SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 22
Download to read offline
Make it Fixable
Designing for Change
Patricia Aas
Security Divas 2017
Patricia Aas
Programmer mainly in C++ and Java
Currently : Vivaldi Technologies
Previously : Cisco Systems, Knowit, Opera Software
Master in Computer Science from UiO
Twitter : @pati_gallardo
Security is Hard
Just Remember :
- You live in the real world
- Take one step at a time
- Make a Plan
● Unable to Roll Out Fixes
● No Control over Dependencies
● The Team is Gone
● It’s in Our Code
Risk Management - Make it Fixable
Unable to
Roll out Fixes
● Relying on User Updates
● Unable to Build
● Unable to Deploy
● Regression Fear
● No Issue Tracking
● No Release Tags
● No Source
● Issue in infrastructure
Fix : Ship It!
Code
● Get the Code
● Use Version Control
● Keep Build Environment
● Write Integration Tests
Holy Grail : Auto Update
Configuration Management
● Have Security Contact
● Track issues
● Make a Deployment Plan
● Control Infrastructure
No Control over
Dependencies
● Too Many Dependencies
● Frameworks are Abandoned
● Libraries Disappear
● Insecure Platform APIs
● Insecure Tooling
● End-of-Life OS (Windows)
● Licenses expire/change
● Known Issues not Fixed
● OS Not Updated (Android)
Fix: Control It!
Be conservative
● Is it needed?
● Do you understand it?
Goal : Dependency Control
Be cautious
● Audit your upstream
● Avoid forking
● Have an upgrade plan
● Have someone responsible
The Team Is Gone
● Team were consultants
● They were downsized
● The job was outsourced
● “Bus factor”
● “Binary blob”
● Abandonware
Fix : Own It!
Take it on yourselves
● Build competence in-house
● Fork, take control
● “Barely Sufficient” Docs
● Ship It and Control It
Goal : Regain Control
Outsource
● Maintenance Contract
● Add Security Clause
● Own deployment channel
It’s in Our Code
● Injection
● Exploited crash etc
● Debug code in production
● Server compromised
● Outdated platform
● Intercepted traffic
● Mined local data
● Fake App
Fix : Live It!
Prevent
● Sanitize your input
● Send crash reports
● Code review + tests
● Review server security
● Encrypt all traffic
● Review local storage
● Work around old platform
● Sign app and check
Goal : Prevent & Cure
Cure
● Ship it!
Designing the User Experience of Security
Example : The Padlock
“You can trust this page”
Or? Users don’t understand the
meaning of the padlock
“Why do you have a red purse?”
The Save icon, the Call icon and
the Padlock icon - too old?
“The page has a green padlock”
Does the user really notice the
context?
The Users Won’t Read
Error blindness
Most users will mentally erase
permanent error notifiers - they
won’t read
“Just click next”
Most users will accept the defaults
- they won’t read
“Make it go away”
The user will try to make the error
dialog go away - they won’t read
Fix : Less is More
Don’t leave it to the user
Just do the right thing, you don’t
have to ask
Have good defaults
Make sure that clicking next will
leave the user in a good place
Be very explicit when needed
If the user is in a “dangerous”
situation - design carefully and if
you have to explain : use language
the user can understand
They Trust You
With Personal information
They trust you to protect them from
both hackers and governments
With Data
They trust you to protect their
pictures, documents, email ...
With Money
They trust you to protect their
payment information and passwords
Fix : Be Trustworthy
Only store what you have to
Try to use end-to-end encryption,
so that even you don’t have access.
Otherwise, encrypt as much as you
can
Back up everything
Your users can’t afford to lose
their baby pictures
Use third party payment
Avoid having responsibility for
their money
Ship It, Control It, Own It, Live It
Security is Hard
Protect Your User
Make it Fixable
Design for Change
Patricia Aas, Vivaldi Technologies
Photos from pixabay.com

More Related Content

What's hot

A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!
A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!
A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!Ammar WK
 
Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016
Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016
Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016Shubham Gupta
 
DevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya Janca
DevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya JancaDevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya Janca
DevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya JancaDevSecCon
 
Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016
Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016
Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016Paul Gower
 
Simplified Security Code Review Process
Simplified Security Code Review ProcessSimplified Security Code Review Process
Simplified Security Code Review ProcessSherif Koussa
 
New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)
New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)
New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)Dinis Cruz
 
It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013
It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013
It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013Ben Ten (0xA)
 
Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)
Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)
Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)Phillip Maddux
 
Getting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking Competition
Getting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking CompetitionGetting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking Competition
Getting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking CompetitionJoe McCray
 
The Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and Fame
The Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and FameThe Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and Fame
The Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and FameAbhinav Mishra
 
Bug Bounty - Hackers Job
Bug Bounty - Hackers JobBug Bounty - Hackers Job
Bug Bounty - Hackers JobArbin Godar
 
[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...
[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...
[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...bugcrowd
 
Pivotal APJ Security Chaos Engineering
Pivotal APJ Security Chaos EngineeringPivotal APJ Security Chaos Engineering
Pivotal APJ Security Chaos EngineeringAaron Rinehart
 
Hackfest presentation.pptx
Hackfest presentation.pptxHackfest presentation.pptx
Hackfest presentation.pptxPeter Yaworski
 
CSA Raleigh application security and deception in the cloud
CSA Raleigh   application security and deception in the cloudCSA Raleigh   application security and deception in the cloud
CSA Raleigh application security and deception in the cloudPhillip Maddux
 
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at YahooSecurity at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at YahooAlex Stamos
 
Backup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin Ahmed
Backup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin AhmedBackup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin Ahmed
Backup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin AhmedMazin Ahmed
 
GDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos Engineering
GDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos EngineeringGDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos Engineering
GDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos EngineeringAaron Rinehart
 
Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.
Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.
Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.Nestor Angulo de Ugarte
 

What's hot (20)

A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!
A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!
A Journey Into Pen-tester land: Myths or Facts!
 
Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016
Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016
Bug Bounty #Defconlucknow2016
 
DevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya Janca
DevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya JancaDevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya Janca
DevSecCon Singapore 2018 - Insecurity in information technology by Tanya Janca
 
Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016
Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016
Code Review: How and When - Tulsa TechFest 2016
 
Simplified Security Code Review Process
Simplified Security Code Review ProcessSimplified Security Code Review Process
Simplified Security Code Review Process
 
New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)
New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)
New Era of Software with modern Application Security (v0.6)
 
It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013
It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013
It's Okay To Touch Yourself - DerbyCon 2013
 
Bug bounty
Bug bountyBug bounty
Bug bounty
 
Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)
Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)
Deception in Cyber Security (League of Women in Cyber Security)
 
Getting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking Competition
Getting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking CompetitionGetting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking Competition
Getting ready for a Capture The Flag Hacking Competition
 
The Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and Fame
The Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and FameThe Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and Fame
The Game of Bug Bounty Hunting - Money, Drama, Action and Fame
 
Bug Bounty - Hackers Job
Bug Bounty - Hackers JobBug Bounty - Hackers Job
Bug Bounty - Hackers Job
 
[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...
[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...
[Webinar] Building a Product Security Incident Response Team: Learnings from ...
 
Pivotal APJ Security Chaos Engineering
Pivotal APJ Security Chaos EngineeringPivotal APJ Security Chaos Engineering
Pivotal APJ Security Chaos Engineering
 
Hackfest presentation.pptx
Hackfest presentation.pptxHackfest presentation.pptx
Hackfest presentation.pptx
 
CSA Raleigh application security and deception in the cloud
CSA Raleigh   application security and deception in the cloudCSA Raleigh   application security and deception in the cloud
CSA Raleigh application security and deception in the cloud
 
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at YahooSecurity at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
 
Backup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin Ahmed
Backup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin AhmedBackup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin Ahmed
Backup-File Artifacts - OWASP Khartoum InfoSec Sessions 2016 - Mazin Ahmed
 
GDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos Engineering
GDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos EngineeringGDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos Engineering
GDS-Austin - DevSecOps & Security Chaos Engineering
 
Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.
Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.
Hacking WordPress... and countermeasures.
 

Viewers also liked

Rb30 dohc guide
Rb30 dohc guideRb30 dohc guide
Rb30 dohc guidejamind
 
The Top 10 Fastest Cars in World
The Top 10 Fastest Cars in WorldThe Top 10 Fastest Cars in World
The Top 10 Fastest Cars in WorldNicole Stanley
 
Farma Presentatie
Farma PresentatieFarma Presentatie
Farma Presentatiemarcomok
 
All about you knee
All about you kneeAll about you knee
All about you kneeConsultonmic
 
20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола Петра
20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола Петра20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола Петра
20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола ПетраAndrei A. Emelin
 
Intro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & Place
Intro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & PlaceIntro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & Place
Intro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & PlaceKevin W. Brooks, MBA
 
Enigmatice gânduri
Enigmatice gânduriEnigmatice gânduri
Enigmatice gânduriDorian NC
 
黃帝內經與資安上部
黃帝內經與資安上部黃帝內經與資安上部
黃帝內經與資安上部Chuan Lin
 
ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALK
ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALKANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALK
ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALKDiana Mendes
 

Viewers also liked (20)

Rb30 dohc guide
Rb30 dohc guideRb30 dohc guide
Rb30 dohc guide
 
UML+Python
UML+PythonUML+Python
UML+Python
 
Chapter 01 New
Chapter 01 NewChapter 01 New
Chapter 01 New
 
Maturity
Maturity Maturity
Maturity
 
The Top 10 Fastest Cars in World
The Top 10 Fastest Cars in WorldThe Top 10 Fastest Cars in World
The Top 10 Fastest Cars in World
 
Speaking unit 11
Speaking unit 11Speaking unit 11
Speaking unit 11
 
Farma Presentatie
Farma PresentatieFarma Presentatie
Farma Presentatie
 
All about you knee
All about you kneeAll about you knee
All about you knee
 
La sabiduría
La sabiduríaLa sabiduría
La sabiduría
 
2315072huk
2315072huk2315072huk
2315072huk
 
20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола Петра
20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола Петра20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола Петра
20170109 Искажение времяисчисления фиксирующее "рекорд" апостола Петра
 
La
LaLa
La
 
Well-Wishers
Well-WishersWell-Wishers
Well-Wishers
 
Intro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & Place
Intro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & PlaceIntro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & Place
Intro to Marketing - Workshop 2 Segmentation, Product & Place
 
Enigmatice gânduri
Enigmatice gânduriEnigmatice gânduri
Enigmatice gânduri
 
Solucion y Psicologia del Bienestar
Solucion y Psicologia del BienestarSolucion y Psicologia del Bienestar
Solucion y Psicologia del Bienestar
 
Sonic boom
Sonic boomSonic boom
Sonic boom
 
黃帝內經與資安上部
黃帝內經與資安上部黃帝內經與資安上部
黃帝內經與資安上部
 
ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALK
ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALKANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALK
ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO - TED TALK
 
Skruzdeliukas
SkruzdeliukasSkruzdeliukas
Skruzdeliukas
 

Similar to Make it Fixable (Security Divas 2017)

The Human Side of Security
The Human Side of SecurityThe Human Side of Security
The Human Side of SecurityRandy Earl
 
Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,
Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,
Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,Sigma Software
 
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software jamieayre
 
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101  when good design & security work togetherSecurity engineering 101  when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work togetherWendy Knox Everette
 
Survey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application SecuritySurvey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application SecurityNicholas Davis
 
ProdSec: A Technical Approach
ProdSec: A Technical ApproachProdSec: A Technical Approach
ProdSec: A Technical ApproachJeremy Brown
 
Identifying a Compromised WordPress Site
Identifying a Compromised WordPress SiteIdentifying a Compromised WordPress Site
Identifying a Compromised WordPress SiteChris Burgess
 
Secure at Speed @ Solent.tech
Secure at Speed @ Solent.techSecure at Speed @ Solent.tech
Secure at Speed @ Solent.techStuart Gunter
 
Secrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security Team
Secrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security TeamSecrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security Team
Secrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security TeamOWASP Delhi
 
SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)
SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)
SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)Artur Barseghyan
 
Application Security - Your Success Depends on it
Application Security - Your Success Depends on itApplication Security - Your Success Depends on it
Application Security - Your Success Depends on itWSO2
 
Wfh security risks - Ed Adams, President, Security Innovation
Wfh security risks  - Ed Adams, President, Security InnovationWfh security risks  - Ed Adams, President, Security Innovation
Wfh security risks - Ed Adams, President, Security InnovationPriyanka Aash
 
Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...
Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...
Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...Michael Pirnat
 
Incident Response Fails
Incident Response FailsIncident Response Fails
Incident Response FailsMichael Gough
 
N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018
N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018
N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018Codemotion
 
Users awarness programme for Online Privacy
Users awarness programme for Online PrivacyUsers awarness programme for Online Privacy
Users awarness programme for Online PrivacyKazi Sarwar Hossain
 
The Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby Dominguez
The Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby DominguezThe Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby Dominguez
The Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby DominguezEC-Council
 
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problemsData security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problemsExove
 
Owasp tds
Owasp tdsOwasp tds
Owasp tdssnyff
 

Similar to Make it Fixable (Security Divas 2017) (20)

The Human Side of Security
The Human Side of SecurityThe Human Side of Security
The Human Side of Security
 
Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,
Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,
Байки із пожежного депо або як працює Big Data в Sigma Software, Денис Пишьєв,
 
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
 
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101  when good design & security work togetherSecurity engineering 101  when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work together
 
Survey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application SecuritySurvey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application Security
 
ProdSec: A Technical Approach
ProdSec: A Technical ApproachProdSec: A Technical Approach
ProdSec: A Technical Approach
 
Identifying a Compromised WordPress Site
Identifying a Compromised WordPress SiteIdentifying a Compromised WordPress Site
Identifying a Compromised WordPress Site
 
Secure at Speed @ Solent.tech
Secure at Speed @ Solent.techSecure at Speed @ Solent.tech
Secure at Speed @ Solent.tech
 
Year Zero
Year ZeroYear Zero
Year Zero
 
Secrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security Team
Secrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security TeamSecrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security Team
Secrets of Google VRP by: Krzysztof Kotowicz, Google Security Team
 
SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)
SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)
SSO using CAS + two-factor authentication (PyGrunn 2014 talk)
 
Application Security - Your Success Depends on it
Application Security - Your Success Depends on itApplication Security - Your Success Depends on it
Application Security - Your Success Depends on it
 
Wfh security risks - Ed Adams, President, Security Innovation
Wfh security risks  - Ed Adams, President, Security InnovationWfh security risks  - Ed Adams, President, Security Innovation
Wfh security risks - Ed Adams, President, Security Innovation
 
Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...
Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...
Shiny, Let’s Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulner...
 
Incident Response Fails
Incident Response FailsIncident Response Fails
Incident Response Fails
 
N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018
N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018
N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018
 
Users awarness programme for Online Privacy
Users awarness programme for Online PrivacyUsers awarness programme for Online Privacy
Users awarness programme for Online Privacy
 
The Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby Dominguez
The Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby DominguezThe Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby Dominguez
The Cloud 9 - Threat & Solutions 2016 by Bobby Dominguez
 
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problemsData security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
 
Owasp tds
Owasp tdsOwasp tds
Owasp tds
 

More from Patricia Aas

NDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdf
NDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdfNDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdf
NDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdfPatricia Aas
 
Return Oriented Programming, an introduction
Return Oriented Programming, an introductionReturn Oriented Programming, an introduction
Return Oriented Programming, an introductionPatricia Aas
 
I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)
I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)
I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)Patricia Aas
 
Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)
Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)
Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)Patricia Aas
 
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)Patricia Aas
 
Classic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdf
Classic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdfClassic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdf
Classic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdfPatricia Aas
 
Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)
Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)
Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)Patricia Aas
 
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)Patricia Aas
 
Thoughts On Learning A New Programming Language
Thoughts On Learning A New Programming LanguageThoughts On Learning A New Programming Language
Thoughts On Learning A New Programming LanguagePatricia Aas
 
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020Patricia Aas
 
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020Patricia Aas
 
DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)
DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)
DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)Patricia Aas
 
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)Patricia Aas
 
Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)
Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)
Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)Patricia Aas
 
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))Patricia Aas
 
Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)
Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)
Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)Patricia Aas
 
Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019)
Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019) Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019)
Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019) Patricia Aas
 
Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)
Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)
Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)Patricia Aas
 
Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)
Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)
Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)Patricia Aas
 

More from Patricia Aas (20)

NDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdf
NDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdfNDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdf
NDC TechTown 2023_ Return Oriented Programming an introduction.pdf
 
Telling a story
Telling a storyTelling a story
Telling a story
 
Return Oriented Programming, an introduction
Return Oriented Programming, an introductionReturn Oriented Programming, an introduction
Return Oriented Programming, an introduction
 
I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)
I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)
I can't work like this (KDE Academy Keynote 2021)
 
Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)
Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)
Dependency Management in C++ (NDC TechTown 2021)
 
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (Meeting C++ 2021)
 
Classic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdf
Classic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdfClassic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdf
Classic Vulnerabilities (MUCplusplus2022).pdf
 
Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)
Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)
Classic Vulnerabilities (ACCU Keynote 2022)
 
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)
 
Thoughts On Learning A New Programming Language
Thoughts On Learning A New Programming LanguageThoughts On Learning A New Programming Language
Thoughts On Learning A New Programming Language
 
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
 
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
Trying to build an Open Source browser in 2020
 
DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)
DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)
DevSecOps for Developers, How To Start (ETC 2020)
 
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019)
 
Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)
Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)
Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown 2019)
 
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))
The Anatomy of an Exploit (NDC TechTown 2019))
 
Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)
Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)
Elections, Trust and Critical Infrastructure (NDC TechTown)
 
Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019)
Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019) Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019)
Survival Tips for Women in Tech (JavaZone 2019)
 
Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)
Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)
Embedded Ethics (EuroBSDcon 2019)
 
Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)
Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)
Chromium Sandbox on Linux (NDC Security 2019)
 

Recently uploaded

Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Scriptwesley chun
 
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessAdvantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessPixlogix Infotech
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEarley Information Science
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Igalia
 
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptxHampshireHUG
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdfhans926745
 
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVReal Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVKhem
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityPrincipled Technologies
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptxFactors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptxKatpro Technologies
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsMaria Levchenko
 
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processorsdebabhi2
 
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfThe Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfEnterprise Knowledge
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonetsnaman860154
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsEnterprise Knowledge
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?Igalia
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreternaman860154
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationSafe Software
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessAdvantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
 
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
 
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVReal Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptxFactors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
 
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
 
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfThe Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
 

Make it Fixable (Security Divas 2017)

  • 1. Make it Fixable Designing for Change Patricia Aas Security Divas 2017
  • 2. Patricia Aas Programmer mainly in C++ and Java Currently : Vivaldi Technologies Previously : Cisco Systems, Knowit, Opera Software Master in Computer Science from UiO Twitter : @pati_gallardo
  • 4. Just Remember : - You live in the real world - Take one step at a time - Make a Plan
  • 5. ● Unable to Roll Out Fixes ● No Control over Dependencies ● The Team is Gone ● It’s in Our Code Risk Management - Make it Fixable
  • 6. Unable to Roll out Fixes ● Relying on User Updates ● Unable to Build ● Unable to Deploy ● Regression Fear ● No Issue Tracking ● No Release Tags ● No Source ● Issue in infrastructure
  • 7. Fix : Ship It! Code ● Get the Code ● Use Version Control ● Keep Build Environment ● Write Integration Tests Holy Grail : Auto Update Configuration Management ● Have Security Contact ● Track issues ● Make a Deployment Plan ● Control Infrastructure
  • 8. No Control over Dependencies ● Too Many Dependencies ● Frameworks are Abandoned ● Libraries Disappear ● Insecure Platform APIs ● Insecure Tooling ● End-of-Life OS (Windows) ● Licenses expire/change ● Known Issues not Fixed ● OS Not Updated (Android)
  • 9. Fix: Control It! Be conservative ● Is it needed? ● Do you understand it? Goal : Dependency Control Be cautious ● Audit your upstream ● Avoid forking ● Have an upgrade plan ● Have someone responsible
  • 10. The Team Is Gone ● Team were consultants ● They were downsized ● The job was outsourced ● “Bus factor” ● “Binary blob” ● Abandonware
  • 11. Fix : Own It! Take it on yourselves ● Build competence in-house ● Fork, take control ● “Barely Sufficient” Docs ● Ship It and Control It Goal : Regain Control Outsource ● Maintenance Contract ● Add Security Clause ● Own deployment channel
  • 12. It’s in Our Code ● Injection ● Exploited crash etc ● Debug code in production ● Server compromised ● Outdated platform ● Intercepted traffic ● Mined local data ● Fake App
  • 13. Fix : Live It! Prevent ● Sanitize your input ● Send crash reports ● Code review + tests ● Review server security ● Encrypt all traffic ● Review local storage ● Work around old platform ● Sign app and check Goal : Prevent & Cure Cure ● Ship it!
  • 14. Designing the User Experience of Security
  • 15. Example : The Padlock “You can trust this page” Or? Users don’t understand the meaning of the padlock “Why do you have a red purse?” The Save icon, the Call icon and the Padlock icon - too old? “The page has a green padlock” Does the user really notice the context?
  • 16. The Users Won’t Read Error blindness Most users will mentally erase permanent error notifiers - they won’t read “Just click next” Most users will accept the defaults - they won’t read “Make it go away” The user will try to make the error dialog go away - they won’t read
  • 17. Fix : Less is More Don’t leave it to the user Just do the right thing, you don’t have to ask Have good defaults Make sure that clicking next will leave the user in a good place Be very explicit when needed If the user is in a “dangerous” situation - design carefully and if you have to explain : use language the user can understand
  • 18. They Trust You With Personal information They trust you to protect them from both hackers and governments With Data They trust you to protect their pictures, documents, email ... With Money They trust you to protect their payment information and passwords
  • 19. Fix : Be Trustworthy Only store what you have to Try to use end-to-end encryption, so that even you don’t have access. Otherwise, encrypt as much as you can Back up everything Your users can’t afford to lose their baby pictures Use third party payment Avoid having responsibility for their money
  • 20. Ship It, Control It, Own It, Live It
  • 22. Make it Fixable Design for Change Patricia Aas, Vivaldi Technologies Photos from pixabay.com