Mainly finding out the engineering fault occurred during the design and construction of Hurricane Protecting System.

1. Case Study of Levee Failures in New Orleans
Names & ID’s of the Group Members:
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018
Name: ID:
Md. Ashiqur Rahman 2015-1-80-026
Md. Mohi Uddin 2015-1-80-037
Md. Mostak Morshed Shuvo 2015-1-80-042
Md. Siddikur Rahman 2015-1-80-048

2. Table of Contents
Name of Content Slide No:
Introduction 3
Background 4
Why Levees and Floodwall Failed 5
Engineering Faults 6
Violation of Codes 7,8
Violation of Responsibility 9
Social Effects 10
Conclusion 11
Reference 12
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018

3. Introduction
Figure 01:Levee failure in New Orleans during
hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina occurred on august
29, 2005
The hurricane protecting system
(HPS) was designed and constructed
by the US Army Corps of Engineers-
• 50 failures of the levee and flood walls
protecting New Orleans, Louisiana
Ten billion gallons of water spilled
into vast areas of New Orleans-
• Caused flooding in 80% of New
Orleans
• Flooding over 100,000 homes and
businesses
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018

4. Background
Occurred in august 2005
Largest & 3rd strongest ever USA
hurricane-
• 175km/h wind speed
• 20ft storm surges
• Category 5 hurricane
Poor design and construction of the
US Army Corps of Engineers-
• Only constructed for category 3
• Levees failure
• Floodwall failure
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018
Figure 02:Before and after levee failure
BeforeAfter

5. Why Levee and Floodwall Failed
Built on weak, spongy swamp land (near
Mississippi)
Levees constructed with hydraulic fill
and higher silt and sand content were
severely damaged.
Soils holding up flood wall weakened
Soil shifts, taking the wall with it
I-type floodwall failed due to insatbility
Insufficient support from metal sheet
pilings-
• only 22 feet deep
levees only 8ft high (category 3) but
storm surges reached 20ft (category 5)
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018
Figure 03: Diagram of I-wall gap

6. Engineering Faults
Engineers misjudged the strength of the peat
Engineers followed the design of
1965(Category 3 hurricane)
floodwalls were so poorly designed
Maximum safe load is only 7 feet (2.1 m) of
water
Half of the original 14-foot (4.3 m) design
The engineers claimed the piles were 17 feet
Drawings show them to be 10 feet
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018
Figure 04:Levee failure due to soil shift

7. Violation of NSPE Codes
“Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.”
(Fundamental Cannons.1-NSPE Codes)
Violation of Fundamental Cannons.1 -
• They followed the design for category 3 hurricane while New Orleans was an area
with high risk of powerful hurricanes.
“Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to
enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession.”
(Fundamental Cannons.6-NSPE Codes)
Violation of Fundamental Cannons.6 –
• They were responsible to follow the original design.
Group No: 10 EEE404

8. Violation of NSPE Codes
“Engineers shall acknowledge their errors and shall not distort or alter the
facts.”
(Professional Obligations .1.a-NSPE Codes)
Violation of Professional Obligations .1.a-
• They claimed a better construction after the failure of the levees which did not match
with their own design.
“Engineers shall not complete, sign, or seal plans and/or specifications that
are not in conformity with applicable engineering standards. If the client or
employer insists on such unprofessional conduct, they shall notify the proper
authorities and withdraw from further service on the project.”
(Professional Obligations .2.b-NSPE Codes)
Violation of Professional Obligations .2.b-
• They followed the design of 1965.
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018

9. Violation of Responsibility
Acceptance of responsibility-
• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not perform their responsibilities
properly.
Fulfil contractual obligations-
• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were supposed to fulfil all the
requirements to build the levee that will protect the city from hazards.
Ignored public interest-
• Public interests were ignored by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018

10. Social Effects
Large number of casualties-
• 1386 deaths, 500,000 refugees &
770,000 displaced
$100 billion in damages-
• Severe property damage (300,000
homes) and electrical outages
• Almost 2 million people lost their
power and had to wait several weeks
for it to be restored
• Twin span bridge collapsed which
made relief difficult to deliver
Lacking of supplies-
• Water, food, power and fuel
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018
Figure 05 : 5 lakhs refugees due to levee failure

11. Conclusion
Poor judgment of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Lack of responsibility shown by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Hurricane was a catalyst
Levee failed
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018

12. Reference
• https://thelensnola.org/2014/05/15/new-orleans-flood-protection-
system-stronger-than-ever-weaker-than-it-was-supposed-to-be/
• https://quizlet.com/106126491/case-study-hurricane-katrina-new-
orleans-flash-cards/
• http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/23/AR2005102301200.html
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_
Orleans
Group No: 10 EEE404 Spring-2018