This presentation summarises the key findings of the OECD publication “An introduction to competition law and policy in Uzbekistan” launched in Tashkent on 8 June 2022. Access the full report available in English and Russian at https://oe.cduzclp.
Uzbekistan: An introduction to competition law and policy – OECD 2022 Report
1. OECD REVIEW:
AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY IN UZBEKISTAN
LAUNCH OF THE OECD REVIEW
8 JUNE 2022, TASHKENT
Sabine Zigelski
Senior Competition Expert
OECD
An Introduction to Competition
Law and Policy in
UZBEKISTAN
LAUNCH OF THE OECD REVIEW
8 JUNE 2022, TASHKENT
Sabine Zigelski
Senior Competition Expert, OECD
2. The Competition Project
2
The project: “Fair Market Conditions for Competitiveness in
six OECD partner countries” - financed by the Siemens
Integrity Initiative
⇒In Uzbekistan: focus on
competition law and policy
Two parts:
1. Review of the competition law and policy framework
2. Two workshops on selected topics – based on the
results of the review
3. The Review
3
Two questionnaires to ACRU:
• Basic legal framework
• Quantitative data (CompSTATS)
OECD background research
Virtual fact finding mission
• Various conversations with ACRU
• Meetings with SAMA, MIFT,
MoEDPR
• Meetings with Private bar,
academia
Timeline: October 2021 – June 2022
Report in English and Russian
oe.cd/uzclp
5. The Benchmarks
5
See here
2021 Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in
Competition Law Enforcement
2021 Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality
2019 Recommendation on Competition Assessment
2019 Recommendation concerning Effective Action against Hard Core
Cartels
2014 Recommendation concerning International Co-operation on
Competition Investigations and Proceedings
2012 Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement
2005 Guiding principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance
2005 Best practices on Information Exchange
2005 Recommendation on Merger Review
List of OECD Standards on Competition
7. Findings and Recommendations
7
Competition Policy Recommendations to Eastern Partnership Countries –
equally relevant to Uzbekistan
Cartels are the most clear-cut and undisputedly harmful competition law violation, and
they affect every country. Determined enforcement against cartels is essential.
Competition authorities need to ensure that all mergers that meet the legal thresholds
are notified, and that they are analysed using sound economic methods. Prohibitions
and structural remedies should be applied in appropriate cases.
Competition agencies need to have sufficient investigation and sanctioning
powers as enabling conditions for strong enforcement.
Effective and impartial enforcement requires highly qualified enforcers who act in an
institutional environment that assures independence from public or private
stakeholder interventions and guarantees an absence of corruption.
Governments should ensure that their competition authorities are always involved in
drafting or reviewing laws and regulations that have the potential to affect
competition in a sector.
Jurisdictions should start or enhance activities to train and educate public
procurement officials to draft tenders in a way that prevents bid rigging, and to
detect suspicious signs of bid rigging.
8. Findings and Recommendations
8
Institutional design and resources
Mandate overload – too much to do next to the core competition
competences – risk of diluting and distracting from the core mandate
Very limited number of staff for high competition case numbers – no in-
depth assessment/economic analyses possible in most cases
Resources are very low in international comparison and not secured
-
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Uzbekistan Non-OECD OECD
EUR
'
000
2019 2020
ACRU budget per competition staff member, International comparison (2019-
2020)
9. Findings and Recommendations
9
Institutional design and resources
Appointment/dismissal of the Chairperson
The appointment of the Chairperson should be based on
objective and qualitative criteria prescribed by legislation
and based on the merits of a candidate
Fixed appointment terms can support managerial
independence
Reasons for early dismissal should pre-determined
narrowly to provide for exceptional circumstances, and not
allow for political interference
10. Findings and Recommendations
10
Framework conditions and international co-operation
Procedures and assessment frameworks should be determined
and made public by ACRU, including public guidance, not through
Decrees or Cabinet Resolutions
Co-operation with other public bodies is often hindered by limited
powers, limited resources or a more passive role of ACRU
Legislative impact assessment suffers from lack of staff resources,
the high volume of acts assessed, and lack of a minimum required
degree of responsiveness of governmental bodies
The judicial review system could benefit from an improved
economic education of the judiciary and/or specialised economic
courts
Increase international co-operation with peer group competition
authorities and engage actively in international meetings
11. Findings and Recommendations
11
Legal framework and enforcement powers for
horizontal agreements and abuse of dominance
All harmful horizontal agreements should be addressed by the
law, no exceptions and no effects analysis should be required for
hard core violations
Focus on prevention/detection of bidder collusion in public
procurement
Abuse of dominance investigations should focus on exclusionary
abuses, less on price, and use an effects based, economic analysis
Reconsider the usefulness of the register of dominant
undertakings
ACRU should be given discretion in choosing cases and priorities
ACRU needs adequate investigation and fining powers; time
limits should be extended
12. Findings and Recommendations
12
Legal framework and enforcement powers for merger
control
The intended increase of merger notification thresholds is a
welcome development and helps focus on mergers with sufficient
economic weight.
The legal test (dominance and/or competition restriction) is vague
and would benefit from specification both at the legislative and soft
law level
Despite high numbers of merger cases, no prohibitions and only
one conditional clearance
Time limits are extremely narrow, and even the intended
introduction of a two-phase procedure may be insufficient
Concentrations that are approved without ACRU involvement would
benefit from clear, transparent criteria and obtaining an ACRU
opinion for better informed decision making
13. Findings and Recommendations
13
Transparency benefits all
The existing rules and procedures and how they are applied should
be clear and transparent
ACRU should issue public guidance on how it applies
substantive rules
ACRU should issue guidance on enforcement procedures
Decisions taken by ACRU should be published fully and should be
accessible on the website
ACRU should be enabled and required to issue statements of
objections to parties under investigation, to grant access to file
and to hear arguments of parties under investigation
When ACRU issues opinions to public bodies, these bodies should
be required to respond
14. Next steps
14
Uzbekistan: discuss the findings of the review
and consider the implementation of the most
relevant recommendations
OECD: develop, together with ACRU, concepts
for workshops that can help to improve
competition enforcement and competition culture
in Uzbekistan