Chapter 9 PowerPoint.pptx

CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,
Third Edition
Chapter 9: Wireless LAN Security
Vulnerabilities
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs, Third Edition 2
Objectives
• Define information security
• Describe the different types of wireless attacks
• List the legacy IEEE security protections
• Explain the vulnerabilities of wireless transmissions
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Principles of Information Security
• The need to defend against many attacks on
technology has created a new element of IT known
as information security.
• Understanding basic principles of defense is an
important first step in understanding WLAN security
and its vulnerabilities.
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs, Third Edition 3
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 4
What is Information Security?
• Information security: Task of securing digital
information
– Ensures protective measures properly implemented
– Protects confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA) on the devices that store, manipulate, and
transmit the information through products, people,
and procedures
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 5
Challenges of Information Security
• Trends influencing increasing difficultly in
information security:
– Universally connected devices
– Speed of attacks
– Sophistication of attacks
– Availability and simplicity of attack tools
– Faster detection of vulnerabilities
– Delays in patching
– Distributed attacks
• The “many against one” approach
– User confusion
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 6
Figure 9-1 Information security components
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 7
Table 9-2 Difficulties in defending against attacks
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Wireless Attacks
• Attacks can be divided into three categories:
– Attacks against enterprise organizations
– Attacks against mobile users
– Attacks against home users
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 8
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Enterprise Attacks
• Attack Vectors: paths that can be exploited
– “Hard edge”: well-defined boundary
– Single entry point onto the network plus security
devices that can defend it (firewall) make up a
network’s hard edge
– Physical hard edge will help keep out unauthorized
personnel so that attackers cannot physically access
devices
– Introduction of wireless LANs in enterprises has
changed hard edges to “blurred edges”
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 9
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 10
Figure 9-3 Network hard edge
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 11
Figure 9-4 Network blurred edge
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Enterprise Attacks
• A wireless device may create multiple enterprise
attack vectors:
– Open or misconfigured AP
– Rogue AP: an employee may bring a device from
home and connect it to the network
– Evil twin: an AP that is set up by an attacker
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 12
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Enterprise Attacks
• Wireless Enterprise Attacks:
– Reading Data: attacker can pick up the RF signal
from an open or misconfigured AP and read any
confidential wireless transmissions and other traffic
– Hijacking Wireless Connections: an attacker can
trick a corporate mobile device to connect the
imposter device instead
• Man-in-the-middle attack: makes it appear that the
wireless device and the network computers are
communicating with each other, when actually they
are sending and receiving data with an evil twin AP
between them
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 13
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Enterprise Attacks
• Wireless Enterprise Attacks (continued):
– Inserting Network Traffic: injecting wireless
packets into a network in order to redirect traffic to
an attacker’s server
– Denial of Service (DoS): attempts to prevent a
device from performing its normal functions
• An attacker can flood network with RF signal noise
(called RF jamming)
• An attacker can create a fictitious frame that pretends
to come from a trusted client
• Manipulating duration field values to a high number
thus preventing other devices from transmitting for a
long period of time
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 14
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Mobile User Attacks
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 15
Table 9-3 Mobile user attacks
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Home Attacks
• Attacks against home WLANs are usually easy
– Most home users fail to configure any security
• Attackers can:
– Steal data
– Read wireless transmissions: usernames,
passwords, credit card numbers
– Inject malware
– Download harmful content
• War driving: searching for wireless signals from an
automobile or on foot using a portable computer
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 16
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 17
Table 9-4 War driving tools
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 18
Legacy 802.11 Security Protections
• IEEE implemented several protections in the
original 1997 802.11 standard
• Three categories of WLAN protections:
– Access control
– Wired equivalent privacy (WEP)
– Authentication
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 19
Access Control
• Access Control: granting or denying approval to
use specific resources
• Wireless access control: Limit user’s admission to
AP
• Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering:
Based on a node’s unique MAC address
Figure 9-6 MAC address
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 20
Access Control
• MAC address filtering considered to be a basic
means of controlling access
• Restrictions can be implemented in one of two
ways:
– A specific device can be permitted or the device can
be blocked
Figure 9-7 MAC address filtering
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 21
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
• Guard the confidentiality of information
– Ensure only authorized parties can view it
• Used in IEEE 802.11 to encrypt wireless
transmissions
– “Scrambling”
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 22
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
• Cryptography: Science of transforming
information so that it is secure while being
transmitted or stored
– scrambles” data
• Encryption: Transforming plaintext to ciphertext
• Decryption: Transforming ciphertext to plaintext
• Ciphertext: Data that has been encrypted
– Given a key that is used to encrypt and decrypt
messages
– Weak keys: Keys that are easily discovered
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 23
Figure 9-8 Cryptography process
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 24
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
• IEEE 802.11 cryptography objectives:
– Efficient
– Exportable
– Optional
– Reasonably strong
– Self-synchronizing
• WEP relies on secret key “shared” between a
wireless device and the AP
– Same key installed on device and AP
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 25
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
• How WEP performs encryption:
– Plaintext to be transmitted has CRC value that WPD
calls the integrity check value (ICV) – the CRC
value is appended to the end of the text
– Shared secret key is combined with an initialization
vector (IV)
• IV is a 24-bit value used in WEP that changes each
time a packet is encrypted
– Default key and IV are entered as the seed value
into a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
that creates a random number
• Output is known as the keystream
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
• How WEP performs encryption (continued):
– Text plus ICV and the keystream are combined to
create encrypted text
– The IV is added to the front of the ciphertext and the
packet is ready for transmission
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 26
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 27
Figure 9-9 WEP encryption process
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 28
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
• When encrypted frame arrives at destination:
– Receiving device separates IV from ciphertext
– Combines IV with appropriate secret key
• Create a keystream
– Keystream used to extract text and ICV
– Text run through CRC
• Ensure ICVs match and nothing lost in transmission
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 29
Authentication
• IEEE 802.11 authentication: Process in which AP
accepts or rejects a wireless device
• Open system authentication:
– Wireless device sends association request frame to
AP
• Carries info about supported data rates and service
set identifier (SSID)
– AP compares received SSID with the network SSID
• If they match, wireless device authenticated
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 30
Authentication
• Shared key authentication: Uses WEP keys
– AP sends the wireless device the challenge text
– Wireless device encrypts challenge text with its WEP
key and returns it to the AP
– AP decrypts returned result and compares to original
challenge text
• If they match, device accepted into network
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 31
Vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.11 Security
• IEEE 802.11 standard’s security mechanisms for
wireless networks have fallen short of their goal
• Vulnerabilities exist in:
– Authentication
– Address filtering
– WEP
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 32
Authentication
• Inherently weak
– Based only on match of SSIDs
– SSID beaconed from AP during passive scanning
• Easy to discover
• Some users configure their APs to prevent the
beacon frame from including the SSID (known as
SSID hiding)
• Limitations of SSID hiding:
– SSID can still be discovered through management
frames sent by the AP
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Authentication
• Limitations of SSID hiding (continued):
– SSID is initially transmitted in plaintext form when a
device is negotiating with the AP
• An attacker can force a renegotiation to discover SSID
– SSID hiding may prevent users from roaming
– Not all APs allow beaconing to be turned off
– May cause connection problems with devices
running Windows XP
– SSID can be retrieved from an authenticated device
– Many users do not change the default SSID, an
attacker can try using default SSIDs
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 33
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Authentication
• Shared key authentication, using challenge text, is
also vulnerable
– Attacker can view the key on an approved device by
looking over someone’s shoulder (called shoulder
surfing)
– AP send the challenge text to a devices as cleartext
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 34
© 2013 Cengage Learning
Address Filtering
• MAC address filtering vulnerabilities:
– Managing the number of MAC addresses in a
medium to large sized wireless network can be
challenging
– MAC addresses are initially exchanged in cleartext
– MAC addresses can be “spoofed” or substituted in
two ways
• Some wireless NICs allow for a substitute MAC
address to be used
• There are programs available that allow you to spoof a
MAC address
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 35
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 36
WEP
• Uses 64-bit or 128-bit number which is made up of
a 24-bit IV and either a 40-bit or 104-bit default key
– Shorter keys easier to crack
• WEP implementation violates cardinal rule of
cryptography
– Creates detectable pattern for attackers
– APs end up repeating IVs
• Collision: Two packets derived from same IV
– Attacker can use info from collisions to initiate a
keystream attack
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 37
Figure 9-10 XOR operations
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 38
Figure 9-11 Capturing packets
© 2013 Cengage Learning
WEP
• Several ways an attacker can use captured
packets:
– In fields where the value may not be known, the
purpose is known so values can be guessed
– Body portion of the text often encodes ASCII text,
giving some possible clues
– An attacker can capture an encrypted packed and
based on its size may guess that it is an ARP
request
• Attacker can re-inject the ARP request into the
network which will supply the attacker with many ARP
responses
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 39
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 40
Summary
• Information security protects the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of information on the
devices that store, manipulate, and transmit the
information through products, people, and
procedures
• Significant challenges in keeping wireless networks
and devices secure
• There are multiple attack points in WLANS: open or
misconfigured APs, rogue APs, and evil twins
© 2013 Cengage Learning
CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 41
Summary
• Attacks that can be launched include reading data,
hijacking wireless connections, inserting traffic, and
performing denial-of-service attacks
• Mobile users and home users face attacks as well
• IEEE implemented several protections in the
original 802.11 standard: access control, wired
equivalent privacy (WEP), and authentication
• Significant security vulnerabilities exist in the IEEE
802.11 security mechanisms
1 von 41

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Chapter 9 PowerPoint.pptx

  • 1. CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs, Third Edition Chapter 9: Wireless LAN Security Vulnerabilities
  • 2. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs, Third Edition 2 Objectives • Define information security • Describe the different types of wireless attacks • List the legacy IEEE security protections • Explain the vulnerabilities of wireless transmissions
  • 3. © 2013 Cengage Learning Principles of Information Security • The need to defend against many attacks on technology has created a new element of IT known as information security. • Understanding basic principles of defense is an important first step in understanding WLAN security and its vulnerabilities. CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs, Third Edition 3
  • 4. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 4 What is Information Security? • Information security: Task of securing digital information – Ensures protective measures properly implemented – Protects confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) on the devices that store, manipulate, and transmit the information through products, people, and procedures
  • 5. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 5 Challenges of Information Security • Trends influencing increasing difficultly in information security: – Universally connected devices – Speed of attacks – Sophistication of attacks – Availability and simplicity of attack tools – Faster detection of vulnerabilities – Delays in patching – Distributed attacks • The “many against one” approach – User confusion
  • 6. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 6 Figure 9-1 Information security components
  • 7. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 7 Table 9-2 Difficulties in defending against attacks
  • 8. © 2013 Cengage Learning Wireless Attacks • Attacks can be divided into three categories: – Attacks against enterprise organizations – Attacks against mobile users – Attacks against home users CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 8
  • 9. © 2013 Cengage Learning Enterprise Attacks • Attack Vectors: paths that can be exploited – “Hard edge”: well-defined boundary – Single entry point onto the network plus security devices that can defend it (firewall) make up a network’s hard edge – Physical hard edge will help keep out unauthorized personnel so that attackers cannot physically access devices – Introduction of wireless LANs in enterprises has changed hard edges to “blurred edges” CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 9
  • 10. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 10 Figure 9-3 Network hard edge
  • 11. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 11 Figure 9-4 Network blurred edge
  • 12. © 2013 Cengage Learning Enterprise Attacks • A wireless device may create multiple enterprise attack vectors: – Open or misconfigured AP – Rogue AP: an employee may bring a device from home and connect it to the network – Evil twin: an AP that is set up by an attacker CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 12
  • 13. © 2013 Cengage Learning Enterprise Attacks • Wireless Enterprise Attacks: – Reading Data: attacker can pick up the RF signal from an open or misconfigured AP and read any confidential wireless transmissions and other traffic – Hijacking Wireless Connections: an attacker can trick a corporate mobile device to connect the imposter device instead • Man-in-the-middle attack: makes it appear that the wireless device and the network computers are communicating with each other, when actually they are sending and receiving data with an evil twin AP between them CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 13
  • 14. © 2013 Cengage Learning Enterprise Attacks • Wireless Enterprise Attacks (continued): – Inserting Network Traffic: injecting wireless packets into a network in order to redirect traffic to an attacker’s server – Denial of Service (DoS): attempts to prevent a device from performing its normal functions • An attacker can flood network with RF signal noise (called RF jamming) • An attacker can create a fictitious frame that pretends to come from a trusted client • Manipulating duration field values to a high number thus preventing other devices from transmitting for a long period of time CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 14
  • 15. © 2013 Cengage Learning Mobile User Attacks CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 15 Table 9-3 Mobile user attacks
  • 16. © 2013 Cengage Learning Home Attacks • Attacks against home WLANs are usually easy – Most home users fail to configure any security • Attackers can: – Steal data – Read wireless transmissions: usernames, passwords, credit card numbers – Inject malware – Download harmful content • War driving: searching for wireless signals from an automobile or on foot using a portable computer CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 16
  • 17. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 17 Table 9-4 War driving tools
  • 18. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 18 Legacy 802.11 Security Protections • IEEE implemented several protections in the original 1997 802.11 standard • Three categories of WLAN protections: – Access control – Wired equivalent privacy (WEP) – Authentication
  • 19. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 19 Access Control • Access Control: granting or denying approval to use specific resources • Wireless access control: Limit user’s admission to AP • Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering: Based on a node’s unique MAC address Figure 9-6 MAC address
  • 20. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 20 Access Control • MAC address filtering considered to be a basic means of controlling access • Restrictions can be implemented in one of two ways: – A specific device can be permitted or the device can be blocked Figure 9-7 MAC address filtering
  • 21. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 21 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • Guard the confidentiality of information – Ensure only authorized parties can view it • Used in IEEE 802.11 to encrypt wireless transmissions – “Scrambling”
  • 22. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 22 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • Cryptography: Science of transforming information so that it is secure while being transmitted or stored – scrambles” data • Encryption: Transforming plaintext to ciphertext • Decryption: Transforming ciphertext to plaintext • Ciphertext: Data that has been encrypted – Given a key that is used to encrypt and decrypt messages – Weak keys: Keys that are easily discovered
  • 23. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 23 Figure 9-8 Cryptography process
  • 24. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 24 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • IEEE 802.11 cryptography objectives: – Efficient – Exportable – Optional – Reasonably strong – Self-synchronizing • WEP relies on secret key “shared” between a wireless device and the AP – Same key installed on device and AP
  • 25. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 25 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • How WEP performs encryption: – Plaintext to be transmitted has CRC value that WPD calls the integrity check value (ICV) – the CRC value is appended to the end of the text – Shared secret key is combined with an initialization vector (IV) • IV is a 24-bit value used in WEP that changes each time a packet is encrypted – Default key and IV are entered as the seed value into a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) that creates a random number • Output is known as the keystream
  • 26. © 2013 Cengage Learning Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • How WEP performs encryption (continued): – Text plus ICV and the keystream are combined to create encrypted text – The IV is added to the front of the ciphertext and the packet is ready for transmission CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 26
  • 27. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 27 Figure 9-9 WEP encryption process
  • 28. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 28 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • When encrypted frame arrives at destination: – Receiving device separates IV from ciphertext – Combines IV with appropriate secret key • Create a keystream – Keystream used to extract text and ICV – Text run through CRC • Ensure ICVs match and nothing lost in transmission
  • 29. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 29 Authentication • IEEE 802.11 authentication: Process in which AP accepts or rejects a wireless device • Open system authentication: – Wireless device sends association request frame to AP • Carries info about supported data rates and service set identifier (SSID) – AP compares received SSID with the network SSID • If they match, wireless device authenticated
  • 30. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 30 Authentication • Shared key authentication: Uses WEP keys – AP sends the wireless device the challenge text – Wireless device encrypts challenge text with its WEP key and returns it to the AP – AP decrypts returned result and compares to original challenge text • If they match, device accepted into network
  • 31. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 31 Vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.11 Security • IEEE 802.11 standard’s security mechanisms for wireless networks have fallen short of their goal • Vulnerabilities exist in: – Authentication – Address filtering – WEP
  • 32. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 32 Authentication • Inherently weak – Based only on match of SSIDs – SSID beaconed from AP during passive scanning • Easy to discover • Some users configure their APs to prevent the beacon frame from including the SSID (known as SSID hiding) • Limitations of SSID hiding: – SSID can still be discovered through management frames sent by the AP
  • 33. © 2013 Cengage Learning Authentication • Limitations of SSID hiding (continued): – SSID is initially transmitted in plaintext form when a device is negotiating with the AP • An attacker can force a renegotiation to discover SSID – SSID hiding may prevent users from roaming – Not all APs allow beaconing to be turned off – May cause connection problems with devices running Windows XP – SSID can be retrieved from an authenticated device – Many users do not change the default SSID, an attacker can try using default SSIDs CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 33
  • 34. © 2013 Cengage Learning Authentication • Shared key authentication, using challenge text, is also vulnerable – Attacker can view the key on an approved device by looking over someone’s shoulder (called shoulder surfing) – AP send the challenge text to a devices as cleartext CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 34
  • 35. © 2013 Cengage Learning Address Filtering • MAC address filtering vulnerabilities: – Managing the number of MAC addresses in a medium to large sized wireless network can be challenging – MAC addresses are initially exchanged in cleartext – MAC addresses can be “spoofed” or substituted in two ways • Some wireless NICs allow for a substitute MAC address to be used • There are programs available that allow you to spoof a MAC address CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 35
  • 36. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 36 WEP • Uses 64-bit or 128-bit number which is made up of a 24-bit IV and either a 40-bit or 104-bit default key – Shorter keys easier to crack • WEP implementation violates cardinal rule of cryptography – Creates detectable pattern for attackers – APs end up repeating IVs • Collision: Two packets derived from same IV – Attacker can use info from collisions to initiate a keystream attack
  • 37. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 37 Figure 9-10 XOR operations
  • 38. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 38 Figure 9-11 Capturing packets
  • 39. © 2013 Cengage Learning WEP • Several ways an attacker can use captured packets: – In fields where the value may not be known, the purpose is known so values can be guessed – Body portion of the text often encodes ASCII text, giving some possible clues – An attacker can capture an encrypted packed and based on its size may guess that it is an ARP request • Attacker can re-inject the ARP request into the network which will supply the attacker with many ARP responses CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 39
  • 40. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 40 Summary • Information security protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information on the devices that store, manipulate, and transmit the information through products, people, and procedures • Significant challenges in keeping wireless networks and devices secure • There are multiple attack points in WLANS: open or misconfigured APs, rogue APs, and evil twins
  • 41. © 2013 Cengage Learning CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs,Third Edition 41 Summary • Attacks that can be launched include reading data, hijacking wireless connections, inserting traffic, and performing denial-of-service attacks • Mobile users and home users face attacks as well • IEEE implemented several protections in the original 802.11 standard: access control, wired equivalent privacy (WEP), and authentication • Significant security vulnerabilities exist in the IEEE 802.11 security mechanisms