SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 9
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Critical Infrastructure Security Woes
...and Why it Matters

Webinar
Introduction
Who We Are
Jay Kaplan, CEO & Co-Founder
Julia Yrani, Strategic Alliances Lead
Wesley Wineberg, Security Research Engineer
What We’ll Cover
Critical Infrastructure Sentiment Survey Results briefed during RSA 2016
Technical Deep-dive on Implications
Potential Technology and Policy-driven Solutions
Survey Demographics

Industries: Transportation, Healthcare and Public Health, Energy, Water and
Wastewater Systems, Financial Services

Titles: Information Technology / Security / Risk Management, Operations,
Engineering
Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective
What we see:
55% of respondents said
they had no dedicated
security team, another
10% have a single
dedicated resource.
What an attacker sees:
A single security person to manage the security of
dozens or hundreds of ICS endpoints is going to
be ineffective
Companies never permit IT to interact with their
Process Control Systems. This means that
organizations that only have IT security in effect
have no SCADA/ICS security.
An attacker thus has a very low chance of being
detected in most cases as there is simply no one
who is handling the security of these systems
Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective

What we see:
Only 33% of respondents
were concerned about weak/
outdated network systems. 
What an attacker knows:
Unlike consumer and business software / systems,
SCADA systems are always running software that
is years old and does not integrate security
patches. 
Process control systems often have a 30 year
lifespan, which also includes the computers and
software which run these systems.
Reliability is always chosen over frequent updates to
systems and software, leaving systems open to
vulnerabilities for months and years at a time.
Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective

What an attacker does:
The larger the network, the easier to hack - all large
business networks have been hacked at one point
(or are still actively compromised).
An attacker can easily pivot to the process control
network.
They can then steal proprietary data and trade secrets,
cause millions of dollars of downtime, or with
careful planning, cause irreparable damage to the
process control system - both physical and
electronic damage. 
What we see:
67% stated that they have direct
connectivity from their
corporate network to the
internal process control
systems
92% admit both inside-out and
outside-in connectivity
Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective
What we see:
Over 60% of respondents
don’t have adequate training,
budget, systems updates
lined up in the near term.
What an attacker sees:
Essentially, poor training, unpatched systems, and
limited budgets all make for an easy to hack target
Attackers will always target the weakest systems for
compromise first, and then attempt to expand
access
Attackers are increasingly becoming aware of the fact
that critical infrastructure is a poorly secured
target
Solutions

Technology
Connectivity comes with the trade-off of adding a path into an (arguably) impossible to
secure system
Companies should consider the actual risk they have taken on by adding external
connections to process control networks. 
Technology controls that are possible include “one-way” data transfer appliances,
safety systems (which are not network controlled or connected)
This comes with additional costs and challenges, but greatly helps to limit likelihood of
attack and the impact of a compromise
Policy
Define and implement policy that requires a more secure architecture across all critical
infrastructure industries. This will drive budget towards solving the problem.
Thank You

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Demonstrating Information Security Program Effectiveness
Demonstrating Information Security Program EffectivenessDemonstrating Information Security Program Effectiveness
Demonstrating Information Security Program EffectivenessDoug Copley
 
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - Overview
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - OverviewSVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - Overview
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - OverviewSilicon Valley Bank
 
The insider versus external threat
The insider versus external threatThe insider versus external threat
The insider versus external threatzhihaochen
 
4 Cyber Security KPIs
4 Cyber Security KPIs4 Cyber Security KPIs
4 Cyber Security KPIsSteven Aiello
 
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation ReportSVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation ReportSilicon Valley Bank
 
7 cyber security questions for boards
7 cyber security questions for boards7 cyber security questions for boards
7 cyber security questions for boardsPaul McGillicuddy
 
2016 Scalar Security Study Roadshow
2016 Scalar Security Study Roadshow2016 Scalar Security Study Roadshow
2016 Scalar Security Study RoadshowScalar Decisions
 
How to measure your cybersecurity performance
How to measure your cybersecurity performanceHow to measure your cybersecurity performance
How to measure your cybersecurity performanceAbhishek Sood
 
Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...
Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...
Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...IBM Security
 
Overcoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security Model
Overcoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security ModelOvercoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security Model
Overcoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security ModelOnRamp
 
Embracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your Decision
Embracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your DecisionEmbracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your Decision
Embracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your DecisionCylance
 
Risk monitoring and response
Risk monitoring and responseRisk monitoring and response
Risk monitoring and responseZyrellLalaguna
 
Symantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global Results
Symantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global ResultsSymantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global Results
Symantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global ResultsSymantec
 
Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008
Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008
Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008John Gilligan
 
Building an effective Information Security Roadmap
Building an effective Information Security RoadmapBuilding an effective Information Security Roadmap
Building an effective Information Security RoadmapElliott Franklin
 
Security and PCI: 4 Things You Need to Know
Security and PCI: 4 Things You Need to KnowSecurity and PCI: 4 Things You Need to Know
Security and PCI: 4 Things You Need to KnowThe Internet of Things
 

Was ist angesagt? (19)

Demonstrating Information Security Program Effectiveness
Demonstrating Information Security Program EffectivenessDemonstrating Information Security Program Effectiveness
Demonstrating Information Security Program Effectiveness
 
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - Overview
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - OverviewSVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - Overview
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report - Overview
 
The insider versus external threat
The insider versus external threatThe insider versus external threat
The insider versus external threat
 
4 Cyber Security KPIs
4 Cyber Security KPIs4 Cyber Security KPIs
4 Cyber Security KPIs
 
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation ReportSVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report
SVB Cybersecurity Impact on Innovation Report
 
7 cyber security questions for boards
7 cyber security questions for boards7 cyber security questions for boards
7 cyber security questions for boards
 
2016 Scalar Security Study Roadshow
2016 Scalar Security Study Roadshow2016 Scalar Security Study Roadshow
2016 Scalar Security Study Roadshow
 
How to measure your cybersecurity performance
How to measure your cybersecurity performanceHow to measure your cybersecurity performance
How to measure your cybersecurity performance
 
Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...
Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...
Leaders & Laggards: The Latest Findings from the Ponemon Institute’s Study on...
 
when minutes counts
when minutes countswhen minutes counts
when minutes counts
 
Overcoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security Model
Overcoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security ModelOvercoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security Model
Overcoming Hidden Risks in a Shared Security Model
 
Embracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your Decision
Embracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your DecisionEmbracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your Decision
Embracing Threat Intelligence and Finding ROI in Your Decision
 
Risk monitoring and response
Risk monitoring and responseRisk monitoring and response
Risk monitoring and response
 
Symantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global Results
Symantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global ResultsSymantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global Results
Symantec 2011 Encryption Flash Poll Global Results
 
CAPP Conference Survey
CAPP Conference SurveyCAPP Conference Survey
CAPP Conference Survey
 
Cylance Information Security: Compromise Assessment Datasheet
Cylance Information Security: Compromise Assessment DatasheetCylance Information Security: Compromise Assessment Datasheet
Cylance Information Security: Compromise Assessment Datasheet
 
Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008
Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008
Consensus Audit Guidelines 2008
 
Building an effective Information Security Roadmap
Building an effective Information Security RoadmapBuilding an effective Information Security Roadmap
Building an effective Information Security Roadmap
 
Security and PCI: 4 Things You Need to Know
Security and PCI: 4 Things You Need to KnowSecurity and PCI: 4 Things You Need to Know
Security and PCI: 4 Things You Need to Know
 

Ähnlich wie Synack cirtical infrasructure webinar

Understanding the security_organization
Understanding the security_organizationUnderstanding the security_organization
Understanding the security_organizationDan Morrill
 
How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?
How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?
How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?Hitachi ID Systems, Inc.
 
2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summarypatmisasi
 
State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3Lumension
 
State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3Lumension
 
State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3Lumension
 
NEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdf
NEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdfNEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdf
NEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdfIDG
 
Ethical hacking a licence to hack
Ethical hacking a licence to hackEthical hacking a licence to hack
Ethical hacking a licence to hackamrutharam
 
Federal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider Threats
Federal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider ThreatsFederal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider Threats
Federal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider ThreatsSolarWinds
 
Threat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security Conference
Threat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security ConferenceThreat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security Conference
Threat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security ConferenceSolarWinds
 
Convergence innovative integration of security
Convergence   innovative integration of securityConvergence   innovative integration of security
Convergence innovative integration of securityciso_insights
 
2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summarypatmisasi
 
MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2
MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2
MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2Chris Baldwin
 
Survey: Insider Threats and Cyber Security
Survey: Insider Threats and Cyber SecuritySurvey: Insider Threats and Cyber Security
Survey: Insider Threats and Cyber SecurityImperva
 
Network Security Risks and Challenges for Enterprises
Network Security Risks and Challenges for EnterprisesNetwork Security Risks and Challenges for Enterprises
Network Security Risks and Challenges for EnterprisesSandeep Yadav
 
Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022
Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022
Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022Gartner Peer Insights
 
Data security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterprise
Data security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterpriseData security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterprise
Data security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterpriseThe Economist Media Businesses
 
Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01
Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01
Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01rajkumar jonuboyena
 
Strategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity Risks
Strategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity RisksStrategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity Risks
Strategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity RisksMatthew Rosenquist
 
Insider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdf
Insider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdfInsider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdf
Insider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdframsetl
 

Ähnlich wie Synack cirtical infrasructure webinar (20)

Understanding the security_organization
Understanding the security_organizationUnderstanding the security_organization
Understanding the security_organization
 
How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?
How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?
How Well is Your Organization Protecting its Real Crown Jewels - Identities?
 
2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2016 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
 
State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3
 
State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3
 
State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3State of endpoint risk v3
State of endpoint risk v3
 
NEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdf
NEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdfNEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdf
NEW_Security Priorities 2021_Sample Slides.pdf
 
Ethical hacking a licence to hack
Ethical hacking a licence to hackEthical hacking a licence to hack
Ethical hacking a licence to hack
 
Federal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider Threats
Federal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider ThreatsFederal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider Threats
Federal Webinar: Best Practices and Tools for Reducing Insider Threats
 
Threat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security Conference
Threat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security ConferenceThreat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security Conference
Threat Detection as presented at the 2016 DGI Cyber security Conference
 
Convergence innovative integration of security
Convergence   innovative integration of securityConvergence   innovative integration of security
Convergence innovative integration of security
 
2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
2015 Scalar Security Study Executive Summary
 
MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2
MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2
MUSE 2015 Product Showcase v2
 
Survey: Insider Threats and Cyber Security
Survey: Insider Threats and Cyber SecuritySurvey: Insider Threats and Cyber Security
Survey: Insider Threats and Cyber Security
 
Network Security Risks and Challenges for Enterprises
Network Security Risks and Challenges for EnterprisesNetwork Security Risks and Challenges for Enterprises
Network Security Risks and Challenges for Enterprises
 
Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022
Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022
Cybersecurity Quarterly Benchmarks Q1 2022
 
Data security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterprise
Data security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterpriseData security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterprise
Data security: How a proactive C-suite can reduce cyber-risk for the enterprise
 
Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01
Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01
Ethicalhackingalicencetohack 120223062548-phpapp01
 
Strategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity Risks
Strategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity RisksStrategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity Risks
Strategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity Risks
 
Insider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdf
Insider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdfInsider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdf
Insider_Threats_in_Healthcare_1651617236.pdf
 

Mehr von Synack

Zeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanning
Zeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanningZeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanning
Zeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanningSynack
 
[DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one!
[DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one![DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one!
[DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one!Synack
 
iOS Automation Primitives
iOS Automation PrimitivesiOS Automation Primitives
iOS Automation PrimitivesSynack
 
OS X Malware: Let's Play Doctor
OS X Malware: Let's Play DoctorOS X Malware: Let's Play Doctor
OS X Malware: Let's Play DoctorSynack
 
RSA OSX Malware
RSA OSX MalwareRSA OSX Malware
RSA OSX MalwareSynack
 
Gatekeeper Exposed
Gatekeeper ExposedGatekeeper Exposed
Gatekeeper ExposedSynack
 
Virus Bulletin 2015: Exposing Gatekeeper
Virus Bulletin 2015: Exposing GatekeeperVirus Bulletin 2015: Exposing Gatekeeper
Virus Bulletin 2015: Exposing GatekeeperSynack
 
DEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke It
DEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke ItDEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke It
DEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke ItSynack
 
DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...
DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...
DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...Synack
 
DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!
DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!
DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!Synack
 
DEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 Devices
DEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 DevicesDEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 Devices
DEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 DevicesSynack
 
Black Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X
Black Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS XBlack Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X
Black Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS XSynack
 
Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...
Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...
Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...Synack
 
DLL Hijacking on OS X
DLL Hijacking on OS XDLL Hijacking on OS X
DLL Hijacking on OS XSynack
 
Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity and You
Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity and YouElectromagnetic Hypersensitivity and You
Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity and YouSynack
 
Home Automation Benchmarking Report
Home Automation Benchmarking ReportHome Automation Benchmarking Report
Home Automation Benchmarking ReportSynack
 
Let's Hack a House
Let's Hack a HouseLet's Hack a House
Let's Hack a HouseSynack
 
Synack at AppSec California with Patrick Wardle
Synack at AppSec California with Patrick WardleSynack at AppSec California with Patrick Wardle
Synack at AppSec California with Patrick WardleSynack
 
Synack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation Vulnerabilities
Synack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation VulnerabilitiesSynack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation Vulnerabilities
Synack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation VulnerabilitiesSynack
 
Synack at ShmooCon 2015
Synack at ShmooCon 2015Synack at ShmooCon 2015
Synack at ShmooCon 2015Synack
 

Mehr von Synack (20)

Zeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanning
Zeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanningZeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanning
Zeronights 2016 - Automating iOS blackbox security scanning
 
[DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one!
[DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one![DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one!
[DefCon 2016] I got 99 Problems, but 
Little Snitch ain’t one!
 
iOS Automation Primitives
iOS Automation PrimitivesiOS Automation Primitives
iOS Automation Primitives
 
OS X Malware: Let's Play Doctor
OS X Malware: Let's Play DoctorOS X Malware: Let's Play Doctor
OS X Malware: Let's Play Doctor
 
RSA OSX Malware
RSA OSX MalwareRSA OSX Malware
RSA OSX Malware
 
Gatekeeper Exposed
Gatekeeper ExposedGatekeeper Exposed
Gatekeeper Exposed
 
Virus Bulletin 2015: Exposing Gatekeeper
Virus Bulletin 2015: Exposing GatekeeperVirus Bulletin 2015: Exposing Gatekeeper
Virus Bulletin 2015: Exposing Gatekeeper
 
DEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke It
DEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke ItDEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke It
DEF CON 23: Stick That In Your (root)Pipe & Smoke It
 
DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...
DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...
DEF CON 23: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simplex ...
 
DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!
DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!
DEF CON 23: 'DLL Hijacking' on OS X? #@%& Yeah!
 
DEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 Devices
DEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 DevicesDEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 Devices
DEF CON 23: Internet of Things: Hacking 14 Devices
 
Black Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X
Black Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS XBlack Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X
Black Hat '15: Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X
 
Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...
Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...
Black Hat '15: Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking: Attacking The GlobalStar Simpl...
 
DLL Hijacking on OS X
DLL Hijacking on OS XDLL Hijacking on OS X
DLL Hijacking on OS X
 
Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity and You
Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity and YouElectromagnetic Hypersensitivity and You
Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity and You
 
Home Automation Benchmarking Report
Home Automation Benchmarking ReportHome Automation Benchmarking Report
Home Automation Benchmarking Report
 
Let's Hack a House
Let's Hack a HouseLet's Hack a House
Let's Hack a House
 
Synack at AppSec California with Patrick Wardle
Synack at AppSec California with Patrick WardleSynack at AppSec California with Patrick Wardle
Synack at AppSec California with Patrick Wardle
 
Synack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation Vulnerabilities
Synack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation VulnerabilitiesSynack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation Vulnerabilities
Synack at AppSec California 2015 - Geolocation Vulnerabilities
 
Synack at ShmooCon 2015
Synack at ShmooCon 2015Synack at ShmooCon 2015
Synack at ShmooCon 2015
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteDianaGray10
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Mark Simos
 
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks..."LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...Fwdays
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsSergiu Bodiu
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Mattias Andersson
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxhariprasad279825
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek SchlawackFwdays
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLScyllaDB
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubKalema Edgar
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time ClashPowerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clashcharlottematthew16
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Commit University
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):comworks
 
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr BaganFwdays
 
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL CertsScanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL CertsRizwan Syed
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationSlibray Presentation
 
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 3652toLead Limited
 
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level pieceStory boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piececharlottematthew16
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
 
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks..."LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time ClashPowerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
 
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
 
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL CertsScanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
 
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
 
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level pieceStory boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
 

Synack cirtical infrasructure webinar

  • 1. Critical Infrastructure Security Woes ...and Why it Matters Webinar
  • 2. Introduction Who We Are Jay Kaplan, CEO & Co-Founder Julia Yrani, Strategic Alliances Lead Wesley Wineberg, Security Research Engineer What We’ll Cover Critical Infrastructure Sentiment Survey Results briefed during RSA 2016 Technical Deep-dive on Implications Potential Technology and Policy-driven Solutions
  • 3. Survey Demographics Industries: Transportation, Healthcare and Public Health, Energy, Water and Wastewater Systems, Financial Services Titles: Information Technology / Security / Risk Management, Operations, Engineering
  • 4. Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective What we see: 55% of respondents said they had no dedicated security team, another 10% have a single dedicated resource. What an attacker sees: A single security person to manage the security of dozens or hundreds of ICS endpoints is going to be ineffective Companies never permit IT to interact with their Process Control Systems. This means that organizations that only have IT security in effect have no SCADA/ICS security. An attacker thus has a very low chance of being detected in most cases as there is simply no one who is handling the security of these systems
  • 5. Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective What we see: Only 33% of respondents were concerned about weak/ outdated network systems. What an attacker knows: Unlike consumer and business software / systems, SCADA systems are always running software that is years old and does not integrate security patches. Process control systems often have a 30 year lifespan, which also includes the computers and software which run these systems. Reliability is always chosen over frequent updates to systems and software, leaving systems open to vulnerabilities for months and years at a time.
  • 6. Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective What an attacker does: The larger the network, the easier to hack - all large business networks have been hacked at one point (or are still actively compromised). An attacker can easily pivot to the process control network. They can then steal proprietary data and trade secrets, cause millions of dollars of downtime, or with careful planning, cause irreparable damage to the process control system - both physical and electronic damage. What we see: 67% stated that they have direct connectivity from their corporate network to the internal process control systems 92% admit both inside-out and outside-in connectivity
  • 7. Survey Findings from an Attacker’s Perspective What we see: Over 60% of respondents don’t have adequate training, budget, systems updates lined up in the near term. What an attacker sees: Essentially, poor training, unpatched systems, and limited budgets all make for an easy to hack target Attackers will always target the weakest systems for compromise first, and then attempt to expand access Attackers are increasingly becoming aware of the fact that critical infrastructure is a poorly secured target
  • 8. Solutions Technology Connectivity comes with the trade-off of adding a path into an (arguably) impossible to secure system Companies should consider the actual risk they have taken on by adding external connections to process control networks. Technology controls that are possible include “one-way” data transfer appliances, safety systems (which are not network controlled or connected) This comes with additional costs and challenges, but greatly helps to limit likelihood of attack and the impact of a compromise Policy Define and implement policy that requires a more secure architecture across all critical infrastructure industries. This will drive budget towards solving the problem.