Diese Präsentation wurde erfolgreich gemeldet.
Wir verwenden Ihre LinkedIn Profilangaben und Informationen zu Ihren Aktivitäten, um Anzeigen zu personalisieren und Ihnen relevantere Inhalte anzuzeigen. Sie können Ihre Anzeigeneinstellungen jederzeit ändern.

Hack your ATM with friend's Raspberry.Py (Black Hat EU-2014)

At all times there have been bad guys, who tried to steal money. ATM machines containing vast amounts of money have always been attractive targets. Until recently, criminals were only using physical weaknesses. Skimmers and shimmers for stealing magstripe-tracking data, fake pin pads and cameras for stealing pin codes, and even fake ATMs were created.

Time passed and ATM software started to unify. Where there is unification, there are viruses. Trojan.Skimmer.*, Ploutus and other named or unnamed trojans.

And what did we see on the public scene? Vendors started discussing the skimmers problem only after they were detected in the wild. As you remember, Barnaby Jack presented "Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines" at Black Hat USA 2010. He used some vulnerabilities in ATM software. He showed that malware, was injected into the OS of the ATM via bootable flash drive or via remote management TCP port.

Barnaby Jack's work was based on assumptions that most vulnerabilities were concentrated in the host machine and that we can and should reuse software made by ATM vendors. And that's quite true, but... antiviruses, locked firmware upgrades, blocked USB connectors, and encrypted hard drives can mitigate such risks. But, what about connecting not to the host machine, but to devices themselves? What countermeasures exist, when we will try to impersonate ourselves as an ATM host? Hacking ATMs with small computer like Raspberry Pi should be impossible, but it isn't.

The point of our presentation is to draw attention to the problem, which has existed for quite a long time. The problem is usage of common interfaces (like RS232 or USB) and protocols of communication from host machine to such devices as card readers, pin pads and/or dispenser units.

  • Als Erste(r) kommentieren

Hack your ATM with friend's Raspberry.Py (Black Hat EU-2014)

  1. 1. Hack your ATM with friend's Raspberry.Py Alexey Osipov Olga Kochetova
  2. 2. Who are we? •Positive Hack Days Team •Authors of multiple articles and researches •White hats •CLUB-MATE addicts •Just cool folks
  3. 3. Agenda •Intro (little bit about ATM history) •Old physical stuff (Skimmers and pin sniffers) •Host based attacks (XFS vulnerabilities/insecurities) •Device-specific attacks •Demos
  4. 4. INTRO (LITTLE BIT ABOUT ATM HISTORY)
  5. 5. The 1stidea: no ATM –no cry •1939 –the 1stidea of ATM •The City Bank of New York rejected it •If you don’t have ATM, it can’t be hacked
  6. 6. 1967 –the world’s 1stATM
  7. 7. Card&PIN&online&soon
  8. 8. Today we can use and investigate ATMs
  9. 9. WHY WE ARE DOING IT?
  10. 10. $#it happened
  11. 11. Banks are curious
  12. 12. We are curious
  13. 13. ATMs are hacked •Trojan.Skimers •Backdoor.Ploutus •Tyupkin •Another target attack •Undocumented features •“Top secret” data is online
  14. 14. ATM Jackpotting by Barnaby Jack •Remote controlled ATM with admin tools •Firmware updates •Dispense money
  15. 15. OLD PHYSICAL STUFF (SKIMMERS AND PIN SNIFFERS)
  16. 16. •Encrypted PIN Pad Motorized hybrid card readerWhat is inside
  17. 17. • Motorized hybrid card readerCard reader
  18. 18. Track2 is enough for transaction
  19. 19. PAN = the 1stpart of Track2
  20. 20. •Skimming •Shoulder-surfing, hidden camera, mirrors •Fake PIN pad •Fake ATMI need your PIN, your card and your cash
  21. 21. Like valid slots
  22. 22. The most popular devices
  23. 23. Converted anti-skimming
  24. 24. 3D printing skimming
  25. 25. via http://krebsonsecurity.com/ Fake ATM
  26. 26. Your money is not yours anymore
  27. 27. HOW HARD TO GET INSIDE OF ATM?
  28. 28. -Service zone -Plastic cover -Single lock -Safe for money -Steel + concrete -Rotary code locks/electronic locks -Two types of locksATM countermeasures
  29. 29. How to get in
  30. 30. How to get in
  31. 31. How to get in
  32. 32. ATM is locked
  33. 33. DEMO
  34. 34. HARDWARE AND PREPARATIONS
  35. 35. -Minimal price -Small -Capable of using multiple interfacesIntent
  36. 36. -Raspberry Pi -2 USB ports -Ethernet -USB-COM converter -Facedancer(kudos to Travis Goodspeed) -Wifidongle -Battery =) Hardware
  37. 37. -PWN Pi -Python -pySerial -pyHID -pyUSB -TTWE framework (thx rvantonder) Software
  38. 38. Raspberry Pi + Python + WiFi= bingo! Our “malware” devices
  39. 39. HOST BASED ATTACKS (XFS VULNERABILITIES)
  40. 40. XFS insecurity Network communicationWindows-based application Configuration informationUnit #1Service provider #1Unit #2Unit #3Service provider #2Service provider #3Unit #4Service provider #4Unit #5Unit #nService provider #5Service provider #nXFS APIXFS SPIXFS managerCOMUSBCustomer/Service mode
  41. 41. XFS insecurity Windows-based application Network communication Configuration information Unit #1 Service provider #1 Unit #2 Unit #3 Service provider #2 Service provider #3 Unit #4 Service provider #4 Unit #5 Unit #n Service provider #5 Service provider #n XFS API XFS SPI XFS manager COM USB Customer/Service mode
  42. 42. XFS, PIN Keypad device PIN device –Open mode and secure mode read data –Export of key is not available
  43. 43. XFS,Identification Card Device IDC device –Read/write data –Insert/eject/retain cards –EMV reader
  44. 44. Cash Dispenser Device –Cash withdrawal without authorization –Cassette and cash control –Software safe openingXFS, Cash Dispenser Device
  45. 45. -Authentication? -Hard to get specification? -Exclusive access to XFS manager/service provider? XFS authentication
  46. 46. -Authentication? What authentication? -Hard to get specification? Freely available -Exclusive access to XFS manager/service provider? Exists, but not intended to be used for securityXFS authentication
  47. 47. •Early 2014 –95% of ATMs run on Windows XP •Support killed off in April •>9000 vulnerabilitiesWindows XP still alive
  48. 48. So?
  49. 49. DEMO
  50. 50. DEVICE-SPECIFIC ATTACKS (PHYSICAL INTERFACES COM/USB)
  51. 51. RS232 insecurity Network communicationWindows-based application Configuration informationUnit #1Service provider #1Unit #2Unit #3Service provider #2Service provider #3Unit #4Service provider #4Unit #5Unit #nService provider #5Service provider #nXFS APIXFS SPIXFS managerCOMUSBCustomer/Service mode
  52. 52. DinosauRS232 •Standard interface •No specific drivers •No authorization •Insecure proprietary protocols (just sniff and replay)
  53. 53. •Direct device control –Command execution mitigating all host-based checks, e.g. cash withdrawal without notes counter checks –Execution of undocumented functions –Intercept unmasked sensitive data •Possibility of producing hardware sniffer, which can’t be detected by software meansAdvantages
  54. 54. •Protocols bloat •Specific method of integrity control •Short timeouts •Endless polling •New firmware version = new protocolDifficulties
  55. 55. DEVICE-SPECIFIC ATTACKS (COM-PROTOCOLS)
  56. 56. -No good tools for analysis -No flow control -No host loss detection -Packets -Fixed size -Start/stop bytes -Length prefix + dataTypical serial protocol
  57. 57. Life without wireshark
  58. 58. Typical data 0230 XX XX XX 01 01 02 00 03 00 04 00 05 00 06 00 1003 42
  59. 59. Typical serial protocol 0230 XX XX XX 01 01 02 00 03 00 04 00 05 00 06 00 1003 42 -02 30 / 10 03 –start-stop sentinels -XX XX–op-code -XX –Unknown -01 01 … –data -42 –CRC8
  60. 60. -Request insert card -Acknowledge host about card inserted -Issue 3 separate commands to read 3 tracks -Issue additional commands for EMV communicationIDC device flow
  61. 61. -Sniff all Track data -Send to host fake information about inserted card -Abuse services existent on ATM that don’t involve cash withdrawal -Card to card transactions -PaymentsIDC device attacks
  62. 62. PIN device flow
  63. 63. -If entering PIN/encryption keys -Authenticate host on currently used keys -Send empty button press events -Send PIN block to host -If entering open string -Send all button press events with button values to hostPIN device flow
  64. 64. PIN MITM attack
  65. 65. -Request open mode from PIN pad when user is going to insert PIN code -Acknowledge host about button presses -Send erroneous PIN block (we don’t know keys) -Host refuses transaction, but attacker knows client PIN code -Next transaction will be unmodifiedPIN device MITM attacks
  66. 66. -Restart/check device -Dispense X notes from Y cassettes -Open shutter -Present notes to userDispenser device flow
  67. 67. DEMO
  68. 68. -No more RS232 –no malicious control -Any use of cryptography –is equal to good use of cryptography -We regret informing you that we had decided to stop producing this model and warranties for our distributors been expired (c) What big vendors think
  69. 69. What we think
  70. 70. HOW TO LIVE WITH ALL THIS?
  71. 71. -Service zone is important -Current methods of protection is not enough -Using execution prevention software without OS patches –is wrongConclusions
  72. 72. -Implement mutual authentication both for ATM computer and it’s devices -Make peer review of XFS standard/communication protocols -Service zone is as important as safe -Trust environment is not about ATMsProposals
  73. 73. Alexander Tlyapov, @Rigmar SCADAStrangeLove, @scadasl And all other guys worth mentioningKudos
  74. 74. Alexey Osipov, @GiftsUngiven Olga Kochetova, @_Endless_Quest_ Questions?

×