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Session ID:
Session Classification:
PROF-­‐M02
General	
  Interest
Will They EVER “Get” Security?
CXOWARE
Jack Jones
News Flash...
Management doesn’t care about security
Question...
How are 1/4” drill bits similar to security?
What we’ll cover...
► Infosec’s value proposition
► Crippling misconceptions
► Packaging and conveying our value prop
► Be careful what you wish for...
► Q&A
Infosec’s Value
Proposition
Remember my question...
How are 1/4” drill bits similar to security?
Infosec’s Value Proposition
Its affect on the frequency and
magnitude of loss (i.e., managing risk)
Which is likely to be more meaningful?
We need to implement security technology/process/
policy X because it’s best practice
or...
If we implement security technology/process/policy X
it will take us from a level 4 (high) risk to a level 2
(medium) risk
or...
Which is likely to be more meaningful?
If we implement security technology/process/policy X
at a cost of $120k, we’ll reduce our average
annualized loss exposure from $1.5M to $200k
$1,500,000&
$200,000&
Before& A.er&
Annualized*Loss*Exposure*(avg)*
News flash...
Management cares about exposure to loss
Crippling
Misconceptions
Crippling misconceptions
► Risk can’t be measured
► There isn’t enough data for quantitative analysis
► Quantitative analysis is impractical
► Infosec risk is different from other forms of risk
► Business people will always accept risk
► You can do meaningful math on ordinal values
Risk can’t can be measured
...but first you have to define it and understand it
► From a practical perspective, risk boils down to
“exposure to loss”
► If you can estimate/measure the probable frequency
of a loss event and the probable impact of that
event, then you are measuring the risk associated
with the event
A common problem though...
Recently reviewed an organization’s risk register
and found things like:
► Failure to patch vulnerabilities
► Default passwords
► Failure to make system backups
► Disgruntled employees
► Unencrypted laptops
Problem: These aren’t loss events, so you can’t assign a
meaningful frequency and magnitude of loss to them
There isn’t enough data
► You have more data than you think you do, and you
need less data than you think you do
► You just have to know where to look and how to
make the best use of what you have
► Book: How to Measure Anything - by Douglas Hubbard
► Leverage ranges, distributions, and Monte Carlo
There isn’t enough data
Quantitative analysis is impractical
► Quantitative analysis does NOT have to require a lot
of research and data
► Quick and dirty is often good enough
► A lot of data is reusable across similar scenarios
▶ Effective use of ranges and distribution can
faithfully represent the quality of your data
Infosec risk is different than other forms
of risk
► Boiled down, risk is simple “exposure to loss”
► Exposure to loss is fundamentally the same in
principle whether we’re dealing with armed conflict,
personal injury, investments, or data breaches
NO
^
Business people will always accept risk
► When presented with good quantitative analysis, I’ve
found business leaders to be remarkably risk averse
► The key is that the information we provide them has to
be rational and defensible
NOT
^
You can can’t do math on ordinal values
Qualitative Scale
(Ordinal)
What does x equal?
What does + equal?
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
5
4
3
2
1
Packaging and
conveying our
value proposition
What’s the purpose?
► The purpose is to support well-informed decisions
► Understand what decisions are at stake and focus on
providing only what’s required to support those
decisions
► This is also NOT about “convincing” executives to see
things our way.
My criteria for communications:
► Clear - Simple terminology, no infosec/IT acronyms
► Concise - Less is more
► Accurate - Absent bias and hyperbole
► Useful - Meaningful and actionable
Keys to packaging and communicating
Above all, be able to defend
what you present
Examples...
Spending decision example
!
Current State: Before additional controls
!
Future State: After additional controls
Prioritization example
$-
$5,000,000
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
$20,000,000
$25,000,000
$30,000,000
$35,000,000
$40,000,000
PersonalSystems
MidrangeDatabases
CustCareInfoApps
TransactionalPharmaApps
InternetApplications
WindowsDatabases
DataWarehouses
AdjudicationApplications
MobileMedia
MainframeDatabases
Internet-facingUnix
Internet-facingWindows
iSeriesSystems
MainframeSystems
BusinessPartnerNetwork
LDAPStorage
Internet-facingNetwork
PrintDisposal
BackupTapes
ExternalTransmission
RemoteAccessDevices
OpenVMS
UnixIntranetSystems
IntranetNetworkDevices
WindowsIntranetServers
CorpFinancialApplications
CredentialProcess
Loss Exposure by Asset Category
$2,588
$-
$10,000,000
$20,000,000
$30,000,000
$40,000,000
$50,000,000
$60,000,000
$70,000,000
Privileged
Insiders
Cyber
Criminals
Non-Privileged
Insiders
Malware*
Exposure by Threat Community
The$most$recent$enterprise$risk$assessment$found$
that$insiders$represent$the$most$significant$threat$
community$(by$35%$over$cyber$criminals),$and$
that$personal$systems$(desktops$&$laptops)$
represent$the$most$significant$point$of$exposure.$
Multi-year strategy example
2009 Current EOY12 EOY13 EOY14 EOY15
Customer	
  
Information	
  
Compromise
Corporate	
  
Information	
  
Compromise
Online	
  Fraud
Denial	
  of	
  Service
Regulatory	
  
Non-­‐Compliance
Loss Exposure	
  Perspective
Risk	
  Level
Timeframe
•  Improved)worksta/on)protec/on)and)malware)controls)
account)for)the)significant)reduc/on)in)loss)exposure)
between)2009)and))2013.)
•  Data)leakage))controls,)combined)with)worksta/on)and)
malware)controls))men/oned)above)have)driven)the)
reduc/on)in)loss)exposure)for)sensi/ve)corporate)
informa/on.)
•  Implementa/on)of)advanced)an/Cfraud)measures)in)2010)
and)2011)have))significantly)reduced)the)volume)of)online)
fraud)losses.)
•  Denial)of)service)exposure)was)reduced)in)2010)thru)an)
upgrade)in)the)network)architecture.))Future)loss)exposure)
will)be)further)reduced)in)2013)with)a)change)in)Internet)
service)providers.)
•  Regulatory)requirements)con/nue)to)s/ffen,)which)has)
slowed)progress)in)reducing)this)exposure.))Plans)for)2012)
and)2013)should)result)in)addi/onal)loss)exposure)reduc/on.)
Keys to packaging
Other suggestions:
► Match the form of your message to what your
stakeholders are used to (PowerPoints? Text? Charts?
Numbers? Colors?)
► Limit “eye candy”. The use of colors should be
strategic and intentional. Don’t overdo it!
Be careful what you
wish for...
Be careful what you wish for...
So, you’ve demonstrated that you
deserve a seat at the table.
Now what?
Things to be prepared for...
► A thirst for more...
► Politics (oh joy)
► Decisions you don’t agree with
Wrapping up...
Summary
► Infosec’s value proposition is its effect on the frequency
and magnitude of loss. We’re missing the target unless/
until we articulate it in those terms
► Misconceptions about risk and quantitative analysis
seriously impede our ability to represent our value
proposition effectively
► Effectively packaging and conveying our value
proposition requires focus, clarity, brevity, and
controlling our personal biases
► Successfully representing our value proposition can put
us at the “big person table” - with all that entails
Resources
► How to Measure Anything - by Douglas Hubbard
► The Failure of Risk Management - by Douglas Hubbard
► Introduction to Factor Analysis of Information Risk
(FAIR) - by Jack Jones
► Coming soon - a series of updated resources to help
prepare for the The Open Group FAIR certification
exam
Questions
For more information:
URL: www.cxoware.com
E-mail: info@CXOWARE.com
Phone: 866.936.0191

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Prof m02 v2

  • 1. Session ID: Session Classification: PROF-­‐M02 General  Interest Will They EVER “Get” Security? CXOWARE Jack Jones
  • 3. Question... How are 1/4” drill bits similar to security?
  • 4. What we’ll cover... ► Infosec’s value proposition ► Crippling misconceptions ► Packaging and conveying our value prop ► Be careful what you wish for... ► Q&A
  • 6. Remember my question... How are 1/4” drill bits similar to security?
  • 7. Infosec’s Value Proposition Its affect on the frequency and magnitude of loss (i.e., managing risk)
  • 8. Which is likely to be more meaningful? We need to implement security technology/process/ policy X because it’s best practice or... If we implement security technology/process/policy X it will take us from a level 4 (high) risk to a level 2 (medium) risk or...
  • 9. Which is likely to be more meaningful? If we implement security technology/process/policy X at a cost of $120k, we’ll reduce our average annualized loss exposure from $1.5M to $200k $1,500,000& $200,000& Before& A.er& Annualized*Loss*Exposure*(avg)*
  • 10. News flash... Management cares about exposure to loss
  • 12. Crippling misconceptions ► Risk can’t be measured ► There isn’t enough data for quantitative analysis ► Quantitative analysis is impractical ► Infosec risk is different from other forms of risk ► Business people will always accept risk ► You can do meaningful math on ordinal values
  • 13. Risk can’t can be measured ...but first you have to define it and understand it ► From a practical perspective, risk boils down to “exposure to loss” ► If you can estimate/measure the probable frequency of a loss event and the probable impact of that event, then you are measuring the risk associated with the event
  • 14. A common problem though... Recently reviewed an organization’s risk register and found things like: ► Failure to patch vulnerabilities ► Default passwords ► Failure to make system backups ► Disgruntled employees ► Unencrypted laptops Problem: These aren’t loss events, so you can’t assign a meaningful frequency and magnitude of loss to them
  • 15. There isn’t enough data ► You have more data than you think you do, and you need less data than you think you do ► You just have to know where to look and how to make the best use of what you have ► Book: How to Measure Anything - by Douglas Hubbard ► Leverage ranges, distributions, and Monte Carlo
  • 17. Quantitative analysis is impractical ► Quantitative analysis does NOT have to require a lot of research and data ► Quick and dirty is often good enough ► A lot of data is reusable across similar scenarios ▶ Effective use of ranges and distribution can faithfully represent the quality of your data
  • 18. Infosec risk is different than other forms of risk ► Boiled down, risk is simple “exposure to loss” ► Exposure to loss is fundamentally the same in principle whether we’re dealing with armed conflict, personal injury, investments, or data breaches NO ^
  • 19. Business people will always accept risk ► When presented with good quantitative analysis, I’ve found business leaders to be remarkably risk averse ► The key is that the information we provide them has to be rational and defensible NOT ^
  • 20. You can can’t do math on ordinal values Qualitative Scale (Ordinal) What does x equal? What does + equal? Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 5 4 3 2 1
  • 22. What’s the purpose? ► The purpose is to support well-informed decisions ► Understand what decisions are at stake and focus on providing only what’s required to support those decisions ► This is also NOT about “convincing” executives to see things our way.
  • 23. My criteria for communications: ► Clear - Simple terminology, no infosec/IT acronyms ► Concise - Less is more ► Accurate - Absent bias and hyperbole ► Useful - Meaningful and actionable
  • 24. Keys to packaging and communicating Above all, be able to defend what you present
  • 26. Spending decision example ! Current State: Before additional controls ! Future State: After additional controls
  • 27. Prioritization example $- $5,000,000 $10,000,000 $15,000,000 $20,000,000 $25,000,000 $30,000,000 $35,000,000 $40,000,000 PersonalSystems MidrangeDatabases CustCareInfoApps TransactionalPharmaApps InternetApplications WindowsDatabases DataWarehouses AdjudicationApplications MobileMedia MainframeDatabases Internet-facingUnix Internet-facingWindows iSeriesSystems MainframeSystems BusinessPartnerNetwork LDAPStorage Internet-facingNetwork PrintDisposal BackupTapes ExternalTransmission RemoteAccessDevices OpenVMS UnixIntranetSystems IntranetNetworkDevices WindowsIntranetServers CorpFinancialApplications CredentialProcess Loss Exposure by Asset Category $2,588 $- $10,000,000 $20,000,000 $30,000,000 $40,000,000 $50,000,000 $60,000,000 $70,000,000 Privileged Insiders Cyber Criminals Non-Privileged Insiders Malware* Exposure by Threat Community The$most$recent$enterprise$risk$assessment$found$ that$insiders$represent$the$most$significant$threat$ community$(by$35%$over$cyber$criminals),$and$ that$personal$systems$(desktops$&$laptops)$ represent$the$most$significant$point$of$exposure.$
  • 28. Multi-year strategy example 2009 Current EOY12 EOY13 EOY14 EOY15 Customer   Information   Compromise Corporate   Information   Compromise Online  Fraud Denial  of  Service Regulatory   Non-­‐Compliance Loss Exposure  Perspective Risk  Level Timeframe •  Improved)worksta/on)protec/on)and)malware)controls) account)for)the)significant)reduc/on)in)loss)exposure) between)2009)and))2013.) •  Data)leakage))controls,)combined)with)worksta/on)and) malware)controls))men/oned)above)have)driven)the) reduc/on)in)loss)exposure)for)sensi/ve)corporate) informa/on.) •  Implementa/on)of)advanced)an/Cfraud)measures)in)2010) and)2011)have))significantly)reduced)the)volume)of)online) fraud)losses.) •  Denial)of)service)exposure)was)reduced)in)2010)thru)an) upgrade)in)the)network)architecture.))Future)loss)exposure) will)be)further)reduced)in)2013)with)a)change)in)Internet) service)providers.) •  Regulatory)requirements)con/nue)to)s/ffen,)which)has) slowed)progress)in)reducing)this)exposure.))Plans)for)2012) and)2013)should)result)in)addi/onal)loss)exposure)reduc/on.)
  • 30. Other suggestions: ► Match the form of your message to what your stakeholders are used to (PowerPoints? Text? Charts? Numbers? Colors?) ► Limit “eye candy”. The use of colors should be strategic and intentional. Don’t overdo it!
  • 31. Be careful what you wish for...
  • 32. Be careful what you wish for... So, you’ve demonstrated that you deserve a seat at the table. Now what?
  • 33. Things to be prepared for... ► A thirst for more... ► Politics (oh joy) ► Decisions you don’t agree with
  • 35. Summary ► Infosec’s value proposition is its effect on the frequency and magnitude of loss. We’re missing the target unless/ until we articulate it in those terms ► Misconceptions about risk and quantitative analysis seriously impede our ability to represent our value proposition effectively ► Effectively packaging and conveying our value proposition requires focus, clarity, brevity, and controlling our personal biases ► Successfully representing our value proposition can put us at the “big person table” - with all that entails
  • 36. Resources ► How to Measure Anything - by Douglas Hubbard ► The Failure of Risk Management - by Douglas Hubbard ► Introduction to Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) - by Jack Jones ► Coming soon - a series of updated resources to help prepare for the The Open Group FAIR certification exam
  • 37. Questions For more information: URL: www.cxoware.com E-mail: info@CXOWARE.com Phone: 866.936.0191