Delaney_A Note on Intention and the Doctrine of Double Effect_Phil Studies_May 2007

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A Note on Intention and the Doctrine of Double Effect
Author(s): Neil Francis Delaney
Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
, Vol. 134, No. 2 (May, 2007), pp. 103-110
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208709
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Philosophical Studies (2007) 134:103-110 © Springer 2007
DOI 10.1007/sll098-007-9086-z
NEIL FRANCIS DELANEY
A NOTE ON INTENTIONAND THE DOCTRINE
OF DOUBLE EFFECT*
ABSTRACT. The purpose of this note is to tidy up some matters con-
cerning ascriptions of intention and the employment of the doctrine of
double effect (henceforth DDE). I first argue that Jonathan Bennett's efforts
to show that DDE is a foolish doctrine are unsatisfactory. I then consider a
puzzle of Mark Johnston's that seems to pose a problem for the defender of
DDE. I turn to possible solutions to the puzzle, criticize one, and then offer
the one I find most appealing. I then show how my proposal for employing
DDE enables it to make some distinctions between courses of conduct
without issuing foolish pronouncements about moral permissibility.
Thepurposeof thisnote is to tidyup somemattersconcerning
ascriptionsof intentionand the employmentof the doctrineof
doubleeffect(henceforthDDE). DDE in its modernformula-
tion basicallystates that in some cases it is worse to directly
intenda badthingas a meansto a good endthanit is merelyto
foreseethatan equallybadthingwillcomeaboutas a resultof
actionswhich are in themselvesmorallyneutralat worst.1A
standardapplicationof DDE yieldsdifferentassessmentsas to
moralpermissibilityfortwoagents,onea strategicbomber(SB)
andtheothera terrorbomber(TB).SBbombsa weaponscache
as a means to defeatingthe enemy while foreseeingthat his
bombingwillbringaboutanumberofciviliandeaths.TBbombs
thesamenumberof civiliansdirectlyasameansto defeatingthe
enemy (he intends to demoralizethe enemy). Proponentsof
DDE regularlydistinguishSBfromTB bynotingthatwhileSB
directlyintendsmerelythe destructionof a weaponscache,TB
directlyintendsto kill civilians.This taken togetherwith an
absoluteprohibitionagainstdirectlyintendingto kill civilians
(eitheras a meansto a good end or as an endin itself) renders
TB'sactionplanmorallyimpermissiblewhileleavingopen the
possibilitythatSB'sactionplanmaybe morallypermissible.

104 NEILFRANCISDELANEY
A standardway of determiningwhethera componentof an
actionplanis a meansto theendis to assesswhetheror not the
componentis causallyefficaciousin securingthe end in ques-
tion. It may be causallyefficaciousas the directlypreceding
stagein accomplishingthe end or it may only be causallyeffi-
caciousin securingsome precedingstage of the plan. In SB's
case the killingof civiliansis NOT causallyefficaciousin the
way this phraseis used in suchdiscussions;the civiliandeaths
are merelya SIDE EFFECT. Destroyingthe weaponscache
depletestheenemy'sfirepowerandprovokesa capitulation;the
deathsof the civiliansaremerelyforeseen.For SB the civilian
deathsarenot causallyefficaciousin producinganystageof his
action plan. In TB's case on the other hand, the killing of
civilians is causally efficacious;killing the civilians is what
producesthe demoralizationof the enemy that leads to sur-
render.It is in this importantsense,the sense of what is effi-
cacious in producing the stages of the action plan that
ultimatelyyields a good outcome, that SB and TB are to be
distinguished.
Now JonathanBennetthassuggestedthatin factthiswayof
looking at TB is all wrong. He claims that what is causally
efficaciousin producingenemy demoralizationis simplythat
the civilianslie about looking dead. By his lightsTB's action
plan does not include the killing of civiliansas a means to
producingthegood end;rather,theactionplansimplyincludes
a stage involvinga convincingscene of civilianslaughter.On
Bennett'saccountTB does not makeuse of the killingof civ-
ilians at all. Sincethe killingof civiliansis not requiredas a
meansto demoralizationandhenceultimatelyasa meansto the
good end,TB'sactionplanshouldnot bediscreditedasmorally
impermissibleby DDE. Withrespectto TB theresimplyis no
MEANS to the end thatis absolutelyprohibited.Bennettgoes
so far as to say that carefulanalysis"makesa mockeryof the
wholeidea of whatis intendedas a means."2
Bennett's argument that DDE cannot distinguish even
standardcases such as SB and TB fails to hold up under
scrutiny.All one needs to do is note that while a convincing
sceneof civilianslaughteris all thatis neededto demoralizethe

A NOTE ON INTENTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 105
enemy, somethingis needed to bring about that convincing
scene.TB eschewsalternativessuch as holograms,mind-alter-
ingdrugs,etc., andsimplyadoptsas MEANS to producinghis
convincing scene the killing of civilians. Killing civilians is
causally efficaciousin producingthe appearanceof civilian
death.TB'sactionplanthusstillincludesa stage,the killingof
civiliansthat is absolutelyprohibitedby proponentsof DDE.
HenceDDE has a way of distinguishingSB fromTB;whereas
forSBkillingciviliansis not directlyintendedas a meansto the
ultimateend,forTB suchkillingis. Bennetthas failedto make
a mockeryof DDE in virtueof its relianceon the notion of
whatis intendedas a means.
Enter Mark Johnston. He offers a case that sidestepsthe
inadequaciesof Bennett'srecastingof TB and seems to put
DDE in jeopardy,if by that we mean he providesa case that
OUGHT to be distinguishedfrom SB but that DDE fails to
discredit.Johnstonasksus to consideran enemyhiddenin an
impregnablefortress,an enemy that only has access to war
room video screens.Thesescreensenablethe enemyto deter-
mine simply whethernuclearweapons have been detonated
over civilian targets.Now suppose the opposition detonates
nuclearweaponsover a civiliantarget;in this case the entire
chainof meansend reasoningemployedby the oppositionex-
cludes the killing of civilians.Nevertheless,this looks like a
morallyimpermissibleterrorbombingthat shouldbe discred-
itedby DDE. How mighta proponentof DDE who wouldlike
to see the doctrinediscreditthis actionplan respond?
Onewaywouldbeto adopta principlesuchasthefollowing:
If an agentintendsto do D so as to makeit appearthat P
whileforeseeingthatdoingD willmakeit thecasethatP, then
for thepurposesof employingDDE the agentis to be takenas
intendingthat P.
Withthis principlein hand one could arguethat the oppo-
sitiondoesindeeddirectlyintendthedeathsof thecivilians;the
oppositionwanted to make it appearthat the civilianswere
deadto the enemy,and adopteda strategythat the opposition
could clearlyforeseewould make it the case that the civilians
weredead.

Therearetwo problemswith the adoptionof this principle.
One is that we have given up on the commonsensenotion of
intendingas a MEANSwhichwas to be the basisfor DDE. In
Johnston'scase unlikeBennett'skillingciviliansdoes not play
anycausalrolein bringingaboutthe enemysurrender.Thatis
its beauty, some might suggest. The enemy is provoked to
surrendersimplyby what it sees on its war room screensto-
gether with some reasonable inferences;the civilians have
nothing to do with what ultimately transpires.What the
opposition needs is a method for provoking the reasonable
inferenceson thepartof theenemy;whatis causallyefficacious
in our senseis simplydetonations,not deaths.
But this problemis I thinka partof a largerproblemwith
the proposed supplementaryprinciple. The problem I am
pointing to has to do with the phrase "for the purposesof
employingDDE the agentis to be takenas intendingthat P."
DDE is best understood as a principle for discriminating
betweenmorallypermissibleand morallyimpermissibleaction
plansbasedon the conceptof intention,specificallythe notion
of intentionas a meansversusintentionas a side effect(what
manycallindirectintentionif intentionat all).Thisconcepthas
a perfectlysecureplacenot only in philosophicaldiscoursebut
in ordinarycommonsense,anditsplaceis securePRIORto any
encounterwith a principlesuchas DDE. DDE is a hypothesis
aboutthe usefulnessof differencesin intentionas a meansas a
wayto morallydiscriminatesomeactionplans.If DDE failsto
securewhat some mightdesireas a moraldistinctionbetween
action planswe shouldnot modify the conceptof what is in-
tended as a means to make the hypothesismore attractive.
Rather,we shouldeitherfindsomeotherway of lookingat the
matterthat leaves the notion of intentionas a means as we
found it or, if this fails, simplygo back to the essenceof the
basicmodernformulationof DDE: thedifferencebetweenwhat
is directlyintendedas a meansandwhatis merelyforeseenas a
side effectsometimesplays a part in distinguishingimpermis-
siblefrompermissibleagency.
This beingsaid, thereis a rathernaturalway of lookingat
Johnston'spuzzle case that might enable DDE to secure a

negativeevaluationfor the opposition'sactionplan. This way
goes backto an earlypaperof Foot's, andplayson the notion
of "closeness"in determiningwhatan agentintends,eitheras a
meansor as an end.3It can be arguedthat the commonsense
conceptof intention,andeventhephilosophicalconceptwhich
I have arguedstandsPRIOR to and INDEPENDENTLY of
DDE, does not allow a clean separationof componentsof an
actionwhenthosecomponentsaresufficientlyclosetogether.It
canbearguedthatanintentionto detonatenucleardevicesover
civiliansjust IS an intentionto kill the civilians,PRIOR TO
andINDEPENDENTLYof anyappealto DDE. Alternatively
and perhapsbetter,it can be arguedthat an intentionto det-
onate nucleardevicesover civiliansneeds to be linked to an
intentionto killciviliansso long as we presumethe agentto be
rational. On this latter proposal, closeness demands that a
rationalagent cannot have the one intentionwithout at the
sametimehavingtheother.Ifeitherof theseprinciplesforwhat
maybe calledintentionconsolidation(thereisjust one intention
or therearetwo that areinseparable)is acceptable,thenDDE
will deem the opposition'saction plan impermissible,which
mightbe pleasingto some.
Foot goes out of her way to point out that a notion like
"closeness"in this contextis boundto involvejudgmentcalls
and slipperyslopes, but she writes this off as a danger of
making philosophicaldistinctions that attempt to reconcile
analysiswithreflectivecommonsense(at anyratethisis how I
readFoot).4If this is right,thenwe mightbe rightto say that
theoppositionhasadopteda morallyimpermissibleactionplan
just insofaras it has adoptedkillingciviliansas a meansto a
good end. We would say this just in case there is only one
intentionwithtwocomponents(detonatingnucleardevicesand
killingcivilians).Alternativelywemightbe rightto saythatthe
opposition has adopted a morallyimpermissibleaction plan
justinsofaras thatactionplanincludesa directintentionto kill
civilians,an intention that necessarilycomes along with the
intentionto detonatenucleardevicesas a means.On the latter
account the killing of civiliansis not directlyintendedas a
means to demoralizethe enemy but is rathersimplydirectly

intendedas an end. The oppositionis forcedto adopt killing
civiliansas an end throughits rationalrecognitionthat one
simplycannotdetonatethedeviceswithoutkillingthecivilians.
Thenotionof closenessdoes theworkthrougheitherof two
principlesof intentionconsolidation.One may say eitherthat
due to theirclosenessan intentionto detonatenucleardevices
just is an intentionto killciviliansandhencethe actionplanis
morallyimpermissibleunderDDE, or one maysaythatdueto
theirclosenessa rationalagentcannot but directlyintendthe
deaths of civiliansinsofar as he pursuesan action plan that
makes use of nucleardetonationsas a means, equallyunac-
ceptableaccordingto DDE. Whetheror not a philosopherfeels
inclinedto accepteitherof theseanswersdependson theextent
to which he or she feels the notion of closeness is doing a
disserviceto the notion of intendingas a means,or, underthe
latterformulation,the conceptof directintentionitself. Some
may simplybe unwillingto concedeeitherway in which the
oppositionmightbe said to directlyintendthe deathsof civil-
ians,as a meansor as anend.Thisis a tradeoff,butat leastthis
tradeoffapplies to the very concept of intentionratherthan
twistingthat conceptin the contextof an application,namely
DDE.
Supposing we follow Foot and adopt the principle of
intention consolidation according to which foreseen effects
that are sufficientlyclose to what is intendedas a meansto a
good end are themselvesdirectlyintendedas ends, it follows
that whetherSB can be morallydistinguishedfromTB simply
dependson the particularsof the case at hand. Supposingthe
munitionscache is located directlyabove a school, the fact
that the bomberforeseesto a practicalcertaintythat bombing
the one will kill civiliansprecludeshim from bombing.But if
there is some reasonablechance that civilianswill be spared
the bomber may well be permittedto bomb the munitions
cache. Practicalconsiderationsdeterminethe moral permissi-
bility of a proposed action plan when it comes to other
examplescustomarilydiscussedby proponentsof the DDE.
Administrationof morphineto a terminallyill patient as a
means to alleviatesufferingwhile foreseeingthat the admin-

istration of the drug is likely to bring about death will be
permissibleif thereis sufficient"space"betweendruggingand
killing. The standarddistinction between craniotomiesand
therapeutichysterectomiesso far as killing the fetus is con-
cernedprobablyfalls as a casualtyto this approachto DDE,
that is to say, since there is no practicaldifferencebetween
removinga cancerousuteruscontaininga fetus and crushing
the fetus'skull,DDE willnot permiteitheroperation.As for a
third classic instance, killing in self-defense,it will depend
whether or not the minimum force required to stop the
aggressoris sufficientlyclose to that which will kill so as to
demandthat a reasonableagentwho employssuch force will
necessarilybe takento directlyintendtheaggressor'sdeath.As
Foot herselfhas suggested,whetheror not two effectsaretoo
close togetherto allowthat one may be simplyforeseenrather
than directlyintendeddemandsjudgmentand is open to crit-
icismof the sorttypicallyofferedwhenjudgmentof this sortis
involved.The fact that DDE may or may not be applicable
whenappliedto standardtestcasesdependingon thedetailsof
thecaseat handis I thinkhardlylamentable,however.Indeed,
looking at DDE in the way I propose helps to shore it up
againstcriticismthat it createsan avenuefor people to "get
away with murder,"so to speak, as well as the chargethat
thereis nothingmore to evaluatingthe test cases than simple
utilitariancalculation.Practicalconsiderationsspecificto the
case at hand determinewhetheror not an effectcan be clas-
sifiedas foreseenbut unintendedand thereforeopen up the
door to properapplicationof DDE.
NOTES
* Thanks to Robert George, Michael Bratman, Gilbert Harman and Mark
Johnston for useful discussion and written comments. For a more extended
and somewhat different treatment of these issues see my "To Double
Business Bound: Reflections on the Doctrine of Double Effect," American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly75, 4, pp. 561-583.
For readers unfamiliar with DDE a more precise formulation can be
offered: an action may be morally permissible if (1) the end is good (2) the
means is at least neutral (3) the foreseen bad effect is not directly intended

and (4) the foreseen bad effect is proportional to the good end after which
the action strives.
2 Here see Bennett: "I said that the intention was to kill [the civilians] so as
to lower morale. But now that turns out to be too crude an account of the
matter. All that was intended was that the people's bodies should be
inoperative for long enough to cause a general belief that they were dead,
this belief lasting long enough to speed the end of the war; there is nothing
which requires, through a causally downstream inference [emphasis mine]
that the inoperativeness be permanent;and so thereis nothing requiringthat
the people actually become dead. Of course [TB]knew that the people would
become not merely inoperative for a while but downright dead - he had no
hope of achieving the lesser thing without achieving the greater. But the
greater thing is complex, and only one constituent of it was intended as a
means. Jonathan Bennett, "Morality and Consequences," TannerLectures
on Human Values, ed. S. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah
Press, 1980), p. 111.
3
Phillippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the
Double Effect," Oxford Review 5 (1967), pp. 5-15.
4 The case Foot has in mind is a classic one according to which DDE
distinguishes craniotomies from therapeutic hysterectomies as a means to
saving a pregnant mother's life. In craniotomy the skull of the fetus is
crushed, whereas in therapeutic hysterectomy the cancerous uterus is
removed. DDE traditionally allows the latter procedure while disallowing
the former. The idea is that in the latter procedurethe means, removal of the
uterus, is neutral while skull crushing is not, being too intimately connected
to killing. Hart countered by suggesting that the proper way to regard
craniotomy is to view it as a neutral skull modification with the foreseen but
unintended effect of bringing about the fetus' death. See H.L.A. Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968),
p. 123. He did this because he, like Bennett, is critical of the idea of using
what is intended as a means as an evaluative tool, and in particularis critical
of DDE. Foot introduced closeness between effects precisely in an attempt
to discount Hart's suggested reinterpretation of craniotomy.
Departmentof Philosophy
GeorgetownUniversity
Washington,DC 20057
USA
E-mail: cfd22@georgetown.edu

Delaney_A Note on Intention and the Doctrine of Double Effect_Phil Studies_May 2007

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