By the end of this lecture students should be able to understand that: Air power represents a technological revolution Air power has tremendously changed the conduct of warfare Air power has not changed the nature of warfare

1. The Characteristics and Utility of Air Power
Professor Joel Hayward

2. From this lecture you should be able to understand that:
• Air power represents a technological revolution
• Air power has tremendously changed the conduct of warfare
• Air power has not changed the nature of warfare

3. Strengths of air power:
• Speed
• Reach
• Height
• Ubiquity
• Agility

4. Weaknesses of air power:
• Impermanence
• Fragility
• Cost
• Base-dependence

5. Traditional Roles of Air Power
“Strategic”
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
“Tactical”
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air

6. Traditional Roles of Air Power
“Strategic”
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
“Tactical”
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air

7. Traditional Roles of Air Power
Independent
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
Integrated
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air

8. Traditional Roles of Air Power
Independent
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
Integrated
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air
= “Strike”

9. Traditional Roles of Air Power
Independent
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
Integrated
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air
Mobility

10. Traditional Roles of Air Power
Independent
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
Integrated
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air
Mobility
Situational Awareness

11. THE
PEOPLE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
The “trinity” of Carl von Clausewitz

12. THE
PEOPLE
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
PEOPLE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE

13. THE
PEOPLE
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
PEOPLE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
The customary nature of war: Force versus Force

14. Warfare through the ages
ATTACK Armed forces Capital Governance

15. ATTACK Armed forces Capital Governance
Warfare through the ages

16. ATTACK Armed forces Capital Governance
The ambition of air power since 1917

17. THE
PEOPLE
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
PEOPLE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
Air Power’s twentieth-century focus
Independent “strategic” strike up to 1945

18. Target sets
• Civilians
– inflict terror
– break morale
• Civilian industry
– create social chaos
– reduce production

19. What was wrong with this approach?
• Targeting civilians was morally / legally questionable
• Targeting cities and industry was dangerous
• It took a long time to have and measure any effect
• It was not actually very effective

20. What’s was right with this approach?
• Nothing

21. THE
PEOPLE
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
PEOPLE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
Independent “strategic” strike since 1945

22. Target sets
• Leadership / governance
– essential energy sources
– essential or high-value state infrastructure
– the economic system

23. What’s wrong with this approach?
• It inevitably causes unintended civilian deaths
• It can lead to accusations of immorality
• It creates greater support for enemy leadership
• It is seldom politically acceptable
• It has not ordinarily proved effective by itself

24. What’s right with this approach?
• It demonstrates resolve
• Not much else

25. THE
PEOPLE
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
PEOPLE
THE
GOVERNMENT
THE
COMMANDER
AND FORCE
Integrated Air Power

26. Target sets
• Enemy forces
– logistical infrastructure, sustainment routes
– troops, bases, positions, weapons, vehicles and communications

27. What’s right with this integrated approach?
• It is moral (combatants fighting only combatants)
• It is usually politically acceptable
• It facilitates effective battle
• Effective battle is ordinarily strategic

28. What’s wrong with this integrated approach?
• Absolutely nothing, but remember:
• It has a higher risk of fratricide
• It is relatively dangerous
• Insurgents provide few, fleeting and often uncertain targets
• Mistakes can be highly politically awkward

29. Concluding thoughts:
• The use of ordnance is now called “strike” and encompasses both
“strategic” and “tactical” contexts
• Air power’s contributions away from traditional battles have usually
been exaggerated
• Expectations of its effects have seldom been met
• Air power integrated in battle has ALWAYS proven remarkably effective

30. Thank you