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Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Exploring Transgender Individuals’
Experience of Safety with Technology
Master’s Thesis by Morgan Klaus Scheuerman
Thesis Supervisors: Stacy M Branham, Foad Hamidi
1
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods
Outline
Introduction Background
2
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods
Outline
Introduction Background
3
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
4Introduction
Research Questions
How can transgender individuals’ experiences of safety with technology
inform the way we consider designing technology?
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Transgender:
an individual whose gender identity is different from the one
they were assigned at birth [87]
Introduction 5
1.4 million United States citizens identify as transgender [16]
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Motivation
6Introduction
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Trans Identity in the Headlines
7Introduction
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
46%
Experienced verbal
harassment
41%
Attempted suicide in their
lifetime.
47%
Experienced sexual assault
2015 U.S. Transgender Survey [60]
8Introduction
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
1
How Do Transgender Users
Experience Safety Online?
9Introduction
First Research Question
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Misgendering:
misidentifying another person’s gender, either intentionally or
unintentionally[86]
10Introduction
56% of transgender people misgendered in workplace attempted
suicide [60]
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Automatic Gender Recognition
● Introduction of transgender dataset
for facial recognition (BTAS 2013;
Mahalingam et al.) [82]
● Experimentation with transgender
dataset to accurately detect identity
across gender transition (ISBA 2016;
Kumar et al.) [70]
Camera
Advertisement
MALE
11BackgroundExample scenario
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
12Introduction
Second Research Question
1
What Do Transgender
Individuals and Technologists
Think about Automatic
Gender Recognition (AGR)
Technology?
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Summary of Motivation
1. Rising discussion about transgender rights and identity
2. Statistics of violence and discrimination
3. Impact of misgendering
13Introduction
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods
Outline
Introduction Background
14
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Defining Safety &
Harm in HCI
15Methods
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Defining Safety
freedom from emotional, physical, and social harm
Children and Youth
● Exploration of parental concerns
about children with autism’s safety
on Minecraft (CSCW 2015;
Ringland et al.) [100]
Women
● Analysis of trolling strategies and
coping mechanisms for dealing
with trolling on a feminist forum
(Information Society 2002; Herring
et al.) [54]
16Methods
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
By Humans
● Examination of online privacy
concerns and practices of victims
of intimate partner abuse (CHI
2017; Matthews et al.) [84]
By Technology
● A discussion of embedded racism in
Google Search and ranking
algorithms (Algorithms of
Oppression 2018; Noble)[91]
17Methods
Defining Harm
the negative effect of abuse and/or safety issues
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Trans Identity in
HCI
18Background
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
The Trans Community and Technology
● Examination of Facebook as a site of both stress and social support for
trans users (CSCW 2015; Haimson et al.) [47]
● Discussion about managing digital footprints for transgender users on
social media (CHI 2016; Haimson et al.)[48]
● Found complexity of information disclosure on social media for LGBT
parents (CHI 2016; Blackwell et al.) [14]
19Background
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Algorithmic
Harm 20Background
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Algorithmic Bias
● Analysis of varying technical biases (Transactions on
Information Systems 1996; Friedman & Nissenbaum) [40]
● Report on racial bias in predictive policing algorithms
(ProPublica 2016; Angwin et al.) [3]
● Found machine learning applied to textual data
displayed gender and racial biases (Science 2017;
Caliskan et al.) [21]
“Fag Face Mask.” Facial
Weaponization Suite by
Zach Blas. 2012. [15]
21Background
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods
Outline
Introduction Background
22
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Participant
Recruitment
23Methods
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Interview Design
2 pilots
13 participants
(3 technologists)
85 minute average
24Methods
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Participant Demographics
25
Male / Trans
Masc
19%
Female / Trans
Fem
31%
Non-Binary
50%
Gender identity
Methods
People of Color
54%
White or White-
Passing
46%
Racial identity
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Data Analysis
grounded theory coding techniques [24]
26Methods
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Coding Categories
27
ResearchQuestion2
Impact of Being
Misgendered by AGR
Worse than a
Human
Better than a
Human
The Same as a
Human
RQ1
• 3 categories
• 10 sub-categories
RQ2
• 6 categories
• 20-subcategories
Example categorization Methods
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods
Outline
Introduction Background
28
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Research Question 1:How Do
Transgender Users Experience
Safety Online?
29Findings
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
The 6 Facets of Harm to
Study Participants
3 dichotomies of harm:
1. Outsider/ Insider harm
2. Targeted/Incidental harm
3. Collective/Individual harm
30Findings
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Outsider Harm
perpetrated by individuals outside of participants’
social circles or the larger transgender community
“The website 8chan—I stumbled across board called
‘transfags’, which is basically bunch of cis men talking
about how they want to brutally murder or hate crime
trans women and encouraging them to kill
themselves.”–P2
31Findings
6/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
“[I deleted my] old name, and just shit that could
be dragged up to disparage me … People will
lurk on my page just to get material to fuel their
hate-filled whatever against me.” –P4
32Findings
Insider Harm
perpetrated by individuals within participant social
circles / LGBTQ community
4/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
“People would message me [on dating
apps] and ask ‘What's in your pants, or
what really are you?’” –P1
33Findings
Targeted Harm
aimed directly at participants
4/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
“[My queer friend’s] family members piled on him …
saying things like … ‘Why would you want gay marriage
if you’re just gonna get AIDS and we’ll have to pay for
your healthcare?’ … His family has not … no one is
speaking to him.” –P8
34Findings
Incidential Harm
harmful content witnessed by participants, but
which was not directed at them specifically
5/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Research Question 2:
What Do Transgender Individuals and
Technologists Think about Automatic
Gender Recognition (AGR)? 35Findings
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
AGR Reinforces Binarism
excludes, invalidates, and assures the
misgendering of non-binary identities
“We're excluded from the direction of the future … that’s sorta
what it feels like.” –P7
36Findings
6/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
AGR is a Tool for Surveillance
fear that AGR could be used to persecute the trans
community
“A lot has been illuminated in recent years about abuses of power and
what can happen when people who have whatever bias are in control
of certain surveillance technologies … I’m also very aware of histories of
surveillance being used against queer communities or communities of people
of color.” –P8
37Findings
5/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
AGR Undermines Autonomy
AGR is non-consensual
“[AGR] is (1) completely unnecessary, and (2)
undesired by many people who would be interacting
with the software without their consent.” –P4
38Findings
4/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
AGR Threatens Safety
gender binarism, lack of autonomy, & surveillance
present threat to trans individuals
“It’s easier for a cis person to be like, “Oh, that's wrong.” But it’s more
of a daily fight for a lot of trans folks, so I could see that being …
harmful. And also, it could be a safety issue ... Like the fear of being
outed … That could have job consequences or physical safety
consequences.” –T1
39Findings
13/13 participants
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods
Outline
Introduction Background
40
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Experiences of Abuse are Salient and
Diverse for Transgender Technology
Users
41Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
The Harm of an “External
Gaze”
42Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Intentionality does not
Negate Impact
43Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods
Outline
Introduction Background
44
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
1. Design to address the
complexity and context of
harm.
45Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
2. Intentionality does not
matter when harm is done.
46Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
3. Understand that abusers are
users.
47Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
4. Provide support for
individuals harmed by or with
technology.
48Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Contributions
● Contributing to experiences of transgender users in HCI
○ (i.e.: Oliver Haimson’s work)
● Building on studies of safety in HCI
○ (i.e.: Tara Matthews et al.’s exploration of safety for survivors of intimate abuse)
● Offering guidelines for designers to diminish harm to trans users
○ (i.e.: Jessica Vitak et al.’s mitigation of harassment of women online)
49Discussion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
50
Limitations
Conclusion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Future Work
51Conclusion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
Conclusion
52Conclusion
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
53
Exploring Transgender Individuals’ Experience of Safety with Technology
Master’s Thesis by Morgan Klaus Scheuerman
morgan.klaus@umbc.edu
Thesis Supervisors Stacy M Branham
Foad Hamidi
Thesis Committee Amy Hurst
Casey Fiesler
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018
54
Publications
1. Gender Recognition or Gender Reductionism? The Social Implications of Automatic Gender Recognition System.
Foad Hamidi, Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, Stacy M Branham.
In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '17). Montréal, Canada. April
21-26, 2018.
Best Paper Award
2. “Is Someone There? Do they have a Gun?” How Visual Information about Others Can Improve Personal Safety
Management for Blind Individuals.
Stacy M Branham, Ali Abdolrahmani, William Easley, Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, Erick Ronquillo, and Amy Hurst.
In Proceedings of the 19th International ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and Accessibility (ASSETS '17).
Baltimore, Maryland. October 30 – November 1, 2017.
3. Learning the Language: The Importance of Studying Written Directions in Designing Navigational Technologies
for the Blind.
Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, William Easley, Ali Abdolrahmani, Amy Hurst, Stacy M Branham.
ACM CHI Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA '17). Denver, Colorado. May 6-
11, 2017

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Exploring Transgender Individuals’ Experience of Safety with Technology

  • 1. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Exploring Transgender Individuals’ Experience of Safety with Technology Master’s Thesis by Morgan Klaus Scheuerman Thesis Supervisors: Stacy M Branham, Foad Hamidi 1
  • 2. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods Outline Introduction Background 2
  • 3. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods Outline Introduction Background 3
  • 4. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 4Introduction Research Questions How can transgender individuals’ experiences of safety with technology inform the way we consider designing technology?
  • 5. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Transgender: an individual whose gender identity is different from the one they were assigned at birth [87] Introduction 5 1.4 million United States citizens identify as transgender [16]
  • 6. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Motivation 6Introduction
  • 7. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Trans Identity in the Headlines 7Introduction
  • 8. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 46% Experienced verbal harassment 41% Attempted suicide in their lifetime. 47% Experienced sexual assault 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey [60] 8Introduction
  • 9. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 1 How Do Transgender Users Experience Safety Online? 9Introduction First Research Question
  • 10. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Misgendering: misidentifying another person’s gender, either intentionally or unintentionally[86] 10Introduction 56% of transgender people misgendered in workplace attempted suicide [60]
  • 11. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Automatic Gender Recognition ● Introduction of transgender dataset for facial recognition (BTAS 2013; Mahalingam et al.) [82] ● Experimentation with transgender dataset to accurately detect identity across gender transition (ISBA 2016; Kumar et al.) [70] Camera Advertisement MALE 11BackgroundExample scenario
  • 12. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 12Introduction Second Research Question 1 What Do Transgender Individuals and Technologists Think about Automatic Gender Recognition (AGR) Technology?
  • 13. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Summary of Motivation 1. Rising discussion about transgender rights and identity 2. Statistics of violence and discrimination 3. Impact of misgendering 13Introduction
  • 14. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods Outline Introduction Background 14
  • 15. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Defining Safety & Harm in HCI 15Methods
  • 16. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Defining Safety freedom from emotional, physical, and social harm Children and Youth ● Exploration of parental concerns about children with autism’s safety on Minecraft (CSCW 2015; Ringland et al.) [100] Women ● Analysis of trolling strategies and coping mechanisms for dealing with trolling on a feminist forum (Information Society 2002; Herring et al.) [54] 16Methods
  • 17. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 By Humans ● Examination of online privacy concerns and practices of victims of intimate partner abuse (CHI 2017; Matthews et al.) [84] By Technology ● A discussion of embedded racism in Google Search and ranking algorithms (Algorithms of Oppression 2018; Noble)[91] 17Methods Defining Harm the negative effect of abuse and/or safety issues
  • 18. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Trans Identity in HCI 18Background
  • 19. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 The Trans Community and Technology ● Examination of Facebook as a site of both stress and social support for trans users (CSCW 2015; Haimson et al.) [47] ● Discussion about managing digital footprints for transgender users on social media (CHI 2016; Haimson et al.)[48] ● Found complexity of information disclosure on social media for LGBT parents (CHI 2016; Blackwell et al.) [14] 19Background
  • 20. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Algorithmic Harm 20Background
  • 21. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Algorithmic Bias ● Analysis of varying technical biases (Transactions on Information Systems 1996; Friedman & Nissenbaum) [40] ● Report on racial bias in predictive policing algorithms (ProPublica 2016; Angwin et al.) [3] ● Found machine learning applied to textual data displayed gender and racial biases (Science 2017; Caliskan et al.) [21] “Fag Face Mask.” Facial Weaponization Suite by Zach Blas. 2012. [15] 21Background
  • 22. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods Outline Introduction Background 22
  • 23. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Participant Recruitment 23Methods
  • 24. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Interview Design 2 pilots 13 participants (3 technologists) 85 minute average 24Methods
  • 25. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Participant Demographics 25 Male / Trans Masc 19% Female / Trans Fem 31% Non-Binary 50% Gender identity Methods People of Color 54% White or White- Passing 46% Racial identity
  • 26. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Data Analysis grounded theory coding techniques [24] 26Methods
  • 27. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Coding Categories 27 ResearchQuestion2 Impact of Being Misgendered by AGR Worse than a Human Better than a Human The Same as a Human RQ1 • 3 categories • 10 sub-categories RQ2 • 6 categories • 20-subcategories Example categorization Methods
  • 28. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods Outline Introduction Background 28
  • 29. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Research Question 1:How Do Transgender Users Experience Safety Online? 29Findings
  • 30. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 The 6 Facets of Harm to Study Participants 3 dichotomies of harm: 1. Outsider/ Insider harm 2. Targeted/Incidental harm 3. Collective/Individual harm 30Findings
  • 31. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Outsider Harm perpetrated by individuals outside of participants’ social circles or the larger transgender community “The website 8chan—I stumbled across board called ‘transfags’, which is basically bunch of cis men talking about how they want to brutally murder or hate crime trans women and encouraging them to kill themselves.”–P2 31Findings 6/13 participants
  • 32. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 “[I deleted my] old name, and just shit that could be dragged up to disparage me … People will lurk on my page just to get material to fuel their hate-filled whatever against me.” –P4 32Findings Insider Harm perpetrated by individuals within participant social circles / LGBTQ community 4/13 participants
  • 33. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 “People would message me [on dating apps] and ask ‘What's in your pants, or what really are you?’” –P1 33Findings Targeted Harm aimed directly at participants 4/13 participants
  • 34. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 “[My queer friend’s] family members piled on him … saying things like … ‘Why would you want gay marriage if you’re just gonna get AIDS and we’ll have to pay for your healthcare?’ … His family has not … no one is speaking to him.” –P8 34Findings Incidential Harm harmful content witnessed by participants, but which was not directed at them specifically 5/13 participants
  • 35. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Research Question 2: What Do Transgender Individuals and Technologists Think about Automatic Gender Recognition (AGR)? 35Findings
  • 36. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 AGR Reinforces Binarism excludes, invalidates, and assures the misgendering of non-binary identities “We're excluded from the direction of the future … that’s sorta what it feels like.” –P7 36Findings 6/13 participants
  • 37. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 AGR is a Tool for Surveillance fear that AGR could be used to persecute the trans community “A lot has been illuminated in recent years about abuses of power and what can happen when people who have whatever bias are in control of certain surveillance technologies … I’m also very aware of histories of surveillance being used against queer communities or communities of people of color.” –P8 37Findings 5/13 participants
  • 38. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 AGR Undermines Autonomy AGR is non-consensual “[AGR] is (1) completely unnecessary, and (2) undesired by many people who would be interacting with the software without their consent.” –P4 38Findings 4/13 participants
  • 39. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 AGR Threatens Safety gender binarism, lack of autonomy, & surveillance present threat to trans individuals “It’s easier for a cis person to be like, “Oh, that's wrong.” But it’s more of a daily fight for a lot of trans folks, so I could see that being … harmful. And also, it could be a safety issue ... Like the fear of being outed … That could have job consequences or physical safety consequences.” –T1 39Findings 13/13 participants
  • 40. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods Outline Introduction Background 40
  • 41. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Experiences of Abuse are Salient and Diverse for Transgender Technology Users 41Discussion
  • 42. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 The Harm of an “External Gaze” 42Discussion
  • 43. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Intentionality does not Negate Impact 43Discussion
  • 44. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 ConclusionDiscussionFindingsMethods Outline Introduction Background 44
  • 45. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 1. Design to address the complexity and context of harm. 45Discussion
  • 46. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 2. Intentionality does not matter when harm is done. 46Discussion
  • 47. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 3. Understand that abusers are users. 47Discussion
  • 48. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 4. Provide support for individuals harmed by or with technology. 48Discussion
  • 49. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Contributions ● Contributing to experiences of transgender users in HCI ○ (i.e.: Oliver Haimson’s work) ● Building on studies of safety in HCI ○ (i.e.: Tara Matthews et al.’s exploration of safety for survivors of intimate abuse) ● Offering guidelines for designers to diminish harm to trans users ○ (i.e.: Jessica Vitak et al.’s mitigation of harassment of women online) 49Discussion
  • 50. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 50 Limitations Conclusion
  • 51. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Future Work 51Conclusion
  • 52. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 Conclusion 52Conclusion
  • 53. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 53 Exploring Transgender Individuals’ Experience of Safety with Technology Master’s Thesis by Morgan Klaus Scheuerman morgan.klaus@umbc.edu Thesis Supervisors Stacy M Branham Foad Hamidi Thesis Committee Amy Hurst Casey Fiesler
  • 54. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman 2018 54 Publications 1. Gender Recognition or Gender Reductionism? The Social Implications of Automatic Gender Recognition System. Foad Hamidi, Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, Stacy M Branham. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '17). Montréal, Canada. April 21-26, 2018. Best Paper Award 2. “Is Someone There? Do they have a Gun?” How Visual Information about Others Can Improve Personal Safety Management for Blind Individuals. Stacy M Branham, Ali Abdolrahmani, William Easley, Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, Erick Ronquillo, and Amy Hurst. In Proceedings of the 19th International ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and Accessibility (ASSETS '17). Baltimore, Maryland. October 30 – November 1, 2017. 3. Learning the Language: The Importance of Studying Written Directions in Designing Navigational Technologies for the Blind. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, William Easley, Ali Abdolrahmani, Amy Hurst, Stacy M Branham. ACM CHI Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA '17). Denver, Colorado. May 6- 11, 2017