1. Russian Federation: Nuclear Exports and Non Proliferation
Challenges and Recommendations
Ivan Knezevica, Saima Aman Khan Sialb, Duc Giang Vuc
aBelgrade University, bNational Defense University, Department of Strategic Studies, cKAIST, Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering
Russian Federation, as one of the largest nuclear power producers in the world, with
33 reactors in operation, acts as the most important nuclear export country in the
world. Expansion of nuclear power exports, with Build-Own-Operate model for
nuclear facilities construction, is part of a strategy to garner global
political influence through energy production. It is a challenge to accomplish this
goal while complying with all the nonproliferation requirements without
compromising on market competitiveness.
Critical analysis of the Russian export control system to understand its export
control policies and outline its implications for the nonproliferation and present
policy recommendations and specific measures for the Russian Federation to
enhance its nonproliferation criteria for nuclear exports without compromising on
its legitimate commercial interests.
Considering the market oriented nature of nuclear exports and the inherent risk of
proliferation involved, how can Russia integrate stronger nonproliferation policies in
its nuclear exports without compromising on market competitiveness?
Two types of licenses:
• Single Export License
issued for
implementation of
exports under a single
contract and lists the
country of end user, the
seller and the buyer
• Multiple Export
(General) License issued
only by a decision of the
Government for
multiple exports of a
certain type of
commodity to one or
more destinations.
Specific buyer does not
need to be listed.
Limitation on the
quantity of
commodities for export.
Issued only under a
Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement.
National Legal Framework for Nuclear Exports
Introduction
Objective of the Study
Research Question
Requirements for the Importing Country - Transferred items :
• shall only be used for peaceful purposes
• shall be controlled by IAEA Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, Additional
Protocol; and shall be secured by sufficient measures recommended by the IAEA
• can be re-exported or transferred to any other recipient country only on the
conditions outlined above
No requirements on notifying Russia in case of re-export of items to another country.
ROSATOM – The State Nuclear Energy Corporation
250 companies and organizations.
Rusatom Overseas for Build-Own-Operate international projects.
Major power reactors abroad:
Operating 6, Contracted 14, Under construction 5, Ordered 15, Under negotiations 8.
Case Study - Vietnam
Challenges&Constraints
2002
2009
2010
2011
Inter-Governmental
Agreement: peaceful
uses of nuclear
energy
EVN-ROSATOM MOU:
cooperation in the
first NPP in Vietnam
territory
Inter-Governmental
Agreement: 1st
Vietnamese NPP
- Rosatom-MOET MOU:
human resources
training
- VARANS-
Rostechnadzor MOU:
legal document
development, licensing,
and monitoring nuclear
and radiation safety
- Rosatom-MOET MOU:
Information Center for
Nuclear Energy
- Inter-Governmental
Agreement: Center for
Nuclear Science and
Technology (CNST)
ISSUES:
- Retransfer/ Reshipment
- Intangible Knowledge Transfer
- Spent Fuel and Waste
Legal Framework: Challenges & Recommendations
Internal Compliance
System
Inter-Agency Process
Transparency
Border Controls
TRAINING & EDUCATION
of the government as well as enterprise personnel
in export control laws, regulations, and methods
UNIFORM CRITERIA for dealing with sensitive export
decisions amongst the agencies involved
TRANSPARENCY IN REPORTING violations and prosecutions
would greatly help in deterring future violations.
SINGLE DATABASE for all commodities related
to Customs Union Market to perform adequate control
in terms of nonproliferation
and enhance the uniform export control efficiency.
Nonproliferation: Challenges & Recommendations
Conditions for
Exports
Re-Export/Re-
Transfer Policy
State Level
Safeguards
Nuclear Security and
Physical Protection
Intangible Knowledge
Transfers
COMPULSARY CONDITIONS
for export controls for importing states:
- IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
- SIGNING NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT
NOTIFICATION & END-USER CERTIFICATION
in the re-transfer to the third countries or entities
STATE-LEVEL SAFEGUARDS APPROACH
as part of its conditions for nuclear export
to inculcate a nonproliferation culture and transparency in
the importing states
CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities
REGIONAL & INTER-REGIONAL TRAININGS
with collaboration with the IAEA
SPECIAL CURRICULUM for training of importing states
personnel on nuclear safety, security and safeguards
Transition from the Authoritarian to the Notification Based Model
NUCLEAR
EXPORTS
MARKET
NON
PROLIFERATION
SAFETY
REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
HUMAN
RESOURCES
NUCLEAR
FUEL CYCLE
SECURITY
ROLE OF
ROSATOMECONOMY
& FINANCE
SAFEGUARDS
Insufficient
Safety
Culture
Requirements for
re-transfer of items
By the importing
country
Lack of trained
personnel both in
Russia and the
importing country
MC&A
IAEA Safeguards
- Market sustainability
- Cost increases
- Transparency
- Infrastructure in new
nuclear countries
- Customs Control
- Illicit Trafficking
- Physical Protection
- High degree of
autonomy
- Control & Monopole:
Corruption?
- Role in State
Administration
Increasing Pu
stockpiles