Le Neuroscienze tra spiegazione della vita e cura della mente, Padova 8 -10 maggio 2012

1. Mario De Caro
(Università Roma Tre – Tufts University)
Free will
and the scientific view of the world
Padua, Conference on Neuroethics
May 9, 2012

2. A double isolationism
• 1. “The free will problem is indeed an
empirical problem. So science alone (and
especially neuroscience) can, and soon
will, solve the free problem.”
• 2. “The free will problem is indeed a purely
conceptual problem. So philosophy alone
should deal with it, in order to clarify and
(hopefully) solve it.”

3. A. Scientific isolationism
“The free will problem is indeed an empirical
problem. So science alone (and especially
neuroscience) can, and probably will, solve
the free problem.”

4. Why the neurosciences will not solve the free problem I
1. What free will is, is deeply controversial (it is not like
establishing what the bosons or the genes are!).
2. Conceptual analysis (i.e. philosophy) is indispensable in
order to define free will in an adequate way. And in doing so
many issues have to be dealt with:
i. Is FW compatible with determinism or even requires it?
ii. Does FW requires indetermism?
iii. Does FW only concern volitions or also actions?
iv. Is FW a necessary condition of moral responsibility?
v. Is awareness of decisions a precondition of FW?

5. Why the neurosciences will not solve the free problem II
The Dominant Argument
of the Scientific Isolationist
“The evidence that our volitions and actions are
neurophysiologically determined does ipso facto
prove that FW is an illusion”
NO, it doesn’t, because of the compatibilistic
option.

6. Why the neurosciences will not solve the free problem III
A methodological issue:
the question of the “urge”.
a. Feeling and urge is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition of free decisions.
b. The intersection between the set of free actions
and the set of actions preceeded by an urge is
pretty small and not very significant.

7. B. Philosophical isolationism
“The free will problem is indeed a purely
conceptual problem. So philosophy alone
should deal with it, in order to clarify and
(hopefully) solve it.”

8. Why philosophy alone cannot solve the free problem I
Among the philosophical theories of FW, some of
the most important have essential empirical
commitments:
a. In the libertarian field, the indeterministic
causalists views (Kane, Searle) and some agent-
causalist views (O’Connor, Dupré) assume the
existence of relevant indeterministic moments
in the causal chains that end in our actions.

9. Why philosophy alone cannot solve
the free problem II
b. In the compatibilist field, the so called
“super-compatibilists” argue that freedom is
possible because our actions are actually
causally determined.
N.B. Determinism or determination?

10. Philosophical isolationist views of FW I
Kant’s view
a. Had Kant known about QM, would he have
thought of the Third Antinony?
b. Is the idea of the noumenical world still
acceptable?

11. Philosophical isolationist views of FW II
P.F. Strawson’s view
We could not abandon the idea that we are
responsible, even if had good reasons to do so.
Support of Strawson’s view
1. Rationalistic argument
2. Naturalistic argument

12. Philosophical isolationist views of FW III
New Compatibilism view
• The idea that FW requires the “possibility of
doing otherwise” is misguided.
• What really matters for moral responsibility
(and therefore what we should look for when
we think of FW) is the ability to act for
reasons.

13. A difficulty for New Compatibilism
One of the strenghts of the traditional
compatibilist view is that it can account for the
causalist intuition about freedom:
W.V. Quine: “Like Spinoza, Hume, and so many
others, I count an act as free insofar as the
agent’s motives or drives are a link in its causal
chain.”

14. But…
New Compatibilism cannot easily account for the
causalist intuition (if it can at all).
The best strategy for the New Compatibilists is
probably trying to show that the causalist
intuition is wrong. But it is so?

15. Free will and nature
Basic naturalism as a requirement for
contemporary philosophy, especially when
dealing with problems like free will.
Worshould be done by negotiating between
conceptual analysis and empirical evidence.
But can a reflective equilibrium ever be found
there?