poster presented at ENTER 2012 PhD Workshop & Conference in Helsingborg, Sweden

1. Re‐intermediation and Pricing Strategies in Tourism:
Niche Strategies Analysis
Malgorzata OGONOWSKA
Malgorzata.Ogonowska@gredeg.cnrs.fr
Traditional Actors
Market Actors:
Consumers:
New strategic choices
Evolving preferences New Niche
New Pricing Strategies
Players
References:
Objectives: Methodology: Buhalis, D. (1998), Strategic use of information technologies in the
Chapter 1: • survey tourism industry, Tourism Management. 19(5): 409‐421.
Burger, B. & Fuchs, M. (2005). Dynamic pricing‐ A future airline business
 identify & describe prevailing price model. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4 (1).
Clemons, E.K., Hann, I‐H. & Hitt, L.M. (2002). Price Dispersion and
discrimination practices • analytical model: Differentiation in On‐Line Travel : An Empirical Investigation.
 indentify necessary conditions to their  heterogeneous demand (Hotelling
Management and Science 48(4): 534–549.
Fay, S. (2008). Selling an Opaque Product through an Intermediary: The
application distribution) Case of Disguising One's Product. Journal of Retailing 84(1): 59‐75.
Fay, S. (2009). Competitive Reasons for the Name‐Your‐Own‐Price
 information asymmetry between the Channel. Marketing Letters 20(3): 277‐293.
Chapter 2: intermediary and the consumers Fay, S. & Xie, J. (2008). Probabilistic Goods: A Creative Way of Selling
Products and Services. Marketing Science 27(4): 674‐690.
 analysis of niche strategy: opaque products’  Stackelberg duopoly (intermediary – Grandos, N., Gupta, A. & Kaufman, R.J. (2008). Designing online selling
distribution leader, consumers – followers): mechanisms: Transparency levels and Prices. Decision Support
Systems 45: 729‐745.
(services’ characteristics are concealed until the payment 1. benchmark case: imperfect, but Jiang, Y. (2007). Price discrimination with Opaque products. Journal of
is completed) complete travellers’ information on Revenue and Pricing Management 6(2): 118‐134.
 description of existing opaque selling models their relative propensity to pay
Longhi, C. (2009). Internet and organization of the industry in tourism: a
focus on the distribution of travel and tourism services. Int. J.
 Is it profitable for an intermediary to jointly 2. Imperfect and incomplete consumers’ Leisure and Tourism Marketing, Vol. 1(2): 131‐151.
Ogonowska, M. & Torre, D. (2010). Joint Opaque Booking Systems for
implement both of the opaque channels ? (Name- information in their relative Online Travel Agencies. Working Paper.
Your-Own-Price and posted price system)? propensity to pay Shapiro, D. & Shi, X. (2008). Market Segmentation: The Role of Opaque
Travel Agencies. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 17(
(issue not considered by existing literature) 4): 803‐837.
Shapiro, D. & Zillante, A. (2009). Naming Your Own Price Mechanisms:
Anticipated Results: Revenue Gain or Drain?. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 72( 2): 725‐737.
 dynamic pricing models Stackelberg, H. von (1934). Market and Equilibrium, Springer‐Verlag.
 heterogeneous, segmented demand Stokey, N.L. (1979). Intertemporal Price Discrimination. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 93(3): 355–371.
 joint implementation of both of the opaque channels is the best solution for Wang, T., Gal‐Or, E. & Chatterjee, R. (2005). Why a 'Name‐Your‐Own‐
Price' Channel Makes Sense for Service Providers (or: Who Needs
moderate uncertainty levels Priceline, Anyway?). Working Paper, September.