1. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE
IV. CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies
University of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN
2008
2. CONTENTS
1. INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
2.
2 PUBLIC POLICY
3. PUBLIC CHOICE
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
5. BUREAUCRATIC POWER
6. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS
7.
7 BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS
8. DECENTRALIZATION
9. DIGITAL (E) – GOVERNANCE
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3. INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
• DISCRETIONARY
POWERS
LAW
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION BUSINESS
POLITICS
MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC POLICY ECONOMICS
PUBLIC CHOICE
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4. PUBLIC POLICY
THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICY ANALYSIS IS
NOW A WELL ESTABLISHED PART OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.
PUBLIC POLICY IS A COURSE OF ACTION ADOPTED AND
PURSUED BY GOVERNMENT (HENRY 2004)
(HENRY, 2004).
PUBLIC POLICY REFERS TO THE DECISIONS MADE BY
GOVERNMENT, TO A PURPOSIVE COURSE OF ACTION
TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN PURSUING
SOLUTIONS TO PERCEIVED PROBLEMS (LEMAY, 2002).
PUBLIC POLICY CAN BEST BE VIEWED AS A PROCESS, A
,
SET OR SERIES OF STAGES THROUGH WHICH POLICY IS
ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED. THE POLICY PROCESS
CONSISTS OF A SUCCESSION OF ANALYTICAL STAGES
(LEMAY, 2002)
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5. PUBLIC POLICY
FOR MANY YEARS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS WERE SEEN
AS NEUTRAL IMPLEMENTORS OF PUBLIC POLICIES SHAPED
AND DESIGNED ELSEWHERE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.
SINCE THE 1960s, WITH THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC POLICY
ANALYSIS, BOTH THE POLICY PROCESS ITSELF AND THE
,
ROLE OF PUBLIC A RATION IN IT HAVE BEEN REEVALUATED.
PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT POLITICS IS MESSY
AND IMPRECISE PROPONENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
IMPRECISE,
ARGUE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF RIGOROUS
ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES AND DECISION TOOLS WILL
DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE BOTH THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC
PROBLEMS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE
SOLUTIONS TO THEM.
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6. PUBLIC POLICY
FURTHER, IT IS ARGUED THAT MORE RATIONAL
DECISION PROCESSES WILL NOT ONLY BE MORE
EFFICIENT,
EFFICIENT BUT ALSO MORE RESPONSIVE TO CITIZEN
NEEDS AND PREFERENCES. THIS VERSION OF PUBLIC
POLICY ANALYSIS VALUES OBJECTIVITY AND
NEUTRALITY; IT IS BASED ON AN ABIDING BELIEF IN
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND ABILITIES.
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7. PUBLIC POLICY
IT MAKES USE OF TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED IN THE FIELDS OF
ECONOMICS, MATHEMATICS, STATISTICS, OPERATIONS
RESEARCH, AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS, AMONG OTHERS, TO
PROVIDE DECISION MAKERS WITH ADVICE IN THE
FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY.
IN APPLYING THOSE TECHNIQUES, THE ANALYST MAY ALSO
DRAW ON KNOWLEDGE FROM FIELDS SUCH AS SOCIOLOGY,
POLITICAL SCIENCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS, LAW,
ORGANIZATION - THEORY, THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
,
SCIENCES, AND ELSEWHERE. POLICY ANALYSIS MUST TAKE
THE ANALYST WHEREVER THE POLICY ISSUE LEADS, MAKING
ANALYSIS THE MULTI DISIPLINARY ACTIVITY PAR
EXCELLENCE.
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8. PUBLIC POLICY
POLICY ANALYSIS INCLUDES:
1) IDENTIFYING THE “PROBLEM” TO BE RESOLVED,
2) SPECIFYING THE GOAL(S) TO BE SOUGHT THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY,
3) IDENTIFYING OR INVENTING THE AVAILABLE POLICY ALTERNATIVES,
4)
) ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVES, BOTH
,
FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE,
5) IMPUTING VALUES IN A SINGLE, COMMENSURABLE MATRIX TO THOSE
EFFECTS, AND
6) CHOOSING THE “BEST” POLICY ALTERNATIVE ACCORDING TO AN
EXPLICIT DECISION RULE.
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9. PUBLIC CHOICE
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE LAST CENTURY, THE
DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPED
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK SET BY WILSON. THE ENDS
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WERE SEEN AS THE
quot;MANAGEMENT OF MEN AND MATERIAL IN THE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PURPOSES OF THE STATE.quot;
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10. PUBLIC CHOICE
IN HIS BOOK: ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1945),
HERBERT SIMON, SUSTAINED A DEVASTATING CRITIQUE
OF THE THEORY IMPLICIT IN THE TRADITIONAL STUDY
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. SIMON ELUCIDATED SOME
OF THE ACCEPTED ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES AND
DEMONSTRATED THE LACK OF LOGICAL COHERENCE
AMONG THEM.
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11. PUBLIC CHOICE
DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING SIMON S CHALLENGE
SIMON'S CHALLENGE,
ANOTHER COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS HAS GRAPPLED
WITH MANY OF THESE SAME INTELLECTUAL ISSUES.
THIS COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS COMPOSED
PREDOMINANTLY OF POLITICAL ECONOMISTS HAVE
BEEN CONCERNED WITH PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE DECISIONS.
ONE FACET OF THIS WORK HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE DEVELOP-MENT OF
THE PLANNING PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING (PPB)
PLANNING,
SYSTEM.
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12. PUBLIC CHOICE
ONE OF SIMON'S CENTRAL CONCERNS WAS TO
SIMON S
ESTABLISH THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY AS A NORM
FOR EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTIONS. SIMON ARGUED THAT THE quot;CRITERION OF
EFFICIENCY DICTATES THAT CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES
WHICH PRODUCE THE LARGEST RESULT FOR THE GIVEN
APPLICATION OF RESOURCES.quot;
IN ORDER TO UTILIZE THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY,
EFFICIENCY
THE RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS MUST BE
DEFINED AND MEASURED CLEAR CONCEPTUAL
MEASURED.
DEFINITIONS OF OUTPUT ARE NECESSARY BEFORE
MEASURES CAN BE DEVELOPED.
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13. PUBLIC CHOICE
PUBLIC CHOICE REPRESENTS ANOTHER FACET OF WORK
IN POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
THEORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. MOST POLITICAL
ECONOMISTS IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION BEGIN
WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIC UNIT OF
ANALYSIS. THE TRADITIONAL quot;ECONOMIC MANquot; IS THEN
REPLACED BY quot;MAN: THE DECISION MAKER.quot;
MAN: MAKER
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14. PUBLIC CHOICE
THE SECOND CONCERN IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE
TRADITION IS WITH THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
PUBLIC GOODS AS THE TYPE OF EVENT ASSOCIATED
WITH THE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC AGENCIES.
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY IS ALSO CONCERNED WITH THE
EFFECT THAT DIFFERENT DECISION RULES OR
DECISION-MAKING ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE UPON
THE PRODUCTION OF THOSE EVENTS CONCEPTUALIZED
AS PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES
SERVICES.
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15. PUBLIC CHOICE
FOUR BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INDIVIDUAL
BEHAVIOR ARE NORMALLY MADE:
FIRST, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE SELF-
INTERESTED (NOT EQUIVALENT TO “SELFISH”). THE
ASSUMPTION OF SELF-INTEREST IMPLIES PRIMARILY THAT
INDIVIDUALS EACH HAVE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES
WHICH AFFECT THE DECISIONS THEY MAKE, AND THAT
THOSE PREFERENCES MAY DIFFER FROM INDIVIDUAL TO
INDIVIDUAL.
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16. PUBLIC CHOICE
SECONDLY, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE RATIONAL.
RATIONALITY IS DEFINED AS THE ABILITY TO RANK ALL KNOWN
ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL IN A TRANSITIVE
MANNER.
THIRD, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO ADOPT MAXIMIZING
STRATEGIES.
STRATEGIES MAXIMIZATION AS A STRATEGY IMPLIES THE
CONSISTENT CHOICE OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES WHICH AN
INDIVIDUAL THINKS WILL PROVIDE THE HIGHEST NET BENEFIT
AS WEIGHED BY HIS OWN PREFERENCES. AT TIMES THE
PREFERENCES
ASSUMPTION OF MAXIMIZATION IS RELATED TO THAT OF
SATISFYING, DEPENDING UPON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO AN INDIVIDUAL IN A DECISION-
MAKING SITUATION.
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17. PUBLIC CHOICE
FOURTH, AN EXPLICIT ASSUMPTION NEEDS TO BE
STATED CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION
POSSESSED BY A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL.
THREE LEVELS HAVE BEEN ANALYTICALLY DEFINED AS
INVOLVING CERTAINTY, RISK, AND
UNCERTAINTY.
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18. PUBLIC CHOICE
THE CONDITION OF CERTAINTY IS DEFINED TO
EXIST WHEN:
1) AN INDIVIDUAL KNOWS ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES;
2) EACHSTRATEGY IS KNOWN TO LEAD INVARIABLY TO
ONLY ONE SPECIFIC OUTCOME, AND;
OUTCOME AND
3) THEINDIVIDUAL KNOWS HIS OWN PREFERENCES FOR
EACH OUTCOME. GIVEN THIS LEVEL OF INFORMATION,
THE DECISION OF A MAXIMIZING INDIVIDUAL IS
COMPLETELY DETERMINED.
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19. PUBLIC CHOICE
UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK, THE INDIVIDUAL IS
STILL ASSUMED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE
STRATEGIES. ANY PARTICULAR STRATEGY MAY LEAD
TO A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL OUTCOMES, AND THE
INDIVIDUAL IS ASSUMED TO KNOW THE PROBABILITY
OF EACH OUTCOME. THUS, DECISION MAKING
BECOMES WEIGHTING PROCESS WHEREBY HIS
PREFERENCES FOR DIFFERENT OUTCOMES ARE
COMBINED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF THEIR
OCURRENCE PRIOR TO A SELECTION OF A STRATEGY.
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20. PUBLIC CHOICE
DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY IS
ASSUMED TO OCCUR EITHER WHERE (1) AN
INDIVIDUAL HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF ALL STRATEGIES
AND OUTCOMES, BUT LACKS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE
PROBABILITIES WITH WHICH A STRATEGY MAY LEAD
TO AN OUTCOME, OR (2) AN INDIVIDUAL MAY NOT
KNOW ALL STRATEGIES OR ALL OUTCOMES WHICH
ACTUALLY EXIST.
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21. PUBLIC CHOICE
UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY, THE
DETERMINATENESS OF SOLUTIONS IS REPLACED BY
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE
quot;SOLUTIONS quot;
SOLUTIONS.
ESTIMATIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIES.
(VINCENT OSBORNE & ELEANOR OSBORN, 1971)
OSBORN
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22. PUBLIC CHOICE
PUBLIC CHOICE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF MODELS
OF DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATION.
OTHER MODELS INCLUDE
INCLUDE:
RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE MODEL;
BARGAINING MODEL;
INCREMENTAL MODEL;
PARTICIPATIVE MODEL.
(LEMAY, 2002)
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23. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFERS TO THOSE LAWS AND
REGULATIONS THAT ARE CREATED BY THE ACTIVITIES
OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES THAT MAKE RULES AND
ADJUDICATE CASES CONCERNING PRIVATE RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS AND THE LIMITS NEEDED TO CONTROL
SUCH AGENCIES.
INCLUDED IN THE BODY OF LAWS (OR RULES AND
REGULATIONS) OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES THAT
COLLECTIVELY MAKE UP ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ARE
INTERPRETATIVE RULES—THOSE RULES THAT SPECIFY
RULES THOSE
AN AGENCY'S VIEWS OF THE MEANING OF ITS
REGULATIONS OR OF THE STATUTES IT ADMINISTERS.
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24. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IS RESTRICTED TO AGENCY
ACTIONS THAT COVER THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES.
IT EXCLUDES THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG
GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND DEPARTMENTS OR THE
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (MATTERS COVERED
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CONCERNS THE QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. THE
ADMINISTRATORS OF SUCH AGENCIES ARE POLICY
MAKERS—BUT WITH A LIMITED RANGE OF AUTHORITY
WHEN MAKING RULES.
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25. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES' FORMAL POWERS
'
INCLUDE:
1) INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS;
2) ORDERING THE ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN PRACTICES;
3)
) SETTING STANDARDS;;
4) PROSECUTING FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LAWS AND
STANDARDS, INCLUDING ISSUING CEASE-AND-DESIST
ORDERS AND IMPOSING FINES;
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26. 5) SETTING FORTH RULES AND REGULATIONS;
6) HOLDING HEARINGS BEFORE ISSUING RULES AND
REGULATIONS;
7) HOLDING ADJUDICATION HEARINGS;
8) ISSUING, WITHHOLDING, AND REVOKING LICENSES;
9) PROVIDING FOR APPEAL PROCEDURES;
10) ORDERING TEMPORARY CESSATIONS OF ACTIVITIES;
AND
11) SEIZING PROPERTY AND IMPOSING FINES AND
PENALTIES.
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27. LIMITATIONS OVER REGULATORY AGENCY DISCRETION
ARE BUILT INTO THE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL RULE
SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED INTO AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY'S ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, OR PRACTICES AS
WELL AS THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW.
OTHER CONTROL DEVICES ALSO LIMIT AGENCY
DISCRETION. ONE SUCH DEVICE IS MEDIA SCRUTINY.
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND THE ABILITY OF MEDIA
MEMBERS TO HOLD AGENCIES UP TO PUBLIC RIDICULE
DOES SERVE AS SOMETHING OF A CHECK ON AGENCY
ABUSE OF POWER.
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28. ANOTHER DEVICE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
OMBUDSMAN, OR AN OFFICIAL WHO IS CHARGED WITH
PROCESSING AND EXAMINING COMPLAINTS AGAINST
THE BUREAUCRACY. OMBUDSMEN TYPICALLY REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURES OR OTHER OFFICE THAT HOLDS
AUTORITY.
CITIZEN ACTION GROUPS SUCH AS COMMON CAUSE
ALSO CAN SERVE AS INFORMAL WATCHDOGS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
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29. TYPICALLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WITH REGULATORY
TYPICALLY,
POWERS IS ESTABLISHED BY STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE
STATUTE CREATES THE AGENCY, DESCRIBES ITS PRIMARY
MISSION OR GOALS (OFTEN IN QUITE BROAD AND GENERAL
TERMS), AND LAYS OUT ITS JURISDICTIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES-AND, IN SO DOING, SOMETHING OF ITS
LIMITATIONS AS WELL.
WELL
THE LEGISLATURE AT THE SAME TIME MIGHT PASS A
GENERAL REGULATORY STATUTE STATING THE BROAD
OUTLINES OF THE LAW; THE AGENCY THEN DEVELOPS
APPROPRIATE RULES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, OR
GU
GUIDELINES THAT IT INTENDS TO US TO IMPLEMENT OR
S S O USE O O
MODIFY THE LAW OR TO MEET NEW SITUATIONS.
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30. ALTHOUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ENJOY WIDE
DISCRETION IN DEVELOPING THE MASSIVE BODY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, RULES OR REGULATIONS, THEIR
DISCRETION HAS ITS LIMITS. THESE LIMITS MAY BE
IMPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE WHEN IT ESTABLISHES
AN AGENCY OR WHEN IT ENACTS AMENDING LAWS
REGARDING AN AGENCY'S JURISDICTION, AS WELL AS BY
AGENCY S
THE COURTS THROUGH THEIR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY ACTIONS AND RULINGS.
(LEMAY,
(LEMAY 2004)
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31. BUREAUCRATIC POWER
AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND
ORGANIZATIONS GREW LARGER, ORGANIZATIONS
(BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) INCREASED THEIR
DIVISION OF LABOR INTO MORE AND SMALLER
SPECIALIZED UNITS.
LARGER INSTITUTIONS BEGAN TO DEFER TO THE
JUDGMENTS OF THESE UNITS, WHICH SHOWS THAT A
MAJOR FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER IS
EXPERTISE, OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE.
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32. AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND
SPECIALIZED, DECISION MAKERS RELIED ON
EXPERT ADVICE SOME BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES,
ADVICE. AGENCIES
THEN, DEVELOPED A NEAR MONOPOLY ON THE
TECHNICAL DATA OR CRITERIA USED TO DECIDE
POLICY.
DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF POLICY THEY
IMPLEMENT, BUREAUCRACY HAVE
DISCRETIONARY POWER, EITHER MORE OR LESS.
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33. IN THE MINDS OF MOST OBSERVERS THE ISSUE IS NOT
OBSERVERS,
WHETHER BUREAUCRACIES HAVE POWER BUT THE
MAGNITUDE AND OMINOUS NATURE OF THAT POWER
POWER.
BUREAUCRACIES ARE SEEN AS TOO INFLUENTIAL, TOO
UNCHALLENGED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DANGEROUS.
, Q
BURCAUCRATS ARC THOUGHT OF AS ASSUMING A
PREMINENT, EVEN UNCHECKED ROLE IN THE
FORMATION AND EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY.
POLICY
THE DEDUCTIVE CASE FOR WHY BUREAUCRACIES ARE
TOO POWERFUL CAN BE MADE ON AT LEAST FOUR
GROUNDS.
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34. FIRST, THE WEBERIAN ORGANIZATIONAL FROM SEEMS TO BE
AN INHERENTLY POWERFUL INSTRUMENT BECAUSE OF ITS
PROPERTIES: ITS UNIFIED HIERARCHY CONCENTRATES
CONTROL,
CONTROL ITS HIGH DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION PROVIDES
GREAT EXPERTISE, ITS PERMANENT RECORDS ACCUMULATE
VAST QUANTITIES OF INFRMATION AND OFFICIALLY
INTERPRET THE PAST AND ITS TENURED WORKFORCE
PAST,
CANNOT BE REMOVED AND HENCE IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE.
SECOND,
SECOND THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND
POLICY, PUTS BUREAUCRACY IN THE POSITION OF
REPRESENTING THE SOVEREIGN STATE TO CITIZENS IN
CONCRETE, EVERYDAY TERMS. TO THEM, THE STATE IS
BUREAUCRACY.
BUREAUCRACY
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35. THIRD, THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF MODERN
ADMINISTRATION MEANS THAT LEGISLATORS AND OTHER
ELECTED OFFICIALS MUST DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY OR EVEN RULE-MAKING POWER TO THE
BUREAUCRATS, WHO THUS ARE quot;LEGISLATORSquot; OF
SORTS.
FOURTH,
FOURTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT
THEORY, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY FAVORING THE
AGENTS GIVES THEM THE ABILITY TO OUTMANEUVER
THEIR PRINCIPALS AND PURSUE THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES.
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36. TO SUM UP, BUREAUCRACIES ARE CHECKED BUT NOT
CHAINED. THEY ARE RESPONSIVE TO EXTERNAL
POLITICAL CONTROL BUT NOT POLITICALLY SUPINE.
THEY REACT NOT MERELY TO STATIC INSTRUCTIONS
BUT TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THEY NOT ONLY
CIRCUMSTANCES.
IMPLEMENT POLICY BUT SHAPE AND ADVOCATE IT.
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37. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS
CORRUPTION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS BOTH PROFESION AND SCIENTIFIC
STUDY FROM THE BEGINNING HAS BEEN VERY MUCH
CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION OR ABUSE
OF POWER.
A CORRUPTED BUREAUCRACY, BY DEFITION, IS ONE THAT, DOES
, , ,
NOT DO WHAT IT IS SUPPPOSED TO, SINCE ILLEGAL PAYMENTS
TO OFFICIALS ARE PRESSUMABLY NOT MADE UNLESS THOSE
WHO RECEIVE PAYMENT CAN AND DO CONTRAVENE THE INTENT
OF THE LAWS THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY. ALTHOUG
FORMALLY SALARIED, BUREAUCRATS IN SUCH QUASI-SALARY
SYSTEMS INDULGE IN SELF ENRICHMENT ON A LARGE SCALE
SELF-ENRICHMENT
(RIGGS,1995).
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38. THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IS ENDEMIC TO POLITICS AND
TO GOVERNMENT SIMPLY BECAUSE ITS DECISIONS INVOLVE
SO MUCH POWER AND WEALTH.
WEALTH
IT BECOMES COMMON PLACE AT ALL LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT--IN THE WAYS CONTRACTS ARE AWARDED,
JOBS ARE CREATED AND FILLED, PEOPLE ARE HIRED OFFICES
FILLED HIRED,
ARE SOLD, FAVORED POLITICAL ALLIES ARE REWARDED,
POWER IS EXERTED, AND THE NEEDS OR PLIGHT OF OTHERS
ARE IGNORED.
THE DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT'S REWARDS FREQUENTLY
EXCEEDS THE SUPPLY, AND ROUTINE DECISION-MAKING
DECISION MAKING
PROCESSES ARE LENGTHY, COSTLY, AND UNCERTAIN IN
THEIR OUTCOME.
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39. FOR THESE REASONS LEGALLY SANCTIONED DECISION MAKING
REASONS, DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES CONSTITUTE A quot;BOTTLENECKquot; BETWEEN WHAT PEOPLE
WANT AND WHAT THEY GET.
THE TEMPTATION TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK TO SPEED
BOTTLENECK—TO
THINGS UP AND MAKE FAVORABLE DECISIONS MORE PROBABLE—IS
BUILT INTO THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
SOCIETY
SOCIETY.
TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK, ONE MUST USE POLITICAL
INFLUENCE—AND CORRUPTION, WHICH BY DEFINITION CUTS
ACROSS ESTABLISHED AND LEGITIMATE PROCESSES, IS A MOST
EFFECTIVE FORM OF INFLUENCE.
(MICHAEL JOHNSTON, 1982)
( , )
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40. CORRUPTION, IS A FORM OF PRIVELEDGE IDULGED
IN BY THOSE IN POWER IT CONCENTRATES POWER
POWER.
IN THE HANDS OF A FEW WHO CAN MAKE DECISIONS
BASED NOT ON THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE BUT ON
THE INTERESTS OF THE FEW.
POWER TENDS TO CORRUPT, AND ABSOLUTE POWER
CORRUPTS ABSOLUTELY.
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41. ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTABILITY IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH A PERSON MUST
ANSWER TO SOME HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ACTIONS IN THE
LARGER SOCIETY OR IN THE AGENCY.
AGENCY
ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO VOTERS.
PUBLIC AGENCY MANAGERS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO ELECTED
EXECUTIVES AND LEGISLATURES.
AGENCY LEADERS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE
POLITICAL CULTURE OF SOCIETY, WHICH HOLDS GENERAL
SOCIETY
VALUES AND IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC MORALITY.
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42. ACCOUNTABILITY IS DETERMINED BOTH EXTERNALLY (BY CODES
OF ETHICS, LEGAL MANDATES CONTAINED IN A CONSTITUTION AND
AUTHORIZATION LAWS, AND PROFESSIONAL CODES OR
STANDARDS) AND INTERNALLY (BY AGENCY RULES AND
REGULATIONS OR PERSONALLY INTERNALIZED NORMS OF
BEHAVIOR AND MORAL ETHICS).
DEMOCRACY REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY: CHECKS
AND BALANCES ON GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, THE SECURITY OF
REGULAR AUDITS, AND THE INQUISITIVE EYE OF COMMUNITY AND
MEDIA WATCHDOGS.
(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)
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43. ETHICS
ETHICS CONCERN WITH WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT
IS WRONG.
(FREDERICKSON,
(FREDERICKSON 1994)
ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELF-
SELF
ACCOUNTABILITY, OR AN “INNER CHECK” ON PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS CONDUCT.
(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)
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44. ETHICS ARE IMBEDDED IN THE VALUES AND NORMS
OF SOCIETY, AND IN AN ORGANIZATION IN ITS
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE.
VALUES ARE ANY OBJECT OR QUALITIES DESIRABLE
AS MEANS OR ENDS THEMSELVES, SUCH AS LIFE,
JUSTICE EQUALITY, HONESTY, EFFICIENCY,
JUSTICE, EQUALITY HONESTY EFFICIENCY
FREEDOM. VALUES ARE BLIEFS, POINTS OF VIEW,
ATTITUDES.
ATTITUDES
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45. STANDARDS AND NORMS
STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS PRINCIPLES OF
RIGHT ACTION BINDING UPON THE MEMBERS OF A
GROUP AND SERVING TO GUIDE, CONTROL, OR REGULATE
PROPER AND ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR.
BEHAVIOR
STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE THE CODIFICATION OF
GROUP, ORGANIZATIONAL, COMMUNITY
GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNITY, OR
GOVERNMENTAL VALUES. LAWS, REGULATIONS, CODES
OF ETHICS.
RULES ARE TYPICAL OF STANDARDS AND NORMS.
(FREDERICKSON, 1994)
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46. ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS
ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS INVOLVES THE
APPLICATION OF MORAL PRINCIPLES TO THE
CONDUCT OF OFFICIALS IN ORGANIZATIONS.
ORGANIZATIONS
BROADLY SPEAKING, MORAL PRINCIPLES SPECIFY
1) THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD RESPECT
WHEN THEY ACT IN WAYS THAT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE WELL-
BEING OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY; AND
2) THE CONDITIONS THAT COLLECTIVE PRACTICES AND POLICIES
SHOULD SATISFY WHEN THEY SIMILARLY AFFECT THE WELL-
BEING OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY.
(DENNIS THOMPSON, 1985)
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47. THE CONVENTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS HOLDS THAT
ADMINISTRATORS SHOULD CARRY OUT THE ORDERS OF
THEIR SUPERIORS AND THE POLICIES OF THE AGENCY
AND THE GOVERNMENT THEY SERVE.
www.ginandjar.com 47
48. THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY DOES NOT DENY THAT
ADMINISTRATORS OFTEN MUST USE THEIR OWN
JUDGMENT IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY. BUT THEIR
AIM SHOULD ALWAYS BE TO DISCOVER WHAT POLICY
THEIR S
SUPERIORS (ELECTED OFFICIALS) INTEND OR
O S( C O C S) O
WOULD INTEND; OR IN A DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE OF
CONFLICTING DIRECTIVES TO INTERPRET LEGALLY OR
CONSTITUTIONALLY WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
DETERMINE POLICY.
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49. ON THIS VIEW, ADMINISTRATORS MAY PUT FORWARD
THEIR OWN VIEWS ARGUE WITH THEIR SUPERIORS
VIEWS, SUPERIORS,
AND CONTEST PROPOSALS IN THE PROCESS OF
FORMULATING POLICY. BUT ONCE THE DECISION OR
POLICY IS FINAL, ALL ADMINISTRATORS FALL INTO
LINE, AND FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT THE POLICY.
FURTHERMORE, THE DISAGREEMENT MUST TAKE
PLACE WITHIN THE AGENCY AND ACCORDING TO THE
AGENCY'S RULES OF PROCEDURE.
PROCEDURE
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50. THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY PORTRAYS THE IDEAL
ADMINISTRATOR AS A COMPLETELY RELIABLE
INSTRUMENT OF THE GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION,
NEVER INJECTING PERSONAL VALUES INTO THE
PROCESS OF FURTHERING THESE GOALS. THE ETHIC
THUS REINFORCES THE GREAT VIRTUE OF
ORGANIZATION-ITS
ORGANIZATION ITS CAPACITY TO SERVE ANY SOCIAL
END IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ENDS THAT INDIVIDUALS
WITHIN IT FAVOR
FAVOR.
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51. FOUR LEVELS OF ETHICS
IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THERE IS A HIERARCHY
OF LEVELS OF ETHICS, EACH OF WHICH HAS ITS OWN
,
SET OF RESPONSIBILITIES.
1) PERSONAL MORALITY—THE BASIC SENSE OF RIGHT AND
WRONG. THIS IS A FUNCTION OF OUR PAST AND IS
DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS PARENTAL
INFLUENCES RELIGIOUS BELIEFS CULTURAL AND SOCIAL
INFLUENCES, BELIEFS,
MORES, AND ONE'S OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES.
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52. 2) PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS
INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE A SET OF PROFESSIONAL
NORMS AND RULES THAT OBLIGATE THEM TO ACT IN
CERTAIN quot;PROFESSIONALquot; WAYS. OCCUPATIONS
SUCH AS LAW AND MEDICINE, WHILE OPERATING
WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO HAVE THEIR
OWN INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL CODES.
CODES
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53. 3) ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS. EVERY ORGANIZATION HAS
AN ENVIRONMENT OR CULTURE THAT INCLUDES BOTH
FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT.
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS TYPICALLY HAVE MANY SUCH
RULES.
RULES PUBLIC LAWS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND
LAWS ORDERS
AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS ALL CAN BE TAKEN
AS FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS FOR ETHICAL
BEHAVIOR.
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54. AN ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE IS COMPOSED OF THE quot;. . .
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND BELIEFS THAT ARE SHARED BY
MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION THAT OPERATE
ORGANIZATION,
UNCONSCIOUSLY, AND THAT DEFINE IN A BASIC TAKEN-
FOR-GRANTED' FASHION AN ORGANIZATION'S VIEW OF
ITSELF AND ITS ENVIRONMENTquot;
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IS A SOCIAL FORCE THAT
CONTROLS PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR BY
SHAPING MEMBERS' COGNITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF
MEANINGS AND REALITIES, PROVIDING EFECTIVE ENERGY
FOR MOBILIZATION AND IDENTIFYING WHO BELONGS AND
WHO DOES NOT.
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55. ETHICS IS NOT ONLY THE HEART OF
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IT IS ALSO THE
CULTURE,
FULCRUM FOR PRODUCING CHANGE. SINCE
ETHICS IS THE FULCRUM FOR CHANGING
CULTURE, CHANGING CULTURE WITHOUT ETHICS
IS AKIN TO CHANGING A TIRE WITHOUT A JACK.
(PASTIN, 1986)
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56. 4) SOCIAL ETHICS. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIAL
ETHICS OBLIGE MEMBERS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY TO
ACT IN WAYS THAT BOTH PROTECT INDIVIDUALS AND
FURTHER THE PROGRESS OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE.
SOCIAL ETHICS ARE FORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT
THEY CAN BE FOUND IN THE LAWS OF A GIVEN
SOCIETY, INFORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE
PART OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S SOCIAL CONSCIENCE.
(SHAFRITZ, RUSSEL, CHRISTOPHER, 2007)
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57. THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECISION
MAKING
WHEN MAKING DECISIONS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS
INEVITABLY PURSUE CERTAIN GOALS, WHETHER
,
PERSONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, OR SOME MIXTURE OF
BOTH. THE PURSUIT OF GOALS INVOLVES STRATEGIC AND
TACTICAL CHOICES TO ACHIEVE THEM (MEANS AND ENDS).
ENDS)
SUCH DECISIONS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
PROPRIETY OF THE MEANS USED IN IMPLEMENTING A
COURSE OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH A PUBLIC PROBLEM.
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58. INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS
WHEN AN INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT PURSUES
ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND SETS ON A COURSE OF ACTION
TOWARD REACHING THOSE GOALS, THE END ITSELF MAY BE
GOALS
SEEN AS SO COMPELLING AS TO SEEMINGLY JUSTIFY ANY
MEANS.
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE OFTEN STRIVEN TO CLARIFY SUCH
DILEMMAS IN DECISION MAKING BY ARTICULATING CODES OF
ETHICS TO GUIDE THE BEHAVIOR OF THEIR MEMBERS.
MEMBERS
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59. PERSONAL ETHICS
OFTEN AT ISSUE IN DECISION MAKING ARE PERSONAL
ETHICS.
ETHICS
THE TEMPTATION TO DIVERT SOME OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR
RESOURCES TO PERSONAL USE CAN BE GREAT AND THE RISK
OF EXPOSURE OFTEN SMALL.
THE MAIN REASON FOR THE WORLDWIDE PRESENCE OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IS THAT PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS HAVE SOMETHING TO ALLOCATE THAT
OTHER PEOPLE WANT.
WANT
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60. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING CHALLENGES
OF O
O MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE
GO S O O CO C
DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF
BUREANCRACY.
BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT
CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO ACCOMPLISH
COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY
TASKS
CHARACTERIZED AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN
THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY.
DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE
BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
POPULAR CONTROL. THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES
CONTROL
TO PRINCIPLES OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE
PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE PUBLIC.
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61. BUT AS SUCH, THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SHOW KEEN
SUCH
ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS,
O S C
OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE. BUREAUCRACY MAY BE
S U UC C
THOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE
COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS
INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT
VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY
RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER.
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62. BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING
CHALLENGES OF MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO
RECONCILE THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE
IMPERATIVES OF BUREAUCRACY
BUREAUCRACY.
BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS
THAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO
ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE
FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED
AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN THREATENING TO
DEMOCRACY.
DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT
ARE BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR CONTROL.
www.ginandjar.com 62
63. THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES TO PRINCIPLES
OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE
PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE
PUBLIC.
PUBLIC BUT AS SUCH THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY
SUCH,
SHOW KEEN ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY,
EFFECTIVENESS,
EFFECTIVENESS OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE.
EXPERTISE
BUREAUCRACY MAY BE THOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S
TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR
PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS
DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT VALUES,
BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY
RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER.
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64. Regime bureaucracy interactions
b ea c ac inte actions
Power Distribution Power Distribution
in Society in Government
Executive ascendant Executive sublated
1 2
Democratic political Bureaucracy
Democ ac
Democracy regime controls dominates democratic
bureaucracy political regime
3 4
Bureaucracy Authoritarian political
Authoritarianism subordination to regime shares power
authoritarian political with Bureaucracy
regime
Sources: modified from Cariño, L.V. (1992) Bureaucracy for Democracy (Quezon City: University of Philippines
Press).
(TURNER AND HULME 1997)
HULME,
www.ginandjar.com 64
65. ONE BASIC APPROACH TO THE BUREAUCRACY-
DEMOCRACY PROBLEM IS TO CONCEIVE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC IMPULSE AS ESSENTIALLY EMANATING
FROM quot;ABOVE.quot;
THE quot;TOPquot; OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN THIS VIEW
TOP SYSTEM VIEW,
CONSISTS OF THE CENTRAL OR MOST FORMALLY
AUTHORITATIVE
AUTHORITATIVE' POSITIONS AND ORGANS OF THE
GOVERNING SYSTEM: THOSE DIRECTLY CHOSEN BY THE
ELECTORATE AND THOSE ENTAILING THE BROADEST
AND MOST ENCOMPASSING JURISDICTION.
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66. BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT LINK TO THE PUBLIC VIA
PERIODIC COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS, BODIES LIKE
PARLIAMENTS AND ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVES HAVE A
SPECIAL CLAIM TO REPRESENT THE AGENDA OF THE
PEOPLE.
PEOPLE
ONE CHALLENGE FACING THESE POLITICAL LEADERS,
THEN,
THEN IS TO MONITOR AND CONTROL THE
BUREAUCRACY SO THAT THE AGENTS DO NOT REPLACE
THE DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN PRINCIPALS AS THE KEY
DECISION MAKERS.
www.ginandjar.com 66
67. THE OTHER BROAD NOTION OF DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IS WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED BOTTOM-UP
DEMOCRACY.
THE LOGIC IS THAT POPULAR CONTROL IS MOST
EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED THROUGH CHANNELS OTHER
THAN THE POLITICAL quot;TOP“.
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68. IN OTHER WORDS, THE BUREAUCRACY AS A POLITICAL
WORDS
INSTITUTION MIGHT BEST BE CHECKED BY DIRECT POPULAR
OVERSIGHT (CITIZENS’ REVIEW BOARDS MONITORING
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, CLIENTS CONTROLLING SOME
ASPECTS OF AGENCY DECISIONS) OR BY INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS THAT DEVIATE FROM A STANDARD
MONOCRATIC AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND INSTEAD
INCORPORATE INCENTIVES FOR BUREAUCRATIC ACTORS TO
BE DIRECTLY ATTUNED TO POPULAR PREFERENCES.
PREFERENCES
ONE WAY THAT THESE OPERATE IS VIA OPENNESS OF THE
BUREAUCRACY ITSELF TO PRESSURE AND CONTROL BY
ORGANIZED INTERESTS THAT MAY CARE GREATLY ABOUT
THE ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS.
www.ginandjar.com 68
69. NEITHER LINE OF REASONING ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND
BUREAUCRACY OFFERS A FULLY SATISFACTORY PICTURE
THE TOP-DOWN ARGUMENTS FRAMED IN THE LOGIC OF
POLITICAL CONTROL OFFER AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF
THE PUZZLE, BUT AN INCOMPLETE ONE.
BOTTOM-UP ANALYSTS ALERT AS TO CRUCIAL MODES
AND CHANNELS OF POPULAR INFLUENCE BUT LIKEWISE
OMIT ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE INCLUDED. ANY VALID
PERSPECTIVE MUST NECESSARILY BE GROUNDED IN THE
EMPIRICAL FEATURES OF ACTUAL GOVERNING SYSTEMS.
www.ginandjar.com 69
70. A GOVERNANCE APPROACH SEEKS TO INTEGRATE
POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC FORCES AT MULTIPLE
LEVELS TO INDICATE HOW PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED,
DESIGNED
ADOPTED, IMPLEMENTED, AND EVALUATED IN TERMS OF
BOTH EFFECTIVENESS AND DEMOCRACY.
SUCH A POINT OF VIEW CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY
WITH EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS CAN
SOCIETIES GENERATE THE FAIRNESS AND SLACK
RESOURCES THAT PERMIT DEMOCRACIES WITH THEIR
LARGE TRANSACTION COSTS TO EXIST AND PROSPER.
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71. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A
DEMOCRACY
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
EXECUTIVE STAFF
SOCIOCULTURAL
AGENCIES
NORMS
OUTSIDE
LEGISLATURE
AUDITORS
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS: LEGISLATIVE
MEDIA STAFF AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT AND
AGENCY HEAD
INTEREST
COURTS
GROUPS
POLITICAL PARTIES OTHER AGENCIES,
OTHER AGENCIES
AGENCIES, SAME LEVEL
DIFFERENT
LEVELS
(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK
(ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005)
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72. ABOVE FIGURE PRESENTS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK THAT
SEES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TAKING THE CENTRAL ROLE
OR STAGE IN A BROADER POLITICAL SYSTEM (THE
CONVERSION PROCESS IN THE SYSTEMS MODEL).)
THE MODEL EMPHASIZES THE INTERRELATED NATURE OF THE
PARTS AND HOW CHANGE IN AN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
(CULTURAL, ECONOMIC POLITICAL
(CULTURAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL) CAUSES CHANGE
IN THE STRUCTURES AND INTERNAL PROCESSES OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION.
THESE CHANGES, IN TURN, INFLUENCE THE OUTPUTS OF THE
BUREAUCRACY; THAT IS, WHAT GOODS, SERVICES, POLICY
PROGRAMS, RULES
PROGRAMS RULES, AND REGULATIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED BY
BUREAUCRACY.
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73. AS IN ANY SYSTEM, A FEEDBACK LOOP DEVELOPS IN
WHICH THE OUTPUTS AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT, ,
WHICH CAUSES FURTHER CHANGE AND OFTEN NEW
DEMANDS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT TO CONTINUE,
INCREASE OR DECREASE, MODIFY OR OCCASIONALLY
DECREASE MODIFY,
EVEN CEASE A PUBLIC POLICY OR PROGRAM.
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74. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CONVERSION PROCESS
ENVIRONMENT INPUTS ADMINISTRATIVE OUTPUTS
• CULTURAL CHANGES LINE AGENCIES
• DEMANDS FOR • GOODS
AND EVENTS PROGRAMS AND “WITHIN-PUTS”
• SERVICE
• ECONOMIC CHANGES SERVICES
• RULES
AND EVENTS • POLICIES
SUPPORT
• POLITICAL CHANGES • PROCEDURES
• PROGRAMME
AND EVENTS • MONEY
• GOALS
• INFORMATION
• SOCIETAL CHANGES • STAF
• STRUCTURE
AND EVENTS
ROLES PLAYED BY
• PERSONAL
• PARTY
• EXPERIENCE LEAD TO
• INTEREST GROUP
• STAFF AGENCIES
(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK
(ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005)
www.ginandjar.com 74
75. DECENTRALIZATION
ALL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVE A COMBINATION
OF CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY.
HOWEVER, FINDING A COMBINATION OF CENTRAL
CONTROL AND LOCAL AUTONOMY THAT SATISFIES REGIME
NEEDS AND POPULAR DEMANDS IS A PERSISTENT DILEMMA
FOR GOVERNMENTS.
CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION ARE NOT
ATTRIBUTES THAT CAN BE DICHOTOMIZED; RATHER THEY
REPRESENT HYPOTHETICAL POLES ON A CONTINUUM THAT
CAN BE CALIBRATED BY MANY DIFFERENT INDICES
INDICES.
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76. MOST AUTHORS ARE AGREED THAT DECENTRALIZATION
WITHIN THE STATE INVOLVES A TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY TO
PERFORM SOME SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM AN
INDIVIDUAL OR AN AGENCY IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO
SOME OTHER INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY WHICH IS 'CLOSER' TO
CLOSER
THE PUBLIC TO BE SERVED.
THE BASIS FOR SUCH TRANSFERS IS MOST OFTEN
TERRITORIAL, THAT IS GROUNDED IN THE DESIRE TO PLACE
AUTHORITY AT A LOWER LEVEL IN A TERRITORIAL
HIERARCHY AND THUS GEOGRAPHICALLY CLOSER TO SERVICE
PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS.
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77. HOWEVER, TRANSFERS CAN ALSO BE MADE FUNCTIONALLY, THAT IS
, ,
BY TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY TO AN AGENCY THAT IS
FUNCTIONALLY SPECIALIZED. SUCH TRANSFERS OF AUTHORITY ARE
OF THREE MAIN TYPES.
THE FIRST IS WHEN THE DELEGATION IS WITHIN FORMAL
POLITICAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT DELEGATES ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT).
THE SECOND IS TRANSFER WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE OR
PARASTATAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE FROM THE
HEADQUARTERS OF A MINISTRY TO ITS DISTRICT OFFICES).
THE THIRD IS WHEN THE TRANSFER IS FROM AN INSTITUTION OF
THE STATE TO A NON-STATE AGENCY (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN A
PARASTATAL NATIONAL AIRLINE IS SOLD OFF TO PRIVATE
SHAREHOLDERS).
SHAREHOLDERS)
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78. SOME IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
DECENTRALIZATION IS THE TRANSFER OF
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC
FUNCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO
SUBORDINATE OR QUASI-INDEPENDENT
Q
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
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79. DECENTRALIZATION IS THE EXPANSION OF LOCAL
AUTONOMY THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES AWAY FROM NATIONAL
BODY
(HEYWOOD, 2002)
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80. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BE
AUTONOMOUS IF THEY ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL
DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE, ALTHOUGH AUTONOMY
,
IN THIS CONNECTION IS SOMETIMES TAKEN TO
IMPLY A HIGH MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT,
RATHER THAN SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE
(ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD 2002)
HEYWOOD,
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81. WHY DECENTRALIZE?
A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IS THE EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OR DECISION-MAKING
AND AUTHORITY WITHIN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
GOVERNMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS ARE COMMONLY PERCEIVED
TO BE GEOGRAPHICALLY AND SOCIALLY REMOTE FROM
'THE PEOPLE' AND TO TAKE DECISIONS WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OR CONCERN ABOUT ACTUAL PROBLEMS AND
PREFERENCES.
www.ginandjar.com 81
82. THE POPULAR REMEDY FOR SUCH CENTRALIZATION
IS DECENTRALIZATION, A TERM WHICH IS IMBUED
WITH POSITIVE CONNOTATIONS-PROXIMITY,
RELEVANCE, AUTONOMY, PARTICIPATION,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVEN DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRACY.
SO GREAT IS THE APPEAL OF DECENTRALIZATION
THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO LOCATE A GOVERNMENT
THAT HAS NOT CLAIMED TO PURSUE A POLICY OF
DECENTRALIZATION IN RECENT YEARS.
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83. THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORKS ARGUE THAT DECENTRALIZATION WILL
LEAD TO BETTER DECISION MAKING AND HENCE
DECISION-MAKING
GREATER EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS ON THE
FOLLOWING GROUNDS.
GROUNDS
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84. LOCALLY SPECIFIC PLANS CAN BE TAILOR-MADE FOR LOCAL AREAS
USING DETAILED AND UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION THAT IS ONLY
LOCALLY AVAILABLE.
INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL.
EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION, FOSTERED BY
DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES THE CHANCES OF MORE EFFECTIVE
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES BEING GENERATED, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY DIFFUSED.
MOTIVATION OF FIELD LEVEL PERSONNEL IS ENHANCED WHEN
FIELD-LEVEL
THEY HAVE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROGRAMMES THEY
MANAGE.
WORKLOAD REDUCTION AT AGENCIES AT THE CENTRE OF
GOVERNMENT WILL RELIEVE THEM FROM ROUTINE DECISION-
MAKING AND GIVE THEM MORE TIME TO CONSIDER STRATEGIC
ISSUES SO THAT THE' QUALITY OF POLICY SHOULD IMPROVE.
SSU S QU O O C S OU O
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87. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION INVOLVES SHIFTING SOME
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EXPENDITURES AND/OR
REVENUES TO LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
THE EXTENT TO WHICH LOCAL ENTITIES ARE GIVEN
AUTONOMY TO DETERMINE THE ALLOCATION OF THEIR
EXPENDITURE
(WORLD BANK, 2001)4
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88. LOCAL FINANCE IN INDONESIA
SOURCES
LOCAL REVENUES EQUITY FUND OTHERS
LOCAL TAXES SHARING REVENUES GIFT
RETRIBUTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY FUND
ALLOCATED FUND
REVENUES FROM LOAN
LOCAL ASSETS SPECIAL ALLOCATED
FUND
OTHERS
www.ginandjar.com 88
89. ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO
REDISTRIBUTE AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITY AND FINANCIAL
AUTHORITY,
RESOURCES FOR PROVIDING PUBLIC SERVICES AMONG
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
www.ginandjar.com 89
90. ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION
ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION WILL
CO O C O C O
INCLUDE PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION. THEY
SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUNCTIONS FROM THE
PUBLIC TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
www.ginandjar.com 90
91. FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION
FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION INCLUDE:
1. DECONCENTRATION
2. DELEGATION TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES
3. DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
4. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO
NONGOVERNMENT INSTITUITION
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)
www.ginandjar.com 91
93. DELEGATION TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS
AGENCIES
ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION IS THE
DELEGATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS
TO ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE NOT UNDER THE
DIRECT CONTROL OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
MINISTRIES
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)
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94. DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO
CREATE OR STRENGTHEN INDEPENDENT LEVELS OR
UNITS OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEVOLUTION OF
FUNCTION AND AUTHORITY.
AUTHORITY
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)
www.ginandjar.com 94
95. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO
NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUITION
DECENTRALIZATION TAKES PLACE IN MANY
COUNTRIES THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF SOME
PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY,
OR OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS FROM GOVERNMENT TO
FUNCTIONS,
VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE, OR NON-GOVERNMENT
INSTITUTIONS.
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)
www.ginandjar.com 95
96. Forms of decentralization
Nature of Delegation Basic for Delegation
Territorial Functional
Within formal political structures Devolution (political Interest group
decentralization, local representation
government, democratic
g ,
decentralization
Within public administrative or Deconcentration Establisment of parastatals
parastatal structures (administrative and quangos
decentralization, field
administration
From state sector to private sector Privatization of developed Privatization of national
function (deregulation, functions (devestiture,
contracting out, voucher deregulation, economic
schemes) liberalization)
(TURNER AND HULME, 1997)
www.ginandjar.com 96
97. IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES OF
DECENTRALIZATION:
1. BETTER MATCH BETWEEN SERVICE PROVISION AND
VOTER PREFERENCES
2. BETTER ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH CLOSER
LINKAGES OF BENEFITS WITH COSTS
3.
3 INCREASED MOBILIZATION OF LOCAL REVENUES
4. BETTER PARTICIPATION OF CLIENTS IN SELECTION
OF OUTPUT MIX
(GERVAIS, 1999)
www.ginandjar.com 97
98. IT MUST BE NOTE THAT THE DECENTRALIZATION DOES
NOT IMPLY THAT ALL AUTHORITY SHOULD BE DELEGATED.
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUST RETAIN A CORE OF
FUNCTIONS OVER ESSENTIAL NATIONAL MATTERS AND
ULTIMATELY HAS THE AUTHORITV TO REDESIGN THE
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND TO DISCIPLINE OR
SUSPEND DECENTRALIZED UNITS THAT ARE NOT
PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY.
HOW EXTENSIVE THIS CORE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE REMAINS A MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL
AND INTELLECTUAL DEBATE OF THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY.
CENTURY
www.ginandjar.com 98
99. DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE
DECENTRALIZATION IN SOME COUNTRIES HAS BEEN
SEEN AS POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT FOR DEALING WITH
REBELLIOUS REGIONS.
IT HAS HOWEVER MORE BASIC VALUE TO DEMOCRACY
HOWEVER,
AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION. MANY SCHOLARS
HAVE PRESENTED THE ARGUMENT THAT
DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCES THE LEGITIMACY AND
LEGITIMACY,
HENCE, STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY.
www.ginandjar.com 99
100. DIAMOND (1999) RAISES FIVE BROAD POINTS ABOUT HOW
AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER A
DECENTRALIZATION SCHEME CAN IMPROVE AND
STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY.
1) GREATER AUTONOMY TO THE REGIONS HELPS DEVELOP
DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND SKILLS AMONG CITIZENS.
2) DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES ACCOUNTABILITY AND
RESPONSIVENESS TO LOCAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS.
3) IT OPENS UP ACCESS TO POWER OF TRADITIONALLY
MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THUS IMPROVES THE
REPRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY.
4) IT STRENGTHENS CHECKS AND BALANCES VIZ-A-VIZ POWER AT
THE CENTER.
5) IT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTIES AND POLITICAL
GROUPS IN OPPOSITION IN THE CENTER TO EXERCISE SOME
MEASURE OF POLITICAL POWER.
www.ginandjar.com 100
101. FROM THE ARGUMENTS ABOVE IT CAN BE CONCLUDED
THAT DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCES THE EFFICACY,
QUALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRACY; HENCE
DECENTRALIZATION IS A NECESSITY FOR DEMOCRACY.
IT IS EVEN MORE SO FOR LARGE—AND PARTICULARLY
LARGE AND
MULTIETHNIC AND MULTICULTURAL—COUNTRIES SUCH
AS INDONESIA AND CHINA, AS DECENTRALIZATION WILL
CLOSE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE CITIZENS, THE
STAKEHOLDER, AND THE POWER AND THE PROCESS OF
POLICY MAKING.
MAKING
www.ginandjar.com 101
102. DECENTRALIZATION IS NOT JUST A POLITICAL
NECESSITY FOR KEEPING THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING
APART OR FOR FOSTERING DEMOCRACY.
IF MANAGED WELL, DECENTRALIZATION CAN BRING
WELL
IMPORTANT BENEFITS TO THE COMMUNITIES AND THE
ECONOMY AS A WHOLE.
HOWEVER, IF MANAGED BADLY, IT COULD HARM THE
PEOPLE AND SQUANDER RESOURCES AND BRING
INSTABILITY INSTEAD
INSTEAD.
www.ginandjar.com 102
103. RICH REGIONS ARE DOING FINE, IN FACT THEY MAY HAVE MORE
MONEY THAT THEY CAN SPEND WHICH CAN POSE A THREAT TO
SPEND,
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY BECAUSE OF SOCIAL-JEALOUSY THERE ARE
ALREADY SOME INDICATIONS THAT REVENUES NOT BEING USED
EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY, ON THE OTHER HAND, POOR
REGIONS ARE CHAFING UNDER
UNDER.
THE RISKS OF AN INCREASE IN CORRUPTION FOLLOWING
DECENTRALIZATION ARE HIGH. IT HAS BEEN WIDELY OBSERVED
THAT SO FAR NOT ONLY POWER AND REVENUE THAT HAVE BEEN
DECENTRALIZED BUT ALSO CORRUPTION.
SOME ANALYSTS COMMENT THAT DECENTRALIZATION HAS
STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF THE LOCAL ELITES AND THEIR
CLIENTELISTIC NETWORKS IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
(HUBER, RUESCHEMEYER AND STEPHENS, 1999).
www.ginandjar.com 103
104. TRANSFERS OF REVENUE TO THE AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS MUST
BE ACCOMPANIED BY TRANSFERS OF EXPENDITURE
RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS. THEY ARE
IMPORTANT TO PREVENT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL
DEFICIT TO INCREASE UNABATEDLY CAUSING SEVERE FINANCING
AND DEBT PROBLEMS FOE THE COUNTRY IN THE FUTURE.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ALSO NEED TO HAVE THE APPROPRIATE
CAPACITY AND SKILLS TO TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT
COMES WITH AUTONOMY. BUDGETARY CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO PREVENT
CORRUPTION AND WASTAGE OF RESOURCES.
IN SHORT EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION WILL ENHANCE
SHORT,
DEMOCRACY BUT IT REQUIRES ALSO GOOD GOVERNANCE, I.E.
CLEAN, TRANSPARENT AND COMPETENT GOVERNANCE AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL.
LEVEL
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105. GOVERNMENT SYSTEM OF INDONESIA
People’s HOUSE OF HOUSE OF SUPREME SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL
Consultative REPRESENTA- REGIONAL THE PRESIDENT AUDIT COURT
COURT
Assembly TIVES REPRESENTA-
CABINET BOARD • JUDICIAL
TIVES COMMISSION
•CENTRAL BANK
DECONCENTRATION DECENTRALIZATION ASSISTANCE TASKS DELEGATION
(FUNCTIONAL DECENTRALIZATION)
REGIONAL STATE-OWNED
GOVERNORS ADMINISTRATION ENTERPRISES
AUTONOMOUS RURAL ADMINISTRATOR,
REGIONS ADMINISTRATION
ETC.
www.ginandjar.com 105
106. DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA
ADMINISTRATIVE
DECONCENTRATION GOVERNMENT /REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT
• REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
• REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
CHIEFS
• ETC.
PRIVATIZATION CENTRAL DELEGATION
GOVERNMENT
• PRIVATE CORPORATION
• SPECIAL AUTHORITY
• BOT
• ETC.
DECENTRALIZATION AUTONOMOUS REGION
PROVINCE
DISTRICT
www.ginandjar.com CITY 106
107. DECENTRALIZATION PRINCIPLES IN INDONESIA
Six tasks (Absolute) • Partly by the central
1. Foreign Policy government;
2. Defense
3. Security • P tl based on
Partly b d
Central 4. Religion deconcentration principles;
5. Justice • Partly based on assistance
Government
6. National Fiscal and Monetary Affairs principle
Outside the six tasks:
Partly
Administrative Concurrent
Tasks Mandatory Tasks (Province, District, City)
1. Planning and control of development
2. Planning, use, and control of space;
3. Public security;
4. Facilities and infrastructure;
5.
5 Health;
6. Education and potential human resources;
7. Solution to social problems;
8. Manpower (incl. interregional mobility);
9. Cooperatives and SMEs; Partly based on
Regional 10. Environment; decentralization principles
Governments 11. Land administration;
12. Civil administration;
13. General government administration;
14. Investment;
15. Other basic services (not yet implemented);
16. Other tasks.
Elective (Province, District, City)
Based on the potentials and characteristics of each region (mining,
fishery, agriculture, plantation, forestry, tourism)
www.ginandjar.com 107
108. DIGITAL (E)-GOVERNANCE
( )
INFORMATION IS A CENTRAL RESOURCE FOR ALL
ACTIVITIES.
IN PURSUING THE DEMOCRATIC/POLITICAL PROCESSES,
IN MANAGING RESOURCES, EXECUTING FUNCTIONS,
MEASURING PERFORMANCE AND IN SERVICE DELIVERY,
INFORMATION IS THE BASIC INGREDIENT' (ISAAC-
HENRY 1997: I 32)
32).
www.ginandjar.com 108
109. INFORMATION IS NO LONGER “WALLED IN , NO LONGER
WALLED IN”
CONSTRAINED BY TIME AND SPACE. INFORMATION IS
WIDELY AVAILABLE TO PEOPLE REGARDLESS OF STATUS,,
POSITION, WEALTH, LOCATION, RACE, ETHNIC OR
CULTURE.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY GIVES A NEW IMPETUS TO
DEMOCRACY AS IT OPENS UP AND WIDENS THE WAY
AND MEANS FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC
DECISSION MAKING PROCESSES.
www.ginandjar.com 109
110. THE MAJOR STEPS HAVE INCLUDED:
USING COMPUTER NETWORKS AS A NEW CHANNEL
FOR SERVICE DELIVERY,
DELIVERY
BEGINNING TO REENGINEER SERVICES AND CREATE
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SELFSERVICE,
EXPANDING RELIANCE ON SERVICES OUTSOURCED
TO OTHER AGENCIES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
SHOWING ANXIETY—BUT NOT MUCH ACTION YET—
ABOUT SOCIAL EQUITY AND COHESION, AND
BEGINNING TO CONTEMPLATE THE CONSEQUENCES
OF NEW FORMS OF ELECTRONIC MONEY.
www.ginandjar.com 110
111. IN THESE FIRST YEARS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
TWENTY FIRST CENTURY,
GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD ARE PREPARING
FOR E GOVERNMENT.
E-GOVERNMENT
WEBSITES HAVE BEEN CREATED FOR MANY
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, AND THE PUSH IS ON FOR
BROADER AND MORE EASILY NAVIGATED PORTALS.
TRANSACTIONS ARE BEING OFFERED OVER THE
INTERNET.
POLITICIANS AND THE PRESS ARE BEGINNING TO TALK
ABOUT quot;DIGITAL DEMOCRACY.quot;
www.ginandjar.com 111
112. THE INFORMATION AGE IS CREATING NEW
CHALLENGES FOR GOVERNANCE BY ENCOURAGING A
MORE COMPLEX DIVISION OF LABOR AND A FLOOD OF
NEW THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES.
MODERN COMMUNICATIONS ARE REDUCING THE
POWER OF GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY IN SHAPING OUR
SENSE OF COMMUNITY AND DETERMINING WHO HAS
THE LEGITIMACY NEEDED TO GOVERN.
www.ginandjar.com 112
113. IN THE LONGER TERM, COMPUTER-BASED
COMMUNICATIONS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY
RESTRUCTURE POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE AS WELL
AS ECONOMICS.
COMPUTER NETWORKS, ARE MAKING IT MORE
NETWORKS
CONVENIENT TO PARTICIPATE IN CONVERSATIONS
THAT WERE FORMERLY HARD TO JOIN. THIS MAY
WELL LEAD TO NEW PATTERNS OF POLITICAL
O SO O C
COMMUNICATION AND PARTICIPATION.
www.ginandjar.com 113
114. THE E-GOVERNMENT PROMISES A NEW HORISON IN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS IT WILL CUT COSTS AND
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY; MEET CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS;
IMPROVE CITIZEN RELATIONSHIP; ENHANCE CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES;;
INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC CONTROL;
FACILITATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
www.ginandjar.com 114
115. THE START OF SOMETHING BIG?
OVER THE NEXT TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS, THE
EXPANSION OF NETWORK-BASED
COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD EXERT A STRONG
INFLUENCE ON HOW COMMUNITIES ARE FORMED
AND GOVERNED.
GOVERNED
www.ginandjar.com 115
116. GOVERNMENTS ARE BUILDING HUGE AND
INTERCONNECTED COMPUTER NETWORKS, BUT WE
HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THESE BECOME
UBIQUITOUSLY AVAILABLE TO ALL WORKERS AND
CITIZENS. THE MOMENTUM IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED,
HOWEVER, AND NOTHING IS LIKELY TO STOP IT.
OUTSOURCING WILL CONTINUE TO EXPAND. IN
ADDITION, MORE GOVERNMENTS WILL BEGIN TO
WORK WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO REFORM
ENTIRE INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMIC
INFRASTRUCTURES.
www.ginandjar.com 116
117. PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS ARE RAPIDLY BECOMING
NETWORKED, AND THEY ARE USING THESE NETWORKS TO
PRODUCE AND DELIVER SERVICES. THIS WILL ULTIMATELY
LEAD TO EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS, MUCH AS HAS
HAPPENED IN THE PRIVATE SECTORY.
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES WILL GRADUALLY BECOME
FLATTER, FASTER, AND MORE CUSTOMER FRIENDLY.
SERVICES WILL BECOME BETTER INTEGRATED AND
CUSTOMIZED, WITH RICH SELF-SERVICE OPTIONS. FEES
RATHER THAN TAXES WILL BE USED MORE EXTENSIVELY
TO RAISE REVENUES AND COORDINATE PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION.
www.ginandjar.com 117
118. AS WE PROCEED MORE DEEPLY INTO THE INFORMATION
AGE, THE NEW CORE VALUE AND CHALLENGE FOR
GOVERNANCE-AT BOTH ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIETAL
LEVELS WILL BE TO LEARN HOW TO ADAPT TO NEW
CONDITIONS AND NEEDS.
TO GOVERN SUCCESSFULLY, WE MUST FIGURE OUT HOW
,
TO PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY AND PREVENT ABUSES OF
POWER WHILE WE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROMOTE
GOVERNMENTAL FLEXIBILITY AND LEARNING.
WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS ON THIS PROBLEM, BUT
OUR STATUS AS WE ENTER THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
MIGHT BEST BE DESCRIBED AS quot;JUST AT THE START OF
SOMETHING BIG“.
(KAMARACK AND NYE JR., 2002)
www.ginandjar.com 118
119. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET
THE INTERNET IS A NETWORK OF NETWORKS OF
ONE-TO-ONE, ONE-TO-MANY, MANY-TO-MANY, AND
MANY-TO-ONE, LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL
INFORMATIO. AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
WITH RELATIVELY OPEN STANDARDS AND
PROTOCOLS AND COMPARATIVELY LOW BARRIERS
TO ENTRY.
www.ginandjar.com 119
120. Estimated Global Internet Users in 2002 and 2004
Survey
y Global Users 2002 Global Users 2004
ITU 627 million 676 million
CIA World Factbook 604 million Not updated
NUA 606 million
ll Not updated
d d
Internet World Stats 587 million 798 million
Computer Industry Almanac
p y 665 million 945 million
Mean 618 million 806 million
Sources: Analysis of data from ITU, 2004a; U.S. Central Intelligent Agency (CIA), 2003; Computer Industry
Almanac, 2004; NUA, 2004
Note: * Based on 2003 projections.
(CHADWICK, 2006)
www.ginandjar.com 120
121. ALL OF THIS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KINDS OF
AUTHORITY AND CONTROL THAT MAY BE EXERCISED OVER
THE INTERNET AND THE LEVELS OF RESISTANCE THAT MAY
BE ACHIEVED BY LESSPOWERFUL GROUPS, WHOSE VOICES
MAY BE ABSENT FROM MAINSTREAM CHANNELS LIKE THE
PRESS AND TELEVISION.
ORDINARY CITIZENS AND THE POLITICALLY MARGINALIZED
ARE NO LONGER WHOLLY DEPENDENT UPON THE WAYS IN
WHICH THE TRADITIONALLY DOMINANT BROADCAST MEDIA
CONSTRUCT THEIR IDENTITIES OR SELECTIVELY FRAME
POLITICAL GRIEVANCES.
www.ginandjar.com 121
122. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ON THE INTERNET BECOMES, IN
BECOMES
THE WORDS OF DOUGLAS KELLNER (1999), quot;MORE
DECENTERED AND VARIED IN ITS ORIGINS, SCOPE AND
C S O G S, SCO
EFFECTSquot;.
THE RELATIVE SPEED AND FLUIDITY OF CYBERSPACE
SOMETIMES ALLOWS MARGINAL GROUPS TO THRUST THEIR
AGENDA INTO THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM (MITRA, 2001).
THE AUTHORITATIVE STATUS OF POWERFUL INSTITUTIONAL
PLAYERS, BE THEY GOVERNMENTS, CORPORATIONS, OR
MAINSTREAM MEDIA, HAS BEEN LOOSENED.
www.ginandjar.com 122
123. POLITICAL ACTORS ARE INCREASINGLY ATTEMPTING TO
USE THE INTERNET TO ENHANCE THEIR PRESENCE AND
LEGITIMIZE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN WAYS THAT ARE
GENUINELY NEW
NEW.
STATES ARE INCREASINGLY REQUIRED TO REGULATE
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ONLINE AND ARE
MONITORING THE USE OF THE INTERNET for ANTI-
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (SUCH AS PORNOGRAPHY), GROUPS
AND MOVEMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE A THREAT TO
POLITICAL STABILITY AND SECURITY (SUCH AS
TERRORISM).
www.ginandjar.com 123
124. A WEB PAGE MAY APPEAR AT FIRST GLANCE TO BE A
SIMPLE ONE-TO-MANY DEVICE, BUT OFTEN WEB
PAGES ARE COMPOSED OF INFORMATION, SUCH AS
INFORMATION
NEWS FEEDS, FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT
HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER BY AUTOMATED
SCRIPTS THAT DYNAMICALLY UPDATE CONTENT
WITHOUT HUMAN INTERVENTION. WEB PAGES MAY
ALSO CONTAIN DISCUSSION FORUMS ALONGSIDE
MORE TRADITIONAL FORMS OF CONTENT.
www.ginandjar.com 124
126. Internet penetration by region, 2002. Sources: Analysis and adaptation of data from ITU, 2004b. The
CIA World Factbook 2004 was used to feel a small number of gaps in the 2002 data.
(CHADWICK,
(CHADWICK 2006)
www.ginandjar.com 126