Perpetuating Authoritarianism: Zimbabwe's Hybrid Regime

‘Perpetuating Authoritarianism’
Examining the Creation and Legitimization of Zimbabwe’s Hybrid Regime through
Constitutional Accommodations and Competitive Authoritarianism
Forest Klein
August 8, 2016
IR 550.01

Klein 1
Table of Contents
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………. 2
Literature Review ………………………………………………………………………….5
Competitive Authoritarianism …………………………………………………………. 5
Western Linkage …………………………………………………………………....7
Organizational Power ……………………………………………………………...8
Western Leverage …………………………………………………………………. 9
Constitutional Dictatorships …………………………………………………………… 11
Case Study ………………………………………………………………………………… 15
Zimbabwe Background …………………………………………………………………15
The Fifth Brigade and the Gukurahundi ………………………………………………. 18
2008 National Election Challenge ……………………………………………………... 22
Case Analysis ……………………………………………………………………………... 27
Constitutional Accommodations and the Matabeleland Campaign……………………..27
Competitive Authoritarianism and the 2008 Presidential Election………….…………..30
Concluding Thoughts…………..…………………………………………………………. 33
Bibliography…………..…………………………………………………………………... 37

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Introduction
The rise of authoritarian regimes in many developing states since the early 1960s has
been characterized by one particular trait: autocrats have used mechanisms sanctioned by the
state to legitimize and maintain their power. Dictators such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe
have utilized existential threats against the state to expand his constitutional authority and
enhance his own autocracy. Mugabe has also used his position as the head of state to authorize
and validate violence against threats to his own regime, further reinforcing the legitimacy of his
own government.1
To this end, one could raise the question: what is the role of the state and its respective
institutions in lending legitimacy to authoritarian regimes? Or rather, does the extent of power
the executive office holds correlate to the rise of these regimes? Are legal concepts created by
these governments simply self-serving, or are they aftermarks of influence from historic,
systemic oppression in states that fail to have the capacity to uphold traditional checks and
balances? Procedures to centralize executive power are common within developed states, and
have been seen as a method to effectively mitigate existential threats to a state. State capacity to2
administer these provisions, however, come into question when abuses of the systems occur. In
such manner, the ability for a weak, non-centralized state to have provisions which fail to limit
executive power may grant opportunity to allow an authoritarian regime to emplace itself in the
structure of a state. The purpose of this paper is to identify what factors contribute to the3
emergence of legal systems without effective executive constraints in developing countries. This
paper will show that authoritarian regimes are structurally dispositioned to secure an autocratic
position as a method to maintain long-term stability; allowing authoritarians to legally preserve
their roles through both constitutional mechanisms and state-sanctioned acts to subvert potential
threats to core institutions.
Countries with limited capacity may rely on Western models of legal structure. Whether
or not a developing state structures their legal precedent to match capacity could determine the
longevity of a country and its proclivity to authoritarianism. This paper could provide additional
credence to issues regarding developing states’ limited capacity in a postcolonial world, adding
current evidence to demonstrate a structural deficiency that tilts these countries toward autocratic
rule. This paper may also provide affirmation of contemporary models that identify authoritarian
state structures, as well as the application of traditional Western legal theories to a developing
state.
To aid in analysis of the case study, two major factors relating to the issue will be
discussed in order to provide foundational basis to interpret the findings. For both competitive
authoritarianism and constitutional accommodation, a significant area of current text is reliant
upon a few scholars. The latter, realism, is consistent with the viewpoints of the foundational
interpretations of this concept; a theory named “constitutional dictatorship,” coined by scholar
1
Norma J. Kriger. "Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay." Review of Our
Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Martin Meredith. Political Science Quarterly
118, no. 2 (2003): 307-313. http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/30035743
2
Bruce G Peabody. "George Washington, Presidential Term Limits, and the Problem of Reluctant Political
Leadership." Presidential Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2001): 439-53. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552322.
3
Alexander Baturo. "The Stakes of Losing Office, Term Limits and Democracy." British Journal of Political
Science 40, no. 3 (2010): 635-62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40930603.

Klein 3
Clinton Rossier, who built off the theories of infamous legal scholar Carl Schmitt. This4
theoretical perspective establishes the state as an institution consisting of legal norms, of which
permit the existence of a “sovereign” who may operate outside the legal boundaries permitted by
a state in the face of external threats. The threats mentioned in literature are broad, and provide5
the groundwork for an argument regarding internal threats to state structures which a sovereign,
or an authoritarian regime, has the ability to mitigate to ensure the long term stability of the
state. The former factor, competitive authoritarianism, is fronted by scholars Steven Levitsky6
and Lucan Way who argue that structural causes influence current norms relating to the adoption
of democracy rather than an authoritarian regime. The scholars further argue that many7
independent regimes are heavily influenced by the West, which provides a leverage point
towards liberal democratic systems of government rather than “electoral authoritarian” regimes.8
If viewed through this lense, one may state that electoral constraints are inherited by former
structural traits, or, that Western linkage and leverage are predetermined for instability in
developing states.9
In determining the subject of the case study, there are a number of governments that fit
the characteristics wherein an authoritarian regime rises from legal precedent. Nearly all the
examples are also postcolonial developing states. As aforementioned, Robert Mugabe persists as
a testament of an autocrat who legally garnered office and manufactured an authoritarian regime.
Zimbabwe exemplifies itself as a regime which lacks executive checks, leading to an
authoritarian being able to latch to the position for nearly thirty-five years. Zimbabwe, a natural
resource rich state in Sub-Saharan Africa gained independence from colonialism at the cost of
war, reaching varying degrees of stability since. Zimbabwe’s subjection to European10
Colonialism has led to significant, “inequalities in land distribution, in educational opportunity
and in labour conditions and job opportunities.” Zimbabwe’s condition also led it to the11
adoption of a democratic government modeled after a traditional Western legal system, which
bore norms ripe with colonial oppression. By independence, then-current Prime Minister12
Robert Mugabe, supported policies which expropriated property from commercial interests back
to peasant farmers, gaining enough legitimacy to become a democratically elected leader. From13
4
Clinton Rossiter. Constitutional Dictatorship. Princeton, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1948. 2002070330.
5
Sanford Levinson and Jack M Balkin. “Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design.” Minnesota Law
Review 94 (June 2010).
6
Nasser Hussain. The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 2009. 2003005027.
7
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010
8
Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War.
9
Yonatan L. Morse. “The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism.” World Politics 64, no. 1 (January 2012): 161–198.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000281
10
Kriger. "Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay." Review of Our Votes, Our
Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Meredith.
11
Andre du Pisani. “The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War.” Review of The Struggle for Zimbabwe:
The Chimurenga War by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson. (1981): 18-20.
http://www.patontrust.co.za/sites/default/files/renov82.10_0.pdf.
12
Eldred V. Masunungure. "Zimbabwe's Militarized, Electoral Authoritarianism." Journal of International Affairs
65, no. 1 (2011): 47-64. http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/24388181.
13
Whitlow, Richard. “Conflicts in Land Use in Zimbabwe: Political, Economic and Environmental Perspectives.”
Land Use Policy 2, no. 4 (October 1985): 309–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0264-8377(85)90029-8.

Klein 4
his initial election in 1980, Mugabe was able to capitalize on the newly found independent state,
forming a one-party system which used public elections validate their authority. From this14
approach, Mugabe further ingrained his party rule into the structure of Zimbabwe’s politics and
government by showcasing opposition parties as threats to the stability of Zimbabwe, rather
solely to himself. Mugabe tightened his rule leading to legally valid suppression through15
government institutions prior to elections. These elections essentially acted as referendums, as16
Mugabe continued to use the power of state institutions to retain legitimacy through an electoral
process.17
For evidence in analysis, the use of a number of databases to find primary sources paired
with peer-reviewed scholarly journals have been used. Specifically, the primary databases used
are JSTOR, Proquest Academic, CIAO, and ISO. Further, scholarly journal articles detailing
administrations, events, and elections were utilized in order to set a grounding for the paper.
Personal biographies have also been used in order to obtain an understanding of why and how
precedents were used strategically. Raw data, such as official election results and demographic
information from government agencies, have also been used with primary sources to support the
theoretical applications provided within this paper.
The paper is structured with an introduction to the topic which leads to a case study
focusing on Zimbabwe. Factor analysis will be reviewed in a literature review, serving to assist
the analysis of the findings from the case study. Within the literature review, competitive
authoritarianism will be discussed by notable scholars, while delving into a three major areas
within the study. Within those areas, Western linkage and its push towards democratization will
be debated by scholars; organizational power and whether or not it should be considered
coalitional will be presented; and Western leverage will be argued on by scholars who
differentiate between internal and external factors influencing democratization. Also discussed
within the literature review will be constitutional accommodations: including the debate on the
provision’s necessity and whether or not it affects stability. The case study will provide a
background to give context for the factor application. Two separate events within Zimbabwe’s
history will be discussed, presenting ideal conditions to demonstrate the application of each
theory in a practical setting. To conclude, a detailed analysis of the case studies will be
provided, followed with more general lessons, applications and prescriptions as noted within the
conclusion.
14
Lloyd Sachikonye. "The 1990 Zimbabwe Elections: A Post-Mortem." Review of African Political Economy, no.
48 (1990): 92-99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4005942; Nicolas Van De Walle. Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (2011):
195-96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23041839.
15
Staffan I. Lindberg. Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2006.
2005024560.
16
Lindberg. Democracy and Elections in Africa.
17
Xan Smiley. "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert Mugabe." Foreign Affairs 58, no. 5 (1980):
1060-083.

Klein 5
Literature Review
Competitive Authoritarianism
The advent of democratization from a number of postcolonial states has been met with
mixed results. One of the most notable challenges facing many developing states is the
circumvention of democracy using the methods present within most democratic systems. As
states move away from colonial regimes and begin linking themselves to Western interests,
authoritarian regimes have rekindled by using elections to legitimize their role at the head of
state. These mock democracies, better known as competitive authoritarianism, are hybrid
regimes which utilize traditional democratic institutions to create unmistakable authoritarian
states.18
As “political and economic orphans” of the Cold War, the wave of democratization from
the 1980s onward prompted many developing states to hold prolonged transitional periods to
become democratic. During these transitions, many governments adopted ideals which19
resembled liberal democracies, yet were diminished in capacity. This concept was ultimately20
defined by two norm theorists, Levitsky and Way, as “competitive authoritarianism;” which is
considered,
civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and
are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in
which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant
advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.21
The most predominant method of which these hybrid regimes use to consolidate and legitimize
power is considered “electoral authoritarianism,” where as defined by norm theorist Schedler:
authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections by
holding regular elections for the chief executive and a national
legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic
principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and
systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian
rule rather than ‘instruments of democracy.’ 22
18
Mario Bours Laborin. "Mock Democracies: Authoritarian Cover-ups" Review of Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky. Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011): 254-56.
http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/24388198.
19
Laborin. "Mock Democracies: Authoritarian Cover-ups" Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid
Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky; Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
after the Cold War; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 51–65.
https://muse-jhu-edu.jpllnet.sfsu.edu/article/17196
20
Levitsky and Way. “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.”
21
Dan Slater. Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky.
Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 2 (2011): 385-88. http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/41479662.
22
Andreas Schedler. “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism” in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of
Unfree Competition. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. http://www.ethiomedia.com/accent/ea_schedler.pdf.

Klein 6
Schedler notes that these elections are essentially façades resembling liberal democratic
elections, being, “broadly inclusive as well as minimally pluralistic, minimally competitive, and
minimally open.” This low, external-facing degree of Western values permit these23
governments to exude the impression that their governments are emulating democracy, whilst
trending their policies and institutions towards stable as well as legitimate authoritarianism.24
Although there are number of other methods to curtail liberal democratic practices within hybrid
regimes, namely marginalization of democratic institutions and the centralization of
administrative institutions to undermine public sovereignty, this review will focus on electoral
authoritarianism as the primary method supporting competitive authoritarianism.25
As a regime, most scholars agree competitive authoritarian governments are inherently
illiberal. Howard and Roessler argue that although hybrid regimes are broadly classified by26
their characteristics, certain aspects separate competitive authoritarianism from a slightly more
authoritarian form of institution they label “hegemonic authoritarianism” (as seen in Figure 1.) 27
Although scholars like Brownlee only distinguish hegemonic authoritarianism by the abstract
strength of oppositional parties, holding all other aspects equal; Howard and Roessler argue that
hegemonic authoritarian governments have even less competitive elections wherein rampant
“violations of political, civil, and human rights” lead to “a de-facto one-party state.” Levitsky28
and Way, however, disregard the definition of hegemonic authoritarianism by noting that
competitive authoritarian regimes comprise numerous illiberal methods to “create an uneven
playfield [sic] between government and opposition.” To this extent, competitive authoritarian29
regimes are traditionally characterized by open and contested elections, lacking only in the
significance of the results. With most authoritarians in hybrid regimes assuming office by a
significant margin, normally more than 75% according to Dommo, scholars have used empirical
analysis in order to determine factors that correlate to the perpetuation of these governments.30
23
Schedler. “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism” in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree
Competition. Page 3.
24
Marc Morjé Howard and Philip G. Roessler. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian
Regimes." American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (2006): 365-81.
25
Henry Hale, Nikolai Petrov, and Masha Lipman. “Overmanaged Democracy in Russia: Governance Implications
of Hybrid Regimes.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russia and Eurasia Program, no. 106 (February
2010). http://www.ciaonet.org.jpllnet.sfsu.edu/record/18835?search=1.
26
Levitsky and Way. “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism;” Howard and
Roessler. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes;” Masunungure. "Zimbabwe's
Militarized, Electoral Authoritarianism;" Daniela Donno. "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian
Regimes." American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (2013): 703-16.
27
Howard and Roessler. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.”
28
Jason Brownlee. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions." American Journal
of Political Science 53, no. 3 (2009): 515-32. http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/25548135.; Howard and
Roessler. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.”
29
Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Page 53.
30
Daniela Donno. "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes;" Chien-Wen Kou and Chieh Kou.
“Electoral Authoritarianism in the Third Wave of Democratization: Concepts and Regime Trajectories.”
Philadelphia, PA: Northeastern Political Science Association, 2011.
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/retrieve/98404/Kou-001.pdf.

Klein 7
Levitsky and Way’s book, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold
War, serves as the dominant political thought on the topic of competitive authoritarianism, and
considers most hybrid regimes being based upon three factors: “Western linkage, the
organizational power of authoritarian regimes, and Western Leverage.” 31
Western Linkage
Density of interaction with the West serves as the foundation to the maintenance of an
authoritarian regime, as noted by Levitsky and Way; movements towards democratization in
postcolonial states hinge on the total economic and social flow between borders. This linkage is32
noted by a number of scholars to have considerable impact to the long term democratization of a
state, with some such as Bruckner and Ciccone noting “transitory economic shocks can open a
window of opportunity for democratic change.” This liberal viewpoint is possessed by other33
scholars, such as Pop-Eleches who notes that Western linkage also has a significant impact on
soft power influence within social interactions, as the “promotion of democratic attitudes among
citizens yearning for Western integration” stands paramount in addition to hard power economic
31
Slater. Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky;
Levitsky and Way. “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.”
32
Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War; Laborin. "Mock
Democracies: Authoritarian Cover-ups" Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold
War by Steven Levitsky.
33
Markus Bruckner & Antonio Ciccone. “Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity.” Social Science
Electronic Publishing, October 12, 2008. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1107156; Kou and Kou. “Electoral
Authoritarianism in the Third Wave of Democratization: Concepts and Regime Trajectories;” Brownlee. "Portents
of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions."

Klein 8
relationships. General agreement among scholars note that the higher the relationship between34
a postcolonial state and the West, the less likely the state is to trend towards authoritarianism;
yet, a lesser relationship does not exactly correlate among scholars a trend towards
authoritarianism in the same manner. Rather, Levitsky, Way and Pop-Eleches argue that35
organizational capacity and vested domestic power within authoritarian regimes hold sizable
influence in determining a hybrid regime.36
Organizational Power
Way argues that many governments facing increasingly weaker forms of democratic
pressures from marginalized relationships with the West have demonstrated a willingness to
invest power into internal institutions which regulate general economic and social relationships
for the state as a whole. Both Friedrich and Brzezinski articulate that as the West continued to37
develop in linear fashion, many non-democratic states feared instability and resulted to autocratic
governments to develop stable institutions. They note that as “[t]hese autocratic regimes of the38
past, while lasting over long periods, witnessed [...] periods of relative order and domestic peace
[given] fierce oppression and tyrannical abuse of power.” These authoritarian institutions39
become commonplace in many postcolonial states in order to maintain general stability in the
short term, yet with the proliferation of other hybrid regimes, scholars like Diamond and
Brownlee disagree with a decisively structuralist view by arguing that these marginalized states
essentially bandwagoned to parallel like governments. Laborin contrasts with the liberals by40
noting that the higher the degree of organization structure and power can all but assure
competitive authoritarian regimes in low-linkage states. Levitsky and Way, however, have41
responded through their research that low organizational power does not necessarily correlate to
authoritarianism among the fourteen states featured within their case studies.42
34
Grigore Pop-Eleches. “Between Historical Legacies and the Promise of Western Integration: Democratic
Conditionality after Communism.” East European Politics & Societies and Cultures 21 (February 2007): 142–61.
doi:10.1177/0888325406297126.
35
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. “Introduction” and “Theoretical Framework” in Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Stephanie A. Matti, "The
Democratic Republic of the Congo? Corruption, Patronage, and Competitive Authoritarianism in the DRC." Africa
Today 56, no. 4 (2010): 42-61; Kou and Kou. “Electoral Authoritarianism in the Third Wave of Democratization:
Concepts and Regime Trajectories;” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107156
36
Pop-Eleches. “Between Historical Legacies and the Promise of Western Integration: Democratic Conditionality after
Communism.”
37
Lucan Way. “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The
Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.” World Politics 57, no. 02 (January 2005): 231–61.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2005.0018.
38
Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 2nd ed. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.
39
Friedrich and Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.
40
Brownlee. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions;”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01636608909443713
41
Laborin. "Mock Democracies: Authoritarian Cover-ups" Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid
Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky.
42
Dan Slater, and Sofia Fenner. "State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian
Durability." Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011): 15-29.

Klein 9
Within the conversation of the collective power of the organizational capacity of a hybrid
regime lies an additional argument regarding the impact institutions may have. Although most
scholars with knowledge of the topic agree with Levitsky and Way that states with higher
capacities of organizational structures trend towards authoritarianism, Slater posits “both regime
strength and oppositional strength [are] more coalitional than purely organizational,” as a variety
of factors shape the practical capacity in an electoral authoritarian regime. Slater’s makes two43
essential arguments: (1) oppositional parties reinforce standing regimes as they serve as a
validator of competition within elections, and (2) oppositional parties can act as a signifier of
democratization. The former, is a key argument made in defining electoral authoritarianism as
stated by Bodgaards, as without competition, the government lacks significant identifiers which
allows it to project the façade of democracy through its transition. The latter, is discussed in44
depth by Schedler in a number of his works, where he states “electoral competition is ‘nested’
inside electoral reform,” essentially dignifying the theory that the more electoral movements
become commonplace, the closer a state becomes to democracy.45
Western Leverage
Granted organizational power is a major determinant for a state’s proclivity to a
competitive authoritarian regime, perhaps one of the strongest indicators in identifying or
prescribing a state as a hybrid regime is the state’s “Western Leverage.” Levitsky and Way46
identify the Western Leverage as a factor indicating a state’s “vulnerability to Western
democratizing pressure.” Separate the two other causal factors, leverage predicts the stability47
of any regime and is paramount to the maintenance of a hybrid regime’s authoritarianism.
Therefore, leverage is inherently connected to Western Linkage, as the two actively drive each
other. Undoubtedly, a debate exists within the theory to whether or not Western Leverage is
entirely the product of external factors, as discussed by Tolstrup, or; if Western Leverage is not
isolated to external influence, rather the product of a historical structure which has been marred
by colonial oppression and other added layers, as believed by Levitsky and Way. Tolstrup48
http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/24388179; Slater. Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid
Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky;
43
Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War; Levitsky and Way.
“Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism;”
44
Matthijs Bogaards. “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism.”
Democratization 16, no. 2 (April 6, 2009): 399–423.
45
Andreas Schedler. “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections.” International Political Science Review
23, no. 1 (n.d.): 103–22. doi:10.1177/0192512102023001006; Andreas Schedler. The Politics of Uncertainty:
Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism. Oxford Studies in Democratization. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013; Andreas Schedler. “Electoral Authoritarianism.” Emerging Trends in the Social and
Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, April 15, 2015, 1–16.
doi:10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0098.
46
Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War.
47
Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Page 54.
48
Jakob Tolstrup. “When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper
Elites.” Democratization 20, no. 4 (April 10, 2012): 716–42. doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.666066; Steven Levitsky
and Lucan Way. “International Linkage and Democratization.” Journal of Democracy, Democracy and Human
Rights, 16, no. 3 (June 2005): 20–34. doi:10.1353/jod.2005.0048.

Klein 10
argues “that structural approaches are useful in explaining interregional differences in external
influence, but have difficulties coping with cases that do not adhere to the overall structural
pattern.” Tolstrup says, that in reality, the,49
structural determinants (linkages) that constitute the basis of
[Levitsky and Way’s] explanation are not non-amenable as they
claim, but can be influenced to a great extent by what I term the
gatekeeper elites of the target country. That is, [...] domestic elites
should not only be perceived as mere objects of external influence,
as they are in the structural accounts, but rather as gatekeepers that
actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors.50
That is to say, that although Western leverage plays a significant role in addressing internal
reaction to external influence, total penetration of the influence is limited by the general structure
of the state. On the other hand, Levitsky and Way treat Western leverage as an implied social
and political norm which increases the tendency to trend towards democratization on all levels of
society, effectively bypassing any “gatekeeper.” Both Grugel and Bishop support Levitsky and51
Way by stating: for “the case of a number of African countries, ‘democratization’ became largely
a reflection of the leverage of international agencies and western mores,” where it was later
noted that the actors involved in leveraging towards democracy were comprised “of not only
self-interested donors, and incumbent regimes, but also non-state actors and other pro-democracy
forces, including non-governmental within and beyond the region.” Slater, on the other hand,52
works to undermine the total effectiveness of leverage compared to total internal factors. Slater
theorizes that,
placing more causal weight on incumbent weakness rather than
Western leverage also seems warranted in cases of unstable
authoritarianism [...] Where the states are extremely weak, one can
draw a straight arrow from low organizational power to unstable
authoritarianism, without any mediation by Western leverage.53
As with other norm theories, the total impact of Western leverage is disputed. Western
influence can be considered a negative influencer towards a developing state, as it can bring
violence to a hybrid regime and lead to destabilization, or potential authoritarian crackdowns, as
argued by Grugel and Bishop. They state “the tendency of the international community to try54
and promote democratization through aid leverages has led authoritarian office-holders to
49
Tolstrup. “When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper Elites.”
50
Tolstrup. “When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper Elites.”
51
Levitsky and Way. “International Linkage and Democratization.”
52
Jean Grugel, and Matthew Louis Bishop. Democratization: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013. Page 273 - 274.
https://books.google.com/books?id=m1EdBQAAQBAJ&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s.
53
Slater. Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky; Slater
and Fenner. "State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability."
54
Grugel and Bishop. Democratization: A Critical Introduction.

Klein 11
introduce electoral procedures for completely cynical motives.” Additionally, another noted55
critic of western leverage is that the impact of the West may be weighted less than regional
neighbors or allies. “Neighbor emulation” is Brinks’ noted evidence based on regionality which
both supports Western leverage and adds an additional factor to competitive authoritarianism.56
Along with Coppedge, Brinks found in a co-authored study “that countries tend to change their
regimes to match the average degree of democracy or nondemocracy found among their
contiguous neighbors” and within the same period of time “countries in the U.S. sphere of
influence tended to become more democratic.” This “status anxiety,” as coined by Slater,57
centers “around fears of Western domination more than ostracism.” Thus it can be said by58
scholars that Western leverage could have an unknown influence towards developing states with
competitive authoritarian regimes. Paired with linkage and regime organizational power (as
modeled in Figure 2), competitive authoritarianism provides a theoretical perspective to
understand the lack of constraints on chief executives of developing states.
Constitutional Dictatorships
Clinton Rossiter coined the term “Constitutional Dictatorship” to explain the
circumvention the Weimar Constitution through the use of Article 48, wherein emergency
55
Grugel and Bishop. Democratization: A Critical Introduction. Page 112.
56
Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge. “Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of
Democracy.” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 4 (May 2006): 463–89. doi:0.1177/0010414005276666.
57
Brinks & Coppedge. “Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy.”
58
Slater. Review of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War by Steven Levitsky.

Klein 12
powers were granted to the executive which overruled the extent of judicial authority, permitting
the Nazi regime to hold unchecked power within the chief executive office. Rossiter argues that59
this form of a regime was unusual, where the provisions which constrain power in terms of total
extent as well as tenure were unfettered, and in practice; it is necessary for contemporary
governments to hold similar provisions to Article 48 in order to meet the demands of a state
within the international system. Rossiter argued, “[n]o form of government can survive that60
excludes dictatorships when the life of the nation is at stake.” This viewpoint is held by a61
variety of other legal scholars, who ultimately provide the position that as the world continues to
progress, economic and social conflicts cannot be mitigated by traditional democratic
government structures, and require authoritarian institutions to meet the potential demands
enlisted by external threats.62
Rossiter’s work provides a definition of constitutional dictatorships, which are also
known as “constitutional accommodations,” being:
the complex system of government of democratic, constitutional
states is essentially designed to function under normal, peaceful
conditions, and is often unequal to the exigencies of a great
national crisis [...] therefore in the time of crisis a democratic,
constitutional government must become temporary altered to
whatever degree is necessary to overcome the peril and restore
normal conditions.63
Daniel Ogden clarifies that the resulting government “in some instances might become an
outright dictatorship,” when the maintenance of the state comes before the general sovereignty of
the public.64
Constitutional dictatorships are primarily faced with the question of necessity. For many
constitutional and legal scholars, the requirement of a constitutional accommodation during a
period of emergency is trivial. Legal thinker Ackerman echoes Rossiter by stating that65
59
Clinton Rossiter. Constitutional Dictatorship. Princeton, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1948. 2002070330.
60
Rossiter. Constitutional Dictatorship.
61
Rossiter. Constitutional Dictatorship. Page 4.
62
Virginia Wood. Review of Constitutional Dictatorship by Clinton L. Rossiter. The Journal of Politics 11, no. 1
(1949): 261-63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2126510; Mitchell Dean. Governing Societies: Political Perspectives on
Domestic and International Rule. Issues in Society. London: McGraw-Hill Education, 2007. Page 111.
https://books.google.com/books?id=iBC0H98Dw9cC&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s; Jennifer Gandhi and Adam
Przeworski. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” Comparative Political Studies, September
17, 2007. doi:10.1177/0010414007305817; Giorgio Agamben. State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005; Carl Schmitt. Political Theology. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1985. 2005048576.
63
Rossiter. Constitutional Dictatorship; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Owen Gross. Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency
Powers in Theory and Practice. Vol. 46. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
64
Daniel M. Ogden, Jr. Review of Constitutional Dictatorship by Clinton L. Rossiter. The Western Political
Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1949): 665.
65
Bruce Ackerman. "The Emergency Constitution." The Yale Law Journal 113, no. 5 (2004): 1029-091; Bruce
Ackerman. Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism. Yale University Press, 2006;

Klein 13
democratic regimes are the “root of the problem itself;” as responses to instability are poor
within liberal democracies as their, “constitutions often contain elaborate safeguards on the use
of emergency powers” which limit the government’s ability to mitigate threats. Although66
Ackerman’s noted reservations, he believes that during moments of emergency, as exemplified
in events such as 9/11, the constitution should serve as an outline to measures necessary to
counter threats. Scholars such as Freejohn and Pasquino bring the ideas brought by Ackerman67
to a theoretical standpoint, stating that provisions which enable a constitutional accommodation
are required in any given contemporary government, however, practical implementation has
provided multiple avenues to pursue. Thus, the argument in favor of the need of provisions is68
categorized by two noted ways of thinking, as first noted by Issacharoff, being: (1) stabilizing the
government with current institutional arrangements, and (2) maintaining the government by
building functional, rather than jurisprudential, institutions.69
The former, using constitutional authority to stabilize the state by using the state’s current
apparatus, are driven primarily by the works of Tusseau and Friedrich. As Morgenthau notes,70
there is an, “inevitable connection between democracy and dictatorship, and the irreversible
trend towards the latter in all democracies,” where it appears that the structure of politics is
destined to move towards authoritarianism due to a few factors. Tusseau is possessed to believe71
that these factors are all but limited to the structure of the legal institution as it stands prior to the
moment of action that leads to a constitutional accommodation. By this take, it is the duty of72
the state in its legal capacity to contribute to the mitigation of a threat by amending societal
norms. Friedrich believes that the only through totalitarianism, as produced by an
accommodation in this context, can a government provide the institutional framework to give
current structures capacity to produce change. Friedrich exemplifies this idea with the73
administrative complex in the Soviet Union as, “an extension of the totalitarian dictatorship of
the Soviet Union in the part of Germany it controlled,” allowing unprecedented management of
public perception and opinion. From this concept, Tusseau states that a government’s legal74
system essentially stabilizes a government by providing legal access to, “produce [norms to]
John Freejohn and Pasquale Pasquino. “The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers.” International
Justice Constitutional Law 210, no. 2 (2004).
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/injcl2&div=16&id=&page=; Jeremy Rayner. “The
Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 4 (November
21, 2007): 1072–74. doi:10.1017/S0008423907071338.
66
Ackerman. Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism.
67
Ackerman. "The Emergency Constitution;" Laurence H. Tribe and Patrick O.Gudridge. "The Anti-Emergency
Constitution." The Yale Law Journal. 113, no. 8 (2004): 1801-870.
68
Freejohn and Pasquino. “The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers.”
69
Samuel Issacharoff. "Political Safeguards in Democracies at War." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29, no. 2
(2009): 189-214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27750046.
70
Guillaume Tusseau. "The Concept of Constitutional Emergency Power: A Theoretical and Comparative
Approach." ARSP: Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy 97, no. 4 (2011): 498-530. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681137; Carl J. Friedrich, "Military
Government and Dictatorship." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 267 (1950):
1-7. http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/1026722.
71
Hans J. Morgenthau. Review of Constitutional Dictatorship by Clinton L. Rossiter. American Journal of
Sociology 54, no. 6 (1949): 566-67. http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/2770805.
72
Tusseau. "The Concept of Constitutional Emergency Power: A Theoretical and Comparative Approach."
73
Friedrich, "Military Government and Dictatorship."
74
Friedrich, "Military Government and Dictatorship."

Klein 14
have a legal form,” to alter the public’s attitude towards an emergency, further countering the
threat.75
Apropos to current state structures initiating societal norm change, the concept of
maintaining government through effective, extra-legal institutions opposed to jurisprudential
institutions stands as a more common ideal among scholars. Most predominantly influencing is
the work of Carl Schmitt, who outlined the foundations of the state of exception relating to
constitutional dictatorships. This state of exception is similar to the modern contemporary state,76
however, it is, as Tusseau states:
rooted in the strange self-reflective paradox that, in order to face an
emergency which is threatening the fundamental values of the
legal order, it may be necessary to accept that those values be
temporarily mistreated, precisely so that they may be established or
re-established.77
As Morgenthau notes from Rossiter: “the renovation of the entire constitutional structure and the
creation of a national government capable of dealing resolutely and effectively with the
bewildering problems of this twentieth century world.” This state, where necessitas legem non78
hebet (necessity has no law), is essentially a “threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and
absolutism” that enables an executive to purposefully act outside of all institutions within a
constitutional government, using methods to secure the tenure of the state, regardless of the risk
of permanent authoritarianism or impacts: ultimately to uphold the stability of the state without
care for the cost on the public. 79
Other scholars believe that constitutional responses are not necessary in most
circumstances due to the risk of the unforeseen with the power given. Gross states that
“extra-legal measures” place emphasis on the requirement to act outside prescribed law not due
to the crises of the state, but rather that new powers which do not have the risk of “legal and
political reparations,” provide an incentive to use. Ní Aoláin holds the perspective that80
constitutional drafters cannot provide contingencies for all emergencies, yet that deferring to a
constitutional accommodation would be an abnormally intensive response. Instead, Ní Aoláin81
states that a more effective method to respond to an emergency would be, “through introducing
legislative amendments and modifications into the existing ordinary legal terrain [with] the belief
is that such answers exist within some legal framework that does not require a complete overhaul
of the existing system.” Further, Finn argues that within a constitutional dictatorship, the,82
“relationship between constitutional documents and the constitutive principles of
constitutionalism” may provide a willful lack of understanding to the extent of authority granted
75
76
Schmitt. Political Theology.
77
78
Morgenthau. Review of Constitutional Dictatorship by Clinton L. Rossiter.
79
Agamben. State of Exception.
80
Oren Gross. "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?" The Yale Law
Journal 112, no. 5 (2003): 1011-134.
81
Ní Aoláin and Gross. Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice.
82

Klein 15
by the constitution, to where Finn continues that the “rejection or denial of constitutional
authority is violent” and leads to repercussions with an “unusually wide scope.” 83
Consequently, the circumvention of a given government’s constitution can be considered
a legitimate method to maintain power, given the necessity of perpetuating state stability. In most
contemporary governments, constitutional accommodations are considered necessary by scholars
due to the quick nature and ability for authoritarians to mitigate external threats to democracy.84
On the other hand, given weak and failing state’s proclivity to authoritarianism as noted within
the theory of competitive authoritarianism, governments which utilize a constitutional
accommodation frequently or outside of times of emergency, may devolve into a permanent
hybrid regime.
Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how dictators and other autocrats
have legitimized their regime through the methods aforementioned. Through the use of
Zimbabwe as a case study, two different events will exhibit themselves as examples of the
application of both constitutional accommodations and electoral authoritarianism. In the context
of constitutional accommodations, Zimbabwe will demonstrate the applied theory as a method to
retain stability in its immediate post-independence unification efforts. As for competitive
authoritarianism, the 2008 Presidential Elections will exhibit a definitive case of the practice,
with a number of nuances which will be explored in the analysis of the paper. These case studies
will foremost demonstrate that authoritarian regimes are structurally positioned to prolong their
tenures as a means to stabilize the state through legal acts, subverting threats to the core
institutions of the state.
Case Study
Zimbabwe Background
Zimbabwe holds a tempered past that has shaped the fragile state. Marks of European
Colonialism are ubiquitous, and the force behind the current regime are abundant. A landlocked
and resource rich state in Southern Africa, more than ninety-nine percent of the state is black,
divided between two significant Bantu-speaking groups, the Shona and Ndebele. The one85
percent non-black population consists nearly entirely of immigrants from the United Kingdom
and South Africa.86
Zimbabwe’s contemporary history began with the annexation of Southern Rhodesia, a
major mineral mining colony, by the United Kingdom from the former British South Africa
Company in 1923. The self governing colony was ruled by a small white minority which
instituted a number of “whites first” policies. In 1940, the white government passed the Land87
Apportionment Act, which restricted land ownership from blacks, compelling much of the
83
84
Wood. Review of Constitutional Dictatorship by Clinton L. Rossiter; Dean. Governing Societies: Political
Perspectives on Domestic and International Rule.
85
“Data: Zimbabwe.” The World Bank, accessed July 22, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/country/zimbabwe; “The
World Factbook: Zimbabwe.” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed July 22, 2016.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html
86
“Data: Zimbabwe.” The World Bank.
87
“Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC, accessed July 22, 2016. June 10, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113618

Klein 16
population into labor markets. This conflict in land usage spurred significant animosity88
between the minority and majority within the state, serving a primary role in the black
independence movement.89
After nearly forty years of colonial rule, the white minority authored a constitution for
Rhodesia in 1961 which further codified the apartheid system of government. In response, two90
militant groups, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU), formed an organized effort against the colonial government. With91
conflict rising domestically, the white government known as the Rhodesian Front, requested
independence from the British Crown. The United Kingdom, however, required the Rhodesian
Front to grant additional voting rights to the Africans as a condition of independence. To the
contrary, the Rhodesian Front unilaterally declared independence in 1965, attracting international
outrage and a range of economic sanctions by both the Commonwealth and the United Nations.92
The Rhodesian Bush War began soon after as both the ZAPU and ZANU groups began
utilizing guerrilla warfare techniques against the Rhodesian Front, with the conflict between the
three parties serving as a bastion of Cold War ideology. The Rhodesian Front remained a
disfigured Western force, with both the ZAPU and the ZANU being heavily influenced by the
East. ZAPU’s core ideology consisted of Marxism and relied on the supply of the Warsaw Pact
and Soviet Union. ZANU, however, was ideologically driven by Maoism, with great support by
Communist China. As time progressed into the late 1970s, the Rhodesian Front’s willingness to93
fight diminished. By 1978, the Rhodesian Front began peace dealings with both the ZANU and
ZAPU. After a brief short lived brokered state, the United Kingdom negotiated a new94
constitution for the country of Zimbabwe under the 1980 Lancaster Agreement which guaranteed
a more representative government and reversed apartheid government policies.95
The following 1980 election, observed by the United Kingdom, saw the ZANU win
nearly fifty-seven of the eighty open black seats within the legislature, providing the party a
comfortable lead over the ZAPU and the twenty reserved white seats. The ZANU Leader,96
Robert Mugabe, prepared extensive land use and economic policy reforms which served as
88
“History of Zimbabwe.” Zimbabwe Embassy in Stockholm, accessed July 22, 2016. 2009.
http://www.zimembassy.se/history.html; “Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC.
89
Richard Whitlow. “Conflicts in Land Use in Zimbabwe: Political, Economic and Environmental Perspectives.”
Land Use Policy 2, no. 4 (October 1985): 309–22. doi:10.1016/0264-8377(85)90029-8.
90
“History of Zimbabwe.” Zimbabwe Embassy in Stockholm.
91
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Peter Lang. Do “Zimbabweans” Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National
Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Africa in Development 3. Bern, Switzerland: International
Academic Publishers, 2009. Page 43; Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. “Zimbabwe: History of a Struggle.”
Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, March 1972.
https://archive.org/details/ZimbabweHistoryOfAStruggle.
92
“Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC; “The World Factbook: Zimbabwe.” Central Intelligence Agency.
93
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Lang. Do “Zimbabweans” Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation
and Crisis in a Postcolonial State; Joshua Eisenman. “Zimbabwe: China’s African Ally.” China Brief 5, no. 15 (July
5, 2005).
http://web.archive.org/web/20070805023113/http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&
issue_id=3390&article_id=2369974.
94
“Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC; “The World Factbook: Zimbabwe.” Central Intelligence Agency.
95
“The World Factbook: Zimbabwe.” Central Intelligence Agency.
96
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Lang. Do “Zimbabweans” Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation
and Crisis in a Postcolonial State; “1980: Mugabe to Lead Independent Zimbabwe.” BBC, March 4, 1980, On This
Day edition. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid_2515000/2515145.stm.

Klein 17
reparations to the impact of the Land Apportionment Act of 1940, allowing Mugabe to promote
himself into the Prime Ministership.97
Mugabe then moved to unify ZAPU and ZANU. Summarily appointing the leader of
ZAPU to a cabinet level position only to later accused them of treason and used a special
division of the military to crackdown on ZAPU supporters. As will be discussed below, this98
internal conflict emphasizes Mugabe’s power as an executive, leading to him significantly
restructuring the state. By 1987, Mugabe restructured ZANU to encompass the remainder of
ZAPU, creating the ruling hegemonic party Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
(ZANU–PF) and reformed the government in 1987 to eliminate the last apartheid influences. 99
After a number of landslide elections, Mugabe and his ZANU-PF faced growing
dissent. A constitutional provision ushering a pro-black land redistribution campaign which100
began in 1997 was soundly defeated by fifty-four percent of the popular vote after it shorted
economic growth and protected government corruption. With the newly organized opposition,101
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), elections saw a large decrease in the total
representation by ZANU-PF. This trend met a short-lived reversal in 2005, when the ZANU-PF
made a number of gains in national elections, winning nearly 69 of 120 contested seats.102
Despite the victory, the election was considered internationally to have a number of irregularities
within the contested elections as both intimidation and “ghost voters” may of played a substantial
role.103
Soon after the election in 2005, the Mugabe government initiated a government
crackdown entitled “Operation Murambatsvina,” which forcibly cleared a number of urban slums
who supported opposition candidates. This retaliation by Mugabe has been seen as a method to104
both punish MDC supporters and encite friction from the public against local MDC
governments.105
By 2008, the MDC’s support grew to a head after government instituted price controls on
fledgling hyperinflation rate failed, and in the first round of voting opposition leader Morgan
97
“History of Zimbabwe.” Zimbabwe Embassy in Stockholm.
98
Kriger. "Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay." Review of Our Votes, Our
Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Meredith; “Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC.
99
Nicolas Van De Walle. Review of A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe by
Daniel Compagnonan. Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (2011): 195-96.
100
“Elections in Zimbabwe.” African Elections Database, accessed July 25, 2016. November 30, 2008.
http://africanelections.tripod.com/zw.html.
101
Barbara Slaughter, and Stuart Nolan. “Zimbabwe: Referendum Defeat for Mugabe Shakes Zanu-PF
Government.” International Committee of the Fourth International, February 22, 2000.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/02/zimb-f22.html; “Fast Track and Land Reform in Zimbabwe.” Human
Rights Watch, March 2002. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302.pdf.
102
“Mugabe’s Party Sweeps to Victory.” BBC. April 2, 2005, sec. Africa.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4399501.stm.
103
Alec Russell.“‘Ghost Voters’ Haunt Zimbabwe Poll.” Financial Times, March 28, 2008.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/08ece9d4-fce9-11dc-961e-000077b07658.
104
“Order out of Chaos, or Chaos out of Order? A Preliminary Report on Operation ‘Murambatsvina.” Zimbabwe
Human Rights NGO Forum, June 2005.
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/ZHRNGOFOrderoutofchaos.htm.
105
“Zimbabwe Cleric Urges ‘Uprising.’” BBC, March 27, 2005, Africa edition.

Klein 18
Tsvangirai won the popular vote. A disputed second round of voting amidst rapidly increasing106
violence resulted in Tsvangirai pulling out and Mugabe receiving nearly eighty-five percent of
the vote. Although the MDC lost the executive, ZANU-PF lost the legislative majority for the107
first time in Zimbabwe’s history. Soon after, a unity government and power-sharing agreement108
was created wherein Mugabe retained the Office of the President while Tsvangirai assumed the
role of Prime Minister. Mugabe has retained the executive despite international condemnation109
through the 2013 national elections, until present day.110
The Fifth Brigade and the Gukurahundi
On the eve of independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe prepared to unify and reconcile a
fractured Zimbabwe. Mugabe and the ZANU, a Shona group based in the north of the country,
recognized the only potential opposition and threat to stability was a power struggle with the
ZAPU. The ZAPU, speaking Ndebele and residing in Southern Zimbabwe with many whites,
were ideologically and ethnically distinct from the ZANU, and had a cornerstone of parliament
by holding nearly twenty of the reserved eighty black seats. Also on Mugabe’s mind was the111
conflict regarding the ideological direction of the new country, which appeared to be at a peak.112
Whether or not the state would would move forward with policies consistent with Communist
China or the Soviet Union was a tantamount concern paired with the long term stability of the
state.113
Mugabe, the Prime Minister at the time, determined first to incorporate leaders of the
ZAPU into the newly formed government. Mugabe’s appointment of Joshua Nkomo, leader of
the ZAPU, to the Minister of Home Affairs pacified some of the mistrust in Nkomo’s potential to
usurp the new government’s authority. However, Mugabe still stood suspicious of Nkomo and114
106
Lauren Ploch. “Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and Implications for U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service,
May 22, 2008. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/106142.pdf; Chris McGrill. “This Is No Election. This Is
a Brutal War.” The Guardian, June 21, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1; Tendai
Maphosa. “Zimbabwe Sets Date for Runoff Amid Increasing Violence.” News VOA. May 22, 2008.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-05-16-voa47.cfm.
107
“Mugabe Begins New Term as Criticism on One-Man Election Mounts.” The Manilla Times. July 1, 2008.
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2518&dat=20080701&id=NE5aAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DCgMAAAAIBAJ&p
g=1518,9518084.
108
“Mugabe’s Zanu-PF Loses Majority.” BBC, April 3, 2008, sec. Africa.
109
Eldred Masunungure and Michael Bratton. “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony.” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (October
2008): 41–55. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0024.
110
Blessing-Miles Tendi. “Robert Mugabe’s 2013 Presidential Election Campaign.” Journal of Southern African
Studies, Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe, 39, no. 4 (December 16, 2013): 963–70.
doi:10.1080/03057070.2013.858537; Brian Raftopoulos. “The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era.”
Journal of Southern African Studies, Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe, 39, no. 4 (December 16, 2013):
971–88. doi:10.1080/03057070.2013.862101.
111
“1980: Mugabe to Lead Independent Zimbabwe.” BBC.
112
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Lang. Do “Zimbabweans” Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity
Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Page 117
113
Eisenman. “Zimbabwe: China’s African Ally.”
114
Kriger. "Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay." Review of Our Votes,
Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Meredith; “Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC.

Klein 19
the few factions of the ZAPU who failed to recognize the new government. Frequent fighting115
between factions of both the ZAPU and the ZANU soon after elections brought Mugabe to lose
his faith in a multi-party system. Mugabe’s non-understanding of unification between the two116
major groups was clear, saying in 1981 that he could not “understand the intentions of people
who refuse to join the party that was responsible for the independence and freedom of
Zimbabwe.” 117
Instability within the particular region of Matabeleland was of concern for Mugabe. The
home of the ZAPU featured both a great deal of natural resources for Zimbabwe, which recently
had a number of trade sanctions lifted as a result of independence, as well as the core of the
tensions between the two parties. To this extent, the debate in Matabeleland consisted not only118
of sparring political factions, but also a conflict between the Shona and the Ndebele, presenting
no clear solutions to the conflict. Many holdouts from the ZAPU embedded in the region
maintained their distance from the Mugabe Government due to the ideological differences
between the two groups, as well as the growing anti-white sentiment held by Mugabe and his
supporters. Although the ZAPU held anti-RF opinions, Matabeleland was home to the largest119
populations of the white minority, including those who assisted the Africans during the
Rhodesian Bush War.120
Ultimately, it was not this dispute alone that led to Mugabe’s eventual violence. It was
when small in-fighting began to occur during the integration of both the ZANU and the ZAPU
into the Zimbabwe Military. In response, Mugabe acted as an executive and began instituting121
policies to counter the potential threat posed to the state’s core institution. In February 1981,
Mugabe began a campaign led by the local military across the nation to begin arresting those
causing disturbances as well as imposing a local curfew in areas of Matabeleland.122
Further, Mugabe, mistrusting the composition of the military at the time, enlisted a
contract with North Korea to train a fighting force of Shona ZANU loyalists who could bring
order to Matabeleland. Mugabe, fearing for the state as an institution organized this new army,123
the Fifth Brigade, to report and be responsible only to the Office of the Prime Minister. In the124
commission of the contract with the North Korean advisors, the government's official
justification was both the “scale of the threat posed by dissident activity” and an impending
115
Timothy Scarnecchia. “Rationalizing Gukurahundi: Cold War and South African Foreign Relations with
Zimbabwe, 1981-1983.” Kronos 37, no. 1 (January 2011). http://ref.scielo.org/wf4fv2.
116
Ian Phimister. “The Making and Meanings of the Massacres in Matabeleland.” Development Dialogue 50
(December 2008): 199–215.
117
Phimister. “The Making and Meanings of the Massacres in Matabeleland.”
118
Muchaparara Musemwa. “Disciplining a ‘Dissident’ City: Hydropolitics in the City of Bulawayo, Matabeleland,
Zimbabwe, 1980–1994.” Journal of Southern African Studies 32, no. 2 (September 4, 2006): 239–54.
doi:10.1080/03057070600656119.
119
Jeremy Youde. "Why Look East? Zimbabwean Foreign Policy and China."Africa Today 53, no. 3 (2007): 3-19.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187790; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Lang. Do “Zimbabweans” Exist?: Trajectories of
Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Page 120
120
Youde. "Why Look East? Zimbabwean Foreign Policy and China."
121
Shari Eppel. “‘Gukurahundi:’ The Need for Truth and Reparation.” In Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political
Reconciliation, by Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage, 43–64. Reconciliation. African Minds, 2004.
122
Eppel. “‘Gukurahundi:’ The Need for Truth and Reparation.” In Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political
Reconciliation, by Raftopoulos and Savage.
123
124

Klein 20
threat poised by the opportunity to intervene by South Africa. Summarily, the state was being125
threatened by both internal and external forces, and thus Mugabe, as the head of state, exercised
his constitutional mandate to protect the institution of government.126
By 1982, Mugabe rid his cabinet of ZAPU members, and began directing the North
Korean trained Fifth Brigade to enter Matabeleland. Although the Fifth Brigade’s initial focus127
was on ZAPU loyalists and insurrection leaders, Mugabe quickly shifted orders for the elite unit
to refocus efforts on the Ndebele under the guise of counterinsurgency efforts. The Fifth128
Brigade indiscriminately selected many local Ndebele as ZAPU Loyalists, conducting mass
beatings, categorical rape, and massacres in the name of Mugabe. Subsequently, the129
government prolonged the campaign and named it “Gukurahundi,” meaning in Shona: “the early
rain which washes away the chaff before the spring.” The Gukurahundi would last five years,130
from 1983 to 1987, and claim an estimated range between four-thousand to thirty-thousand lives.
The tactics used by the Fifth Brigade throughout the campaign indicated an arbitrary nature to131
killings, including one incident where men of fighting age were arrested by the Fifth Brigade due
to the potential of them being dissidents. These Ndebele men were either executed or sent to132
“reeducation camps” wherein torture and other human rights violations occurred. Another133
incident occurred towards the beginning of Gukurahundi where members of the Fifth Brigade
took part in a mass execution of sixty-two men and women on the banks of the Cewale River .134
The total number of human rights abuses is still unknown, however, general post-conflict
estimates place the number of violations by all sides above seven-thousand (as seen by Figure
125
Scarnecchia. “Rationalizing Gukurahundi: Cold War and South African Foreign Relations with Zimbabwe,
1981-1983;” Phimister. “The Making and Meanings of the Massacres in Matabeleland;”
Celia Dugger. “Art Exhibit Stirs Up the Ghosts of Zimbabwe’s Past.” New York Times. January 23, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/world/africa/24zimbabwe.html?_r=2&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha3.
126
127
“Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC.
128
Alan Cowell. “Mugabe’s Fifth Brigade: Grounded in Loyalty.” New York Times. March 6, 1983.
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/06/world/mugabe-s-fifth-brigade-grounded-in-loyalty.html; Stuart Doran. “New
Documents Claim to Prove Mugabe Ordered Gukurahundi Killings.” The Guardian, May 19, 2015.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland.
129
Timothy Scarnecchia. "An Important Document on Political Violence in Zimbabwe." Review of Gukurahundi in
Zimbabwe: A Report of the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988 by Elintor Sisulu. The
Journal of African History 49, no. 3 (2008): 493-95. http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/40206686;
1981-1983;” Eppel. “‘Gukurahundi:’ The Need for Truth and Reparation.” In Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political
130
131
“Breaking the Silence - Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands.”
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, April 1999.
https://web.archive.org/web/20090211071232/http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf; Geoff Hill. The Battle for
Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown. Zebra, 2003.
132
133
134
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace.

Klein 21
3). The Zimbabwe government went so as far to emplace a food embargo on Matabeleland in135
1984, placing nearly four-hundred-thousand civilians at risk of starvation.136
Not only did Zimbabwe, as well as Mugabe, implicitly acknowledge the massacre, they
noted it as the only possible “total strategy” to protect the newly independent state from the
destabilizing forces which existed at domestic and international level. Many Zimbabwean137
Military Commanders defend the usage of the Fifth Brigade against civilian targets, with some
such as Lieutenant Colonel Lionel Dyke noting the usage “brought peace very, very quickly.” 138
Many international sources, however, cite the Gukurahundi as expanding the ZAPU fighters
ranks.139
Peace between the ZAPU and the ZANU was achieved after international economic
pressure forced the two sides to begin unity talks. Additionally, Nkomo and the ZAPU were at140
135
136
137
138
139
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace; “Resolution on State Repression in Zimbabwe.” Boca Raton, Florida:
International Association of Genocide Scholars, June 7, 2005.
http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/files/document%09%5Bcurrent-page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGS%2
0RESOLUTION%20ON%20ZIMBABWE%207%20June%202005.pdf.
140
Terrence Mashingaidze. “The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and Its Aftermath: A Case of Peace
without Reconciliation?” In From National Liberation to Democratic Renaissance in Southern Africa, by Cheryl
Hendricks and Lwazi Lushaba, 82–92. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2005;

Klein 22
the brink of collapse: all Parliament seats in Matabeleland were occupied with ZANU loyalists in
the 1985 elections; the youth wing of ZANU became ever present in the province; and the ZAPU
were banned from holding office. In 1987, the Unity Accord was struck between Mugabe and141
Nkomo to form a unified party, promising amnesty to the ZAPU dissenters under the condition
of an end to the conflict. To this extent, Mugabe shielded himself of potential legal142
implications further by extending amnesty to the three-thousand-five-hundred members of the
Fifth Brigade and those participants of the Gukurahundi. The Accord allowed a few remaining143
members of ZAPU to hold office under the new unified party, the ZANU-PF, effectively
establishing a one party state.144
2008 National Election Challenge
Nearly twenty years later, Mugabe faced the most formidable opposition of his tenure.
Starting in 2005, Mugabe’s government began implementation of Operation “Murambatsvina,”
which was posed as a method to clear crime and poverty out of urban areas. The Operation145
sought to leverage political retribution from an election earlier in the year where the opposition,
Movement for Democratic Change, had made remarkable gains. The nationwide campaign146
saw police and military forces push well over a million people out of their homes and disrupted
internal markets, creating a large internal refugee crisis. The targeted areas across Zimbabwe147
correlated to areas of support for the MDC, noting a significant political aspect to the crisis.148
Economically, the state was in deep chaos by 2008. The International Monetary Fund
suspended Zimbabwe in 2004 for failing to meet debt repayment deadlines. Land use reform149
policies emplaced by the ZANU-PF since 2000 prompted a fifty-two percent decrease in
agricultural output in five years. 2008 Marked the seventh year of decline for Zimbabwe’s150
141
142
Ndabaningi Sithole. Review of Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990 by C. S. Banana. Zambezia 18, no. 2
(1991): 143–52.
143
144
145
“Order out of Chaos, or Chaos out of Order? A Preliminary Report on Operation ‘Murambatsvina.’” Zimbabwe
Human Rights NGO Forum, June 2005.
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/ZHRNGOFOrderoutofchaos.htm.
146
Human Rights NGO Forum; Kriger. "Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay."
Review of Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Meredith.
147
Human Rights NGO Forum.
148
Human Rights NGO Forum.
149
“IMF to Close Zimbabwe Resident Representative’s Office.” International Monetary Fund. October 1, 2004.
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/pr04208.htm.
150
Precious Zikhali. “Fast Track Land Reform and Agricultural Productivity in Zimbabwe.” Discussion Paper.
Environment for Development, October 2008.
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/EfD-DP-08-30.pdf; “Zimbabwe Agriculture Sheet.”

Klein 23
GDP, experiencing between negative two to negative seventeen percent growth rate.151
Hyperinflation was rampant, as by late 2007 month-over-month inflation was over
two-hundred-and-forty percent; this number would grow to be over seventy-nine-billion percent
a year later (as seen in Figure 4). State mandated price controls in 2007 to combat152
hyperinflation decimated local vendors and restricted most citizens access to basic goods. The153
state faced eighty percent unemployment, as well as an active cholera epidemic affecting nearly
ninety-thousand who were no longer serviced by the National Health Service.154
Mugabe’s ZANU-PF was fracturing as dissenters echoed the MDC’s claims against the
sitting president. Although the ZANU-PF first called for the 2008 Presidential Election to be
pushed back until 2010 as a cost-saving measure, public outcry mixed with international
reactions forced the government to reconsider the policy; instead moving the 2010 Parliamentary
elections to 2008. Mugabe, weary of the status of the state, instituted a multitude of new laws155
Zimbabwe Data Portal, accessed July 23, 2016. December 11, 2014.
http://zimbabwe.opendataforafrica.org/lsbphze/zimbabwe-agriculture-sheet
151
“Zimbabwe GDP Annual Growth Rate 1961-2016” Trading Economics, accessed July 23, 2016. 2016.
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/gdp-growth-annual
152
Michael Wines. “Zimbabwe Price Controls Cause Chaos.” New York Times. July 3, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/world/africa/03cnd-wzimbabwe.html?_r=0.
153
Wines. “Zimbabwe Price Controls Cause Chaos.”
154
“Crisis in Zimbabwe.” New York: International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, March 2010.
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-zimbabwe.
155
Simon Badza. “Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and Their Implications for Africa.” African Security Review 17, no. 4
(July 22, 2010): 1–16. doi:10.1080/10246029.2008.9627493.

Klein 24
to decrease voting access and promote intimidation, including implementation of a 2005
provision which required a majority rather than a plurality to be elected president. With the156
announcement in late January of the elections being held in March, opposition had a limited time
to prepare for the violence that awaited them.157
The government began arresting MDC supporters, student leaders, and civil society
activists across the state, citing fictitious or otherwise misused statutes to legitimize the
detainment. Further beatings, abductions, torture, and murders reminiscent of the Gukurahundi158
became commonplace. A number of journalists were abducted and threatened, and high159
ranking members of the state “made numerous public threats of violence against demonstrators
and members of the opposition.” State instituted statutes included mass evictions in urban160
areas, a three month ban on NGO aid activity, and an audit of registered voters.161
By the time of the first vote in March 2008, the Electoral Commission, which was
completely appointed by the president, failed to facilitate effective voting procedures. Mugabe,162
using presidential powers, declared the day a national holiday, and instituted mechanisms of
intimidation masqueraded as voting “protections.” The ban on police officers within163
one-hundred feet of polling locations was dismissed, as they were now required to assist illiterate
and disabled voters. At least three polling locations in rural areas failed to have enough ballots164
for registered voters. In some urban areas, entire blocks of people were not on official registry165
lists. The ink used by voters was easily washable, and a number of ghost voters appeared on
official election lists.166
Nonetheless, the Electoral Commission failed to release results soon after the election
night, issuing a number of recount orders to various polling stations. A number of independent167
observers called the elections for the MDC opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai, winning between
156
“2008 Human Rights Report: Zimbabwe.” 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. United States
Department of State, February 25, 2009. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119032.htm#; Dumisani
Muleya. “Zimbabwe: Mugabe ‘Could Be Swept Away’ If Forced Into Run-Off.” All Africa, February 21, 2008.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200802210110.html
157
McGrill. “This Is No Election. This Is a Brutal War.”
158
“2008 Human Rights Report: Zimbabwe.” United States Department of State.
159
160
161
“Crisis in Zimbabwe.” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect; “2008 Human Rights Report:
Zimbabwe.” United States Department of State.
162
Greg Linington. “Illegality & Zimbabwe’s 2008 Presidential Elections.” In Defying the Winds of Change :
Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections, by Eldred Masunungure and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 98–118. Harare, Zimbabwe:
Weaver Press, 2009. http://www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/2010/05/Defying_6.pdf.
163
McGrill. “This Is No Election. This Is a Brutal War;” “2008 Human Rights Report: Zimbabwe.” United States
Department of State.
164
Linington. “Illegality & Zimbabwe’s 2008 Presidential Elections.” In Defying the Winds of Change : Zimbabwe’s
2008 Elections, by Masunungure and Stiftung.
165
Linington. “Illegality & Zimbabwe’s 2008 Presidential Elections.” In Defying the Winds of Change :
Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections, by Masunungure and Stiftung.
166
Russell.“‘Ghost Voters’ Haunt Zimbabwe Poll;” “2008 Human Rights Report: Zimbabwe.” United States
Department of State; Badza. “Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and Their Implications for Africa.”
167

Klein 25
fifty-one and seventy-two percent of the vote. However, the government threatened these168
organizations noting that official law states only the Electoral Commission could call an
election. Nearly a month later, the official results were provided by the Electoral Commission:169
showing Mugabe behind at forty-three percent and Tsvangirai at forty-eight percent. The170
failure of any candidate to receive fifty percent of the vote meant a runoff election would be
scheduled.
ZANU-PF immediately double-downed on their efforts to instill fear in MDC supporters.
Abductions, torture, arrests, and other state-sanctioned activities increased their frequency in
MDC strongholds across Zimbabwe. Independent officials within the Electoral Commission171
were replaced with members of the military citing election and state security, just as the MDC
legally challenged the official results. By late April, the Electoral Court sided with the Mugabe172
Regime in not releasing official results until early April, and certified the validity of the
government count. Only a week after, the MDC headquarters were raided by the police as173
documents that reflected MDC’s national polls were considered illegal as non-official results.174
Internationally, outcry was overwhelming directed at the ZANU-PF. United States
President George Bush called for regional allies to observe the run-off elections, and noted that
"Mr. Mugabe has failed the country." The United Nations Security Council received a report175
by the Secretary General calling for international observers to oversee the elections, however the
proposal was rejected. Regional allies such as South Africa noted the election results as176
irregular and that Zimbabwe’s stability had to be monitored.177
By the time of the second round of voting for the Presidential Election in late June,
political violence was at an all time high. Citing the illegitimacy of the election, as well as178
168
McGrill. “This Is No Election. This Is a Brutal War;” “Zimbabwe: ‘Police Keen to Interview Biti.’” All Africa.
May 1, 2008. http://allafrica.com/stories/200805010032.html.
169
“Zimbabwe: ‘Police Keen to Interview Biti.’”
170
McGrill. “This Is No Election. This Is a Brutal War;” Linington. “Illegality & Zimbabwe’s 2008 Presidential
Elections.” In Defying the Winds of Change : Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections, by Masunungure and Stiftung.
171
“2008 Human Rights Report: Zimbabwe.” United States Department of State; “56 MDC Supporters, MP Arrested
in Crackdown.” New Zimbabwe, July 24, 2008.
https://web.archive.org/web/20080420071857/http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/mdc189.18073.html.
172
173
Badza. “Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and Their Implications for Africa;” “Recount Goes Ahead as Judge Rejects
MDC Petition.” New Zimbabwe, July 24, 2008.
https://web.archive.org/web/20120229113036/http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/electoral240.18079.html.
174
“Zimbabwe Cops Arrest Hundreds In Raids.” Sky News, April 25, 2008.
https://web.archive.org/web/20080719103844/http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30200-1314058,00.html.
175
Angus Shaw. “Nearly 200 Zimbabwe Opposition Supporters Released.” Washington Post, April 29, 2008.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/29/AR2008042900576_pf.html.
176
“Update Report No. 1: Zimbabwe.” Security Council Report. Zimbabwe. United Nations Security Council, July
9, 2008.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20R
eport%209%20July%202008%20Zimbabwe.pdf; “Security Council Fails to Adopt Sanctions Against Zimbabwe
Leadership as Two Permanent Members Cast Negative Votes.” United Nations Security Council, July 11, 2008,
SC/9396. http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9396.doc.htm.
177
“SADC Calls Zim Crisis Meeting.” News 24. April 9, 2008.
https://web.archive.org/web/20080612205823/http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/Zimbabwe/0,,2-11-1662_23
02927,00.html.
178

Klein 26
expressing concern over safety of the state, Tsvangirai discontinued campaigning and pulled
himself from the election. Opting to form a power-sharing agreement, Tsvangirai stated,179
“Instead of focusing on what divides us, we must now try to heal our nation. This means that we
can even talk about restoring ZANU-PF.” Subsequently, in late June, Mugabe won an180
overwhelming eighty-five-point-five percent of the vote to be re-elected President (as seen by
Figure 5).181
MDC’s campaign was not for null, however, as Parliamentary results replaced the
ZANU-PF legislative majority with a MDC majority. Thus, a power sharing agreement was182
necessary as MDC formed a coalition government. Although political violence continued,
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF entered into a power-sharing agreement with the MDC in September
2008, which was negotiated by South Africa. With the signing of the 2008 Global Political183
Agreement, Tsvangirai assumed the Prime Minstership and received basic legislative authority,
however, Mugabe still held a multitude of executive functions which allowed him to continue his
regime without check into the 2013 Presidential Election.184
179
Badza. “Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and Their Implications for Africa;” Morgan Tsvangirai. “Zimbabwe: MDC
Press Statement On Presidential Run-Off.” All Africa, June 22, 2008.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200806220008.html.
180
“Zimbabwe Opposition Leader Sees Role for Ruling Party.” Reuters, May 30, 2008.
http://www.polity.org.za/print-version/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-sees-role-for-ruling-party-2008-05-30.
181
182
Badza. “Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and Their Implications for Africa;” “Last Elections.” Zimbabwe National
Assembly, accessed July 24, 2016. 2013. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2361_E.htm.
183
Badza. “Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and Their Implications for Africa;” “Crisis in Zimbabwe.” International
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.
184
“Crisis in Zimbabwe.” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.

Klein 27
Case Analysis
Each of the case studies provide context to view the applied effects of both constitutional
accommodations and competitive authoritarianism in practice. Although many nuances to the
exact application of the theories to both cases are apparent, the circumstances provided within
the cases paired with the theories discussed deliver credence to the use of each respective
conjecture. Ultimately, neither the Fifth Brigade and the Gukurahundi or the 2008 Presidential
Election demonstrate a consummate application of constitutional accommodations and
competitive authoritarianism; however, each signify major indicators of use, allowing for more
prescriptive and analytical application of the theories for future cases.
Constitutional Accommodations and the Matabeleland Campaign
The violence and abuses that took place across Zimbabwe soon after independence serves
as an example of a state securing stability through authoritarianism, and as a case where
constitutional accommodations are a primary driver of action. As the state began to unify,
Mugabe and his ZANU Party did not initially intend to seize absolute power, rather they
intended to create a liberal democratic system. As the failure to incorporate both ZANU and185
ZAPU into the state increased tensions, Mugabe took the rightfully prescribed action as required
by the state structure to maintain the stability of the government. This prolonged use of186
extra-constitutional methods to curtail dissent, however, led to the establishment of a dictator
focused on their own power and tenure rather than the role and stability of the state.187
Subsequently, the power of the chief executive grew exponentially over a number of years, while
at the same time internal dissent simmered and created the last bastion of autocracy in Africa.188
The application of constitutional accommodations begins with Zimbabwe’s
independence. In 1980, Zimbabwe was recovering from the Rhodesian Bush War as well as a
failed constitution that lasted less than a year. The forced inclusion of the United Kingdom into
the state’s first independent elections secured a relatively legitimate democratic government,
establishing a generally representative regime to begin the formal process of governing the
tumultuous state. These initial elections also provided a place for Mugabe, as the head of state,189
to begin traditional methods of unification between the two ethnic and ideologically opposed
185
Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Meredith; “Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline.” BBC.
186
Reconciliation, by Raftopoulos and Savage; Phimister. “The Making and Meanings of the Massacres in
Matabeleland.”
187
Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Meredith; Smiley. "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and
the Rise of Robert Mugabe;" Levinson and Balkin. “Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design.”
188
Ploch. “Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and Implications for U.S. Policy;” Slaughter and Nolan. “Zimbabwe:
Referendum Defeat for Mugabe Shakes Zanu-PF Government;” Van De Walle. Review of A Predictable Tragedy:
Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe by Compagnonan.
189
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Lang. Do “Zimbabweans” Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity
Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State; “The World Factbook: Zimbabwe.” Central Intelligence Agency.

Klein 28
parties. Mugabe recognized that the largest threat to the newly-formed state was the potential190
for internal power-grabbing that could derail the new constitution as it did in 1979. Aware of191
this situation, Mugabe and the ZANU controlled legislature began bringing in ZAPU leadership
into the cabinet as well as into the large bureaucratic institutions that the state was in the process
of creating. Despite efforts by the state to secure buy-in from the leadership, ZAPU appeared192
to fracture and create fringe groups unwilling to comply with the democratic majority, promoting
conflict against the legitimate state. This was widely exemplified by the clashes in Matabeleland
during unification of the Zimbabwe Military in 1981.193
It was at this point in time that Mugabe was faced two responses to a growing threat:
either (1) ensuring an insurmountable force to counter against dissent via loyal institutions or, (2)
prolonging the state’s ambiguity against fringe groups with the hope of ideological unification in
the future. Citing this as an existential threat to the democratic process, Mugabe chose the194
former. By temporarily modifying his role as the head of state to match the threat to the195
stability of the state, Mugabe increased his allotted constitutional power and initiated sanctioned
acts by the government including the procurement of the Fifth Brigade and the enactment of the
Gukurahundi. In doing so, the Mugabe Regime became the very definition as conceived by196
Rossiter: wherein the state enduring accommodation is a “constitutional government [which has
become] altered to whatever degree is necessary to overcome the peril and restore normal
conditions [in the face of an existential threat].” 197
In this circumstance, the state answered the foremost question of necessity, defining the
violence as significant enough of a threat to the state, thus justifying the proper use of
extra-constitutional measures. Subsequently, the state recognized that it needed to be able to
respond in a method that would undoubtedly curb the threat of dissent, requiring a new level of
violence which countered both current and potential threats. Additionally, the new democratic
190
Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe by Meredith; Masunungure and Bratton. “Zimbabwe’s
Long Agony.”
191
1981-1983;” Smiley. "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert Mugabe."
192
Matabeleland.”
193
Matabeleland.”
194
Issacharoff. "Political Safeguards in Democracies at War;" Phimister. “The Making and Meanings of the
Massacres in Matabeleland;” Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Lang. Do “Zimbabweans” Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism,
National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State; Scarnecchia. "An Important Document on Political
Violence in Zimbabwe." Review of Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Report of the Disturbances in Matabeleland and
the Midlands, 1980-1988 by Sisulu.
195
196
Matabeleland.”
197
Rossiter. Constitutional Dictatorship; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Owen Gross. Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency
Powers in Theory and Practice. Vol. 46. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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