2. ... So, what does it take for
Piracy to go “Critical” ?
1. User-Friendly Geography and
2. Lack of a robust Central Government and
3. Lawlessness, (Somalia is the “Wild-Wild-
West” of East Africa...) and the Most
Important Ingredient ...
4. Continuous Traffic of Commercial Vessels !
3. … So, why do we care about Somali
Piracy ?
• It’ s a Crime, “Hostis Humani Generis” ;
• It’ s an Expensive Crime (annual costs of $7 -
$12bil., projected to reach $15bil. by 2015) ;
And the Most Important...
• It ravages (and sometimes claims) human lives
(7 dead and 34 injured in the first quarter of
2011, excluding Pirates…) ;
7. Indian Ocean: Area of Interest
>50% of the global
container traffic
>70% of the global
petroleum traffic
Gulfs of Aden and
Oman, (annually):
>21.000 – 23.000
ships 2,200 Nautical Miles
>11% of global crude
oil traffic and 33% of
Europe’s Oil Supplies
>$1 Trillion worth of
Trade
1,800 Nautical Miles
8. The Scale of the Problem
Latitude: 12°S
Longitude: 70 78°E
9. N M m i l. N M
.
sq
The “Tyranny of Distance”: 2,6 2.000
83 Helicopter equipped vessels are needed to provide effective 1 hour response in the area.
13. A Friend’ s description of Somalia:
• Where God has long ago turned a Blind Eye…
• Where Evil reigns Unchallenged…
and
• Life at Night buys less than a Bullet !
14. Somalia
Surface Area: 637.657
(almost half the size of
France) ;
Coastline: 2.896 Km. ;
Population (2007, U.N.):
8.699.000 ;
Ave. L.E. (2007, U.N.):
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, C.I.A. Women: 49,4 years
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_so.html
, [Accessed 24 February 2010] Men: 46,9 years ;
15. Somalia
Surface Area: 637.657
(almost half the size of
France) ;
Coastline: 2.896 Km. ;
Population (2007, U.N.):
8.699.000 ;
Ave. L.E. (2007, U.N.):
Women: 49,4 years
Men: 46,9 years ;
16. Failed States Index 2010, I
Source: The Fund For Peace, http://www.fundforpeace.org , [Accessed 24 May 2011]
17. Failed States Index 2010, II
Source: The Fund For Peace, http://www.fundforpeace.org , [Accessed 24 May 2011]
18. Food Security Risk Index
Source: Maplecroft, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/food_security.html , [Accessed December 2011]
19. Terrorism’s Risk Index Map
Source: Maplecroft, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism_index_2011.html, [Accessed August 2011]
23. Ground Facts:
1. Largest Number of Refugees after Afghanistan
and Iraq (614.000 by the end of August 2010) ;
2. Every day more than 1.350.000 Somalis
depend on World Food Programs to feed ;
3. Highest Child-Malnutrition Rate in the World: 1
out of every 5 children is malnourished (a total
of 240.000) ;
26. G.N.I. per Capita
10.000
9.000
8.000
7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Per capita GNI at current prices - US dollars / Somalia
Per capita GNI at current prices - US dollars / World
U.N. POVERTY CUT OFF LINE
Source: U.N. Data, http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=WorldStat , [Accessed 24 February 2010]
27. Gross Value Added
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
60%
500
0
1991
1994
1997
1998
2001
2004
2007
2008
1990
1992
1993
1995
1996
1999
2000
2002
2003
2005
2006
Gross Value Added by Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing at current prices - mil. US
dollars
Total Gross Value Added at current prices - mil. US dollars
Source: U.N. Data, http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=WorldStat , [Accessed 24 February 2010]
28. The Yemen – Somalia “Trade”, I
Arms Migrants
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, C.I.A.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_so.html, [Accessed
30 November 2010]
29. The Yemen – Somalia “Trade”, II
1. Somalis have been given automatic refugee
status in Yemen since 1991 ;
2. 170,000 officially registered Somalis as
refugees, (estimates of one Million) ;
3. With sea passage costing around $150 and
crossing the Saudi border costing another
$150, this migration economy could be worth
$20m a year, encompassing 5 countries ;
30. The Yemen – Somalia “Trade”, III
1. The proportion of Ethiopians is rising, now
estimated to be ¾ of those making the crossing ;
2. With sea passage costing around $150 and
crossing the Saudi border costing around $150,
this migration economy could be worth $20m a
year, encompassing 5 countries ;
39. Age Profile of Attacked / Pirated Vessels
AVERAGE AGE OF ATTACKED & PIRATED VESSELS AGE PROFILE OF ATTACKED VESSELS (2007 - June 2010)
25,0
0,35
21,0
20,0 0,30 % of International Fleet
17,9 18,0
17,1
0,25
Relative Frequency
AGE (in years)
15,0 13,3 13,5 13,4
12,7 0,20
StatTools Student Version
10,0 0,15
For Academic Use Only
0,10
5,0
0,05
0,0 0,00
0
5
10
15
20
30
35
50
25
40
45
2007 2008 2009 2010
Age of Attacked Vessel (Years)
AVERAGE AGE OF ATTACKED VESSELS AVERAGE AGE OF PIRATED VESSELS
AGE PROFILE OF PIRATED VESSELS (2007 - June 2010)
0,20
% of International Fleet
0,15
Relative Frequency
0,10 StatTools Student Version
For Academic Use Only
0,05
0,00
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
40
35
Age of Attacked Vessel (Years)
Source: Compilation based on I.M.O. & I.M.B. monthly Reports
40. Vessel Types Involved in Incidents off Somalia
(01/01/07-30/06/10)
40%
Vessel Type Age per DWT (years)
35%
35.1 % 35.1 % Bulk Carriers 14.2
Tankers 10.7
30% Container Vessels 9.0
27%
25% Gen. Cargo 22.0
25%
20% % of Vessel Type within the World Fleet (2009)
20% 18%
16%
15% 15%
15% 13% 13%
13.6 % ATTACKED
11%
10% PIRATED
10% 9.1 % 8%
6%
5% 3%
0.7 %
0%
BULK TANKER CONTAINER G. CARGO VARIOUS CHEMICAL FISHING
CARRIER VESSEL TANKER TRAWLER
Source: I.M.B.
41. Evolution in Time and Space, I
Source: U.S. National Geospatial Agency & MARLO
42. Evolution in Time and Space, II
Source: U.S. National Geospatial Agency & MARLO
46. Evolution of 8 Major Registries from 2000 till
2009, (% of International Fleet in vessel units)
16%
14% Panama
% of International Fleet (vessel counts)
12% Liberia
St. Vincent &
10% Grenadines
Marshall
Islands
8%
Bahamas
6% Antigua &
Barbuda
4% Hong Kong
Singapore
2%
0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport from 2000 till 2009
47. Number of Attacks (2000-9) per Flag
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Panama
Liberia
Hong Kong
Malta
Marshall Islands
United Kingdom
Cyprus
Singapore
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
St. Vincent & Grenadines
U.S.A.
Italy
Denmark
France
Turk ey
China
Greece
Norway
Netherlands
Germany
Bermuda
Source: Compilation based on I.M.O. & I.M.B. annual Reports
48. Number of Suez Canal Passages (2000-9) per Flag
0 5.000 10.000 15.000 20.000 25.000 30.000 35.000
Panama
Liberia
United Kingdom
Malta
Germany
Bahamas
Hong Kong
Cyprus
Greece
Singapore
Marshall Islands
Denmark
Norway
Italy
U.S.A.
Antigua and Barbuda
Netherlands
China
Turkey
France
Grenadines
Source: Canal Suez Authority, Annual Reports from 2000 till 2009
49. Remember the Golden Rule of
Statistical Analysis:
Correlation does not mean Causation
50. The D.N.A. of The D.N.A. of (Linear)
Randomness (statistical Correlation (statistical
footprint) footprint)
80
70
60
50
40 StatTools Student Version
Fit
For Academic Use Only
30
y
20
li p
irac
a
10 Som
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
51. The D.N.A. of Somali Piracy (statistical footprint)
80
70
60
50
40 StatTools Student Version
Fit
For Academic Use Only
30
20
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
52. Flag’s Probability (Risk) of Attack
High Risk Group, Av. Pr. Of Attack = 0,70%
1.00%
0.90%
0.80%
0.70%
Low Risk Group, Av. Pr. Of Attack = 0,37%
0.60%
0.50%
0.40%
0.30%
0.20%
0.10%
0.00%
s
ly
ey
De ria
us
s
k
.
lI y
m
a
Ba es
a
ay
ce
No e
ta
as
a
Ba ng
G land
A
nd
H b ud
in
n
ec
ar
m
Ita
Ne gdo
in
rk
pr
al
an
S.
m
rw
in arsh ma
be
o
Ch
re
la
na
ite nm
M
ad
K
U.
ha
Tu
Cy
Fr
s
Li
r
er
G
er
in
Pa
g
tig ren
th
K
on
G
al
&
d
ua
&
Un
M
nt
ce
An
.V
St
Source: A. Coutroubis, G. Kiourktsoglou Paper: “Somali Piracy vs Flag of Attacked Vessel”, Jan. 2010 (updated in Feb.2012)
53. The “Panama Effect”
2007 2008 2009
COUNTRY
OR
TERRITORY NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER
OF OF OF OF
DOMICILE VESSELS % VESSELS % VESSELS %
JAPAN 2.082 51,6 2.236 54,5 2.292 53,3
CHINA 460 7,2 501 9,0 558 9,5
GREECE 546 10,2 511 8,8 503 8,1
KOREA 297 7,3 302 7,3 324 8,0
TAIWAN 306 4,7 296 4,5 332 5,3
GERMANY 34 2,4 39 2,2 95 3,1
HONG KONG 159 4,9 137 2,9 127 2,0
SWITZERLAND 234 4,3 32 0,3 32 0,3
SUM 3.122 71,4 3.287 74,5 3.448 74,0
Countries with Naval presence around the Horn of Africa
Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport from 2007-09
54. ….. and the “Liberia Effect”
2007 2008 2009
COUNTRY
OR
TERRITORY NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER
OF OF OF OF
DOMICILE VESSELS % VESSELS % VESSELS %
GERMANY 659 31,1 770 32,5 857 34,0
GREECE 288 19,5 360 20,2 387 19,9
RUSSIA 86 7,5 90 7,1 95 6,9
SAUDI ARABIA 26 6,9 24 5,6 28 6,3
TAIWAN 76 6,0 84 5,8 92 6,2
JAPAN 102 5,8 114 6,2 115 6,0
SINGAPORE 42 5,0 39 4,0 36 3,8
U.S.A. 105 3,7 122 3,8 105 3,2
HONG KONG 23 1,2 59 3,4 60 3,2
ITALY 19 1,2 43 2,5 48 2,5
NORWAY 40 2,8 41 2,2 49 1,9
U.K. 34 1,2 27 0,7 30 1,2
CHINA 51 3,1 15 0,3 12 0,3
SUM 1.384 75,9 1.582 75,5 1.698 75,9
Countries with Naval pres ence around the Horn of Africa
Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport from 2007-09
58. The Human Factor (Seafarers)
“Man is the Ultimate Measure of Everything”,
Protagoras the Philosopher, (ca. 490 BC – 420 BC)
59. Facts I
1. More than 100.000 Seafarers (at any
given time) are preparing for, or transiting
through, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden.
2. 4.185 Seafarers attacked
3. 1.090 Seafarers held hostage,ig uresnever
F 70%
2010Release
went back to Sea after their
4. 342 Seafarers used Citadels
5. 516 Seafarers used as Human Shields
60. Facts II
6. Approximately 3.500 People (mainly
Seafarers) held hostage between 2007 and
2010;
7. 62 among them… never made it back…;
8. 225 Hostages at sea (as of 02/Feb/2012),
Average Duration of Captivity: 8 months
9. 26 Hostages ashore (as of 02/Feb/2012),
Average Duration of Captivity: 10 months
61. Average Days in Captivity
800
Longest Duration of Captivity
700
• Panama-flagged MV Iceberg 1
600
• hijacked on March 29, 2010 20 10 ;
e in sed
stag suicide while
500 • with 24 crew members
• One of the hostages committedr Ab
ho o u
Days
e d rementally ill…
hto lbecome d
400
300
ew
others were said
Cr e Tor tu
0
200
109 wer
100
33%
0
09
09
09
09
10
10
10
11
G
ER
20
20
20
20
10
20
20
20
EB
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
R
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
A
IC
YE
V
M
Source: I.M.B.
62. Average Days in Captivity
(Ransomed & Released Vessels)
250
200
150
Days
100
50
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (until Sept.)
Source: AEGIS London, http://goo.gl/Lbpkm, [Accessed 11 November 2012]
63. Statistics
1. 52% of the Seajacked Crews come from 5
Countries: Philippines, India, China, Thailand
and Ukraine ;
2. It seems that the presence of a Country’s Naval
Forces off Somalia has no impact on the
Seajacks of Crews which include any number of
its Nationals ;
3. Although 1 out of every 4 Seafarers victims of
Somali Pirates comes from the Philippines, the
Island Nation has no Naval Force off East
Africa;
64. % of Nationals in Crews of Seajacked Vessels
30% INCIDENT LEVELS
2010 INTERN. LEVELS
25% 10 COUNTRIES, 70 % OF
5 COUNTRIES, 52% OF SEAJACKED POPULATION
SEAJACKED COUNTRIES WITH
20% POPULATION NAVAL PRESENCE
15%
10%
5%
0%
a
ia
a
nd
es
a
ia
a
e
ey
m
a
ia
A.
di
in
in
ssi
y
nk
r
in
an
s
na
rk
S.
la
en
Sy
In
ne
Ch
ra
Ru
pp
La
ai
U.
m
et
Tu
K
do
Uk
Th
Ro
Vi
ili
ri
In
Ph
Sh
Source: Incidents between Jan/2007 and Dec/2011, The Global Labour Market for Seafarers onboard Merchant Cargo Ships (2010)
72. Ransom Payments vs U.S. Aid
1. 2009: $177 mil. $411 mil.
2. 2010: $238 mil. (+36%) $133 mil. (-68%)
3. 2011: $160 mil. (+50%) $85 mil. (-36%)
One Earth Future Foundation / United States Agency for International Development
73. The Tally of Criminal Proceeds
Source: Somalia Report 2011
86. … So, why do we care about Somali
Piracy ?
• It’ s a Crime, “Hostis Humani Generis” ;
• It’ s an Expensive Crime (annual costs of $7 -
$12bil., projected to reach $15bil. by 2015) ;
And the Most Important...
• It ravages (and sometimes claims) human lives
(7 dead and 34 injured in the first quarter of
2011, excluding Pirates…) ;
87. The Fight against Piracy
The Stakeholders
Tactics
Na
s
st
tio
re
te
na
and
In
Work on
l In
s
es
te
in
re
s
st
Bu
s
Supra-National Interests Strategy
88. An Alternative View…
What if, Somali Piracy is not just a Crime…?
What if, it is Something More Elaborate…
a (Criminal) Business maybe…?
89. Pr. Michael E. Porter
• Appointee by former U.S.
President Ronald Reagan
to the Commission on
Industrial Competitiveness
• C. Roland Christensen
Professor of Business
Administration at the
Harvard Business School
90. “The Competitive Advantage of
Nations”
and
The “Million Dollar” Question…:
“Why do some nations succeed and others
fail in international competition...?”
91. Competitive vs Comparative
Advantages
• Competitive Advantages are developed
progressively over the Business Cycle(s) and
as time goes by... ;
• Comparative Advantages are naturally
endowed... ;
92. Porter’s Diamond
Piracy’s Diamond
Context of a Company’s
Creation, Organization,
Context of Somali Piracy
Management and Rivals
Human
Piracy’s Resources of
Knowledge Resources “Derived” Demand for
Local Demand,
Physical Sorts
Various & Piracy’s “Product”
Market Features,
Capital Prevailing Marketing
Mechanism(s)
Business Ecosystem
Piracy’s “Satellite”
Source: The Competitive Advantage of Nations Industries
93. 1. Factor Conditions or Factors of
Production
1.1. Human Resources: Kingpins, Investors,
Negotiators, Pirates ;
1.2. Knowledge Resources: Information &
Intelligence on Vessels & Trade Patterns ;
1.3. Physical Resources: Equipment &
Paraphernalia ;
1.4. Capital Resources: “Seed Capital” ;
94. 2. Demand Conditions
2.1. “Derived” Demand for the “Product” of
Piracy, which is...:
Income for Locals and Profit for
International Investors ;
2.2. Mechanisms through which the “Derived”
Demand reverberates... ;
95. 3. Relating and Supporting
Industries
“If Somalia is the so called ‘Hive’ of Piracy...
then its ‘Relating and Supporting Industries’ are
responsible for its ‘Business Pollination’...”
3.1. Financial Industry (Banking, “Hawala” etc.) ;
3.2. Industry of Legal Services ;
3.3. Industry of Logistical Services ;
96. 4. Structure and “Domestic” Rivalry
International Community
nium
om es
um m n
Neighboring
el l a o
T.F.G.
Countries
B tr
Militias
con Clans
“Domestic” Rivalry:
97. Somali Piracy’s Competitive vs
Comparative Advantages
“Competitive” Adv. Comparative Adv.
1. Unstable T.F.G ; 1. Geography ;
2. Lawlessness ;
v al ries
Ri
tic”
3. Utter Povertys/ Destitution ;
Do me
“mil. trained personnel ;
4. Quasi
5. Geographical Concentration ;
6. Corruption ;
98. So, what can we do in terms of
Strategy, to eradicate (over time)
a Criminal Business like Piracy...?
le... d higher s…
nab yd’l être”, ines
stio lways
• Attack Piracy’s “Raison ie
Que will a e Bus
itimat
Profit n Leg
which is...:rime
C s tha
Return
• Attack Piracy’s “Main Driver”, which
is…: ?
99. Somali Piracy’s Competitive vs
Porter: “the “Main Driver” behind
every competitive Advantages
Comparative business is
always the same”...: Comparative Adv.
“Competitive” Adv.
1. Unstable T.F.G ; 1. Geography ;
2. Lawlessness ;
Competition... in other Words:
3. Utter Poverty / Destitution ;
4. Quasi mil. trained personnel ;
“Domestic” Rivalries
5. Geographical Concentration ;
6. Corruption ;
100. To Reduce Somalia’s “Domestic”
Rivalries focus on:
Most Importantly though:
1. a Progressive Scaling-Down of outside
military Intervention… “Somalia inoculated
from foreign Jihadist Movements”, (2007
Do“Constructive; Disengagement”
not give up Counter-Terrorism
a West Point Report)
Activities !
2. a Gradual Promotion of Grassroots
National Reconciliation ;
3.1. Humanitarian Aid and 3.2. Development ;
101. A Criminal Business
• 2010 Turnover: $238 mil., (projected to rise to a
whopping $400 mil. by 2015) ;
• Profit Margin of Pirates: 25-30% ;
• Firmly Structured P&L (Profit & Loss) Statement ;
• Stock Exchange (Harardere) ;
Source: Geopolicity 2011
102. The Tally of Criminal Proceeds
Source: Somalia Report 2011
104. The Economics of Criminal
Motivation
• A Somali Pirate’s AnnualCost of $33.000 -
Risk Adjusted Income:
$79.000 ;
• Lifetime Earnings: $168.000 - - $1.350 ;
being a Pirate: $1.650 $394.000
• 67 to 157 times Somalia’s Average Income ;
• Next Best Alternative: $500 (Annual), $14.500
(Lifetime) ;
Source: Geopolicity 2011
106. The Context of Maritime Security
The Stakeholders
Tactics
Na
s
st
tio
re
te
na
and
In
Work on
l In
s
es
te
in
re
s
st
Bu
s
Supra-National Interests Strategy
107. Types of Problems
ble
m atic
:
ro itime d
t P“Simple” Problems
Type 1: Is Mar Wicke
1s enjoy a consensus
a
rity m…?
bothecu otheir definitions &
on ble solutions;
S
Pr
Example : A machine breaks down…
Type 2: “Complex” Problems introduce conflict
to the problem-solving process;
Example : Best Way to Improve Student learning…
Type 3: “Wicked” Problems engender a high
level of conflict among the stakeholders. No
agreement on the problem or its solution;
Example : Rural community facing water shortages, unemployment and
unaffordable housing. Influx of wealthy people who are buying up avail. land...
Source: “Coping with Wicked Problems: the Case of Afghanistan”, Nancy Roberts
108. Distinguishing Properties of
Wicked Problems, I
1. There is NO Definitive Formulation of a
wicked problem;
Example : What is the definition of the problem of Somali piracy ?
2. Wicked problems have NO Stopping Rule;
Example : When can one claim a FINAL solution to Somali piracy ?
3. Solutions are NOT True-or-False, but Good-
or-Bad;
Example : Are there any conventionalized criteria for a True or False solution
to the problem of Somali piracy ?
Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
109. Distinguishing Properties of
Wicked Problems, II
4. No Immediate & No Ultimate Test of a
Solution to a wicked problem;
Example : Any solution to Somali piracy generates long term consequences ;
5. Every solution is a “One-Shot Operation”;
Example : Any solution to Somali piracy is consequential. Every Trial counts!
6. No Enumerable Set of Pot. Solutions, Nor
a Well-Described Set of Permissible Ops;
Example : Any good idea for an anti-piracy measure may be a candidate ;
Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
110. Distinguishing Properties of
Wicked Problems, III
7. Every wicked problem is essentially Unique;
Example : Somali piracy bears similarities with Nigerian piracy. Then again,
each one is unique ;
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to
be a Symptom of another Problem;
Example : What is the Proximate Cause of Somali piracy…?
Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
111. Distinguishing Properties of
Wicked Problems, IV
9. The Existence of a “Discrepancy”
representing a wicked problem can be
explained in numerous ways. The choice of
Explanation determines the nature of the
problem’s resolution;
Example : The choice of explanation (of Somali piracy) is arbitrary in the
logical sense. Stakeholders chose explanations most plausible to them ;
10. The planner has NO Right to be Wrong;
Example : Stakeholders are liable for the consequences of their actions ;
Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
112. Copying Strategies
em
:
atic lem
bl ob
Pro ked Pr y be
nd Use Collaborative
2 Wic ecurit No
the S Strategies
Can aritime using Yes
of M solved Power Contested ?
ra tive Use Competitive
abo s…?
Coll egie No Strategies
t
Stra Yes
Power Concentrated ? Use Authoritative
Strategies
Conflict over Problem & Solution: Type 3, Wicked Problem
Conflict ? Conflict over Solution: Type 2, Complex Problem
Agreement on Problem & Solution: Type1, Simple Problem
Source: “Coping with Wicked Problems: the Case of Afghanistan”, Nancy Roberts
113. “Solving” the Problem using a
Collaborative Strategy
A. Advantages B. Disadvantages
1. Share Costs; 1. Increased ot
on n d Costs”;
“Transaction
luti tee
2. Strength in numbers; So ran
Gua
2. “Challenging”
3. Elimination of Synergies;
Redundancies; 3. Collaboration is
4. Enhance Efficiency; Time-Consuming;
114. “Solving” the Problem using a
Collaborative Strategy,
Basic Steps I
1. Set up a Strategy of Collaboration;
2. Development, Validation & Implementation of a
Strategic Framework of Principles and
Policies;
3. Seek Common Ground; avoid dwelling on
Differences;
115. “Solving” the Problem using a
Collaborative Strategy,
Basic Steps II
4. “Fail into Collaboration”;
5. “Get the Whole System in the Room” and in
doing so create a “Community of Interest”;
6. Be open to “Self-Organization” and “Co-
Evolution” in other words “Trust the
Process”;
117. Two Distinctive Levels:
1.Tactical (the “no Silver Bullet” principle) ;
“Protecting a vessel from piracy is like
protecting a marriage from divorce...
Many “little” things need to be Done !”
2. Strategic ;
118. 1. Tactics on a:
1.1. Business Level ;
1.2. National Level ;
1.3. Supra-National Level ;
119. 1.1. Business Level
1.1.1. Adopt I.M.O’s “Best Management Practices” ;
1.1.2. Armed Guards (Vicarious Liability ?),
“Equipping the Man” (Priv. Sec. Comp.) vs
“Manning the Equipment” (Military) ;
1.1.3. Take a detour, (Northern Passage, Cape
of Good Hope, “Sirius Star” Nov/2008) ;
120. 1.2. National Level
1.2.1. Participate in a Naval Task Force off
Somalia ;
1.2.2. Update Counter-Piracy Legislation
(prosecution), Djibouti Code, Equipment
Articles ;
1.2.3. Adoption by National Flag Registries of
I.M.O’s “Best Management Practices” ;
121. 1.3. Supra-National Level
1.3.1. Coordinate National Counter-Piracy
Efforts ;
1.3.2. Address the “Prosecutorial Vacuum”
(“Catch-and-Release” Policy, over 70% of the
pirates captured are released within hours) ;
1.3.3. Use “technically competitive” vessels for the
transportation of Humanitarian Aid (U.N.) ;
122. 2. Strategy
Just wait for the “Game Changer”...
Ter
ror ism Pi racy
y Org
genc . Crim
In sur e
to Partially Overlap
123. Please do not Forget!
This is not just a Battle Between the Shipping
Community and Somalia’s Pirates...
... But rather a War between the Civilized World
and the Forces of Darkness (Extremists).
... Thus, it will get far worse before it gets better
!
125. What is a Protection & Indemnity
Club?
• It is a Mutual Association of Shipowners and
Charterers ;
• It covers Liabilities, Risks and Expenses of its
Members ;
and
• Every Club has its own Set of Rules ;
126. A typical Cover provided by a P&I
Club includes…
1. “Injury, Illness and Death of Seamen” ;
ng?
issi
2. “Repatriation & Substitute Expenses” ;
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thin
anyUnemployment
3. “Wages & Shipwreckere
Is th
Indemnity” ;
4. “Loss of Damage to the Effects of Seamen and
Others” ;
5. “Life Salvage” ;
127. Yes! One Liability and…
one Condition…
• Liability: “Piracy Unemployment Indemnity”
(unpaid wages while in captivity) ;
and
• Condition: “Settlement of Liabilities” ;
128. Framing the Problem(s)…
1. Wages paid while crew in captivity ;
and
2. Wages paid directly to the families of the crew ;
129. “Brainstorming” potential
Solution(s)…
• Set up a Fund ;
• Managed by the I.T.F ;
• Paid Contributions by Shipowners and
Charterers ;
• Paid Contributions by Seafarers ;
• Donations ;
131. Piracy & Insurance, I (Vessel)
• Piracy is a peril normally covered (for now at
least) as a Marine Risk (Hull policies) ;
• A Hijacking might also (or alternatively)
constitute a Riot or a Civil Commotion (in the
latter cases coverage only under War or Strikes risk policies) ;
• Hijackers might be Terrorists or persons
acting Maliciously ;
“Maritime Fraud and Piracy”, 2nd Edition, Paul Todd
132. Piracy & Insurance, II (Cargo)
• Coverage of Cargo only under an all risk cargo
policy ;
“Maritime Fraud and Piracy”, 2nd Edition, Paul Todd
133. Ransom recovery, (vessel with
cargo)
• Ransom paid by the Owner ;
• If the Owner is insured, he can recover
from his Insurers (Sue & Labour clause) ;
• If the Owner is not insured, he can declare
General Average ;
• If the Owner is insured, he can potentially
recover from his Insurers and declare
General Average (right of Subrogation) ;
“Maritime Fraud and Piracy”, 2nd Edition, Paul Todd
141. JAPAN P3C
250500Z – 251300Z
IRTC
Z FEB
400
T 250
EAS FEB
BO
00Z
415
ON
T2
EAS
TR
AN
ORE
O
HK
M
T
SOU
CH
SE
ANE
T
JAP
M
FS
H
G
ESE
EM
CHIN
ST
AL
FEB
00Z
T2506
WES
Convoy
TF 465 (EU)
TF 151 (CMF) IRTC Coverage Example
TF 150
TF 508 (NATO)
NATIONAL
142. Nato Counter-Piracy Background
SNMG2 Out of Area Deployment
Op Allied Provider Oct – Dec 08
Dec 08 Op Atalanta (EU NAVFOR)
Coalition Maritime Force
SNMG1 Out of Area Deployment
Op Allied Protector Mar – Aug 09
Aug 09 Op Ocean Shield
2012
Ongoing
143. OCEAN SHIELD Campaign Plan
Lines of Operation Tactical End State
1 Disrupt pirate operations at sea
Piracy in
Gulf of
Aden and
2 Integrate international counter-piracy efforts Somali
Basin at
acceptable
level
3 Build maritime community counter-piracy ability
without
NATO
operations
4 Develop regional counter-piracy capacity
144. Naval Costs to the International
Community (rough calculation)
1. 28-32 Naval Vessels off Somalia ;
2. Yearly (additional) cost of a Frigate / Destroyer:
$50-60 mil. ;
3. Total Yearly Costs: $1,4 – 1,92 bil. ;
Somalis have been given automatic refugee status in Yemen since 1991. 170,000 are officially registered as refugees, while the Yemeni government estimates the true figure could be as many as one million. However fluctuations in the numbers travelling suggest that Yemen is the middle link in a chain, and the destination country is very important: numbers leaving Somalia decreased dramatically when in 2009 the Saudis closed the border and the new president in Puntland promised to crack down on the trade. In spring 2010 the Saudi border reopened and numbers began to rise again. The route has also changed, with refugees making the crossing to Yemen from Djibouti – a much shorter, safer route. The proportion of Ethiopians is rising, now estimated to be ¾ of those making the crossing. The majority of Ethiopians are smuggled straight to Saudi Arabia. With sea passage costing around $150 and crossing the Saudi border costing around $150, this migration economy could be worth $20m a year, encompassing 5 countries.
