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The Ballistic Axis: Strategic Implications of DPRK and Iran's Cooperation in Missiles and Space

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The Ballistic Axis: Strategic Implications of DPRK and Iran's Cooperation in Missiles and Space

  1. 1. The Ballistic Axis : DPRK and Iran's cooperation in missiles and space - strategic implications © 2016 by Tal Inbar Tal Inbar Head, Space Research Center The Fisher Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies, Israel April 21, 2016, Washington DC
  2. 2. Disclaimer • The presentation is based exclusively on unclassified open source information • The views represents the author and are NOT necessarily represent an official Israeli governmental position; © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  3. 3. Content of the presentation • Introduction to Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal • Introduction to DPRK ballistic missile arsenal • Recent revelations on DPRK missile technologies and nuclear warhead • Iran’s silos for ballistic missiles • Iran’s space program – and DPRK technologies incorporated • Prospects for the future © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  4. 4. Iran’s Ballistic missiles First missiles acquired from DPRK during the Iran-Iraq War. © 2016 by Tal Inbar Teharani Moghadem, “Father of Iranian missiles” Refueling vehicle Scud Missile Note the horizontal refuel
  5. 5. Iran’s Ballistic missiles © 2016 by Tal Inbar Standard Scud TEL. Note 1980’s DPRK Scheme Scud Missile
  6. 6. Shahab 2 (DPRK Scud C) © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  7. 7. Shahab 3 (DPRK Nodong) © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  8. 8. Shahab 3 / Ghadr (DPRK Nodong) © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  9. 9. Shahab 3 production in Iran © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  10. 10. Sajil – 2 stage, solid propelled © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  11. 11. Sajil – 2 stage, solid propelled © 2016 by Tal Inbar Thrust termination port (1/4) Housing for second stage jet vanes (1/4)
  12. 12. Fateh 110 – the accuracy revolution © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  13. 13. Fateh 110 – the accuracy revolution © 2016 by Tal Inbar Guidance section
  14. 14. Khalij Fars – Anti ship ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  15. 15. Hourmuz – Anti ship ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  16. 16. Fateh 313 – Extended range © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  17. 17. Fateh 313 – Extended range © 2016 by Tal Inbar Note the pattern – possible carbon fiber outer skin of the missile
  18. 18. Fateh 313 – Extended range © 2016 by Tal Inbar Test launch of the missile (2015)
  19. 19. Shahab 3 with sub munitions © 2016 by Tal Inbar Note the sub- munitions inside the missile’s warhead
  20. 20. Advanced Zelzal – Sub munitions © 2016 by Tal Inbar Heavy sub munition Fins
  21. 21. Ya Ali cruise missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  22. 22. Soumar cruise missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  23. 23. Soumar cruise missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  24. 24. Qiam ballistic missile – A Scud replacement © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  25. 25. Qiam ballistic missile – A Scud replacement © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  26. 26. Qiam ballistic missile – A Scud replacement © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  27. 27. Shahab 2 with new guidance © 2016 by Tal Inbar Movable steering fins
  28. 28. Emad – advanced Ghadr © 2016 by Tal Inbar Note the movable steering fins
  29. 29. Emad – advanced Ghadr © 2016 by Tal Inbar Retro rocket (1 of 2)
  30. 30. Iran’s Silo basing Iran has different types of silos: • Conventional designed (missile in vertical position on alert) • Underground “missile city” – tunnels and TEL’s • Coffin type silo © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  31. 31. Iran’s Silo basing © 2016 by Tal Inbar Shahab 3 on alert – vertically mounted Blast doors to the silo Doors on ground level
  32. 32. Iran’s Silo basing © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  33. 33. Iran’s Silo basing © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  34. 34. Iran’s Silo basing © 2016 by Tal Inbar Qiam missile Launch hole
  35. 35. Iran’s Silo basing © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  36. 36. Iran’s Silo basing © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  37. 37. Underground missile depo © 2016 by Tal Inbar Note: missiles are stored without the warheads
  38. 38. Iran’s Silo basing © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  39. 39. North Korean ballistic missiles • The NK arsenal of ballistic missiles consist of former Soviet Union technologies and origin: Scud, SS-21(KN-02) and BM-25 (aka Musudan, BK-1) • Original design: Nodong, HS-13 – two versions Soviet Origin Original NK design © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  40. 40. HS-13 (KN 08) missile • The missile was first shown on a military parade on April 15, 2012. • Photographic materials indicated that the missile was under development or production in Kim Jong Il time. • It is described by North Korea as ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile). • On October 2015, a second version of the missile was shown. • No test flight was conducted for either type. © 2016 by Tal Inbar HS-13 HS-13 mod. 2
  41. 41. HS-13 (KN 08) missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar 1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage Re-entry vehicle
  42. 42. HS-13 mod. 2 missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  43. 43. HS-13 (KN 08) missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  44. 44. © 2016 by Tal Inbar Note the same support structure for the missile Kim Jong Un, March 2016 Kim Jong Il, Date UNKNOWN When was the HS-13 built?
  45. 45. Nuclear equipped warhead (RV) of the HS-13 missile • On March 9, 2016, DPRK displayed, for the first time, a nuclear equipped warhead for its HS-13 (KN-08) long range ballistic missile. HS-13 (KN-08) RV on its cradle © 2016 by Tal Inbar • Triconic RV configuration • Blunt Nose-Tip • Low ballistic coefficient (b)
  46. 46. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead Electronic package for the nuclear bomb or ballast weight Nuclear explosive device © 2016 by Tal Inbar Aft Skirt (for stabilization) Nose Tip
  47. 47. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar Electronic package for the nuclear bomb or ballast weight Nuclear explosive device Aft Skirt (for stabilization) Nose Tip
  48. 48. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  49. 49. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  50. 50. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  51. 51. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  52. 52. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  53. 53. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  54. 54. Nuclear equipped warhead of the HS-13 missile • DPRK leader Kim Jong Un was shown the nuclear bomb that was designed to fit inside the re-entry vehicle of the HS-13 missile. Note the missile in the background. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  55. 55. Nuclear equipped warhead of the HS-13 missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar HS-13 missile first stage HS-13 missile second stage
  56. 56. Nuclear Bomb for HS-13 © 2016 by Tal Inbar Explosive Lens
  57. 57. Nuclear Bomb for HS-13 Electrical cords for explosive lens activation © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  58. 58. Geometry of the nuclear explosive device Nuclear bomb with some pentagons and hexagons superimposed Probable geometry of the nuclear device (minus external features) © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  59. 59. Nuclear equipped warhead of the HS-13 missile Inside view of the re- entry vehicle of the HS- 13 ballistic missile Electronic package for the nuclear bomb OR ballast © 2016 by Tal Inbar Aft Squirt Mounting point Location of the Nuclear payload
  60. 60. The strategic significance • It is a devastating combination of long range ballistic missile AND a nuclear warhead. • North Korea never tested a missile to a range exciding 1100 km – the HS-13 family is a quantum leap in it’s capabilities. • The unveiling of the miniaturized nuclear bomb is a direct response to the west’s claims that NK lack the capability to produce them. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  61. 61. Re-entry simulation for the nose tip of the HS-13 (mod. 2) missile • On March 15, 2016, NK published detailed view of a ground test of the nose tip of the HS-13 mod. 2 ballistic missile. • The simulated atmospheric re-entry was conducted by using a static test stand and exposure of the nose tip to the exhaust gases of a Scud missile. Front page of the Rodong Sinmun revealing the test © 2016 by Tal Inbar • The test aim was to evaluate and prove of the nose tip in heat loads and heat fluxes typical to the critical phase of atmospheric reentry.
  62. 62. Erosion and Ablation test of the Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 Nose tip – probably made of ceramics Ablative material Electrical connectors Attachment Bolts (to the missile) © 2016 by Tal Inbar Note the cover up design
  63. 63. Erosion and Ablation test of the Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 Nose tip poised for test Scud engine Exhaust from the scud engine Nose tip © 2016 by Tal Inbar Scud engine
  64. 64. Schematic drawing of the nose tip © 2016 by Tal Inbar Gauge to measure the curve of the nose tip: note that very little material has been ablated Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
  65. 65. Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 © 2016 by Tal Inbar Electronic package used for the nuclear explosive device OR ballast Electrical connectors
  66. 66. Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 Charred nose tip Thermal blankets (possible use of Asbestos Phenolic ) Ablative material. Note that MOST of the material withstand the heat during the test © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  67. 67. Electronic equipment – probably related to the nuclear bomb. Some may be avionics.Antenna Bolts unaffected by the heat © 2016 by Tal Inbar Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
  68. 68. HS-13 missile First stage Cables duct Second stage First stage main engine © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  69. 69. HS-13 mod. 2 Nose tip (as was tested on March 15, 2016) Large compartment for nuclear bomb (Larger than the one shown on march 9, hence larger yield possible)
  70. 70. Technological assessments • The HS-13 missile shown with the nuclear warhead looks authentic. • The 6 HS-13 (mod. 2) missiles shown looks authentic. • The design of the nuclear bomb looks authentic. • The nose tip used for simulated re-entry is authentic in every aspect. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  71. 71. Solid propelled rocket motor • On March 2016, DPRK performed a static test of a new, large diameter (probably 1.25 meters) solid rocket motor. • DPRK leader Ki Jong Un attended the test. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  72. 72. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Rails Engine’s exhaust Jet vane mount
  73. 73. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Electrical Connector Nozzle Jet Vane
  74. 74. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  75. 75. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  76. 76. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  77. 77. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  78. 78. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  79. 79. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  80. 80. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar Burning time of the rocket engine in seconds (?)
  81. 81. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  82. 82. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Welding Jet vane mount
  83. 83. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  84. 84. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  85. 85. Static test fire of HS-13 engines • On April 2016, DPRK performed a static test of the engines which are installed in the HS-13 missile. • Kim Jong Un attended the test. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  86. 86. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  87. 87. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  88. 88. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  89. 89. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  90. 90. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  91. 91. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  92. 92. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  93. 93. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  94. 94. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  95. 95. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
  96. 96. Static test of dual-combustion chamber rocket engine for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar Flame from engine 2 Flame from engine 1 Truss – connecting the engines to the missile Cables for measurements during the test Probable location of turbo- pumps assembly
  97. 97. Solid propelled SLBM • On April 23, 2016, DPRK conducted a test flight of a SOLID PROPELLED SLBM, from under the sea. • DPRK state run television claimed it was launched from a submarine. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  98. 98. Solid propelled SLBM © 2016 by Tal Inbar Protective cover of the launch tube Hand grips Outer cover of the launch tube. Note the DPRK submarine color
  99. 99. Solid propelled SLBM © 2016 by Tal Inbar Protective cover of the launch tube
  100. 100. Solid propelled SLBM © 2016 by Tal Inbar Missile’s nose tip Cables Duct Protective cover of the launch tube
  101. 101. UNHA SLV first stage © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  102. 102. Solid propelled SLBM © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  103. 103. Preliminary conclusions • DPRK has finished the design of two versions of the HS-13 ballistic missile. • DPRK has succeeded to built a miniaturized nuclear bomb to fit its large ballistic missiles. • DPRK has the technology to design, manufacture and test of re-entry vehicles for ballistic missiles. • Transfer of DPRK missile technologies is conformed in regard to Iran and Pakistan, among other countries. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  104. 104. Future prospects • Static tests of both versions of the HS-13 must be conducted (including separation tests – for stages of the missiles, AND the re-entry vehicles must be conducted). NOTE – This might have been partially achieved through launches of the UNHA satellite launch vehicle. • Nuclear test with the miniaturized bomb must be conducted (this MAY HAVE been done already, with reduced yield). • Dynamic tests (launches) of both versions of the HS-13 missile must be conducted to test the design and build reliability. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  105. 105. Future prospects • NK might develop even smaller nuclear warheads, to fit its arsenal of Nodong missiles. • If they will, it will have a profound influence on all assessments regarding Iran – since Iranian Shahab 3, Ghader 110 are Nodong derivatives. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  106. 106. talinbar@fisherinstitute.org.il © 2016 by Tal Inbar Contact Information
  107. 107. Back up slides © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  108. 108. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  109. 109. © 2016 by Tal Inbar First presentation of a space launcher to Iran’s supreme leader Half section of the fairing Launcher forward section Satellite
  110. 110. © 2016 by Tal Inbar The satellite launcher – integral part of Iran’s missiles arsenal Shahab missile Sajil missile Safir satellite launch vehicle
  111. 111. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
  112. 112. © 2016 by Tal Inbar

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