual
perspectives. We cannot expect them to describe or interpret a world that
is beyond their perspective. However, if we combine all of those
descriptions, we will find a more, though not completely, accurate
description of the world.

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