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4G Security - What hackers know?4G Security - What hackers know?
4G Security - What hackers know?
OHM 2013
0
1 August 2013
Stephen Kho/ Rob Kuiters
4G Security - What hackers know?
Agenda
•Who we are & why we are giving this talk?
•Introduction and transition to 4G
•4G network architectural overview
•Protocols you need to know
•LTE & EPC components and vulnerabilities
•Mitigation & best practises
•Conclusions
•Q&A
1
4G Security - What hackers know?
Who we are & why this talk?
•Stephen Kho & Rob Kuiters
•KPN CISO Team
•KPN-CERT & REDteam
•Penetration Testing & Incident Response
•Overview of transition to 4G technology
•Provide understanding of components, protocols and
vulnerabilities
2
4G Security - What hackers know?3
Introduction and transition to 4G
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
4
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
5
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
6
• 1G Nordic Mobile Telephone (1980)
• 2G Global System for Mobile Communication
(1994)
• 3G Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(2004)
• 4G Evolved Packet System (2013)
• 5G ???? Somewhere 2023
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
7
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
8
User Equipment Radio Network Core Network
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
2G
9
Basic Components
• Basestation Tranciever
• Basestation Controler
• Mobile Switching Centre / Visitor Loction Register
• Home Location Register
Main Protocols
• BSSAP
• MAP / ISUP
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
2G
10
BSC
HLR
UE
BTS
MSC / VLR GMSC
voice
SS7
Walled Garden
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
2G and some
11
Basic Components
• Basestation Tranciever
• Basestation Controler
• Mobile Switching Centre / Visitor Location Register
• Serving GPRS Support Node / Vistor Location Register
• Gateway GPRS Support Node
• DNS
• Home Location Register
Main Protocols
• BSSAP / BSSGP
• GTP
• IP
• MAP / ISUP
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
2G and some
12
Not So Walled Garden
BSC
HLR
UE
BTS
MSC / VLR GMSC
voice
SS7
SGSN GGSN
WWW /
PDN
GRX
DNS
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
3G
13
Basic Components
• NodeB
• Radio Network Controller
• Mobile Switching Centre / Visitor Loction Register
• Serving GPRS Support Node / Vistor Location Register
• Gateway GPRS Support Node
• DNS
• Home Location Register / Authentication Centre
Main Protocols
• RANAP
• GTP
• IP
• MAP / ISUP UMTS
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
3G
14
BSC
HLR
UE
BTS
MSC / VLR GMSC
voice
SS7
SGSN GGSN
WWW /
PDN
GRX
DNS
Not So Walled Garden
RNC
NodeB
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
3G
15
Basic Components
• E NodeB
• Mobile Mobility Entity
• Serving Gateway
• Packet Data Network Gateway
• DNS
• Home Subscriber System
Main Protocols
• Diameter
• GTP
• IP
4G Security - What hackers know?
Introduction and transition to 4G
2G
16
S-GW
HSS
UE
BTS
MME
PDN GW
WWW /
PDN
IPX / GRX
Semi public open place
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
Testing approach
•Infrastructure penetration test
•Host based security assessment
•Web application testing
•Code review
17
Information Gathering
Vulnerability Analysis
Exploitation
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
18
Where and what did we test?
Evolved Packet Core (EPC)
PDN-GWSeGW
MME HSS
eNodeB
DRA
UE
Internet
DNS
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
Diameter Routing Agent
(DRA)
•Helps reduce number of connections
between devices
•Complex routing and provisioning
•Load balancing and congestion
control
•Multi-vendor interoperability
•Security functions – protocol
validation
19
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
20
DRA vulnerabilities found (example from a vendor)
•Infrastructure penetration test
•MySQL installation running with root user privileges & without a password
•Improper network segmentation for running services
•Weak password policy on the OS
•Multiple users with sudo rights without a password.
•Multiple software security patches are missing
•Easy to guess SNMPv3 password
•Web application test
•Multiple default accounts
•Inadequate user privilege separation
•Insecure SSL certificate
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
21
Packet Data Network Gateway (PDN-GW)
• Connects UE to PDN
• Performs policy enforcement
• Packet filtering for each user
• Charging support
• Lawful Interception
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
22
PDN-GW vulnerabilities found (example from a popular vendor)
•Host security assessment
•No firmware hashing or cryptographic verification
•Clear-text transmission of PDN-GW login credentials
•PDN-GW username enumeration possible
•No failed login account lockout
•Self-signed and expired SSL certificate
•Weak password policy – no complexity
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
23
PDN-GW vulnerabilities found (example from a popular vendor)
•Code review (manual & automated static code analysis)
•Hardcoded symmetric password encryption keys used
•Weak lawful interception key generation
•Software verification bypass
•Weak authentication mechanism – weak encryption and hashing algorithm
(DES,MD5)
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
24
Home Subscriber Server (HSS)
•Central database for user-related and subscription-related information
•Mobility management, call and session establishment support
•User authentication and access authorization
4G Security - What hackers know?
EPC components and vulnerabilities
25
HSS vulnerabilities found (example from another popular vendor)
•Infrastructure penetration test
•World exported NFS shares
•Sensitive data stored on HSS NFS shares
•Default account credentials in use
•Critical security updates missing
•Unnecessary services running
4G Security - What hackers know?
Mitigation & best practises
26
 Implement network segmentation & filtering
 Utilise centralised identity and access management
 Enforce vendor security patch update
 Implement security patch management
 Perform regular vulnerability scans
 Carry out in-depth penetration tests
 Implement host & network based IDS
 Practice incident response
4G Security - What hackers know?
Conclusion
•The Wallled Garden telcos use to have are no longer
•Vendor OSes are Linux or Windows based
•Common IP network vulnerabilities are in 4G network
•Telco vendors need to raise their IP security awareness
•Adopt common IP network security best practises and mitigations
•The community needs to help mature the overall security level of these “newer”
protocols e.g. Diameter by doing more research
27
4G Security - What hackers know?4G Security - What hackers know?
Thank you for your attention
28
rob.kuiters@kpn.com
stephen.kho@kpn.com

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4G LTE Security - What hackers know?

  • 1. 4G Security - What hackers know?4G Security - What hackers know? 4G Security - What hackers know? OHM 2013 0 1 August 2013 Stephen Kho/ Rob Kuiters
  • 2. 4G Security - What hackers know? Agenda •Who we are & why we are giving this talk? •Introduction and transition to 4G •4G network architectural overview •Protocols you need to know •LTE & EPC components and vulnerabilities •Mitigation & best practises •Conclusions •Q&A 1
  • 3. 4G Security - What hackers know? Who we are & why this talk? •Stephen Kho & Rob Kuiters •KPN CISO Team •KPN-CERT & REDteam •Penetration Testing & Incident Response •Overview of transition to 4G technology •Provide understanding of components, protocols and vulnerabilities 2
  • 4. 4G Security - What hackers know?3 Introduction and transition to 4G
  • 5. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 4
  • 6. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 5
  • 7. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 6 • 1G Nordic Mobile Telephone (1980) • 2G Global System for Mobile Communication (1994) • 3G Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (2004) • 4G Evolved Packet System (2013) • 5G ???? Somewhere 2023
  • 8. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 7
  • 9. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 8 User Equipment Radio Network Core Network
  • 10. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 2G 9 Basic Components • Basestation Tranciever • Basestation Controler • Mobile Switching Centre / Visitor Loction Register • Home Location Register Main Protocols • BSSAP • MAP / ISUP
  • 11. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 2G 10 BSC HLR UE BTS MSC / VLR GMSC voice SS7 Walled Garden
  • 12. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 2G and some 11 Basic Components • Basestation Tranciever • Basestation Controler • Mobile Switching Centre / Visitor Location Register • Serving GPRS Support Node / Vistor Location Register • Gateway GPRS Support Node • DNS • Home Location Register Main Protocols • BSSAP / BSSGP • GTP • IP • MAP / ISUP
  • 13. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 2G and some 12 Not So Walled Garden BSC HLR UE BTS MSC / VLR GMSC voice SS7 SGSN GGSN WWW / PDN GRX DNS
  • 14. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 3G 13 Basic Components • NodeB • Radio Network Controller • Mobile Switching Centre / Visitor Loction Register • Serving GPRS Support Node / Vistor Location Register • Gateway GPRS Support Node • DNS • Home Location Register / Authentication Centre Main Protocols • RANAP • GTP • IP • MAP / ISUP UMTS
  • 15. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 3G 14 BSC HLR UE BTS MSC / VLR GMSC voice SS7 SGSN GGSN WWW / PDN GRX DNS Not So Walled Garden RNC NodeB
  • 16. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 3G 15 Basic Components • E NodeB • Mobile Mobility Entity • Serving Gateway • Packet Data Network Gateway • DNS • Home Subscriber System Main Protocols • Diameter • GTP • IP
  • 17. 4G Security - What hackers know? Introduction and transition to 4G 2G 16 S-GW HSS UE BTS MME PDN GW WWW / PDN IPX / GRX Semi public open place
  • 18. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities Testing approach •Infrastructure penetration test •Host based security assessment •Web application testing •Code review 17 Information Gathering Vulnerability Analysis Exploitation
  • 19. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities 18 Where and what did we test? Evolved Packet Core (EPC) PDN-GWSeGW MME HSS eNodeB DRA UE Internet DNS
  • 20. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities Diameter Routing Agent (DRA) •Helps reduce number of connections between devices •Complex routing and provisioning •Load balancing and congestion control •Multi-vendor interoperability •Security functions – protocol validation 19
  • 21. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities 20 DRA vulnerabilities found (example from a vendor) •Infrastructure penetration test •MySQL installation running with root user privileges & without a password •Improper network segmentation for running services •Weak password policy on the OS •Multiple users with sudo rights without a password. •Multiple software security patches are missing •Easy to guess SNMPv3 password •Web application test •Multiple default accounts •Inadequate user privilege separation •Insecure SSL certificate
  • 22. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities 21 Packet Data Network Gateway (PDN-GW) • Connects UE to PDN • Performs policy enforcement • Packet filtering for each user • Charging support • Lawful Interception
  • 23. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities 22 PDN-GW vulnerabilities found (example from a popular vendor) •Host security assessment •No firmware hashing or cryptographic verification •Clear-text transmission of PDN-GW login credentials •PDN-GW username enumeration possible •No failed login account lockout •Self-signed and expired SSL certificate •Weak password policy – no complexity
  • 24. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities 23 PDN-GW vulnerabilities found (example from a popular vendor) •Code review (manual & automated static code analysis) •Hardcoded symmetric password encryption keys used •Weak lawful interception key generation •Software verification bypass •Weak authentication mechanism – weak encryption and hashing algorithm (DES,MD5)
  • 25. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities 24 Home Subscriber Server (HSS) •Central database for user-related and subscription-related information •Mobility management, call and session establishment support •User authentication and access authorization
  • 26. 4G Security - What hackers know? EPC components and vulnerabilities 25 HSS vulnerabilities found (example from another popular vendor) •Infrastructure penetration test •World exported NFS shares •Sensitive data stored on HSS NFS shares •Default account credentials in use •Critical security updates missing •Unnecessary services running
  • 27. 4G Security - What hackers know? Mitigation & best practises 26  Implement network segmentation & filtering  Utilise centralised identity and access management  Enforce vendor security patch update  Implement security patch management  Perform regular vulnerability scans  Carry out in-depth penetration tests  Implement host & network based IDS  Practice incident response
  • 28. 4G Security - What hackers know? Conclusion •The Wallled Garden telcos use to have are no longer •Vendor OSes are Linux or Windows based •Common IP network vulnerabilities are in 4G network •Telco vendors need to raise their IP security awareness •Adopt common IP network security best practises and mitigations •The community needs to help mature the overall security level of these “newer” protocols e.g. Diameter by doing more research 27
  • 29. 4G Security - What hackers know?4G Security - What hackers know? Thank you for your attention 28 rob.kuiters@kpn.com stephen.kho@kpn.com