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© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Anatomy of Comment Spam
Shelly Hershkovitz, Sr. Security Research Engineer, Imperva
1
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Agenda
2
§  Comment Spam - What & Why?
§  Comment Spam Attacks
§  Data Analysis
§  Mitigation Techniques
§  Case Studies
§  Conclusion
§  Q&A
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Shelly Hershkovitz,
Sr. Security Research Engineer, Imperva
3
§  Leads the efforts to capture and
analyze hacking activities
•  Authored several Hacker Intelligence
Initiative (HII) Reports
§  Experienced in machine learning
and computer vision
§  Holds BA in Computer Science &
M.Sc degree in Bio-Medical
Engineering
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Comment Spam - What & Why?
4
§  What?
•  Wikipedia: ”Comment spam is a term used to refer to a broad
category of spam bot postings which abuse web-based forms to
post unsolicited advertisements as comments on forums,
blogs, wikis and online guest books.”
§  Why?
•  Search engine optimization
•  Advertisements
•  Malware distribution
•  Click fraud
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Search Engine Optimization
5
MyWebSite.com
OtherWebSite.com
OtherBlog.com
OtherWebSite.com
OtherNewsWebSite.com
Backlink
Backlink
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Comment Spam Attack
6
Target
Acquisition
Comment
Generation
Posting
Verification
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Comment Spam in Practice
7
§  Success relies on large scales
§  Automated tools are used
§  Inputs
•  The site to be promoted
•  Relevant keywords
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  URL Harvesting
•  Locate relevant websites
•  Locate suitable URLs for commenting
§  An alternative – buy ‘Quality URLs’ lists
•  A typical price is $40 for ~13,000 URLs
Target Acquisition
8
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Selecting the Targets
9
Target
Selection
Relevance
Quality Difficulty
Policy
•  Relevance:
Relevance to the
promoted site
•  Quality:
The URL’s own search
engine ranking
•  Difficulty:
The difficulty of posting
comments (Captcha)
•  Policy:
The site’s policy regarding
search engine (follow/
nofollow attribute)
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Target Acquisition in Action
10
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  Verbal comments attached to the promoted site
•  Input keywords
Comment Generation
11
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Comment Generation in Action
12
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  Post comments on many URLs
§  Authentication, CAPTCHA, or user details handling
Posting
13
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Posting in Action
14
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  Collect feedback whether or not the comments
were posted
Verification
15
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Verification in Action
16
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Comment Spam in Action
17
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  17% of the attackers generated 58% of comment
spam traffic
Data Analysis
18
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  80% of comment spam traffic is generated by 28%
of attackers
Data Analysis
19
28.00%
Source IP
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Mitigation Techniques
20
§  Content inspection
§  Source reputation
§  Anti-automation
§  Demotivation
§  Manual inspection
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Mitigation Techniques: Content Inspection
21
§  Inspecting the content of the posted comments
§  Rule based
•  Large number of links
•  Logical sentences not related to the subject
§  Akismet
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Mitigation Techniques: Source Reputation
22
§  Based on the reputation of the poster
§  Online repositories based on crowdsourcing
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Mitigation Techniques: Anti-Automation
23
§  Anti-automation tools
•  CAPTCHA
•  Check-box for posting the
comment
•  Client type classification
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Mitigation Techniques: Demotivation
24
§  Make comment spam useless
§  Follow/nofollow value of the rel attribute of an HTML
anchor <A>
•  Specifies whether a link should be followed by search engines
§  Penguin update for Google search engine algorithms
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Mitigation Techniques: Manual Inspection
25
§  Effective but not scalable
§  Effective against manual comment spam
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Case Studies
26
§  Attack Target: Specific Victim
§  Attack Source: Specific Attacking IP
§  Google App Engine
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  A non-profit organization
§  A single host with many URLs
§  Our theory associates popular phrases within the URL
address and page content, to the attack rate
Specific Victim
27
Numberof
Attacks
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  52% of source IPs produce 80% of the traffic
Specific Victim
28
52%
Source IP
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Specific Attacking IP
29
§  Comment spam posting from a specific IP
§  Rapid response (IP reputation feed) would have
significantly reduce the impact of the attack
Numberof
Attacks
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  Five target websites were attacked from this source
§  Most had suffered a relative high amount of comment
spam attacks
Specific Attacking IP
30
1
41%
2
25%
3
21%
4
11%
5
2%
Percentage of Traffic per Target
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
§  Hyperlinks in a single request are for different websites
§  Consecutive requests have similar hyperlinks
§  Using different URLs for the same website avoids bad
reputation
Specific Attacking IP
31
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Case Studies: Google App Engine
32
§  Google App Engine can be used to spread comment
spam through proxy services
§  This technique can be used to bypass IP based
mitigations
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Conclusion
33
§  Comment spam is a prosperous industry
•  Many tools and services are available for comment spam
generation and distribution
§  Identifying the attacker as a comment spammer early on
and blocking its requests prevents most of the malicious
activity
•  Reputation based controls are effective (IP / source application)
§  Reputation based controls must be combined with some
content based controls to avoid false positives
§  Anti-automation and bot-detection controls can reduce
the likelihood of an application becoming a target
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Webinar Materials
34
Post-Webinar
Discussions
Answers to
Attendee
Questions
Webinar
Recording Link
Join Group
Join Imperva LinkedIn Group,
Imperva Data Security Direct, for…
© 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
www.imperva.com
35

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The Anatomy of Comment Spam

  • 1. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. The Anatomy of Comment Spam Shelly Hershkovitz, Sr. Security Research Engineer, Imperva 1
  • 2. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Agenda 2 §  Comment Spam - What & Why? §  Comment Spam Attacks §  Data Analysis §  Mitigation Techniques §  Case Studies §  Conclusion §  Q&A
  • 3. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Shelly Hershkovitz, Sr. Security Research Engineer, Imperva 3 §  Leads the efforts to capture and analyze hacking activities •  Authored several Hacker Intelligence Initiative (HII) Reports §  Experienced in machine learning and computer vision §  Holds BA in Computer Science & M.Sc degree in Bio-Medical Engineering
  • 4. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Comment Spam - What & Why? 4 §  What? •  Wikipedia: ”Comment spam is a term used to refer to a broad category of spam bot postings which abuse web-based forms to post unsolicited advertisements as comments on forums, blogs, wikis and online guest books.” §  Why? •  Search engine optimization •  Advertisements •  Malware distribution •  Click fraud
  • 5. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Search Engine Optimization 5 MyWebSite.com OtherWebSite.com OtherBlog.com OtherWebSite.com OtherNewsWebSite.com Backlink Backlink
  • 6. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Comment Spam Attack 6 Target Acquisition Comment Generation Posting Verification
  • 7. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Comment Spam in Practice 7 §  Success relies on large scales §  Automated tools are used §  Inputs •  The site to be promoted •  Relevant keywords
  • 8. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  URL Harvesting •  Locate relevant websites •  Locate suitable URLs for commenting §  An alternative – buy ‘Quality URLs’ lists •  A typical price is $40 for ~13,000 URLs Target Acquisition 8
  • 9. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Selecting the Targets 9 Target Selection Relevance Quality Difficulty Policy •  Relevance: Relevance to the promoted site •  Quality: The URL’s own search engine ranking •  Difficulty: The difficulty of posting comments (Captcha) •  Policy: The site’s policy regarding search engine (follow/ nofollow attribute)
  • 10. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Target Acquisition in Action 10
  • 11. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  Verbal comments attached to the promoted site •  Input keywords Comment Generation 11
  • 12. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Comment Generation in Action 12
  • 13. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  Post comments on many URLs §  Authentication, CAPTCHA, or user details handling Posting 13
  • 14. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Posting in Action 14
  • 15. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  Collect feedback whether or not the comments were posted Verification 15
  • 16. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Verification in Action 16
  • 17. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Comment Spam in Action 17
  • 18. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  17% of the attackers generated 58% of comment spam traffic Data Analysis 18
  • 19. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  80% of comment spam traffic is generated by 28% of attackers Data Analysis 19 28.00% Source IP
  • 20. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Mitigation Techniques 20 §  Content inspection §  Source reputation §  Anti-automation §  Demotivation §  Manual inspection
  • 21. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Mitigation Techniques: Content Inspection 21 §  Inspecting the content of the posted comments §  Rule based •  Large number of links •  Logical sentences not related to the subject §  Akismet
  • 22. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Mitigation Techniques: Source Reputation 22 §  Based on the reputation of the poster §  Online repositories based on crowdsourcing
  • 23. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Mitigation Techniques: Anti-Automation 23 §  Anti-automation tools •  CAPTCHA •  Check-box for posting the comment •  Client type classification
  • 24. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Mitigation Techniques: Demotivation 24 §  Make comment spam useless §  Follow/nofollow value of the rel attribute of an HTML anchor <A> •  Specifies whether a link should be followed by search engines §  Penguin update for Google search engine algorithms
  • 25. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Mitigation Techniques: Manual Inspection 25 §  Effective but not scalable §  Effective against manual comment spam
  • 26. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Case Studies 26 §  Attack Target: Specific Victim §  Attack Source: Specific Attacking IP §  Google App Engine
  • 27. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  A non-profit organization §  A single host with many URLs §  Our theory associates popular phrases within the URL address and page content, to the attack rate Specific Victim 27 Numberof Attacks
  • 28. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  52% of source IPs produce 80% of the traffic Specific Victim 28 52% Source IP
  • 29. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Specific Attacking IP 29 §  Comment spam posting from a specific IP §  Rapid response (IP reputation feed) would have significantly reduce the impact of the attack Numberof Attacks
  • 30. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  Five target websites were attacked from this source §  Most had suffered a relative high amount of comment spam attacks Specific Attacking IP 30 1 41% 2 25% 3 21% 4 11% 5 2% Percentage of Traffic per Target
  • 31. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. §  Hyperlinks in a single request are for different websites §  Consecutive requests have similar hyperlinks §  Using different URLs for the same website avoids bad reputation Specific Attacking IP 31
  • 32. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Case Studies: Google App Engine 32 §  Google App Engine can be used to spread comment spam through proxy services §  This technique can be used to bypass IP based mitigations
  • 33. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Conclusion 33 §  Comment spam is a prosperous industry •  Many tools and services are available for comment spam generation and distribution §  Identifying the attacker as a comment spammer early on and blocking its requests prevents most of the malicious activity •  Reputation based controls are effective (IP / source application) §  Reputation based controls must be combined with some content based controls to avoid false positives §  Anti-automation and bot-detection controls can reduce the likelihood of an application becoming a target
  • 34. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Webinar Materials 34 Post-Webinar Discussions Answers to Attendee Questions Webinar Recording Link Join Group Join Imperva LinkedIn Group, Imperva Data Security Direct, for…
  • 35. © 2014 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. www.imperva.com 35