This presentation gives a detailed overview of Nuclear export control regimes.

1. Nuclear Export Control Regimes
Dr. Mehmood Hussain
Assistant Professor of IR
AJ&K University Muzaffarabad

2. Introduction
 The main multilateral export control regimes—the Australia Group (AG), the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and
 the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-
use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement, WA)—coordinate trade
controls on goods and technologies that have uses in connection with chemical,
biological, nuclear and conventional weapons.
 All four politically binding agreements operate by consensus and are
implemented through national laws.
 They also serve an important information-exchange function since they provide
a framework in which policy, licensing, enforcement, technical and intelligence
officers can meet.
 The NSG contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the AG aims to
minimize the risk of assisting proliferation of biological and chemical weapons,
MTCR works toward nonproliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of
delivering WMD, and the WA promotes transparency and responsibility in
transfer of both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and
technology.

4. The Australia Group
 The 43 AG participants seek to ‘minimize the risk of
assisting chemical and biological weapon (CBW)
proliferation’ by ‘harmonizing participating countries’
national export control licensing measures’.
 Established in response to the use of Chemical weapons in
Iran-Iraq war 1980-88, the group has extended its coverage
from chemical weapons to biological weapons, equipment,
materials and technology.
 First meeting of AG was convened in 1985 in Brussels.
 Number of group members are 43.
 The AG’s control lists are continuously updated based on
consensus decisions by the members of the group.
 The 2018 AG plenary expressed concern over the use of
chemical weapons in Syria, Iraq, the United Kingdom and
Malaysia.

5. Cont.
 All participants have licensing measures over 63 chemical
weapons precursors. Participants also require licenses for
the export of specific:
 Chemical weapons precursors
 Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment
and related technology and software
 Dual-use biological equipment and related technology and
software
 Biological agents
 Plant pathogens
 Animal pathogens

6. The Missile Technology Control Regime
 The MTCR was established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Now, it has more than 90 members.
 The purpose is to stop proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal association of
countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to
coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their
proliferation.
 MTCR partners have committed to apply a common export policy (MTCR
Guidelines) on a common list of controlled items, including all key equipment
and technology needed for missile development, production, and operation.
 The regime places particular focus on missiles capable of delivering a payload of
at least 500 kg to a distance of at least 300 km—so-called “Category 1” or
“MTCR-class” missiles.
 The Regime’s controls are applicable to certain complete rocket systems
including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles (SLVs), and sounding rockets as
well as unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems including cruise missiles, drones,
UAVs, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs).

7. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
 NSG was established in response to India’s nuclear test, a violation of
peaceful purposes technology transfer and material.
 It has now 45 member states, is a widely accepted, mature, and effective
export-control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of
nuclear and nuclear-related exports.
 NSG guidelines were published in 1978 to apply to nuclear transfers for
peaceful purposes.
 In 1990, a review conference was convened to make number of
recommendations.
 In 1992, NSG decided to establish guidelines for the transfer of dual-use
equipment, material and technology.
 Guidelines for nuclear transfers
 The first set of NSG Guidelines governs the export of items that are
especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. These include: (i) nuclear
material; (ii) nuclear reactors and equipment therefor; (iii) non-nuclear
material for reactors; (iv) plant and equipment for the reprocessing,
enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and
heavy water production; and (v) technology associated with each of the
above items.


8. Cont.
 Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials,
software and related technology
 The second set of NSG Guidelines governs the export of nuclear related dual-use
items and technologies, that is, items that can make a major contribution to an
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which have
non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry.

9. The Wassenaar Arrangement
 The WA promotes ‘transparency and greater responsibility’
regarding transfers of conventional arms and related dual-
use items. More specifically, it seeks to prevent
‘destabilizing accumulations’ of such items and their
acquisition by terrorists.
 The WA plenary session in 2018 acknowledged the advances
in technology, so revised control list.
 The introduction of new controls on quantum-resistant
cryptography algorithms (i.e. cryptography that would be
able to resist an attack by a quantum computer) and
electromagnetic pulse (EMP)-resistant software (i.e.
software that would be able to withstand an attack by an
EMP).
 WA also emphasized to closely monitor satellite components,
artificial intelligence and ‘advanced sensors and navigation
equipment’ for enhancing the autonomy of weapon systems
and the ‘robotization of the battlefield.