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XFLTReaT:
a new dimension in tunnelling
Balazs Bucsay / @xoreipeip
Senior Security Consultant @ NCC Group
Bio / Balazs Bucsay
•  Hungarian hacker
•  Senior Security Consultant @ NCC Group
•  Strictly technical certificates: OSCE, OSCP, OSWP, GIAC GPEN, CREST CCT/2
•  Lots of experience in offensive security
•  Started with ring0 debuggers and disassemblers in 2000 (13 years old)
•  Major projects:
•  GI John (2009) – Hacktivity
•  Chw00t (2015) – PHDays, DeepSec, Hacktivity
•  XFLTReaT (2017) – Shakacon ;)
•  Twitter: @xoreipeip
•  Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bucsayb
Presentations
•  Talks around the world: •  Honolulu (HI) / Shakacon (returning speaker)
•  Atlanta (GA) / Hacker Halted
•  Moscow (RU) / PHDays
•  Oslo (NO) / HackCon
•  Vienna (AT) / DeepSec
•  Budapest (HU) / Hacktivity
•  London (UK) / Inf. Gov. & eDiscovery Summit
•  There is some more space here…
@xoreipeip
Tunnels
Without a tunnel
5
@xoreipeip
With a tunnel
6
@xoreipeip
Why would one use tunnels?
•  Work VPN – to access the corporate internal network
•  Hide real IP address
•  Whistle-blowers/Journalists to communicate anonymously
•  Torrent
•  ISPs filtering some ports (secure IMAP, SMTPS, NetBIOS, …)
•  Bypass corporate proxy policy
•  Bypass captive portals!?
•  What about you?
@xoreipeip
Have you done … tunnelling?
Protocol Tool
TCP
@xoreipeip
Have you done … tunnelling?
Protocol Tool
TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect
UDP
@xoreipeip
Have you done … tunnelling?
Protocol Tool
TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect
UDP OpenVPN
ICMP
@xoreipeip
Have you done … tunnelling?
Protocol Tool
TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect
UDP OpenVPN
ICMP Hans Ping Tunnel ICMPTx
DNS
@xoreipeip
Have you done … tunnelling?
Protocol Tool
TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect
UDP OpenVPN
ICMP Hans Ping Tunnel ICMPTx
DNS iodine DNSCat* Ozymandns
HTTP CONNECT Proxifier
Pure HTTP ?
TLS v1.2 ?
TLS v1.2 with Kerberos auth ?
@xoreipeip
Oh no! I forgot to set up my OpenVPN on port 443
(Port TCP/443 unfiltered)
Two days on a ferry
10 hour flight to Japan
(ICMP unfiltered)
At the airport
(DNS unfiltered)
What did I see?
Get tired of:
•  As many protocols as many solutions
•  Hard to modify the existing ones
•  No modularity
•  Portability issues
•  Configuration issues
•  Unsupported/EoL tools
•  No automation at all
•  It is just hard, but it does not have to be!
@xoreipeip
XFLTReaT
The beast was born!
Tunnelling theory 101 / MTU
@xoreipeip
What is XFLTReaT?
XFLTReaT (say exfil-treat or exfiltrate)
•  Tunnelling framework
•  Open-source (will be released soon)
•  Python based
•  OOP
•  Modular
•  Multi client
•  Plug and Play (at least as easy as it can be)
•  Check functionality
@xoreipeip
Easy, modular, plug & play
•  Install:
•  git clone & pip install
•  edit config
•  run
•  Tunnels, encryption, authentication etc. are modular
•  Plug and play:
•  Copy new module into modules/, support files to support/
•  edit config
•  run
@xoreipeip
Framework, as it is
You do not have to:
•  Set up the routing
•  Handle multiple users
•  Create and set up an interface or interfaces
•  Care about encryption, authentication or encoding
You only have to:
•  Package your packets into your protocol
•  Implement protocol related things
@xoreipeip
Check functionality
•  Easy way to figure out, which protocol is not filtered on the network
•  Automated approach: No deep knowledge is needed
•  Client sends a challenge over the selected (or all) modules to the server
•  If the server responses with the solution:
•  We know that the server is up and running
•  The specific module/protocol is working over the network
•  Connection can be made
@xoreipeip
One interface to rule them all
@xoreipeip
Ease of development
Module tree
@xoreipeip
Ease of use/development
•  Only web traffic allowed?
@xoreipeip
Ease of use/development
•  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80
•  Only ICMP type X allowed?
@xoreipeip
Ease of use/development
•  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80
•  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X
•  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2?
@xoreipeip
Ease of use/development
•  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80
•  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X
•  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only
•  HTTP should work, but only with special header?
@xoreipeip
Ease of use/development
•  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80
•  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X
•  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only
•  HTTP should work, but only with special header? Set the header in source
•  Want to send data over text/SMS?
@xoreipeip
Ease of use/development
•  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80
•  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X
•  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only
•  HTTP should work, but only with special header? Set the header in source
•  Want to send data over text/SMS? Handle connection with your phone from a module
•  Special authentication over HTTP proxy?
@xoreipeip
Ease of use/development
•  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80
•  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X
•  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only
•  HTTP should work, but only with special header? Set the header in source
•  Want to send data over text/SMS? Handle connection with your phone from a module
•  Special authentication over HTTP proxy? Implement the auth, change the config
•  PROTIP: just use the source!
@xoreipeip
DEMO
Offense
•  Bypass basic obstacles
•  Specific ports are unfiltered (TCP / UDP)
•  DNS allowed
•  ICMP allowed
•  Bypass not that basic obstacles
•  Specific protocol allowed (IPS or any other active device in place)
•  Special authentication required
•  Exfiltrate information from internal networks
•  Get unfiltered internet access
@xoreipeip
Defense for companies
Check your network settings
•  Check functionality
•  Try to exfiltrate data – check whether your active network device can catch it
Captive portals
•  Drop all packets that are addressed to external until not authenticated
•  All DNS query should have the same response (the portal)
@xoreipeip
Defense for companies
No solution is 100% secure
•  Do not route your network to the internet
•  Disable all traffic between the internet and internal network
•  Use HTTP Proxy and enforce it
•  Whitelist ports (80 and 443, would you need anything else?)
•  Blacklist websites (does not really help on XFLTReaT)
•  DNS
•  Filter external DNS queries if possible (let HTTP proxy do the resolving)
@xoreipeip
Defense for companies
No solution is 100% secure
•  Do you have an inventory? (IP, owner, purpose, location)
•  Do baselining (Use Netflow or Bro)
•  Check relation between IPs
•  What are the top talker source IPs (bytes, packets, flows)?
•  What are the top destination IPs (bytes, packets, flows)?
•  Any unusual activity should generate an alert/be blocked when you are done
@xoreipeip
TODO
•  Python 2.x and 3.x support
•  Multi OS support
•  More modules (DNS is the next one)
•  Encryption and authentication modules
•  Adding more comments to the code
@xoreipeip
Release
•  Will be released on Github
•  http://xfltreat.info
•  It takes some little more time, because:
•  Adding comments
•  More modules
•  Bug fixes
•  etc.
@xoreipeip
Q&A - Thank you for your attention
Balazs Bucsay / @xoreipeip
Office Locations
Europe
Manchester - Head Office
Amsterdam
Basingstoke
Cambridge
Copenhagen
Cheltenham
Delft
Edinburgh
Glasgow
The Hague
Leatherhead
Leeds
London
Madrid
Malmö
Milton Keynes
Munich
Vilnius
Zurich
North America
Atlanta, GA
Austin, TX
Boston, MA
Campbell, CA
Chicago, IL
Kitchener, ON
New York, NY
San Francisco, CA
Seattle, WA
Sunnyvale, CA
Toronto, ON
Asia-Pacific
Singapore
Sydney
Middle East
Dubai

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XFLTReat: a new dimension in tunnelling

  • 1. XFLTReaT: a new dimension in tunnelling Balazs Bucsay / @xoreipeip Senior Security Consultant @ NCC Group
  • 2. Bio / Balazs Bucsay •  Hungarian hacker •  Senior Security Consultant @ NCC Group •  Strictly technical certificates: OSCE, OSCP, OSWP, GIAC GPEN, CREST CCT/2 •  Lots of experience in offensive security •  Started with ring0 debuggers and disassemblers in 2000 (13 years old) •  Major projects: •  GI John (2009) – Hacktivity •  Chw00t (2015) – PHDays, DeepSec, Hacktivity •  XFLTReaT (2017) – Shakacon ;) •  Twitter: @xoreipeip •  Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bucsayb
  • 3. Presentations •  Talks around the world: •  Honolulu (HI) / Shakacon (returning speaker) •  Atlanta (GA) / Hacker Halted •  Moscow (RU) / PHDays •  Oslo (NO) / HackCon •  Vienna (AT) / DeepSec •  Budapest (HU) / Hacktivity •  London (UK) / Inf. Gov. & eDiscovery Summit •  There is some more space here… @xoreipeip
  • 7. Why would one use tunnels? •  Work VPN – to access the corporate internal network •  Hide real IP address •  Whistle-blowers/Journalists to communicate anonymously •  Torrent •  ISPs filtering some ports (secure IMAP, SMTPS, NetBIOS, …) •  Bypass corporate proxy policy •  Bypass captive portals!? •  What about you? @xoreipeip
  • 8. Have you done … tunnelling? Protocol Tool TCP @xoreipeip
  • 9. Have you done … tunnelling? Protocol Tool TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect UDP @xoreipeip
  • 10. Have you done … tunnelling? Protocol Tool TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect UDP OpenVPN ICMP @xoreipeip
  • 11. Have you done … tunnelling? Protocol Tool TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect UDP OpenVPN ICMP Hans Ping Tunnel ICMPTx DNS @xoreipeip
  • 12. Have you done … tunnelling? Protocol Tool TCP OpenVPN Cisco AnyConnect UDP OpenVPN ICMP Hans Ping Tunnel ICMPTx DNS iodine DNSCat* Ozymandns HTTP CONNECT Proxifier Pure HTTP ? TLS v1.2 ? TLS v1.2 with Kerberos auth ? @xoreipeip
  • 13. Oh no! I forgot to set up my OpenVPN on port 443 (Port TCP/443 unfiltered) Two days on a ferry
  • 14. 10 hour flight to Japan (ICMP unfiltered)
  • 15. At the airport (DNS unfiltered)
  • 16. What did I see? Get tired of: •  As many protocols as many solutions •  Hard to modify the existing ones •  No modularity •  Portability issues •  Configuration issues •  Unsupported/EoL tools •  No automation at all •  It is just hard, but it does not have to be! @xoreipeip
  • 18. Tunnelling theory 101 / MTU @xoreipeip
  • 19. What is XFLTReaT? XFLTReaT (say exfil-treat or exfiltrate) •  Tunnelling framework •  Open-source (will be released soon) •  Python based •  OOP •  Modular •  Multi client •  Plug and Play (at least as easy as it can be) •  Check functionality @xoreipeip
  • 20. Easy, modular, plug & play •  Install: •  git clone & pip install •  edit config •  run •  Tunnels, encryption, authentication etc. are modular •  Plug and play: •  Copy new module into modules/, support files to support/ •  edit config •  run @xoreipeip
  • 21. Framework, as it is You do not have to: •  Set up the routing •  Handle multiple users •  Create and set up an interface or interfaces •  Care about encryption, authentication or encoding You only have to: •  Package your packets into your protocol •  Implement protocol related things @xoreipeip
  • 22. Check functionality •  Easy way to figure out, which protocol is not filtered on the network •  Automated approach: No deep knowledge is needed •  Client sends a challenge over the selected (or all) modules to the server •  If the server responses with the solution: •  We know that the server is up and running •  The specific module/protocol is working over the network •  Connection can be made @xoreipeip
  • 23. One interface to rule them all @xoreipeip
  • 26. Ease of use/development •  Only web traffic allowed? @xoreipeip
  • 27. Ease of use/development •  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80 •  Only ICMP type X allowed? @xoreipeip
  • 28. Ease of use/development •  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80 •  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X •  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? @xoreipeip
  • 29. Ease of use/development •  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80 •  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X •  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only •  HTTP should work, but only with special header? @xoreipeip
  • 30. Ease of use/development •  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80 •  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X •  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only •  HTTP should work, but only with special header? Set the header in source •  Want to send data over text/SMS? @xoreipeip
  • 31. Ease of use/development •  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80 •  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X •  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only •  HTTP should work, but only with special header? Set the header in source •  Want to send data over text/SMS? Handle connection with your phone from a module •  Special authentication over HTTP proxy? @xoreipeip
  • 32. Ease of use/development •  Only web traffic allowed? Set your server on port TCP/80 •  Only ICMP type X allowed? Copy ICMP module, change type 8 to X •  HTTPS allowed but only with TLS v1.2? Copy TLS module, set it to 1.2 only •  HTTP should work, but only with special header? Set the header in source •  Want to send data over text/SMS? Handle connection with your phone from a module •  Special authentication over HTTP proxy? Implement the auth, change the config •  PROTIP: just use the source! @xoreipeip
  • 33. DEMO
  • 34. Offense •  Bypass basic obstacles •  Specific ports are unfiltered (TCP / UDP) •  DNS allowed •  ICMP allowed •  Bypass not that basic obstacles •  Specific protocol allowed (IPS or any other active device in place) •  Special authentication required •  Exfiltrate information from internal networks •  Get unfiltered internet access @xoreipeip
  • 35. Defense for companies Check your network settings •  Check functionality •  Try to exfiltrate data – check whether your active network device can catch it Captive portals •  Drop all packets that are addressed to external until not authenticated •  All DNS query should have the same response (the portal) @xoreipeip
  • 36. Defense for companies No solution is 100% secure •  Do not route your network to the internet •  Disable all traffic between the internet and internal network •  Use HTTP Proxy and enforce it •  Whitelist ports (80 and 443, would you need anything else?) •  Blacklist websites (does not really help on XFLTReaT) •  DNS •  Filter external DNS queries if possible (let HTTP proxy do the resolving) @xoreipeip
  • 37. Defense for companies No solution is 100% secure •  Do you have an inventory? (IP, owner, purpose, location) •  Do baselining (Use Netflow or Bro) •  Check relation between IPs •  What are the top talker source IPs (bytes, packets, flows)? •  What are the top destination IPs (bytes, packets, flows)? •  Any unusual activity should generate an alert/be blocked when you are done @xoreipeip
  • 38. TODO •  Python 2.x and 3.x support •  Multi OS support •  More modules (DNS is the next one) •  Encryption and authentication modules •  Adding more comments to the code @xoreipeip
  • 39. Release •  Will be released on Github •  http://xfltreat.info •  It takes some little more time, because: •  Adding comments •  More modules •  Bug fixes •  etc. @xoreipeip
  • 40. Q&A - Thank you for your attention Balazs Bucsay / @xoreipeip
  • 41. Office Locations Europe Manchester - Head Office Amsterdam Basingstoke Cambridge Copenhagen Cheltenham Delft Edinburgh Glasgow The Hague Leatherhead Leeds London Madrid Malmö Milton Keynes Munich Vilnius Zurich North America Atlanta, GA Austin, TX Boston, MA Campbell, CA Chicago, IL Kitchener, ON New York, NY San Francisco, CA Seattle, WA Sunnyvale, CA Toronto, ON Asia-Pacific Singapore Sydney Middle East Dubai