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Email is the #1 way we get
pwned, so how do they keep
getting by our defenses and what
can you do about it?
Michael Gough – Founder
MalwareArchaeology.com
MalwareArchaeology.com
Who am I
• Blue Team Defender Ninja, Malware Archaeologist, Logoholic
• I love “properly” configured logs – they tell us Who, What, Where,
When and hopefully How
Creator of
“Windows Logging Cheat Sheet”
“Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet”
“Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet”
“Windows PowerShell Logging Cheat Sheet”
“Windows Splunk Logging Cheat Sheet”
“Malware Management Framework”
• Co-Creator of “Log-MD” – Log Malicious Discovery Tool
– With @Boettcherpwned – Brakeing Down Security PodCast
• @HackerHurricane also my Blog
MalwareArchaeology.com
The Problem
or Challenge
We all Face
MalwareArchaeology.com
Email is #1
• Phishing IS our worst enemy
MalwareArchaeology.com
Ransomware
MalwareArchaeology.com
What we see in email
• Attachments
– .js, .jse, .wsf, .wsh, .hte, .lnk, PS1, CMD, BAT, .vbs, .vbe,
etc.
– PDF, Word, Excel, etc.
• URL’s
– Click HERE to see more
– Then downloads the above file formats
– Or sends you to a credential stealer webpage
• Encrypted emails
– Same as above but protected with a password to
bypass ALL security controls
MalwareArchaeology.com
So what can we do?
MalwareArchaeology.com
Don’t Panic
MalwareArchaeology.com
Why what they do Works
MalwareArchaeology.com
Understand WHY it works
• Email gateways do not block enough or anything
• Exchange and Outlook controls are seldom used
• Don’t forget users check personal email (Gmail,
Yahoo, etc.)
• Yeah, executables are not allowed (.EXE)
• We do NOT do enough here and we should
• It’s FREE, your email gateway and Exchange
server already have the ability
• Even Outlook has rules that can be enabled
MalwareArchaeology.com
Outlook Rules
• You REALLY need to enable these
• https://support.office.com/en-
us/article/Blocked-attachments-in-Outlook-
3811cddc-17c3-4279-a30c-060ba0207372
• Do it on your gateway !!!
• Drop these PLEEEASE
MalwareArchaeology.com
RansomWare/Malware
• Most malware/ransomware comes in via
email attachments
• Some by drive-by surfing
• Most infections are because users double-click
the attachment
• Dropping these will result in 90%+ reduction
• Do whatever you can to reduce these at the
email gateway or server
MalwareArchaeology.com
If we drop these,
What is left?
• Encrypted messages
• Attachments with URL’s
• These will get by as ALL security solutions can’t
inspect encrypted emails (It’s Haaaarrrrd)
• Attachments with no malicious content also pass,
URL’s are generally not bad… Yet - New
campaigns use NEW URL’s
• They use Cloud Storage too
• Users download and Double-Click
MalwareArchaeology.com
What Gets By
MalwareArchaeology.com
What gets by
• Documents that have URL’s that have the user
download the file that would have been
dropped if it were an attachment
• Encrypted Word/Office Docs that have Macros
or OLE objects that are scripts
– We see a LOT of these
• If the file type gets by in this way, then we
have to address what happens when a user
double-clicks
MalwareArchaeology.com
Block Macros !!!
MalwareArchaeology.com
Block Macros !!!
• For corporate users – Office 2013 or 2016
required
MalwareArchaeology.com
Or tweak the registry
Office 2016
• HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice16.0wordsecurity
HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice16.0excelsecurity
HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice16.0powerpointsecur
ity
– In each key listed above, create this value:
DWORD: blockcontentexecutionfrominternet Value = 1
Office 2013
•
HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice15.0wordsecurity
HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice15.0excelsecurity
HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice15.0powerpointsecur
ity
– In each key listed above, create this value:
DWORD: blockcontentexecutionfrominternet Value = 1
MalwareArchaeology.com
#WINNING
• After adding these tweaks you will see this
when you try and enable a macro and/or
content
• You can unblock if truly needed and trusted
MalwareArchaeology.com
There is More Than
Macros
MalwareArchaeology.com
More than Macros
• Macros account for a lot, but malwarians are
morphing and evolving
• We blocked more than 6000 emails between
June and Dec 2016
• They have moved to encrypted documents
• They have moved to documents with URL’s
• They have moved to using Cloud Storage to
retrieve documents
MalwareArchaeology.com
Why it Works
MalwareArchaeology.com
Understand WHY it works
• Windows is SOoooooo broken
• The malwarians are taking advantage of the
default configuration of Windows
• What happens when you Double-Click is the
enemy
• Users have been trained to just double-click
MalwareArchaeology.com
So how does it work?
• Double-Clicking by users
• Yeah, Yeah, Yeah… User awareness training
– It won’t be enough
• How about this…
• Change what happens when users Double-
Click a suspect file type
• There’s a thought…
MalwareArchaeology.com
Deny the Double-Click
MalwareArchaeology.com
Deny the Double-Click
• Windows allows by default the execution of a
file type by double-clicking and launching the
execution program (Booooooo)
• So how about changing the dangerous file
types that launch the interpreters to launching
a simple editor?
• Yup, NOTEPAD to the rescue !!!!!
• Finally a good use for Notepad
MalwareArchaeology.com
Deny the Double-Click
• This will NOT break the way these file types
normally work.
• Cscript ‘Logon.vbs’ will work fine
• Double-Clicking ‘logon.vbs’ will just open
Notepad
• You WILL need to convince IT, they are kind of
inexperienced here due to FUD and lack of
experience
• Prove it by showing it work !
MalwareArchaeology.com
Default Programs
MalwareArchaeology.com
File Type
MalwareArchaeology.com
Change to Notepad
• Change ANYTHING that can execute a script to
open to Notepad
MalwareArchaeology.com
Windows Based Script Host
• Get rid of it, they use it to execute malware
• Consider .vbe, .vbs, .ps1 and .ps1xml too, but
this is used in corporate environments
• This only affects double-clicking the file, not
using the file properly (cscript Good_file.vbs)
MalwareArchaeology.com
So what happens?
• Users will open files that have been blocked,
but got by either via an encrypted email or a
URL in an email or attachment
• The user then downloads the malicious file
type and double-clicks it… If it is one of the
types that you have changed the File
Association for, the malware script will FAIL !!!
• #WINNING
MalwareArchaeology.com
Now What Can Get By?
MalwareArchaeology.com
What can still get by?
• Binaries (MZ, 4D5A, EXE)
• Yup, documents or emails that have URL’s to a
website or cloud storage will be allowed
• Browsers are doing a pretty good job of
blocking .EXE downloads, or at least warning
you
• The malwarians will use ZIP or 7Zip, Doc, or
PDF files with or without passwords to get by
the browser controls
MalwareArchaeology.com
What can still get by?
• If a user gets an .EXE, then everything we have
discussed thus far will not work, you can do:
– Application Whitelisting - Complicated
– Detect it and Respond – Logging and people
– Next Gen Endpoint protection - $$$$
• Maybe User Awareness can help as you can
now focus the training since all the other ways
they get in have been dealt with
MalwareArchaeology.com
Whitelisting
MalwareArchaeology.com
Software Restriction Policies
• Block all executions from “C:Users*”
• Block all USB executions from “E:*”
MalwareArchaeology.com
Software Restriction Policies
• If you set to block like I do, then when you try
to launch, install, or an update runs, it will fail
• Generates an Event ID 866 in the Application
Log
• Copy the path that failed and create an
exception if good and approved
• Be careful of over trusting generic paths
• Use a * to genericize an entry C:Users*
MalwareArchaeology.com
AppLocker
• ONLY works in Windows Enterprise versions
• Screw you Microsoft ;-(
• Has an Audit only mode (IDS) so can detect
what would be blocked to allow you to tweak
the policy before enforcing
• It does Dlls
• And it does Scripts
MalwareArchaeology.com
User Awareness
MalwareArchaeology.com
User Awareness
Teach them two things, and only 2 things
1. Don’t open emails that have encrypted
attachments AND have the password in the
body AND contain a few words and not
descriptive
2. Don’t launch ANY .EXE files that you
download from sources via email and links in
emails or documents – EVER!
MalwareArchaeology.com
Watch Incoming Email
MalwareArchaeology.com
Alert on encrypted emails
• You heard me
• Setup an email alert to copy your InfoSec team on
encrypted emails with attachments of:
– Word
– Excel
– PDF
• Filter out the know good senders
• You will see campaigns coming in
• Tweak to prepend the subject with “Suspicious
Email” once you made all your adjustments
MalwareArchaeology.com
Malware/Ransomware
Prevented
• If you do these simple things, which are all
FREE, you will curb malware/ransomware
infections by 90-95% or more
• This does not address malicious binaries .EXE
files or .DLL files
• Whitelisting with Software Restriction Policies
or AppBlocker will be needed for this
MalwareArchaeology.com
What do we do with the
attachments we receive?
MalwareArchaeology.com
Evaluate them
• Splunk alerts looking at:
– Same sender, multiple subjects or attachment
names
– Different senders same subject or attachment
name
– Encrypted Doc and XLS files
• Detonate them in a malware lab
• Obtain the artifacts to see who else might
have open the ones that got through
MalwareArchaeology.com
What do we use to
quickly evaluate the
malware?
MalwareArchaeology.com
• The Log and Malicious Discovery tool
• Audits your system and produces a report
• Also shows failed items on the console
• Helps you configure proper audit logging
• ALL VERSIONS OF WINDOWS (Win 7 & up)
• Helps you enable what is valuable
• Compares to many industry standards
• CIS, USGCB and AU standards and “Windows
Logging Cheat Sheet”
MalwareArchaeology.com
Free Edition
• Collect 1-7 days of logs
• Over 20 reports
• Full filesystem Hash Baseline
• Full filesystem compare to Hash Baseline
• Full system Registry Baseline
• Full system compare to Registry Baseline
• Large Registry Key discovery
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Over 25 reports
• Interesting Artifacts report
• WhoIS resolution of IPs
• SRUM (netflow from/to a binary)
• AutoRuns report with whitelist and Master
Digest exclusions
• More Whitelisting
• Master-Digest to exclude hashes and files
MalwareArchaeology.com
Resources
• Websites
– MalwareArchaeology.com
– Log-MD.com The tool
• The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet”
– MalwareArchaeology.com
• Malware Analysis Report links too
– To start your Malware Management program
MalwareArchaeology.com
Questions?
• You can find us at:
• @HackerHurricane
• @Boettcherpwned
• Log-MD.com
• MalwareArchaeology.com
• HackerHurricane.com (blog)
• http://www.slideshare.net
MalwareArchaeology.com

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DIR ISF - Email keeps getting us pwned v1.1

  • 1. Email is the #1 way we get pwned, so how do they keep getting by our defenses and what can you do about it? Michael Gough – Founder MalwareArchaeology.com MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 2. Who am I • Blue Team Defender Ninja, Malware Archaeologist, Logoholic • I love “properly” configured logs – they tell us Who, What, Where, When and hopefully How Creator of “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” “Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet” “Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet” “Windows PowerShell Logging Cheat Sheet” “Windows Splunk Logging Cheat Sheet” “Malware Management Framework” • Co-Creator of “Log-MD” – Log Malicious Discovery Tool – With @Boettcherpwned – Brakeing Down Security PodCast • @HackerHurricane also my Blog MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 3. The Problem or Challenge We all Face MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 4. Email is #1 • Phishing IS our worst enemy MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 6. What we see in email • Attachments – .js, .jse, .wsf, .wsh, .hte, .lnk, PS1, CMD, BAT, .vbs, .vbe, etc. – PDF, Word, Excel, etc. • URL’s – Click HERE to see more – Then downloads the above file formats – Or sends you to a credential stealer webpage • Encrypted emails – Same as above but protected with a password to bypass ALL security controls MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 7. So what can we do? MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 9. Why what they do Works MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 10. Understand WHY it works • Email gateways do not block enough or anything • Exchange and Outlook controls are seldom used • Don’t forget users check personal email (Gmail, Yahoo, etc.) • Yeah, executables are not allowed (.EXE) • We do NOT do enough here and we should • It’s FREE, your email gateway and Exchange server already have the ability • Even Outlook has rules that can be enabled MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 11. Outlook Rules • You REALLY need to enable these • https://support.office.com/en- us/article/Blocked-attachments-in-Outlook- 3811cddc-17c3-4279-a30c-060ba0207372 • Do it on your gateway !!! • Drop these PLEEEASE MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 12. RansomWare/Malware • Most malware/ransomware comes in via email attachments • Some by drive-by surfing • Most infections are because users double-click the attachment • Dropping these will result in 90%+ reduction • Do whatever you can to reduce these at the email gateway or server MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 13. If we drop these, What is left? • Encrypted messages • Attachments with URL’s • These will get by as ALL security solutions can’t inspect encrypted emails (It’s Haaaarrrrd) • Attachments with no malicious content also pass, URL’s are generally not bad… Yet - New campaigns use NEW URL’s • They use Cloud Storage too • Users download and Double-Click MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 15. What gets by • Documents that have URL’s that have the user download the file that would have been dropped if it were an attachment • Encrypted Word/Office Docs that have Macros or OLE objects that are scripts – We see a LOT of these • If the file type gets by in this way, then we have to address what happens when a user double-clicks MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 17. Block Macros !!! • For corporate users – Office 2013 or 2016 required MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 18. Or tweak the registry Office 2016 • HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice16.0wordsecurity HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice16.0excelsecurity HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice16.0powerpointsecur ity – In each key listed above, create this value: DWORD: blockcontentexecutionfrominternet Value = 1 Office 2013 • HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice15.0wordsecurity HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice15.0excelsecurity HKCUSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftoffice15.0powerpointsecur ity – In each key listed above, create this value: DWORD: blockcontentexecutionfrominternet Value = 1 MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 19. #WINNING • After adding these tweaks you will see this when you try and enable a macro and/or content • You can unblock if truly needed and trusted MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 20. There is More Than Macros MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 21. More than Macros • Macros account for a lot, but malwarians are morphing and evolving • We blocked more than 6000 emails between June and Dec 2016 • They have moved to encrypted documents • They have moved to documents with URL’s • They have moved to using Cloud Storage to retrieve documents MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 23. Understand WHY it works • Windows is SOoooooo broken • The malwarians are taking advantage of the default configuration of Windows • What happens when you Double-Click is the enemy • Users have been trained to just double-click MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 24. So how does it work? • Double-Clicking by users • Yeah, Yeah, Yeah… User awareness training – It won’t be enough • How about this… • Change what happens when users Double- Click a suspect file type • There’s a thought… MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 26. Deny the Double-Click • Windows allows by default the execution of a file type by double-clicking and launching the execution program (Booooooo) • So how about changing the dangerous file types that launch the interpreters to launching a simple editor? • Yup, NOTEPAD to the rescue !!!!! • Finally a good use for Notepad MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 27. Deny the Double-Click • This will NOT break the way these file types normally work. • Cscript ‘Logon.vbs’ will work fine • Double-Clicking ‘logon.vbs’ will just open Notepad • You WILL need to convince IT, they are kind of inexperienced here due to FUD and lack of experience • Prove it by showing it work ! MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 30. Change to Notepad • Change ANYTHING that can execute a script to open to Notepad MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 31. Windows Based Script Host • Get rid of it, they use it to execute malware • Consider .vbe, .vbs, .ps1 and .ps1xml too, but this is used in corporate environments • This only affects double-clicking the file, not using the file properly (cscript Good_file.vbs) MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 32. So what happens? • Users will open files that have been blocked, but got by either via an encrypted email or a URL in an email or attachment • The user then downloads the malicious file type and double-clicks it… If it is one of the types that you have changed the File Association for, the malware script will FAIL !!! • #WINNING MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 33. Now What Can Get By? MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 34. What can still get by? • Binaries (MZ, 4D5A, EXE) • Yup, documents or emails that have URL’s to a website or cloud storage will be allowed • Browsers are doing a pretty good job of blocking .EXE downloads, or at least warning you • The malwarians will use ZIP or 7Zip, Doc, or PDF files with or without passwords to get by the browser controls MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 35. What can still get by? • If a user gets an .EXE, then everything we have discussed thus far will not work, you can do: – Application Whitelisting - Complicated – Detect it and Respond – Logging and people – Next Gen Endpoint protection - $$$$ • Maybe User Awareness can help as you can now focus the training since all the other ways they get in have been dealt with MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 37. Software Restriction Policies • Block all executions from “C:Users*” • Block all USB executions from “E:*” MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 38. Software Restriction Policies • If you set to block like I do, then when you try to launch, install, or an update runs, it will fail • Generates an Event ID 866 in the Application Log • Copy the path that failed and create an exception if good and approved • Be careful of over trusting generic paths • Use a * to genericize an entry C:Users* MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 39. AppLocker • ONLY works in Windows Enterprise versions • Screw you Microsoft ;-( • Has an Audit only mode (IDS) so can detect what would be blocked to allow you to tweak the policy before enforcing • It does Dlls • And it does Scripts MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 41. User Awareness Teach them two things, and only 2 things 1. Don’t open emails that have encrypted attachments AND have the password in the body AND contain a few words and not descriptive 2. Don’t launch ANY .EXE files that you download from sources via email and links in emails or documents – EVER! MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 43. Alert on encrypted emails • You heard me • Setup an email alert to copy your InfoSec team on encrypted emails with attachments of: – Word – Excel – PDF • Filter out the know good senders • You will see campaigns coming in • Tweak to prepend the subject with “Suspicious Email” once you made all your adjustments MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 44. Malware/Ransomware Prevented • If you do these simple things, which are all FREE, you will curb malware/ransomware infections by 90-95% or more • This does not address malicious binaries .EXE files or .DLL files • Whitelisting with Software Restriction Policies or AppBlocker will be needed for this MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 45. What do we do with the attachments we receive? MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 46. Evaluate them • Splunk alerts looking at: – Same sender, multiple subjects or attachment names – Different senders same subject or attachment name – Encrypted Doc and XLS files • Detonate them in a malware lab • Obtain the artifacts to see who else might have open the ones that got through MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 47. What do we use to quickly evaluate the malware? MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 48. • The Log and Malicious Discovery tool • Audits your system and produces a report • Also shows failed items on the console • Helps you configure proper audit logging • ALL VERSIONS OF WINDOWS (Win 7 & up) • Helps you enable what is valuable • Compares to many industry standards • CIS, USGCB and AU standards and “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 49. Free Edition • Collect 1-7 days of logs • Over 20 reports • Full filesystem Hash Baseline • Full filesystem compare to Hash Baseline • Full system Registry Baseline • Full system compare to Registry Baseline • Large Registry Key discovery MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 50. • Over 25 reports • Interesting Artifacts report • WhoIS resolution of IPs • SRUM (netflow from/to a binary) • AutoRuns report with whitelist and Master Digest exclusions • More Whitelisting • Master-Digest to exclude hashes and files MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 51. Resources • Websites – MalwareArchaeology.com – Log-MD.com The tool • The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” – MalwareArchaeology.com • Malware Analysis Report links too – To start your Malware Management program MalwareArchaeology.com
  • 52. Questions? • You can find us at: • @HackerHurricane • @Boettcherpwned • Log-MD.com • MalwareArchaeology.com • HackerHurricane.com (blog) • http://www.slideshare.net MalwareArchaeology.com