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GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION 2020
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN DIGITAL
MARKETS
Presentation by the Secretariat
8 December 2020
Jam...
Why are abuse of dominance concerns so prominent
in digital markets?
2
Firm size Multi-sidedness Vertical integration
Cong...
Key themes in background paper
3
• Importance of legislative and
historical context for
enforcement approaches
– Formalist...
Categorising different theories of harm
4
Refusal to deal
(Cegedim in France; TREB in Canada)
Predatory pricing
(Bottin Ca...
Proposals to address abuse of dominance
concerns in digital markets
• Adjust enforcement approaches
– More guidance
– New ...
Thank you
James.MANCINI@oecd.org
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Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets – OECD Secretariat – December 2020 OECD discussion

This presentation by the OECD Secretariat was prepared for the discussion on “Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets” held at the 19th OECD Global Forum on Competition on 8 December 2020. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at http://oe.cd/dmkt.

This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.

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Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets – OECD Secretariat – December 2020 OECD discussion

  1. 1. GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION 2020 ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN DIGITAL MARKETS Presentation by the Secretariat 8 December 2020 James Mancini Competition Division
  2. 2. Why are abuse of dominance concerns so prominent in digital markets? 2 Firm size Multi-sidedness Vertical integration Conglomerate/ ecosystem business models Zero or subsidized prices Network effects Consumer biases Overlapping consumer protection or privacy concerns
  3. 3. Key themes in background paper 3 • Importance of legislative and historical context for enforcement approaches – Formalistic vs. effects-based – Balancing over- and under- enforcement – Harm to competitive process vs. consumers • Establishing dominance through substitutability, identifying entry barriers, and other indicators
  4. 4. Categorising different theories of harm 4 Refusal to deal (Cegedim in France; TREB in Canada) Predatory pricing (Bottin Cartographes in France) Exclusive dealing and loyalty discounts (Qualcomm in Europe) Tying and bundling (Microsoft in US, Google Android in Europe and India) Exploitative abuses (Facebook case in Germany) Margin squeeze (Google Shopping in Europe) New theories: Abusive leveraging? Privacy policy tying?
  5. 5. Proposals to address abuse of dominance concerns in digital markets • Adjust enforcement approaches – More guidance – New economic tools – Rebalancing over- and under-enforcement risks – Interim measures – Legislative change (e.g. reverse burden of proof) • Alternative measures to abuse of dominance enforcement – New regulatory frameworks for digital platforms – Measures to focus on demand-side problems in markets 5
  6. 6. Thank you James.MANCINI@oecd.org

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