n this session, Dr. Erica Chenoweth discusses how repression affects nonviolent campaigns. She provides empirical evidence that nonviolent movements are still effective even against brutally oppressive opponents. She discusses how movements "manage" repression through the promotion of backfire, as well as the strategic options movements have in dealing with repression. She also provides evidence suggesting that nonviolent movements that adopt violence or develop armed wings are not usually advantaged relative to nonviolent movements. This is because using violence against the regime, even when provoked, can undermine the necessary public participation that nonviolent campaigns enjoy, and can also undermine the backfiring of regime repression.

1. Presentation
prepared
for
the
2013
Fletcher
Summer
Institute

2. ¡ Nonviolent
resistance
cannot
succeed
against
very
repressive
or
brutal
opponents.
¡ Repression
or
violence
forces
nonviolent
movements
to
adopt
counter-­‐violence.

3. “Ruling
people
in
the
conquered
regions
is,
I
might
say,
of
course
a
psychological
problem.
One
cannot
rule
by
force
alone….For,
in
the
long
run,
government
systems
are
not
held
together
by
the
pressure
of
force,
but
rather
by
the
belief
in
the
quality
and
the
truthfulness
with
which
they
represent
and
promote
the
interests
of
the
people.”
~
???

4. “Ruling
people
in
the
conquered
regions
is,
I
might
say,
of
course
a
psychological
problem.
One
cannot
rule
by
force
alone….For,
in
the
long
run,
government
systems
are
not
held
together
by
the
pressure
of
force,
but
rather
by
the
belief
in
the
quality
and
the
truthfulness
with
which
they
represent
and
promote
the
interests
of
the
people.”
~
Adolph
Hitler,
1943

5. ¡ Power
is
based
on
obedience
and
consent,
not
on
monopoly
of
force.
¡ The
use
of
violence
demonstrates
weakness,
since
it
demonstrates
a
the
loss
of
voluntary
compliance.
¡ Regimes
are
not
monolithic.
¡ Power
is
never
permanent.
All
powerholders
must
constantly
replenish
their
power.

6. Regime Leadership
Pillars of Support
Civilians

7. Figure 2. The Effects of Campaign Participation on the
Probability of Success
p=.02

8. Figure 3. The Effects of Campaign Participation on the
Probability of Security Force Defections, by Campaign Type
p=.07

10. Source: Lee Smithey, 2011 (used with permission)

11. HighLow
Low
High
Mobilization
Repression

12. ¡ Do
not
assess
the
strategic
position
and
asymmetries
between
campaign
and
opponent.
¡ Assume
power
is
permanent
and
monolithic.
¡ Do
not
differentiate
between
methods
of
struggle.
¡ Do
not
incorporate
the
strategy
or
choices
available
to
campaign
participants.

13. ¡ Summy
1994:
nonviolent
resistance
can
work
against
extremely
brutal
opponents
when
§ A
dependency
relationship
exists
▪ The
opponent’s
survival
depends
squarely
on
the
obedience
of
the
people
▪ Iran,
Norway
&
Denmark,
Chile,
Serbia
§ An
indirect
dependency
relationship
exists
or
is
produced
▪ Intervention
of
a
third
party
that
has
linkages
to
movement
and
to
the
opponent
▪ United
States
civil
rights
movement,
1943
Rosenstraβe
protests,
East
Timor,
Tibet,
Refusenick
movement

14. ¡ Chenoweth
&
Stephan
2011
§ Repression
reduces
the
chances
of
success
for
nonviolent
and
violent
campaigns,
BUT
§ When
faced
with
violent
repression,
nonviolent
campaigns
have
a
46%
success
rate,
compared
with
only
20%
for
violent
campaigns.
▪ Size
=>
tactical
innovation
&
resilience
(Schock
2005)
▪ Repression
against
NV
campaigns
more
likely
to
backfire

15. ¡ Repression
can
produce
“moral
shock”
and
paradoxically
backfire
by:
§ Empowering
a
movement
▪ Can
generate
icons
and
martyrs.
▪ Movement
participants
increase
the
intensity
of
their
attachments.
§ Enhancing
recruitment
among
sympathetic
publics
▪ Third
parties
may
offer
support.
§ Weakening
a
regime
▪ Turn
public
opinion
and
undermine
legitimacy.
▪ Create
internal
dissent
and
divisions
among
elites,
functionaries,
and
security
forces.
¡ Hess
&
Martin
2006:
movements
can
“manage”
repression
by:
§ Portraying
the
act
as
unjust,
unfair,
excessive
or
disproportional.
§ Communicating
information
about
the
action
to
relevant
audiences.
§ Possessing
a
plan
to
counter
censorship
and
regime
propaganda.

16. Shift
Nonviolent
Methods
Methods
of
concentration
Methods
of
dispersion
Maintain
Status
Quo
Try
to
manage
effects
of
repression
Cross
your
fingers
and
hope
for
a
lucky
break!
Retreat
Respond
with
Violence

17. “[The
Nazis]
were
experts
in
violence,
and
had
been
trained
to
deal
with
opponents
who
used
that
method.
But
other
forms
of
resistance
baffled
them—and
all
the
more
in
proportion
as
the
methods
were
subtle
and
concealed.
It
was
a
relief
to
them
when
resistance
became
violent
and
when
nonviolent
forms
were
mixed
with
guerrilla
action,
thus
making
it
easier
to
combine
drastic
repressive
action
against
both
at
the
same
time.”
~
Basel
H.
Liddell-­‐Hart

18. ¡ Violence
is
typical
against
nonviolent
campaigns
that
threaten
the
status
quo.
¡ Repression
can
hurt
campaigns
and
should
be
avoided
or
evaded
whenever
possible.
¡ But
repression
does
not
necessarily
doom
a
campaign,
and
nonviolent
campaigns
are
still
more
effect
than
violent
or
mixed
campaigns
under
repressive
conditions.
¡ There
are
strategic
choices
and
ways
to
prepare
for
&
“manage”
the
effects
of
repression.

19.
“Courage is not absence of fear; it
is control of fear, mastery of fear.”
~ Mark Twain

20.
Blogs:
rationalinsurgent.wordpress.com
politicalviolenceataglance.org
Email:
Erica.Chenoweth@du.edu
On
Twitter:
@EricaChenoweth

21. The Effects of Radical Flank on Campaign Participation
p=.05 Source: Chenoweth & Shock 2013

22. ¡ May
apply
to
a
situation
in
which
there
are
two
or
more
groups
challenging
the
same
opponent
¡ “Radicals”
are
conceptualized
as
those
with
more
extreme
methods
or
more
extreme
demands
relative
to
other
opposition
groups
§ My
usage
is
more
extreme
methods
=
violence
¡ Radical
flank
effects
may
be
intra-­‐movement
or
inter-­‐
movement
¡ Radical
flank
effects
may
be
positive,
negative,
or
null

23. ¡ A
radical
flank
may
increase
the
leverage
of
the
nonviolent
campaign
by:
§ Raising
the
profile
of
the
movement
&
its
demands
(Haines
1984)
§ Making
the
nonviolent
movement
seem
less
threatening
and
therefore
a
better
alternative
§ Creating
a
political
crisis
that
is
resolved
in
favor
of
the
nonviolent
movement
&
more
moderate
voices
§ Protecting
participants
and
civilians
(Jouejati
2012)
§ Empowering
participants
&
severing
links
to
existing
order
(Fanon
1964)
¡ It
may
also
encourage
citizen
engagement
in
the
workplace,
society,
etc.
(Isaac,
et
al
2006)

24. ¡ A
violent
campaign
may
decrease
the
leverage
of
the
nonviolent
campaign
by:
§ Discrediting
all
regime
opponents
(Pearlman
2011)
§ Providing
justification
for
widespread
repression
against
all
opponents
(Carey
2010;
Moore
&
Conrad
2012)
§ Reducing
widespread
popular
participation
§ Shifting
the
struggle
to
a
domain
in
which
the
regime
has
the
clear
advantage
(Pearlman
2011)
§ Decreasing
the
likelihood
of
backfire

25. ¡ Bob
&
Nepstad:
movements
can
survive
the
assassination
of
their
leader
under
four
conditions
§ Leader
is
administrative
rather
than
prophetic
§ Movement
has
a
martyrdom
ideology
§ The
leader
shares
group’s
guiding
identity
§ The
movement
was
unified
prior
to
repression
¡ Examples
§ El
Salvador
(Romero)
§ Nigerian
(Saro-­‐Wiwa)