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Assessing the Effectiveness
            of Antivirus Solutions
Amichai Shulman, CTO




                       © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Agenda

    Modern Malware and Compromised Insider Threat
    Our Study
    Comparing Spend to Threat
    Summary and Conclusions




 2                  © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                         © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Amichai Shulman – CTO Imperva

   Speaker at industry events
    + RSA, Sybase Techwave, Info Security UK, Black Hat
   Lecturer on info security
    + Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
   Former security consultant to banks and financial services
    firms
   Leads the Application Defense Center (ADC)
    + Discovered over 20 commercial application vulnerabilities
       –   Credited by Oracle, MS-SQL, IBM and others



           Amichai Shulman one of InfoWorld’s “Top 25 CTOs”

                           © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Modern Malware and Compromised Insiders




4                 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
In Recent Events …

   Saudi Aramco
     + Malicious Insider
     + 30,000 computers hacked
     + Full service disruption




   Global Payments
     + Compromised Insider
     + 1.5M payment cards
       compromised



 5                      © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                             © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Case Study




 6           © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                  © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Some APT Statistics


  Malware         Type         Total number Operating                            Discovered   Undetected
                               of infections since                                            duration
                                             (estimated)                                      [years]
  Stuxnet 2009    Sabotage         ?         June 2009                           ~June 2010   1
  Stuxnet 2010    Sabotage     >300K         March-April                         June 2010    0.16
                                             2010
  Duqu            Espionage    ~50-60        April 2011                          Oct 2011     0.5
  Wiper           Sabotage     Tens                                              April 2012
  Flame           Espionage    ~5000-6000    Aug 2008                            May 2012     ~4
  Gauss           Espionage    ~2500         Aug – Sep                           June 2012    ~1
                                             2011
  Narilam         Sabotage         ?         2010                                Nov 2012     3
  GrooveMonitor   Sabotage     ~10                                               Dec 2012
  Red October     Espionage    ~200          May 2007                            Jan 2013     5.5




 7                            © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Compromised Insider Defined



               Compromised Insider

     A 3rd party who gains access and acquires
     intellectual property and/or data in excess via
     client infection. The client, often employees in
     government, military or private industry, are
     unknowing accomplices and have no
     malicious motivation.



 8                   © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                          © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Malware: Compromised Insiders on the Rise

            2012 Verizon Data Breach Report
            • Malware is on the rise: “69% of all data breaches
              incorporated Malware”… a 20% increase over 2011.
            • Malicious insider incidents declining: “4% of data breaches
              were conducted by implicated internal employees”… a 13%
              decrease compared to 2011.



            Director of National Intelligence
            • “Almost half of all computers in the United States have
              been compromised in some manner and ~60,000 new
              pieces of malware are identified per day”.




                   © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                        © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Putting Things in Perspective




                                                                   “Less than 1% of your
                                                                     employees may be
                                                                   malicious insiders, but
                                                                  100% of your employees
                                                                  have the potential to be
                                                                   compromised insiders.”


  Source: http://edocumentsciences.com/defend-against-compromised-insiders


                                              © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                                            © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Anatomy of a Modern Malware Attack




11              © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Where Do They Attack?

  End-user                                                         Multimillion
 devices and                                                         dollar
  the user                                                         datacenter


   Not well          Both access                                     Well
  protected         the same data                                  protected




 12             © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                     © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Distribution

      Phishing / Spear Phishing
      Drive-by-download
      Malvertizement
      BlackHat SEO




  13                   © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                            © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Distribution – The Unbearable Ease of Targeting




 14              © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                      © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Distribution – The Unbearable Ease of Targeting




 15              © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                      © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Industrialized Approach

 Specialized Frameworks and Hacking tools such as BlackHole 2.0
   and others, allow easy setup for Host Hijacking and Phishing.


 How easy is it ?
 For $700: 3 month license for BlackHole available online.
 Includes support!




 16                         © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Modern Malware – Key Differentiators

   Modular Design
      + Almost any function can be replaced at any time
   Robust C&C and Collection Infrastructure
      + Relies on web communications
      + Server redundancy, fast flux DNS, bulletproof hosting, etc.
   Versatile Payloads
      + Data extrusion, backdoor and remote control, outbound
        activities (attack, spam), destruction
   Sophisticated Infection Infrastructure
      + Drive-by-download & spam
      + Infection kits



 17                      © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                              © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
The Study




18   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Study

   “The antivirus industry
  has a dirty little secret: its
   products are often not
    very good at stopping
           viruses.”

      - The New York Times
           12/31/2012

 Sources: New York Times: Outmaneuvered at Their Own Game, Antivirus Makers Struggle to Adapt,
 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/01/technology/antivirus-makers-work-on-software-to-catch-malware-more-
 effectively.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0


 19                                          © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                                  © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Assessing Antivirus Solutions


  Imperva found that less
   than 5% of anti-virus
   solutions in the study were
   able to initially detect
   previously non-cataloged
   viruses.
  For certain vendors, it may
   take up to four weeks to
   detect a new virus from
   the time of the initial scan.



  20                © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                         © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Methodology

   Collect malware samples from the web
      + ~80 samples were collected
      + Samples are left untouched
   Test against multiple AV products over time
      + ~40 products
      + Test at 1 week intervals
   Analyze
      + Consider only “consensus” malware
      + Consensus = more than 50% of products at the end of the
        testing period




 21                      © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                              © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Methodology - Collection

   Anonymous proxy traffic
      + Attackers upload and share malware
      + Took me 3 hours of repeating this exercise before hitting the
        first ZeroAccess sample not detected by AV
   Google searches
      + Look for executable files with specific names
   (Softcore) Hacker forums




 22                      © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                              © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Methodology - Collection




                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Methodology - Collection




                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Methodology - Collection


  Program for hacking ICQ
  Program for hacking e-
   mail
  Program for hacking
   Skype
  Program for hacking
   accounts on Russian
   social networks.




 25                © 2012 Imperva, Inc.Inc. rights reserved.
                      © 2013 Imperva, All All rights reserved.
Methodology - Testing

   Using a public API exposed by VirusTotal.com
   “VirusTotal, a subsidiary of Google, is a free online
    service that analyzes files and URLs enabling the
    identification of viruses, worms, trojans and other
    kinds of malicious content detected by antivirus
    engines and website scanners.”*
   Record findings per product




  *https://www.virustotal.com/about/



 26                                    © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                            © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Methodology - Testing




                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
27               © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Methodology - Testing




                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
28               © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Methodology - Testing




                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
29               © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Methodology - Testing




                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
30               © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Detection Rates
                                                                     26/06/2012                     24/07/2012

         Virus Name                                            #                     %         #                 %
         CCFFacebookSetup-v1.45.exe_                            15                35.71429     17            41.46341
         ccn.exe_                                               15                35.71429     18            43.90244
         CHAT.EXE_                                              19                46.34146     22            57.89474
         CoralExplorer_200401.exe_                               3                7.142857      3            7.317073
         Crack-Neobot.exe_                                      12                28.57143     13            31.70732
         CRNI.zip_                                              36                85.71429     36            87.80488
         denied.shtml_                                           5                12.19512      5            12.19512
         directory.exe_                                         32                76.19048     31            75.60976
         erluofang.exe_                                         25                59.52381     25            60.97561
         extracticon.rar_                                       21                      50     18            43.90244
         Facebook filter v0.01.exe_                             15                35.71429     12            29.26829
         favicon.ico_                                           36                87.80488     36            87.80488
         FBWallFlooder_sean013.zip_                              3                7.142857      3            7.317073
         flashplayer10.exe_                                     26                61.90476     24            58.53659
         Fraps v3.2.4 Registered.exe_                           21                51.21951     22            53.65854
         G-Force1.5.exe_                                        15                35.71429     18            43.90244
         GoldenEye.exe_                                         27                64.28571     28            68.29268
         Google setup.exe_                                      20                47.61905     20            48.78049
         helpdesk.exe_                                          10                24.39024     11            26.82927
         INFO.RAR_                                              35                83.33333     34                  85

         Internet Download Manager v6.05 Full.rar_              32                76.19048     34            82.92683
         javaupdate.exe_                                        32                76.19048     31            75.60976
         killer_cdj.exe_                                        12                29.26829     14            34.14634
         machine_sample.exe_                                    30                71.42857     30            73.17073
         mirc635ru.exe_                                         16                38.09524     15            36.58537
         mms.jar_                                               29                69.04762     26            68.42105
         ocx.rar_                                               24                57.14286     23            56.09756
         OPALA.rar_                                             33                78.57143     34            82.92683
         OpenTab-install.exe_                                   19                 45.2381     20            48.78049
         ovh-professional-setup.exe_                             8                 19.5122      9            21.95122
         pdf_trk_invoice.zip.carefull_                          30                71.42857     31            75.60976
         Police.exe_                                             9                21.42857     10            24.39024
         product.exe_                                           27                64.28571     30            73.17073
         q3j2xh7qtqmq.jpeg_                                     31                73.80952     31            75.60976
         qip8095.exe_                                           21                      50     24            58.53659
         RECYCLER.RAR_                                          34                80.95238     35            85.36585
         reg.zip_                                               13                30.95238     17            41.46341
         sample_9275.exe_                                       29                69.04762     28                  70
         sample_ebook_2006.exe_                                 13                31.70732     12                  30
         scandsk.exe_                                           22                52.38095     30            73.17073
         setup.exe_                                             29                69.04762     28            68.29268
         setup1.exe_                                            29                69.04762     30            73.17073



                                                   © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                                                 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Number of Weeks Required to Identify Infected
File not Identified in First Run

 4.5


  4


 3.5


  3


 2.5


  2


 1.5


  1


 0.5


  0
       Kaspersky   Trend-Micro                 Symantec              Avast   McAfee




                         © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                       © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Viruses Detection between First and Last Run, by
   Anti-Virus Vendor

 70


 60


 50


 40


 30


 20


 10


  0




                 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                      © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Rate of Detection Over Time – Widespread Malware


 0.9

 0.8

 0.7

 0.6

 0.5

 0.4

 0.3

 0.2

 0.1

  0
  07-Aug   09-Aug   11-Aug      13-Aug             15-Aug            17-Aug   19-Aug   21-Aug   23-Aug




                               © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                             © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Sample Drill Down

   Google_setup.exe




                   © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                        © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Sample Drill Down (cont.)

   Initial analysis by VirusTotal
      + February 9th, 2012
   Results by the end of testing period (August 2012)
      + 20/42
   Results by November 2012
      + 23/42




 36                     © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                             © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Security Spend vs. Threats




37          © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Security Spending by Market Share

      2001                                                   2011
      1. Anti-virus                                          1. Anti-virus
      2. Firewall/VPN                                        2. Firewall/VPN
      3. Content Filtering                                   3. Secure Email/Web
      4. IDS/IPS                                             4. IPS
                                                                                        % of
         Security Solutions     2002             % of Spending               2012
                                                                                      Spending
       Anti-virus                  $ 1.4B                 59%               $ 7.9B      33%
       Firewall                    $ 389M                 16%               $ 6.7B      28%
       Intrusion Detection
                                   $ 161M                  7%               $ 1.5B      6%
       System
       Content Filtering           $ 291M                 12%               $ 2.4B      10%
       SIEM                       $ 70M                    3%               $ 1.2B      5%
       Other                      $ 99M                    4%               $ 4.1B      17%
       Total Spending          $ 2.4B                    100%               $ 23.8B    100%

 38                           © 2012 Imperva, Inc.Inc. rights reserved.
                                 © 2013 Imperva, All All rights reserved.
Security Spending is Disproportional


                                 Threat                                                Spend
  100%
                                                                                        Over 95% of
       80%                                                                                the $27B
                                      In 2011,                                            spent on
       60%                         83% of data                                             security
                                     breached                                              went to
       40%                          was taken                                            traditional
                                     from web                                              security
       20%                             apps or                                           products.
                                    databases.
       0%


  Sources: Verizon Data Breach, 2011 and Gartner, Worldwide Spending on Security by Technology Segment, Country and
  Region, 2010-2016


  39                                           © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                                    © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
The Anti Virus Vendors view




             Hackers Exploit 'Zero-Day' Bugs For 10 Months On
                     Average Before They're Exposed

 http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/10/16/hackers-exploit-software-bugs-for-10-months-on-
 average-before-theyre-fixed/
                                                © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                                              © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Recommendations




41     © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Typical Attack Timeline


                                           Privilege
                                         Escalation /                           Maintain
       Reconnaissance
                                      Lateral Movement                         Persistence
                                      / Data Exfiltration



        Initial intrusion                 Install Various
       into the network                      Utilities




          Establish a
                                            Obtain User
       Backdoor into the
                                            Credentials
           network


  42                        © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Protect and Monitor the Cheese

   The Problem: Most organizations
    chase the mice and don’t focus
    enough on protecting the cheese.
   Much of security budgets spent on:
      + Malware detection
      + Virus prevention
   Front-line/end-user defenses must be
    100% accurate, since if only 1 mouse
    gets past them the cheese is gone.




 43                        © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                                © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Step 1: Know What Users Do With Data

   Classify Sensitive Information
      + Identifying the information within the corporate databases and
        file servers allows understanding of risk and severity of data
        access.
   Persistent Security Policy
      + A good security policy will allow you to put compensating
        controls in place while not disrupting business needs and
        maintaining security.
   User Rights
      + Map your user’s rights. Understand who has access to what and
        why, are there dormant accounts ?
   Analyze, Alert and Audit on Activity
      + By keeping track over access and access patterns, it becomes
        very easy to understand who accessed your data, what was
        accessed and why.
 44                     © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                             © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Step #2: Look for Aberrant Behavior

                                        What: Weirdness probably
                                         means trouble.
                                        How
                                                 + Profile normal, acceptable
                                                       usage and access to sensitive
                                                       items by
                                                            – Volume
                                                            – Access speed
                                                            – Privilege level
                                                 + Put in place monitoring or
                                                       “cameras in the vault.”




 45              © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                      © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Example: Databases

   Checks the entry method. Legitimate individuals
    should, typically, access data through a main door.
   Monitor the activity of the individuals. If
    employees have been granted miscellaneous access
    permissions, you should monitor what they are
    doing. Malware from spear phishing typically causes
    unusual behavior
   Monitor the activity of privileged users. Database
    controls should track the activity of the privileged users
    and monitor what are these privileged users accessing.



 46                   © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                           © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Conclusion: Rebalance the Portfolio




 47              © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved.
                      © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
Webinar Materials

    Join Imperva LinkedIn Group,
    Imperva Data Security Direct, for…

                                                           Answers to
          Post-Webinar
                                                            Attendee
           Discussions
                                                           Questions



             Webinar
                                                            Join Group
          Recording Link


                      © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
                    © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
www.imperva.com




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Assessing the Effectiveness of Antivirus Solutions

  • 1. Assessing the Effectiveness of Antivirus Solutions Amichai Shulman, CTO © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 2. Agenda  Modern Malware and Compromised Insider Threat  Our Study  Comparing Spend to Threat  Summary and Conclusions 2 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 3. Amichai Shulman – CTO Imperva  Speaker at industry events + RSA, Sybase Techwave, Info Security UK, Black Hat  Lecturer on info security + Technion - Israel Institute of Technology  Former security consultant to banks and financial services firms  Leads the Application Defense Center (ADC) + Discovered over 20 commercial application vulnerabilities – Credited by Oracle, MS-SQL, IBM and others Amichai Shulman one of InfoWorld’s “Top 25 CTOs” © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 4. Modern Malware and Compromised Insiders 4 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 5. In Recent Events …  Saudi Aramco + Malicious Insider + 30,000 computers hacked + Full service disruption  Global Payments + Compromised Insider + 1.5M payment cards compromised 5 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 6. Case Study 6 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 7. Some APT Statistics Malware Type Total number Operating Discovered Undetected of infections since duration (estimated) [years] Stuxnet 2009 Sabotage ? June 2009 ~June 2010 1 Stuxnet 2010 Sabotage >300K March-April June 2010 0.16 2010 Duqu Espionage ~50-60 April 2011 Oct 2011 0.5 Wiper Sabotage Tens April 2012 Flame Espionage ~5000-6000 Aug 2008 May 2012 ~4 Gauss Espionage ~2500 Aug – Sep June 2012 ~1 2011 Narilam Sabotage ? 2010 Nov 2012 3 GrooveMonitor Sabotage ~10 Dec 2012 Red October Espionage ~200 May 2007 Jan 2013 5.5 7 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 8. Compromised Insider Defined Compromised Insider A 3rd party who gains access and acquires intellectual property and/or data in excess via client infection. The client, often employees in government, military or private industry, are unknowing accomplices and have no malicious motivation. 8 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 9. Malware: Compromised Insiders on the Rise 2012 Verizon Data Breach Report • Malware is on the rise: “69% of all data breaches incorporated Malware”… a 20% increase over 2011. • Malicious insider incidents declining: “4% of data breaches were conducted by implicated internal employees”… a 13% decrease compared to 2011. Director of National Intelligence • “Almost half of all computers in the United States have been compromised in some manner and ~60,000 new pieces of malware are identified per day”. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 10. Putting Things in Perspective “Less than 1% of your employees may be malicious insiders, but 100% of your employees have the potential to be compromised insiders.” Source: http://edocumentsciences.com/defend-against-compromised-insiders © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 11. Anatomy of a Modern Malware Attack 11 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 12. Where Do They Attack? End-user Multimillion devices and dollar the user datacenter Not well Both access Well protected the same data protected 12 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 13. Distribution  Phishing / Spear Phishing  Drive-by-download  Malvertizement  BlackHat SEO 13 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 14. Distribution – The Unbearable Ease of Targeting 14 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 15. Distribution – The Unbearable Ease of Targeting 15 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 16. Industrialized Approach Specialized Frameworks and Hacking tools such as BlackHole 2.0 and others, allow easy setup for Host Hijacking and Phishing. How easy is it ? For $700: 3 month license for BlackHole available online. Includes support! 16 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 17. Modern Malware – Key Differentiators  Modular Design + Almost any function can be replaced at any time  Robust C&C and Collection Infrastructure + Relies on web communications + Server redundancy, fast flux DNS, bulletproof hosting, etc.  Versatile Payloads + Data extrusion, backdoor and remote control, outbound activities (attack, spam), destruction  Sophisticated Infection Infrastructure + Drive-by-download & spam + Infection kits 17 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 18. The Study 18 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 19. The Study “The antivirus industry has a dirty little secret: its products are often not very good at stopping viruses.” - The New York Times 12/31/2012 Sources: New York Times: Outmaneuvered at Their Own Game, Antivirus Makers Struggle to Adapt, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/01/technology/antivirus-makers-work-on-software-to-catch-malware-more- effectively.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 19 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 20. Assessing Antivirus Solutions  Imperva found that less than 5% of anti-virus solutions in the study were able to initially detect previously non-cataloged viruses.  For certain vendors, it may take up to four weeks to detect a new virus from the time of the initial scan. 20 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 21. Methodology  Collect malware samples from the web + ~80 samples were collected + Samples are left untouched  Test against multiple AV products over time + ~40 products + Test at 1 week intervals  Analyze + Consider only “consensus” malware + Consensus = more than 50% of products at the end of the testing period 21 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 22. Methodology - Collection  Anonymous proxy traffic + Attackers upload and share malware + Took me 3 hours of repeating this exercise before hitting the first ZeroAccess sample not detected by AV  Google searches + Look for executable files with specific names  (Softcore) Hacker forums 22 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 23. Methodology - Collection © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 24. Methodology - Collection © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 25. Methodology - Collection  Program for hacking ICQ  Program for hacking e- mail  Program for hacking Skype  Program for hacking accounts on Russian social networks. 25 © 2012 Imperva, Inc.Inc. rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, All All rights reserved.
  • 26. Methodology - Testing  Using a public API exposed by VirusTotal.com  “VirusTotal, a subsidiary of Google, is a free online service that analyzes files and URLs enabling the identification of viruses, worms, trojans and other kinds of malicious content detected by antivirus engines and website scanners.”*  Record findings per product *https://www.virustotal.com/about/ 26 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 27. Methodology - Testing © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 27 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 28. Methodology - Testing © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 28 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 29. Methodology - Testing © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 29 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 30. Methodology - Testing © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 30 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 31. Detection Rates 26/06/2012 24/07/2012 Virus Name # % # % CCFFacebookSetup-v1.45.exe_ 15 35.71429 17 41.46341 ccn.exe_ 15 35.71429 18 43.90244 CHAT.EXE_ 19 46.34146 22 57.89474 CoralExplorer_200401.exe_ 3 7.142857 3 7.317073 Crack-Neobot.exe_ 12 28.57143 13 31.70732 CRNI.zip_ 36 85.71429 36 87.80488 denied.shtml_ 5 12.19512 5 12.19512 directory.exe_ 32 76.19048 31 75.60976 erluofang.exe_ 25 59.52381 25 60.97561 extracticon.rar_ 21 50 18 43.90244 Facebook filter v0.01.exe_ 15 35.71429 12 29.26829 favicon.ico_ 36 87.80488 36 87.80488 FBWallFlooder_sean013.zip_ 3 7.142857 3 7.317073 flashplayer10.exe_ 26 61.90476 24 58.53659 Fraps v3.2.4 Registered.exe_ 21 51.21951 22 53.65854 G-Force1.5.exe_ 15 35.71429 18 43.90244 GoldenEye.exe_ 27 64.28571 28 68.29268 Google setup.exe_ 20 47.61905 20 48.78049 helpdesk.exe_ 10 24.39024 11 26.82927 INFO.RAR_ 35 83.33333 34 85 Internet Download Manager v6.05 Full.rar_ 32 76.19048 34 82.92683 javaupdate.exe_ 32 76.19048 31 75.60976 killer_cdj.exe_ 12 29.26829 14 34.14634 machine_sample.exe_ 30 71.42857 30 73.17073 mirc635ru.exe_ 16 38.09524 15 36.58537 mms.jar_ 29 69.04762 26 68.42105 ocx.rar_ 24 57.14286 23 56.09756 OPALA.rar_ 33 78.57143 34 82.92683 OpenTab-install.exe_ 19 45.2381 20 48.78049 ovh-professional-setup.exe_ 8 19.5122 9 21.95122 pdf_trk_invoice.zip.carefull_ 30 71.42857 31 75.60976 Police.exe_ 9 21.42857 10 24.39024 product.exe_ 27 64.28571 30 73.17073 q3j2xh7qtqmq.jpeg_ 31 73.80952 31 75.60976 qip8095.exe_ 21 50 24 58.53659 RECYCLER.RAR_ 34 80.95238 35 85.36585 reg.zip_ 13 30.95238 17 41.46341 sample_9275.exe_ 29 69.04762 28 70 sample_ebook_2006.exe_ 13 31.70732 12 30 scandsk.exe_ 22 52.38095 30 73.17073 setup.exe_ 29 69.04762 28 68.29268 setup1.exe_ 29 69.04762 30 73.17073 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 32. Number of Weeks Required to Identify Infected File not Identified in First Run 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Kaspersky Trend-Micro Symantec Avast McAfee © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 33. Viruses Detection between First and Last Run, by Anti-Virus Vendor 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 34. Rate of Detection Over Time – Widespread Malware 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 07-Aug 09-Aug 11-Aug 13-Aug 15-Aug 17-Aug 19-Aug 21-Aug 23-Aug © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 35. Sample Drill Down  Google_setup.exe © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 36. Sample Drill Down (cont.)  Initial analysis by VirusTotal + February 9th, 2012  Results by the end of testing period (August 2012) + 20/42  Results by November 2012 + 23/42 36 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 37. Security Spend vs. Threats 37 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 38. Security Spending by Market Share 2001 2011 1. Anti-virus 1. Anti-virus 2. Firewall/VPN 2. Firewall/VPN 3. Content Filtering 3. Secure Email/Web 4. IDS/IPS 4. IPS % of Security Solutions 2002 % of Spending 2012 Spending Anti-virus $ 1.4B 59% $ 7.9B 33% Firewall $ 389M 16% $ 6.7B 28% Intrusion Detection $ 161M 7% $ 1.5B 6% System Content Filtering $ 291M 12% $ 2.4B 10% SIEM $ 70M 3% $ 1.2B 5% Other $ 99M 4% $ 4.1B 17% Total Spending $ 2.4B 100% $ 23.8B 100% 38 © 2012 Imperva, Inc.Inc. rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, All All rights reserved.
  • 39. Security Spending is Disproportional Threat Spend 100% Over 95% of 80% the $27B In 2011, spent on 60% 83% of data security breached went to 40% was taken traditional from web security 20% apps or products. databases. 0% Sources: Verizon Data Breach, 2011 and Gartner, Worldwide Spending on Security by Technology Segment, Country and Region, 2010-2016 39 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 40. The Anti Virus Vendors view Hackers Exploit 'Zero-Day' Bugs For 10 Months On Average Before They're Exposed http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/10/16/hackers-exploit-software-bugs-for-10-months-on- average-before-theyre-fixed/ © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 41. Recommendations 41 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 42. Typical Attack Timeline Privilege Escalation / Maintain Reconnaissance Lateral Movement Persistence / Data Exfiltration Initial intrusion Install Various into the network Utilities Establish a Obtain User Backdoor into the Credentials network 42 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 43. Protect and Monitor the Cheese  The Problem: Most organizations chase the mice and don’t focus enough on protecting the cheese.  Much of security budgets spent on: + Malware detection + Virus prevention  Front-line/end-user defenses must be 100% accurate, since if only 1 mouse gets past them the cheese is gone. 43 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 44. Step 1: Know What Users Do With Data  Classify Sensitive Information + Identifying the information within the corporate databases and file servers allows understanding of risk and severity of data access.  Persistent Security Policy + A good security policy will allow you to put compensating controls in place while not disrupting business needs and maintaining security.  User Rights + Map your user’s rights. Understand who has access to what and why, are there dormant accounts ?  Analyze, Alert and Audit on Activity + By keeping track over access and access patterns, it becomes very easy to understand who accessed your data, what was accessed and why. 44 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 45. Step #2: Look for Aberrant Behavior  What: Weirdness probably means trouble.  How + Profile normal, acceptable usage and access to sensitive items by – Volume – Access speed – Privilege level + Put in place monitoring or “cameras in the vault.” 45 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 46. Example: Databases  Checks the entry method. Legitimate individuals should, typically, access data through a main door.  Monitor the activity of the individuals. If employees have been granted miscellaneous access permissions, you should monitor what they are doing. Malware from spear phishing typically causes unusual behavior  Monitor the activity of privileged users. Database controls should track the activity of the privileged users and monitor what are these privileged users accessing. 46 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 47. Conclusion: Rebalance the Portfolio 47 © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights rights reserved. © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All reserved.
  • 48. Webinar Materials Join Imperva LinkedIn Group, Imperva Data Security Direct, for… Answers to Post-Webinar Attendee Discussions Questions Webinar Join Group Recording Link © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.