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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
WELCOME!
Building a secure architecture
A deep-dive into security design principles
January 21, 2021 | with Thomas Kerbl
1
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
• 20+ years experience in information security
• 50+ speeches
• Service Owner for
„Secure Software Development Consulting“
• Teamleader
• Security Analyst, Security Architect
Education
• MSc @ Technikum Vienna, Specialization in
Multimedia & Software Development
• Dipl. Ing @ Hagenberg, Specialization in
Computer- and Media Security
Certificates
• Accredited ÖNORM A 7700 Auditor
• ISTQB Certified Tester
• ISAQB Certified Professional for
Software Architecture
• ISSECO Certified Professional for
Secure Software Engineering
• PCiIAA Practitioner Certificate in
Information Assurance Architecture
Thomas Kerbl
Principal Security Consultant
t.kerbl@sec-consult.com
https://twitter.com/dementophobia
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
2
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Principle: A rule or belief governing one's behavior.
➢ High level concepts that guide security design
➢ Agnostic concerning
• Technology
• Mechanism
• Development Methodology
• Industry / Type of Organization
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
What are Security Design Principles?
AVAILABILITY
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
Choose your principles carefully for each protection profile!
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Multiple security controls on multiple layers
➢ If one control breaks, others mitigate the impact
➢ Mechanisms must not rely on each other
➢ No single point of failure from a defense perspective
Security Design Principles – Defense in Depth
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Build as many walls as required around your crown jewels!
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Also known as: No Security by Obscurity
➢ Security does not depend on concealment of algorithms and architecture
➢ The application shall remain secure even when the architecture is made public
➢ Does not include credentials for authentication and cryptographic secrets
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Open Design
This does not imply, that the source code must be open source,
but you should be comfortable even if your source code leaks!
5
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ External data should be viewed as not trustworthy
➢ Many vulnerability classes can be eliminated
through proper input validation
➢ All validation mechanisms must be at least
implemented on server side
➢ Rules must be strict, but still allow all valid use cases
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Principle of general mistrust
Regardless whether data originates from a user or a backend system,
input data must always be subjected to strict validation.
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Actors are given the minimum level of access rights
➢ Privileges are only granted as long as required
➢ Potential damage caused by actors (real or compromised) is limited
➢ Example: Never browse the web with administrative privileges
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Least Privilege
Assigning rights to actors beyond the necessary scope can allow
actors to obtain or modify information in unwanted ways.
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Critical operations require two or more authenticated actors
➢ If only one secret gets compromised, no damage can be done
➢ Examples for implementation:
• Two or more key cards to access Hardware Security Module (HSM)
• Two or more cryptographic keys are required to decrypt a message
• Two or more people split a passphrase for a system
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Separation of Privilege
Ensure that no single actor can perform critical operations on their own!
8
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Also known as: KISS – Keep it small and simple
➢ Also known as: Minimize the attack surface
➢ Only functionality defined by use cases is implemented
➢ Small systems are less prone to error and easier to audit
➢ Only include libraries and frameworks that you really need
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Economy of Mechanism
The more functionality that is built in,
the more potential points of entry attackers have.
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Limit shared resources and information paths
➢ Compromise of one component does not affect other components
➢ Examples for implementation
• Multitenancy
• Sandbox environments
• Separate endpoints for authentication of administrators and users
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Least Common Mechanism aka. Isolation
Choosing the right level of isolation is the result of
a sensible trade-off between cost and security.
10
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Every access to an object must be checked for authority
➢ Permissions must be checked with every request
➢ Examples:
• Changed permissions will be applied immediately
• Force logout of user to refresh permissions during login
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Complete Mediation
Don’t use caches for your permissions or force updates!
Changes will only be applied after cache is updated.
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Invest your resources where they matter most
➢ Attackers are more likely to attack weak spots
➢ A single high-risk vulnerability can put the whole system in jeopardy
➢ Consider the weakest link first in all your security decisions
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Secure the weakest link first
Put yourself into the perspective of the attacker.
Where would YOU break into the system?
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ If the application fails it shall do so securely
➢ Failing safe involves restoring to a secure state
➢ Attackers cannot gain access and obtain information during a failure
➢ Confidentiality and integrity shall remain although availability was lost
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Fail Safe
Anticipate failures and handle them in your application.
Use last resort error handlers for unexpected failures!
13
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Make your systems easy to use in a secure fashion
➢ Security mechanisms should be as unintrusive as possible
➢ Examples:
• Allow copy/paste from password stores
• Provide guidance for the creation of strong passwords
• Provide secure defaults
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Psychological acceptability
If you make the life of users too complicated,
they will find ways to circumvent important security mechanisms.
14
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Don’t apply localized patches to systemic problems
➢ Identified vulnerabilities must be eliminated at their root
➢ Perform root cause analysis for all new types of vulnerabilities
➢ This should be part of a well-defined security defect life-cycle
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Eliminate root causes
Patching a vulnerability locally fixes one issue.
Eliminating the root cause improves the whole architecture.
15
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
➢ Shared services should be properly validated and considered secure
➢ Invest in security once, benefit often
➢ Using those components does not introduce new vulnerabilities
➢ Provide guidance on how to use them in a secure fashion
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Security Design Principles – Leverage existing components
Components can be many things:
Infrastructure, Services, Frameworks, Libraries, Functions, etc.
16
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Recommended Reading
@Dementophobia
Follow me for Updates!
A deep dive into Secure Software Development
based on OWASP SAMM
https://r.sec-consult.com/SSDLC
https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/
Sichere-Software-entwickeln-mit-
OWASP-SAMM-4918292.html
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© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
18
© 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved
A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public
Q&A
ASK ME ANYTHING!
Thomas Kerbl
t.kerbl@sec-consult.com
https://twitter.com/dementophobia
https://at.linkedin.com/in/thomas-kerbl-2ab81648
19
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Building Security Design Principles

  • 1. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public WELCOME! Building a secure architecture A deep-dive into security design principles January 21, 2021 | with Thomas Kerbl 1
  • 2. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved • 20+ years experience in information security • 50+ speeches • Service Owner for „Secure Software Development Consulting“ • Teamleader • Security Analyst, Security Architect Education • MSc @ Technikum Vienna, Specialization in Multimedia & Software Development • Dipl. Ing @ Hagenberg, Specialization in Computer- and Media Security Certificates • Accredited ÖNORM A 7700 Auditor • ISTQB Certified Tester • ISAQB Certified Professional for Software Architecture • ISSECO Certified Professional for Secure Software Engineering • PCiIAA Practitioner Certificate in Information Assurance Architecture Thomas Kerbl Principal Security Consultant t.kerbl@sec-consult.com https://twitter.com/dementophobia A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public 2
  • 3. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Principle: A rule or belief governing one's behavior. ➢ High level concepts that guide security design ➢ Agnostic concerning • Technology • Mechanism • Development Methodology • Industry / Type of Organization A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public What are Security Design Principles? AVAILABILITY CONFIDENTIALITY INTEGRITY Choose your principles carefully for each protection profile! 3
  • 4. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Multiple security controls on multiple layers ➢ If one control breaks, others mitigate the impact ➢ Mechanisms must not rely on each other ➢ No single point of failure from a defense perspective Security Design Principles – Defense in Depth A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Build as many walls as required around your crown jewels! 4
  • 5. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Also known as: No Security by Obscurity ➢ Security does not depend on concealment of algorithms and architecture ➢ The application shall remain secure even when the architecture is made public ➢ Does not include credentials for authentication and cryptographic secrets A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Open Design This does not imply, that the source code must be open source, but you should be comfortable even if your source code leaks! 5
  • 6. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ External data should be viewed as not trustworthy ➢ Many vulnerability classes can be eliminated through proper input validation ➢ All validation mechanisms must be at least implemented on server side ➢ Rules must be strict, but still allow all valid use cases A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Principle of general mistrust Regardless whether data originates from a user or a backend system, input data must always be subjected to strict validation. 6
  • 7. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Actors are given the minimum level of access rights ➢ Privileges are only granted as long as required ➢ Potential damage caused by actors (real or compromised) is limited ➢ Example: Never browse the web with administrative privileges A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Least Privilege Assigning rights to actors beyond the necessary scope can allow actors to obtain or modify information in unwanted ways. 7
  • 8. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Critical operations require two or more authenticated actors ➢ If only one secret gets compromised, no damage can be done ➢ Examples for implementation: • Two or more key cards to access Hardware Security Module (HSM) • Two or more cryptographic keys are required to decrypt a message • Two or more people split a passphrase for a system A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Separation of Privilege Ensure that no single actor can perform critical operations on their own! 8
  • 9. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Also known as: KISS – Keep it small and simple ➢ Also known as: Minimize the attack surface ➢ Only functionality defined by use cases is implemented ➢ Small systems are less prone to error and easier to audit ➢ Only include libraries and frameworks that you really need A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Economy of Mechanism The more functionality that is built in, the more potential points of entry attackers have. 9
  • 10. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Limit shared resources and information paths ➢ Compromise of one component does not affect other components ➢ Examples for implementation • Multitenancy • Sandbox environments • Separate endpoints for authentication of administrators and users A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Least Common Mechanism aka. Isolation Choosing the right level of isolation is the result of a sensible trade-off between cost and security. 10
  • 11. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Every access to an object must be checked for authority ➢ Permissions must be checked with every request ➢ Examples: • Changed permissions will be applied immediately • Force logout of user to refresh permissions during login A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Complete Mediation Don’t use caches for your permissions or force updates! Changes will only be applied after cache is updated. 11
  • 12. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Invest your resources where they matter most ➢ Attackers are more likely to attack weak spots ➢ A single high-risk vulnerability can put the whole system in jeopardy ➢ Consider the weakest link first in all your security decisions A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Secure the weakest link first Put yourself into the perspective of the attacker. Where would YOU break into the system? 12
  • 13. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ If the application fails it shall do so securely ➢ Failing safe involves restoring to a secure state ➢ Attackers cannot gain access and obtain information during a failure ➢ Confidentiality and integrity shall remain although availability was lost A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Fail Safe Anticipate failures and handle them in your application. Use last resort error handlers for unexpected failures! 13
  • 14. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Make your systems easy to use in a secure fashion ➢ Security mechanisms should be as unintrusive as possible ➢ Examples: • Allow copy/paste from password stores • Provide guidance for the creation of strong passwords • Provide secure defaults A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Psychological acceptability If you make the life of users too complicated, they will find ways to circumvent important security mechanisms. 14
  • 15. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Don’t apply localized patches to systemic problems ➢ Identified vulnerabilities must be eliminated at their root ➢ Perform root cause analysis for all new types of vulnerabilities ➢ This should be part of a well-defined security defect life-cycle A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Eliminate root causes Patching a vulnerability locally fixes one issue. Eliminating the root cause improves the whole architecture. 15
  • 16. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved ➢ Shared services should be properly validated and considered secure ➢ Invest in security once, benefit often ➢ Using those components does not introduce new vulnerabilities ➢ Provide guidance on how to use them in a secure fashion A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Security Design Principles – Leverage existing components Components can be many things: Infrastructure, Services, Frameworks, Libraries, Functions, etc. 16
  • 17. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Recommended Reading @Dementophobia Follow me for Updates! A deep dive into Secure Software Development based on OWASP SAMM https://r.sec-consult.com/SSDLC https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/ Sichere-Software-entwickeln-mit- OWASP-SAMM-4918292.html 17
  • 18. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public 18
  • 19. © 2021 SEC Consult | All rights reserved A deep-dive into security design principles | Responsible: T. Kerbl | Version / Date: 1.0 / 2021-01 Confidentiality Class: Public Q&A ASK ME ANYTHING! Thomas Kerbl t.kerbl@sec-consult.com https://twitter.com/dementophobia https://at.linkedin.com/in/thomas-kerbl-2ab81648 19 19