Renewed Tensions and Continuing Maritime Security Dilemma in the South China ...
Crime-Terrorism-Insurgency Nexus in the Philippines
1. PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH
2nd Floor, CPDRI Room, Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines
Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines
Telephone +632 9946972 Fax: +632 4333870
www.pipvtr.com
CRIME-TERRORISM-INSURGENCY
NEXUS
IN
THE
PHILIPPINES
Rommel
C.
Banlaoi
Chairman
of
the
Board
and
Executive
Director
Philippine
Institute
for
Peace,
Violence
and
Terrorism
Research
Email:
rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com
Presented
at
the
International
C onference
o n
N ational
a nd
R egional
S ecurity:
C ountering
O rganized
Crime
a nd
T errorism
in
t he
A SEAN
P olitical
S ecurity
a nd
C ommunity
( APSC)
o rganized
b y
t he
German-Southeast
Asian
Center
of
Excellence
for
Public
Policy
and
Good
Governance
(CPG),
Faculty
of
Law,
Thammasat
University,
Bangkok,
Thailand
on
19-20
September
2012.
Please
check
against
delivery.
I
am
truly
honored
to
stand
before
you
to
candidly
discuss
the
issue
of
crime-‐
terrorism-‐insurgency
nexus
in
the
Philippines.
This
presentation
is
based
on
the
various
scholarly
research
works
I
conducted
on
the
topic
over
a
span
of
eleven
years
after
September
11,
2001
(9/11).
In
my
various
publications,
I
have
always
argued
that
terrorist
threats
in
the
Philippines
cannot
be
fully
understood
if
not
analyzed
in
the
context
of
a
larger
environment
in
which
we
find
ourselves.
Terrorism
in
the
Philippines
has
always
been
inextricably
linked
with
crime
and
insurgency
problems.
In
fact,
terrorism,
crime
and
insurgency
threats
are
also
deeply
enmeshed
in
panoply
of
other
related
internal
security
concerns
associated
with
warlordism,
violent
entrepreneurship,
clan
warfare,
revenge
killing,
personal
vendetta,
and
local
political
dynamics.
So-‐called
terrorist
groups
in
the
Philippines
are
not
only
parts
of
larger
insurgency
movements
from
the
Moro
and
Communist
fronts.
They
are
also
tightly
woven
in
a
complex
network
of
organized
criminal
activities
like
trafficking/smuggling
of
arms,
drugs
and
humans
as
well
extortion,
car
napping,
kidnapping
operations
and
even
illegal
logging.
Complicating
this
dreadful
situation
is
the
depressing
reality
that
these
terrorist
groups
not
only
have
tactical
alliances
with
each
other
but
also
have
some
“violent
entrepreneurial
relations”
with
some
corrupt
elected
local
officials
and
with
a
few
misfits
in
the
police
and
the
military
sectors.
These
armed
groups
and
individuals
create
and
perpetuate
the
violent
economy
of
Mindanao
where
guns
and
goons
rule
in
a
semi-‐anarchic
society.
1
2. Without
a
nuanced
knowledge
of
the
whole
gamut
of
these
issues,
crime-‐terrorism-‐
insurgency
nexus
in
the
Philippines,
therefore,
will
be
very
difficult
to
subdue.
The
involvement
of
children
and
young
people
in
this
nexus
exacerbate
this
bewildering
problem.
In
the
Philippines,
it
is
common
to
refer
to
the
Abu
Sayyaf
Group
(ASG)
when
talking
about
terrorist
threats.
There
is
a
debate
on
whether
the
ASG
is
a
rebel,
terrorist
or
a
mere
bandit
group.1
Some
carelessly
describe
the
ASG
as
the
Frankenstein
monster
of
the
Philippine
military.
The
media
interchangeably
describes
the
ASG
as
a
bandit
and
a
terrorist
group.
But
the
United
States
decisively
classifies
the
ASG
as
a
foreign
terrorist
organization.
In
my
continuing
study
of
the
ASG
for
more
than
15
years,
I
have
learned
that
the
ASG
has
evolved
into
a
non-‐state
armed
group
with
multiple
personalities
involved
in
various
acts
of
violence.2
When
Abdurajak
Janjalani
formed
the
group
in
1989,
his
original
intention
was
to
bridge
the
divide
between
the
Moro
National
Liberation
Front
(MNLF)
of
Nur
Misuari
and
the
Moro
Islamic
Liberation
Front
(MILF)
of
the
late
Hashim
Salamat.
Thus,
Abdurajak
recruited
followers
from
the
MNLF
and
the
MILF.
But
when
he
died
in
1998,
the
ASG
rapidly
degenerated
into
a
bandit
group
engaged
in
kidnapping,
extortion
and
smuggling
activities
under
the
leadership
of
his
brother,
Khadaffy
Janjalani.
At
present,
the
ASG
has
adopted
a
cellular-‐type
structure
led
by
commanders
in
their
respective
geographical
turfs.
With
many
commanders
at
the
helm
of
a
single
group,
the
ASG
has
already
evolved
into
a
highly
promiscuous
armed
group
linked
with
other
armed
groups
engaged
in
terrorism,
insurgency,
banditry
and
other
violent
acts.
It
has
also
become
a
very
resilient
armed
group
having
been
protected
by
some
corrupt
local
politicians
and
a
few
scalawags
in
uniform
who
benefit
from
ASG’s
violent
activities.3
Some
ASG
members
even
serve
as
private
armed
escorts
of
a
few
local
politicians
in
Sulu,
Basilan
and
Tawi-‐Tawi,
particularly
during
elections.
1Soliman
M.
Santos,
Jr.
and
Octavio
A.
Dinampo.
“Abu
Sayyaf
Reloaded:
Rebels,
Agents,
Bandits,
Terrorists
(Case
Study)
in
Soliman
Santos,
et,
al.
Primed
and
Purposeful:
Armed
Groups
and
Human
Security
Efforts
in
the
Philippines
(Geneva:
Small
Arms
Survey,
2010),
pp.
115-‐138.
2For
my
most
updated
publication
on
the
ASG,
see
Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
Al-Harakatul
Al-Islamiyyah:
Essays
on
the
Abu
Sayyaf
Group,
3rd
edition
(Quezon
City:
Philippine
Institute
for
Peace,
Violence
and
Terrorism
Research,
2012).
3Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
“The
Sources
of
Abu
Sayyaf
Resilience
in
the
Southern
Philippines”.
CTC
Sentinel
(3
May
2010).
2
3. Thus,
the
ASG
of
the
late
80’s
is
no
longer
the
ASG
of
today.
In
fact,
some
armed
men
who
claim
to
be
followers
of
the
ASG
are
also
claiming
to
be
followers
of
the
MNLF
and
the
MILF,
depending
on
the
situation.
Current
remnants
still
prefer
to
use
the
name,
ASG,
as
it
has
become
a
very
convenient
trademark
for
their
violent
activities.
Ustadj
Abdul
Rasul
Sayyaf,
the
real
person
whom
this
trademark
is
based,
is
very
displeased
to
see
his
name
being
used
in
the
Philippines
for
violent
purposes.
Since
the
global
war
on
terrorism
in
2001,
the
Philippine
government
has
already
put
to
justice
many
ASG
members
for
committing
various
crimes
associated
with
terrorism.
But
the
ASG
threat
persists
because
the
ASG
has
a
survival
instinct
that
is
also
shared
by
some
likeminded
groups
abroad.
ASG’s
staying
power
comes
from
the
continuous
supply
of
illiterate
and
out-‐of-‐
school
youth
in
Mindanao
joining
the
group
for
a
variety
of
reasons
from
personal,
economic,
social,
and
political.4
In
fact,
the
ASG’s
rank-‐and-‐file
is
composed
of
some
young
orphans
being
abused
by
old
commanders
to
mount
various
kidnap-‐for-‐
ransom
and
extortion
activities.
The
Philippine
military
says
that
the
ASG
has
around
400-‐armed
members
as
of
2010.5
Most
of
its
members
operate
mainly
in
Basilan,
Sulu,
Zamboaga
Sibugay
and
Tawi-‐Tawi.
But
there
are
also
sightings
of
ASG
followers
in
Metro
Manila.
During
the
first
semester
of
2012,
the
Philippine
government
says
that
the
ASG
membership
has
declined
to
around
350.
My
independent
research
on
the
ASG,
however,
indicates
that
the
ASG
has
only
around
100
regular
followers
serving
six
major
commanders
lording
over
in
only
three
major
provinces
in
Mindanao:
Basilan,
Sulu
and
Tawi-‐Tawi
(BASULTA).
In
Sulu,
which
is
the
epicenter
of
ASG
activities,
there
are
three
major
commanders:
Commander
Radullan
Sahiron,
Commander
Yassir
Igasan,
and
Commander
Hajan
Sawadjaan.
Sahiron
has
only
around
30
regular
armed
followers.
He
is
the
recognized
over-‐all
operational
commander
of
the
ASG.
Igasan,
who
has
been
rumored
to
be
the
over-‐all
Amir
of
the
ASG,
only
has
around
5
regular
armed
followers.
Sawadjaan
only
has
around
10
regular
armed
followers.
4Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
“The
Pull
of
Terrorism:
A
Philippine
Case
Study”.
Youth
and
Terrorism:
A
Selection
of
Articles
(Kuala
Lumpur:
Southeast
Asian
Regional
Centre
for
Counter-‐
Terrorism,
2011),
pp.
39-‐50.
5General
Headquarters
of
the
AFP,
Internal
Peace
and
Security
Plan,
Bayanihan
(Quezon
City:
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
Headquarters,
2010),
p.
12.
3
4.
In
Basilan,
there
are
also
three
major
commanders:
Commander
Isnilon
Hapilon,
Commander
Khair
Mundos,
and
Commander
Puruji
Indama.
Hapinol
has
only
around
20
regular
armed
followers.
Mundos
has
only
around
15
regular
armed
followers
while
Indama
has
only
around
15
regular
armed
followers.
In
Tawi-‐Tawi,
the
recognized
ASG
commander
in
the
area
is
Jul
Asman
Sawadjaan,
the
brother
of
Hajan
Sawadjaan.
He
is
believed
to
have
at
least
10
regular
armed
followers.
There
is
an
emerging
young
commander
of
the
ASG
by
the
name
of
Nadzmir
Alih.
He
is
an
adopted
son
of
ASG
founder,
Abdurajak
Janjalani.
In
his
mid-‐30s,
Nadzmir
Alih
operates
in
Basilan
as
a
military
protégé
of
Isnilon
Hapilon
and
in
Sulu
as
spiritual
mentee
of
Yassir
Igasan.
Nadzmir
Allih
has
around
10
regular
armed
young
followers
associated
with
another
group
called
Anak
Ilo
or
orphaned
sons.
His
group
is
responsible
for
a
spate
of
“small-‐to-‐medium-‐scale”
kidnap-‐for-‐ransom
activities
in
Sulu
and
Basilan.
Thus,
the
ASG
is
only
a
very
miniscule
armed
group.
But
the
ASG
threat
looms
large
because
it
wields
tremendous
strength
from
its
superb
ability
to
network
with
countless
armed
groups
in
Mindanao
engaged
in
various
criminal,
terrorist,
insurgent
and
even
partisan
political
activities.
While
a
few
ASG
commanders
still
embrace
an
Islamic
ideology
that
aims
to
promote
the
establishment
of
a
Islamic
State
in
Mindanao,
most
followers
have
become
violent
entrepreneurs
engaged
in
predatory
economic
activities
such
as
kidnapping,
extortion
and
smuggling
of
arms
and
drugs.
These
violent
entrepreneurs
have
skills
in
jungle
and
urban
warfare.
Worse,
they
have
the
ability
to
manufacture
improvised
explosive
devices
(IEDs)
that
they
use
for
criminal,
terrorist
and
insurgent
activities.
Based
on
our
independent
investigative
research
aided
by
seasoned
intelligence
officers,
we
discovered
that
almost
90%
of
the
funds
of
the
ASG
are
derived
from
illicit
activities,
mainly
from
kidnap-‐for-‐ransom
and
extortion.6
As
a
violent
group,
the
ASG
has
also
demonstrated
its
inherent
capability
to
conduct
acts
of
piracy
for
economic
reasons
and
maritime
terrorism
for
political
reasons.7
6Rodolfo
B.
Mendoza,
Jr.,
“The
Evolution
of
Terrorist
Financing
in
the
Philippines”
(Paper
presented
at
the
International
Conference
in
Countering
the
Financing
of
Terrorism
at
the
Sulu
Hotel,
Philippines,
7-‐8
July
2008).
7Rommel
C.
Banlaoi.
“The
Abu
Sayyaf
Group:
Threat
of
Maritime
Piracy
and
Terrorism
in
Peter
Lehr
(ed),
Violence
at
Sea.
Piracy
in
the
Age
of
Global
Terrorism
(New
York:
Routledge,
2007),
pp.
121-‐
138.
4
5.
The
Philippine
government
has
declared
a
policy
of
crushing
the
ASG
through
combined
police
and
military
efforts.
But
it
recognizes
difficulties
in
doing
so
because
of
the
ASG’s
complex
links
with
other
armed
groups
like
the
lawless
elements
of
the
MILF,
rouge
factions
of
the
MNLF,
remnants
of
Jemaah
Islamiyah
(JI)
in
Mindanao
and
other
violent
groups
such
as
the
Al
Khobar
Group
(AKG),
the
Bangsamoro
Islamic
Freedom
Fighters
(BIFF)
and
even
the
New
People’s
Army
(NPA).
The
ASG’s
links
with
some
local
warlords,
government
militias,
and
local
communities
confound
the
already
convoluted
threat
it
poses
to
Philippine
internal
security.
In
other
words,
the
ASG
has
become
“complex
adaptive
system”
with
a
superb
survival
instinct.
This
instinct
to
survive
is
reinforced
by
their
complex
linkages
with
one
another
as
well
as
with
ordinary
organized
crimes
groups
and
partisan
armed
movements.
Underlying
issues
of
abject
poverty,
inefficient
governance,
ethnic
conflict,
clan
feuding
and
religious/ideological
intolerance,
among
others,
also
fuel
the
staying
power
of
the
ASG.
As
such,
the
U.S.
Department
of
State
claims
that
the
Philippines
remains
as
a
“terrorist
safe
haven”
in
its
Country
Reports
on
Terrorism
published
in
July
2012.8
It
even
warns
that
through
the
ASG
and
the
country’s
porous
border,
the
Southern
Philippines
can
be
used
to
transport
weapons
of
mass
destruction
(WMD).9
Allow
me
to
conclude
by
stressing
that
the
ASG
is
an
excellent
example
of
the
nexus
of
crime,
terrorism
and
insurgency.
Countering
the
threat
posed
by
the
ASG
is
a
formidable
challenge
not
only
for
law
enforcement
and
other
concerned
government
agencies
but
also
for
the
wider
society
of
citizens
who
are
often
times
victims,
casualties,
and
collateral
damages
of
criminal,
terrorist
and
insurgent
activities.
Thank
you
very
much
for
your
attention.
8US
State
Department,
Country
Reports
on
Terrorism
2011
(Washington
DC:
Bureau
of
Counterterrorism,
July
2012),
p.
181.
9Ibid.
5