POL310 PROJECT

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School Of Politics And International Relations, Queen Mary, University Of
London
TITLE: The Political Economy of Football: A Comparative Case Study
between the English Premier League and the German Bundesliga.
STUDENT NUMBER: 120155853
WORD COUNT: 11,961
A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree: B.A Honours in International Relations.

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Departmental Statement
In submitting this work, I declare that I have read and understood the College
regulations on plagiarism contained in the Student Handbook. The work
contained in this project is solely my own and all the sources used are cited in
the text and contained in my bibliography.

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Abstract
This essay looks into the key differences between the English and German
football leagues, in relation to the respective political economies of England and
Germany and the impact this has on football. The principle argument is that
football does in fact need more political regulation to counter the growing
strengths of economic forces. With the extension of capitalism into football there
has been an increasing politics of resistance by supporters and I argue that to
maintain positive social, political and economic conditions, the British
government and the Football Association (FA) should work together to
incorporate a German model of governance. In light of increasing foreign
ownership and the excessive influence of global media corporations, clubs
should work with their respective association and supporters to insulate from
market forces. With football providing important values to society and the
economy, I fundamentally argue that the cost of ticket prices must be regulated
to ensure fans are not neglected from the game, which would inhibit social
development and the economy. I hope to bring this point to the fore. Germany
and England have been picked because they are polar opposites of one another
in regards to success on the pitch but also in their governance of football. The
German model offers far greater care to its supporters, while not prohibiting
successes on the pitch. ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ by Peter Hall and David Soskice
plays an important role as my point of comparison in the economies of England
and Germany. By explaining the importance of football I will highlight the social,
political and economic impacts football has, before looking into the impact of the
different national political economies of England and Germany on football and
analysing whether or not foreign investment and global media corporations are

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detrimental to success. I recommend the English FA to regulate ticket prices,
with Premier League clubs using the recent £5billion TV deal to make up the loss
on deficit, while also suggesting further regulations on ownership. I hope this
project is readable not only for those who follow football, but also those who
wish to learn more. Although a reflection of football in both nations will be
shown, this project will focus greater on the English side due to enhanced
knowledge of football in this country and a lack of German to read German
articles.

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Contents Page
o INTRODUCTION:
6
o LITERATURE REVIEW:
8
o METHODOLOGY:
13
o CHAPTER ONE: The Social, Political And Economic Impacts of Football
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o CHAPTER TWO: How do differences in national political economy impact
upon football?
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o CHAPTER THREE: Are Global Media Corporations detrimental to football?
29
o CHAPTER FOUR: Case Study Between Arsenal FC and Bayern Munich
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o CHAPTER FIVE: Does Football Need More Politics to Counter The Strength of
Economic Forces?
40
o CONCLUSION
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o BIBLIOGRPAHY
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Introduction
This project will strive to provide a thorough understanding of the political
economic aspect of football, which inevitably has consequences on the wider
world. To begin, let me briefly explain why football is such an important part of
our contemporary world within the social, political and economic spheres. Often
referred to as the beautiful game, football has an incredible uniting power,
bringing together not only different communities in the support of one club, but
also entire nations during international tournaments. Politically, it is a great
source of physical activity, while also greatly helping the Governments’ ‘keep
youth of the streets’ campaign, with seven million people playing football weekly
in the UK alone. From an economic point of view, the game is worth billions, with
football related business contributing to over £250 billion of the economy
annually (Guilianotti, 2005, 19), while the English Football Association (FA)
invests £100 million each year to develop grassroots football alone (Parliament,
2013). I have chosen the countries of England and Germany, not only because of
the intense football rivalry, but because they are complete opposites in
footballing terms. While Germany has been exceptionally successful in
international tournaments, with seven major victories, England has only got the
one World Cup medal to show in 1966. Moreover, off the pitch the two nations
have minimal resemblance, especially in terms of regulations over ownership, TV
rights and fundamentally in ticket pricing. Indeed, part of this project was
inspired by the abysmal differences in costs, as I believe that the exploitation of
supporters is the biggest problem within football in the UK. As stated by the
former Bayern Munich club president, Uli Hoeness (Evans, 2013):

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"We do not think the fans are like cows to be milked. Football has got to
be for everybody. That's the biggest difference between us and England."
Thus, a clear focus of this essay will be to look into ticket prices and analyse
whether this has effects on society and football. I will argue that football needs
greater political regulation to counter the strengths of economic forces, to ensure
that the game is treated as more than a marketable commodity. In terms of
structure, I will start by defining the social, political and economic impacts of
football, before analysing the impacts of the differing national political
economies of England and Germany on football and supporters. I will then
discuss whether global media corporations are detrimental to football, before
looking into the specific case study of Arsenal and Bayern Munich to highlight
differences and enhance my argument. Finally, I will offer my suggestions to
improve the state of football in England by offering proposals to the government,
the Football Association and Clubs themselves. The principle argument of this
project is that football does need more regulation to counter the growing
strength of economic forces, with the best means of accomplishing this being to
grant the FA far greater regulatory power, which would in turn be enforced by
the government. Ultimately, only states and major political institutions have the
power to govern and regulate football appropriately to ensure sustainability.
From my studies, I argue that the German model offers a successful blueprint to
follow in a number of aspects which the Premier League can look to build on.

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Literature Review
On starting this project, the first and main theoretical article I read was Wyn
Grant’s ‘An Analytical Framework for a Political Economy of Football (2007).
Wyn Grant, a professor at the University of Warwick, offers a great insight into
the political economy of football, not only in this article but also within his
website www.footballeconomy.com. Grant argues that the main tension within
football today is between the “profit maximising understanding of football
versus the community oriented, democratic vision that seeks to pursue
government policy goals” (Grant, 2007, 1). He further argues that there are
principally four variables that represent the political economic aspect of football
in its relationship with the government; business, leisure activity, source of
identity for fans and the promotion of social policy objectives (ibid). In this
project I will strive to expand on these aspects, particularly looking into the
effects of global media corporations, in which he argues the “media industry has
become increasingly interlocked with football” (ibid, 10). Grant states the
government “has been largely content to let the FA put its own house in
order…with football being a highly insulated sector of economy” (ibid, 4-5).
Reviving this point, I will compare the regulations put in place in England to that
of Germany, highlighting similarities and differences between the two.
Furthermore, I agree with Grant who states that due to the “intense loyalty of
fans to their club, fans are open to exploitation” (ibid, 11). This area will be given
enhanced attention in this project, as I believe it is a problem that needs
addressing in England, while I show substantial differences to that of the German
model. Grant also notes the growing influence of foreign investors, with “market
forces and big business interests prevailing” (ibid, 17). This is also an area I will

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look to advance on, stating that continual ownership changes leads to
uncertainty within clubs, as it is dangerous to rely on the wealth of a single
owner. Finally, I will agree and look to build on Grant’s assertion that “specific
characteristics of the football market justify regulatory intervention” (ibid, 31).
Overall, this piece has helped me greatly by leading me onto a clearer direction
in which to focus and I will look to advance on theories brought up by Grant and
extend them to the case of Germany.
I built on this Wyn Grant’s article by reading Simon Lee’s chapter, ‘Moving the
Goalposts: the Governance and Political Economy of World Football’, in Roger
Levermore and Adrian Budd’s book” ‘Sport and International Relations: An
Emerging Relationship”, 2004. As the politics of football is largely a neglected
area, this chapter offered me valuable insight. Lee initially highlights that the
governance debate on political economy “primarily concerns the relationship
between sources of political authority and the market…with sport not immune to
the conflicts between public regulation and private power” (Lee, 2004, 112). He
raises important points such as the ownership of clubs being linked to private
corporate interests that are displacing the traditionally associated pattern of
football governance. This pattern of increasing corporate power over the
governance of football emerged in the 1990’s, as a “huge and rapid
commercialisation of the sport has transformed it into a major global business”
(ibid, 113). I agree with his theory that the new elite’s, driven by commercial
interests, have “established structures to increasingly rival the long-established
associations” (ibid, 117). This theory has further led me to believe that major
sporting institutions, such as FIFA and the FA, must have a more important role

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in all aspects of football and must not be dictated to by powerful elites. Indeed,
the demise of major football clubs in England appears to “demand urgent action
from football’s governing associations to redistribute income from the rich elite
to the impoverished majority in order to nurture the sport’s traditional
grassroots” (ibid, 123). I firmly support Lee when he states that corporate
governance ensures that financial institutions’ interests “always prevail over
those of supporters” (ibid, 126). This is an aspect I will advance on by comparing
the Premier League to the German model, which greatly supports and protects
its fans. Finally, Lee believes that only “states and major political institutions
posses the necessary power and resources to provide a framework for corporate
governance and social responsibility…yet, the willingness of political authorities
to intervene in football’s governance has not been consistent” (ibid, 127). This
statement has enticed me to further look into this topic to highlight why this is
the case, as I truly agree with Lee that football does indeed need greater
governance.
In reference to analysing the impacts of different national political economies on
football, the key text I read was ‘Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage’, by Peter Hall and David Soskice, 2001.
With the UK being a Liberal Market Economy (LME) and Germany being a
Coordinated Market Economy (CME), these distinct types of political economies
will serve as my point of comparison when highlighting its affects on football. As
argued by Hall and Soskice, these two types of capitalist economies are
frameworks for understanding the institutional similarities and differences
between developed economies. Here, it is argued that LME’s (UK) hold

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competitive market arrangements, have competitive inter-firm relations and
unequal income distribution, compared to CME’s (Germany), which involves
non-market relations, collaborative inter-firm relations and equal income
distribution. It is stated that a key difference between the two national political
economies is that “British firms pass the price increase along to customers to
maintain profitability, while German firms maintain their prices and accept
lower returns in order to preserve market share” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 16).
Although not directly linked to football clubs, I have applied these concepts to
football, where I have found similar patterns.
An online piece which I found to be very interesting and certainly one that
helped inspire this project was the ‘Price of Football: Ticket increases outstrip
cost of living’ study by the BBC in 2014. This article was very useful for me as it
drew more closely on the costs of attending games in English football compared
to other leagues in Europe, including the German Bundesliga. This truly
highlighted the shocking cost of tickets in England, which has increased by 13%
since 2011, despite an increased income of £3.1 billion from television rights for
Premier League clubs over the same period. Indeed, as stated by BBC sports
editor Dan Roan, the “fortunes clubs make through unprecedented TV deals are
not passed down and used to alleviate the pressure on fans’ pockets” (Roan,
2014). As this is a critical part of my project, this article has been extremely
helpful in providing key figures such as the cost of tickets, which I will be using
throughout this project.

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Finally, The Guardian journalist David Conn has provided insightful articles
based around this topic that has been a great help. This is the case particularly
on his piece on German football giants Bayern Munich, ‘Inside Bayern Munich:
How the Bundesliga club plans global expansion’, 2013. This article provided me
with great insight into how German football is modelled, particularly in relation
to ticket pricing and ownership structures, which are fundamentally different.
Conn thus argues that the Bundesliga is “fundamentally different from the clubs
for sale, eye watering ticket prices, sheikh and oligarch funded spectacle of the
Premier League” (Conn, 2013c). Providing this alternative German model helped
me to outline my area of critique within the Premier League; notably ticket
pricing and the neglect of supporters within decision-making.

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Methodology
As this project is based on the gradual process of capitalism extending into
football, rather than a historical event on a specific date, I have tended to use
predominantly secondary and tertiary sources. With football having an excessive
number of features that can be analysed, I spent quite a bit of time pondering
different themes to investigate. Having decided to focus on a political economic
aspect of football, I felt it would be best to compare and contrast two different
nations as this would help in challenging and evaluating existing accounts while
supporting my own argument. Thus, there were no better nations that differ as
much as England and Germany in terms of football, but also in so far as the
features of their political economies. Having defined my question and case
studies, I proceeded to find documents online and in the library, with my sources
ranging from online newspaper articles, books, the Football Associations official
website and finally to government records. I realise that there is a reliance on
secondary and tertiary sources which is why I have attempted to use a broader
range, however, secondary data was ideal as it helped me to deepen my
understanding of my research topic, but also because I was limited to this due to
the topic of choice, which is an on-going process rather than a historical event. I
did however attempt to get in contact with the FA, who politely let me know that
due to high demand, they could not respond to my specific questions.
This project has followed a linear model of research: following the development
of my research question, I undertook background reading before writing this
project. As previously stated, to grasp the concept of each nations respective
economies, I read ‘Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of

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Comparative Advantage’, by Peter Hall and David Soskice, 2001. I then read
important financial studies within football by the BBC and Deloitte to become
fully aware with the topic, which provided me with quantitative data to prove/
disprove my argument. I proceeded to read academics’ thoughts on the topic,
particularly those of Wyn Grant and The Guardian sports journalist David Conn,
who offered great insight into the subject area. This led me to produce this
project, which is based around a comparative case study between the English
Premier League and the German Bundesliga within the contemporary period
having looked into multiple factions of power within football including
governments, governing bodies, owners and global media corporations.

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Chapter 1: What are the social, political and economic impacts of football?
I believe it is important to clarify the value of football before going into the main
aspect of this project. As stated by Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd, the
“analysis of sport can tell us a good deal about international relations”
(Levermore and Budd, 2004, 6). Yet, sport is generally a concept neglected
within the study of politics and international relations, which I believe is a
mistake. In this chapter I shall thus outline the social, political and economic
importance of football within our world, to provide a thorough understanding of
the importance of football through the context of supporters in the
contemporary world, providing present examples. What is clear to me, and what
I wish to express in this project is that football is one of the key defining features
of modern culture, with it being the world’s universal language and one that
transcends national borders and religion alike. Football, more than any other
sport, has thrived on globalisation (The Economist, 2014), which is why I believe
far greater political attention is necessary to completely understand the concept.
First of all, it is paramount to understand that attending a “football match is as
much a social event as a sporting exercise” (Grant, 2007, 11). Indeed, despite my
young age and the relatively low standard of football during my first match-day
experience, I shall never forget the feeling of disgust and anger of those around
me, who, having given up their Saturday afternoon, witnessed their beloved
Leyton Orient succumb to a 4-1 defeat to Cheltenham Town. Although that
particular day did not inspire me to become a permanent fan of Leyton Orient,
the emotions of those around me made me realise that football, the beautiful
game, is far more than just a ‘sport’. As Rogan Taylor argues, football is

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intrinsically connected with ‘identity formation’ (Taylor, 2004, 129). He insists
that football is one of the most “powerful prisms through which relations of
many kinds can be refracted and seen more clearly” (ibid). One of the greatest
aspects of football is its ability to unite different communities on so many levels.
From representing your school team, to your part of town and indeed all the way
up to your nation, football has the unprecedented power of stimulating the most
passionate of emotions and identifications on numerous levels. As insisted by
Kimberley Schimmel, sport is “bound up with a variety of sentiments…placing
attachments and identities that people find socially meaningful and important”
(Schimmel, 2005, 6). In an article detailing the need for football clubs to capture
the social value of football, David Conn highlights that despite the recent
financial crises, clubs are still “rallying points for civic pride” (Conn, 2010). There
is no doubt that this is the case.
Of course, anything that brings with it such passion inevitably also brings certain
disharmony and conflict, particularly between different sets of fans. One major
known rivalry, which has evolved through the Protestant/Catholic divide, is the
Old Firm derby between Celtic and Rangers. Traditionally, Rangers supporters
are Protestant while Celtic fans are Catholic. This rivalry is deeply embedded
within Scottish culture and contributes significantly to the political, social and
religious divisions in Scotland. Unfortunately, despite the on-field rivalry, the
tensions between the two clubs runs much deeper than what takes place on the
pitch, with conflict between fans erupting in violence on many occasions, with
games between the two ending in some of the worst riots and tragedies in
sporting history: in Glasgow, the violence and abuse has gone well beyond

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football hooliganism. A prime example of this is the brutal murder of 15 year old
Celtic fan Mark Scott in 1995, simply because he was wearing a Celtic jersey
walking through a Protestant neighbourhood (Levesque, 2002). Although
hooliganism was notorious within British football during the 1980s especially, it
has dramatically improved, making football more enjoyable for all involved
without unnecessary bloodshed. Yet, the fact that football has this much power
to ignite passions should surely be a major political concern for governments.
Participation in football is also exceptional, which is important both socially and
politically. As stated by Wyn Grant, football “enters into a partnership with the
state to develop policies that seek to fulfil goals such as more healthy lifestyles”
(Grant, 2007, 31). Certainly, men’s football is the most played sport in the United
Kingdom, with ten times more people playing football weekly (7 million) than
the second most popular sport in the UK, cricket (Parliament, 2013). Crucially,
football is not considered to be an elite sport such as golf or tennis, thus, literally
anybody in the world can play irrespective of gender or social status. This of
course serves a political interest of keeping the population fit and healthy, while
also reducing youth crime, stimulating regeneration and altogether reducing
anti-social behaviour (Sport England, 2013). In recent years, expectation has
grown from the government, football authorities and the public for professional
football clubs to help out within the local community to address certain social
issues. Arsenal FC have been particularly active in North London through their
‘Positive Futures’ and ‘Kickz’ programmes, offering football as a means of
rehabilitation and gang exit strategies for youth who increasingly find
themselves drawn into criminal acts via gang involvement (Arsenal, 2011).

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Football is also a huge sector of the British economy. As found in a study by Sport
England, the estimated contribution of sport to the UK economy was £20.3billion
in 2010 (Sport England, 2013). It further highlights that sport is in the top fifteen
industry sectors in England above the motor vehicle, telecom, legal and
accounting sectors to name a few (ibid). Furthermore, sport employment
remains a crucial component of the economy, with over 400,000 people
currently in sport-related jobs- 2.3% of all employment in England (ibid).
Globally, sport has a similar reach with sport accounting for 3% of world trade
(Lee, 2004, 114). Without a doubt fans are integral to the economics of football,
which is agreed to by Sue Bridgewater, who notes that fans are the “mainstay of
football…without which there would be no revenue in football” (Bridgewater,
2010, 6). Thus, concerted efforts should go into accommodating fans into the
increasingly commercialised game, as it is paramount for the overall good of the
wider community that both professional and grassroots football remain in
prominence.
Supporters also play an important role as a political tool and should not be under
estimated. As stated by Grant, the “expansion of capitalism into football has been
met with a politics of resistance by fans” (Grant, 2007, 4). Moreover, politics
within football is not merely about the call for less commercialisation and the
exploitation of fans, but draws on wider grievances. This is epitomised by the
Spanish football giants of Barcelona, located in Catalunya and Real Madrid, the
embodiment of the monarchy of Spain and representing the political
establishment. Here, political tensions are voiced in the terraces, particularly by

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Barcelona supporters who deem Catalunya to be independent from Spain. Yet,
the Spanish League, La Liga, has stressed that were Catalunya to be granted
independence, Barcelona would be withdrawn from the Spanish league, which
would inevitably see a great reduction in profits and prestige for FC Barcelona.
Political tensions have been brought to the fore this season, with Barcelona and
Basque based Athletic Bilbao, who also want independence from Spain,
requesting for the final of the Spanish Cup that they will contest, to be held at
Real Madrid’s historic stadium, the Santiago Bernabeu. As it was very likely this
would have been used as propaganda to demonstrate against the government,
with memories of the 2012 Cup final where both showed disrespect to the
national anthem of Spain. Thus, following in the words of Rogan Taylor, the
process of football to “contribute to the formation of a sense of the ‘self’ for many
millions of people is worthy of our best academic efforts” (Taylor, 2004, 129),
and this is precisely what I hope to accomplish in the remaining chapters.

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Chapter 2: How do differences in national political economy impact upon
football?
In this chapter I will focus primarily on the English Premier League and the
German Bundesliga, offering insight into their respective political economies and
the impact this has in their respective nations. I will first discuss the national
political economies of the two nations, before looking into particular differences,
predominantly the variances in ownership regulation and ticket pricing
strategies.
According to Peter Hall and David Soskice, there are two distinct types of
capitalist economies: the Liberal Market Economy (LME), for example the UK
and the US, and the Coordinated Market Economy (CME), for example Germany
and Japan. There are a number of differences between the two that should be
highlighted to understand the institutional differences between developed
economies. First of all, LME’s hold competitive market arrangements supported
by deregulation and competition, as opposed to CME’s holding non-market
relations, with the encouragement of collaboration between firms. Furthermore,
in LME’s, an institutions function is to be competitive with freer movement of
inputs, compared to the sanctioning of defectors and monitoring in CME’s.
Indeed, Hall and Soskice state that “British firms tend to pass the price increase
along to customers in order to maintain their profitability, while German firms
maintain their prices and accept lower returns in order to preserve market
share” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 16). This project will show that this is largely true
in relation to the football market. It can certainly be said that “German clubs
seem much like the rest of German business in that they are not indebted to the

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point of drowning and rely much more on income generated and then invested
back in the game” (Evans, 2013). This will be highlighted in chapter four during
the case study on Bayern Munich.
A difference between the two nations that is clear to see is the primary corporate
goal in each nation. While UK firms chase profitability, German companies have
multiple goals such as profitability, market share and employment reliability
(Vitols, 2001, 339). The goals of a company are set by the owner/s: here there
are crucial regulatory differences between English and German football clubs. In
England, the vast majority of clubs are run by foreign financial tycoons; such as
Roman Abramovich at Chelsea FC, Sheikh Mansour at Manchester City and
Malcolm Glazer at Manchester United to name but a few. No other major league
in any sport has allowed an influx of foreign ownership on this scale (more than
half of the Premier League clubs are owned by foreigners). Indeed, due to the
peculiar ownership structure in England, where all clubs are limited companies,
together with the UK’s traditionally open stance on foreign investment, it is
“much easier for foreigners to buy their way in” (Szymanski, 2011). In complete
contrast, the German Bundesliga installs a ‘50+1’ rule, whereby its members,
who must have a controlling stake, are entitled to run the club. This is primarily
intended to “safeguard against ruinous megalomaniacs” (The Economist, 2012).
This follows the national political economies of each nation, with Sigurt Vitols
stating:
‘Ownership in Germany is highly concentrated in the hands of long-term,
strategic actors with multiple links with the company, with dispersed
authority among the top level of management…relationships in the UK, in

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contrast, are regulated to a much greater extent by markets’ (Vitols, 2001,
345).
This phenomenon in England was affirmed greatly during the 1990’s, when clubs
became more like other businesses via their floatation on the stock exchange
with profits going to shareholders. This has taken part in the context of the
Premier League, which was formed by the top twenty clubs in England in 1992,
in the hope of generating greater profit with the gradual rise in the price of
television rights. Grant argues that this has seen the government largely content
to let the FA “put its own house in order…with football becoming a highly
insulated sector of economy and society” (Grant, 2007, 5-6). This has had some
negative impacts, particularly in the mistreatment of fans as ‘customers’ to be
exploited, with David Conn questioning football’s “social role and value as being
completely submerged beneath clubs’ status as private companies” (Conn, 2010).
The difference in thinking between the two leagues consequently has different
financial outcomes. BBC sports editor Stephen Evans notes that the majority of
Premiership clubs run at a loss while most Bundesliga clubs make a profit, with
the key difference being the way in which German clubs keep costs down: for the
2012/13 season, Bundesliga clubs in total generated £47million worth of profit
compared to the Premiership making a combined loss of £207million (Evans,
2013). These are astonishing figures when one considers the fact that the income
of the Premier League is far greater, particularly via TV right deals and match
day revenue. Unfortunately, with little regulation, the game has become a “model
of capitalism” (Carter, 2006, 123). Although at the national level government
intervention is not totally absent from football, as there is the Department of

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Culture, Media and Sport, which deals with football-related disorder and health
and safety policies. Crucially however, the government has “little interest in
imposing a regulator against the football authorities’ wishes” (Brown, 2000, 258)
and by 2002, it was possible for FA officials to assert, without fear of political
contradiction, that “we, the FA, are the regulators” (Bower, 2003, 4). Yet, even
the FA has increasingly had a minute say in the dealings of clubs, with the
independent Premier League forming a defensive shield over clubs. The same
cannot be said of Germany.
The German FA (DFB) can largely be praised for this revelation. In the
Bundesliga clubs face a number of regulatory checks, with “strict cost controls
preventing clubs from overspending… with authorities in Germany allowed to
prohibit transfer activity or regulate teams as punishment for breaching
regulation” (The Economist, 2012). James Skinner adds to this by bringing to the
fore that in the Bundesliga, clubs must “submit information about their budgets
and expenditure, and prove they are financially stable in order to play in the
league, with check ups during the season” (Skinner, 2010). This is not seen in
England, with the results present for all to see: The Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) reported that the total debt of Premier League teams
combined- £3.44billion- is greater than that of the rest of Europe’s top-flight
clubs put together (ibid). Within the last decade, traditional English clubs such as
Leeds United and Portsmouth have gone into administration and have never
truly recovered. While English football appears to be “drowning in affluence…it
is accompanied by increasing inequalities between rich and poor clubs” (Lee,
2004, 122). These factors appear to highlight the urgent demands from football

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governing associations to redistribute income from the “rich elite to the
impoverished majority in order to nurture the sports’ traditional grassroots”
(ibid, 123).
Undeniably, within the context of globalisation, there has been a “growing
recognition of the importance of non-state actors” (Levermore and Budd, 2004,
9). UEFA have attempted to constrain wild spending in recent years through
Financial Fairplay Regulations (FFP), set in motion in 2010, which “limits the
extent to which clubs entering the two major European club competitions could
operate at a loss” (Goddard and Sloane, 2014, 1). FFP dictates that there must be
a.) No overdue payables, and b.) The club must break-even (calculated over a
period of 3 years), with an acceptable deviation of £5million (Peeters and
Szymanski, 2013, 3). It is clearly noted that direct subsidies by owners to buy
players are not prohibited, which significantly curtails the spending power of the
super-rich, making European club football more sustainable. As I later suggest I
believe a similar policy within the Premier League would be beneficial.
Perhaps the greatest difference between the two nations is their treatment of
supporters. It is a great shame that in recent years supporters in England are
being alienated from the game due to outrageous ticket pricing, considering the
fact that football started out as a game of the working classes. As noted by James
Walvin, football has “become an alien land for its supporters” (Walvin, 2001,
201). Reading the BBC’s ‘Price of Football Study’ last year, it became evident just
how decadent the situation was. In the Premier League, the average price of the
cheapest tickets across English football has risen at almost twice the rate of the

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cost of living since 2011- 13% to 6.8% (BBC Sport, 2014). Many have voiced
their concerns at this development, with Shadow Sports Minister Clive Efford
stating, “inflation-busting increases just cannot be acceptable” (Efford in BBC
Sport, 2014). Furthermore, business leader Justin King believes that clubs need
to guarantee they are providing value for money if they are to ensure their
sustainability, insisting, “any business that thinks they can simply rely upon the
loyalty of its customers, regardless of how they treat them, will fail” (King in BBC
Sport, 2014). The fact that fans are treated poorly surely does not help the cause.
This has led to Dan Roan to validly state that “English football is becoming more
of a middle-class pursuit” (Roan in BBC Sport, 2014). This is a terrible situation
as working class football fans are the foundation of football, without whom the
game would not be at the stage it finds itself in today.
The same can certainly not be said in reference to Germany. In the Bundesliga,
clubs put fans first by keeping ticket prices low. Although the cheapest tickets
are usually in standing sections, which is banned in Premier League grounds
since the late 1980’s due to health and safety concerns, fans get to cheer for their
favourite clubs week in week out, with relatively low concerns about the costs.
Even the biggest and most successful teams in the league charge incredibly low
prices; Bayern Munich, Bayer Leverkusen, Schalke and Borussia Dortmund all
charge less than £13 for their cheapest match day tickets (BBC Sport, 2014).
Thus, it comes as no shock whatsoever that the Bundesliga has the highest
average attendances in football at 42,609, with the Premier League second with
36, 695 (Grant, 2014a). This is not just due to generous chairman of clubs
offering low prices, but a matter of policy. As members largely run the club, it is

26
natural for them to meet their own interests. It is fundamental to remember here
that this does not lead to poor performances on the pitch. First and foremost fans
want to see their team win and thus will not harm their teams performances to
benefit themselves, which is dubious when foreign financial tycoons come in.
Thus, the German model of ownership seems to be highly beneficial for all
parties involved. It is a shame this is not appreciated in England.
The most disturbing factor of this growing exploitation is that there is no
substantial need for it: it is just a consequence of financial greed. It is absurd to
note that, during the 1996-97 season, Manchester United earned almost as much
from merchandising as from gate receipts, so much so that, had they played in an
empty stadium, the club would “still make millions of pounds of profit” (Walvin,
2001, 207). This highlights the fact that clubs simply don’t need to charge as
much as they do to make profit, yet, greed leads clubs to exploit even the most
loyal of fans who work week in week out just to be able to afford the pleasure of
watching their team play and soak up the atmosphere of match days. There is
definitely a difference of philosophy in Germany, where fans, not money, are
prioritised. As noted by Borussia Dortmund’s Marketing Director, Carsten
Cramer:
“Why are tickets so cheap? Football is a part of people’s lives and we want
to open the doors for the whole of society. We need the people; they
spend their hearts, emotions with us. They are the clubs most important
asset” (in Smith, 2014).

27
This should be taken into account by British clubs if they are to ensure the
continuation of support for their clubs. The German model of pricing in football
certainly meets the assertion of Hall and Soskice that “German firms maintain
their prices and accept lower returns in order to preserve market share” (Hall
and Soskice, 2001, 16). While this model may not be as attractive for those clubs
determined to make money above all else, in Germany it is certain that the “fan is
king” (Smith, 2014). This has become valued by fans all over the world, with it
being reported last year that British fans actually travel overseas to Spain and
Germany just to watch the titans of football that are Bayern Munich, Real Madrid
and Barcelona; perhaps the three greatest clubs in the history of European club
football. Yet, this fact becomes even more absurd when one notes that it is
cheaper to book return flights on low budget airlines and match day tickets at
these clubs, then it is to watch top-level games in the Premier League.
For many supporters, the politics within football is of disinterest and what really
matters to them is the beautiful game, not the “tired odd suits who run it” (The
Economist, 2014). However, as noted by Wyn Grant, following the extreme
exploitation of fans by English football clubs, there has been a growing “politics
of resistance by fans” (Grant, 2007, 4). Just this week it has been reported that
demonstrations are planned outside a meeting of Premier League club
executives, with calls for a demand to cap away tickets at £20 and every Premier
League club to set aside £1million per season to subsidise ticket prices with no
reduction in away ticket allocations (Conway, 2015). Fortunately, there have
been some concerted efforts to meet the demands of fans by certain politicians
and initiatives. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair had stated while in office that

28
market forces would not be allowed exclusive control of footballs fate, with the
“voice of ordinary supporters to be heard in clubs” (Blair in Bower, 2003, 147).
Furthermore, as articulated by David Conn last year, the Labour Party is keen to
get fans in the boardroom of clubs, which would most likely be opposed by clubs.
This commitment to see elected supporter representatives on board of all clubs
is a “landmark step in the agonising, attritional battle to recognise Britain’s
historic clubs as sporting homes of passion and belonging, not mere businesses
for financial spectators to exploit” (Conn, 2014c). This would help, if not
significantly alter, the decision making process of clubs and would aid the
supporters no end. As argued rather pessimistically by Raymond Boyle and
Richard Haynes, fans have “always been exploited who have always been last to
have a say in fundamental shifts in the game’s governance” (Boyle and Haynes,
2004, 24). I would however argue that the use of ‘always’ is a gross exaggeration,
and only in the late 20th century, with the advancement of neoliberalism and
globalisation that directly led to the creation of the Premier League, have we
seen a more blatant form of fan exploitation. To maintain the highly beneficial
aspects of football as discussed in chapter one, I believe the government must
take firmer action. I will now analyse the effects of commercialisation on football,
of which there are both positives and negatives.

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Chapter 3: Are Global Media Corporations detrimental to football?
Since the birth of the Premier League, there has been a fierce rivalry between
global media networks to gain television rights to screen live games. The pattern
of increasing corporate power over the governance of football emerged during
the 1990’s following a “huge and rapid commercialisation that transformed
football into a major global business” (Lee, 2004, 113). This has hit
unprecedented heights in the Premier League, with the 3 year deal between
2016 and 2019 reaching a mind boggling £5.14billion, shared between BT and
Sky (Gibson, 2015). This means that the cost of showing just one live game
comes to around £10million: an astonishing amount. Yet it does not end there;
these figures are merely for domestic live TV rights, as later this year the
international rights will be auctioned off, while the BBC has already agreed to
pay £204million to retain the highlights for its historic ‘Match of the Day’
programme. Thus, come the end of the 2016/17 season, the bottom placed club
in the Premier League will receive around £100million; an outrageous amount to
be given to the worst team in a league. Wyn Grant has since argued that the
Premier League is no longer about footballing success on the pitch, with the real
point of the Premier League being to “create a televised entertainment spectacle
for global consumption” (Grant, 2015). This development must be recognised
within the context of globalisation, where there has been an increased value in
the role of non-state actors.
Despite highly reasonable calls for this money to be redistributed to grassroots
sport and a reduction in ticket prices, clubs have shown “no inclination to use
their TV rights windfalls to reduce historically inflated ticket prices” (Conn,

30
2014b). The money is far more likely to go to the pockets of owners, players and
their agents. It seems highly implausible that the fortunes of clubs made through
unprecedented TV deals will be “passed down to alleviate the pressure on fans’
pockets” (Roan in BBC Sport, 2014). Nevertheless, the Football Supporters
Federation has called for clubs to use the TV deal to cut ticket prices, noting that
they could slash prices by up to £30 off each ticket and still generate the exact
same revenue as they currently have (BBC Sport, 2014). Clive Efford, the shadow
sports minister, has subsequently called for more money to be shared within
grassroots football, stating:
“These are incredible sums of money and it would be nothing short of
criminal if none of this extra money goes to expand participation at the
grassroots of football through a boost in participation and improved
facilities” (Efford in Gibson, 2014)
However, this remains unlikely, as no club has publicly declared that they will
use the increase in TV revenue to reduce ticket prices. The extension of
capitalism’s ‘production-consumption’ relations into the realm of sport has been
“one of the defining features of modern sport” (Schimmel, 2005, 6). The
economisation of football has been welcomed with open arms by the Premier
League, who generated such a high price for their television rights due to the
intense rivalry between Sky and BT, with Sky determined to maintain its
stronghold on the Premier League in relation to BT’s quick expansion in recent
years. Indeed, at the core of this revelation is a “broad agenda driven by the
media as it increasingly impacts on footballing culture” (Boyle and Haynes, 2004,
11). As stated by Wyn Grant, footballing profitability has become “interlocked

31
with that of the media industry” (Grant, 2007, 10). Although I agree football is
fantastic to watch on the television and Sky Sports have truly done a remarkable
job in providing coverage of football games, in no way does it beat the experience
of attending an actual football game. It is also increasingly worrying how media
organisations are shaping the game at the highest levels. For example, last month
during the prestigious FA Cup quarterfinal game between Manchester United
and Arsenal, it was decided by the BBC for it to be held on a Monday night. As
you can imagine, Arsenal fans were outraged to be forced to travel up to
Manchester and back on a weeknight. Yet, the BBC did not make
reconsiderations and the game went ahead: money came first. This development
must be recognised within the context of globalisation, where there has been an
increased value in the role of non-state actors. But, if football is to return to being
a game for everyone, the stronghold of commercialisation must be restrained.
Although there are a number of negatives about the costs of football in the
Premier League, it must be noted that the League has benefitted greatly from
these TV deals. Premier League transfer spending on players hit a record
£835million during last summer’s transfer window, boosted no end by the 70%
increase in the previous bumper television deal. This significantly improves the
quality of the Premier League as highly skilled footballers join clubs in England
that adds to the spectacle. As the renewed TV deal is an extra 70% on top of the
previous one, it would come as no surprise if the £1billion landmark were
surpassed. Although it is important to consider the argument of Alex Fynn and
Lynton Guest, who stress that “fans have always been treated with disdain…it is
not television or commercialisation that are the enemies of fans, but the attitudes

32
of owners and administrators” (Fynn and Guest, 1999, 258). However, I would
argue that this has not always been the case but has developed by the “new
commercially driven elite committed to the commodification of the English game
for private profit” (Lee, 2004, 121). Indeed, it is perfectly justifiable to question
the interests of global tycoons, who having grown up in the Far East or the
Middle East, where football is certainly not prominent. Here, money appears to
be the attraction. However, when this profit is matched with success on the pitch
there seems to be no animosity from the fans. The prime example of this is
within Chelsea FC, bought by Roman Abramovich’s billions, he has turned a club
with relatively no history, with only one league title beforehand, into a global
powerhouse in football. Yet, when money is not matched with success, as is the
case currently with Mike Ashley at Newcastle United, the fans are quick to want
you out of the club as soon as possible. However, fans should be careful what
they wish far as too many changes in leadership could undoubtedly lead to
uncertainty.
Another real positive about the television deal is that it is split fairly amongst
clubs; hence the bottom placed clubs still get millions of pounds. Half of the UK
TV deal is shared equally, 25% is linked to where a club finishes and 25%
depends on the number of times the club is televised live, while the overseas TV
deal is distributed equally. The TV deal is the principle reason why eight of the
Top 20 Deloitte Football Money League clubs are from the Premier League, while
amazingly all 20 Premier League teams are in the top 40. This is an astonishing
feat and must be congratulated, with Bayern Munich chairman Karl-Heinz
Rummenigge stating that German football wants to “mirror the commercial

33
success of the Premier League” (Rummenigge in Conn, 2013c). This is easier said
than done and the Bundesliga is lagging a long way behind England in this sector.
The difference in money between the Premier League and the Bundesliga, and
actually to all leagues within all sports-apart from the National Football League
(NFL) in America, is massive. This could be explained by the regulations within
Germany, with Sigurt Vitols stating that the “German company is characterised
by consensus decision-making among top management and strong employee
representatives who can block or moderate the pace of corporate change”
(Vitols, 2001, 359). Indeed, the German Bundesliga was confined to only
domestic television rights and did not enter the foreign market until 2005. This
was a considerable marketing mistake. The sale of foreign television rights is
increasingly becoming a key element of the game and a crucial factor in many
teams’ business model. Yet, to contrast the two we find an amazing difference. In
2010, the Premier League made £479million, compared to the mere £35million
made by the Bundesliga (Grant, 2010). If we place the Bundesliga in context we
find extraordinary results, with Cardiff City FC, who finished bottom of the
Premier League last season receiving €74million in contrast to the €47million
received by Bundesliga champions Bayern Munich (The Swiss Ramble, 2015).
This significantly weakens the financial capacity of teams in the German league,
who, aside from Bavarian giants Bayern Munich, struggle to attract the biggest
names in football. There is no such problem in the Premier League, which
dominates transfer activity year after year, spending millions in the process.

34
Thus, while global media corporations have played an increasingly important
role in the governance of football, it has been beneficial for the UK economy and
Premier League clubs. However, the greatest problem is the use of this money by
clubs themselves, and more specifically, their refusal to use it to accommodate
supporters. It is true that the Premier League offers a global spectacle that no
other sport can match and is the envy of leagues across Europe. Yet, no club in
Germany is willing to change their business models to gain more revenue, which
suggests that the Premier League model is not perfect. Indeed it is not, which is
why the FA should look into implementing certain regulations in terms of how
television revenue should be spent. The Premier League has certainly hit the
jackpot, now it must claim its money by helping the wider football community,
not their pockets.

35
Chapter 4: Case Study of Arsenal FC and Bayern Munich
In this chapter I will look into the specific case study between Arsenal and
Bayern Munich, analysing their ticket pricing strategies and success (or lack off)
on the pitch. The main source of financial insight comes from the ‘Deloitte
Football Money League’, which offers a ranking of football clubs by revenue
generated through footballing operations. I will be using the latest figures that
were released in January 2015. I have chosen these two clubs as they are both
relatively successful teams in their respective leagues, and have both recently
built modern new stadiums. While they are also ranked highly in Deloitte’s
money league, they do so through entirely different means, which will be looked
into here.
Arsenal F.C has had a prominent role within English football since its
establishment in 1886. Second to only Manchester United, Arsenal have been the
most successful team in the Premier League era, famously going a whole season
unbeaten in 2003/04, becoming immortalised as ‘The Invincibles’. Yet, since this
outstanding achievement, the club have only won two FA Cups, the latter just last
year after a barren run of 9 years. Much of this poor spell in the clubs history was
put down to the fact they had to pay off debts of their new 60,000-seater
stadium, The Emirates. However, fans were not content with the situation, and
have often called for manager Arsene Wenger to be sacked, which highlights the
fickleness of football fans. But the fans were not entirely in the wrong. For years,
Arsenal sold their most valuable assets abroad and to domestic rivals, brought in
players less talented and continually charged fans the most expensive tickets in
the country. Meanwhile, Bayern Munich, by far Germany’s most successful

36
football club, also decided to modernise the club by building a magnificent new
stadium, the Allianz Arena. Despite the significant cost of this project and the
financial crisis, Bayern have fully paid off the debt (£346million) taken out in
2005, an impressive 16 years earlier than planned (Grant, 2014b). Crucially
however, during this period the club was not short of success, famously winning
the treble in 2013.
Let me begin by examining Arsenals revenue. Ranked 8th in the Deloitte money
league, Arsenals total revenue for 2014 was £300.5million, up from
£243.6million in 2013 (Deloitte, 2015). Due to their fantastic new stadium,
Arsenal has the second largest average league attendance at 60,014, which
explains to an extent the £100.2millon made annually from match days (33% of
total revenue). This figure is second only to Manchester United in revenue gained
(£108.1million), who do have a larger capacity stadium by quite some distance.
Thus, primarily one factor explains the astonishingly high profit generated from
match days: the cost ticket prices. Arsenal rather notoriously charges the most
expensive tickets in England, and thereby in the world. Their most expensive
match day ticket costs £97, with their most expensive season ticket coming in at
a mindboggling £2,013, while their cheapest season tickets is £1,014, which is
still more than what 17 Premier League clubs charge for their most expensive
ones (BBC Sport, 2014). To contrast this with Manchester City, the reigning
champions, their cheapest season ticket is a fair £299. Yet, to put even further
put shame on English football’s prices, and particularly on Arsenal, Charlton
Athletic offer the cheapest season tickets within England’s top 4 divisions at
£150, while FC Barcelona, one of the world’s greatest ever football clubs, charge

37
around £103 for their lowest-priced season ticket (ibid). The increasing costs of
ticket prices has been met by resistance by fans, including the Arsenal
Supporters Trust, who earlier this year surveyed over 2,000 Arsenal fans. In
relation to the recent TV deal discussed in chapter three; over 97% of those
surveyed want to see some additional money from the TV deal used to reduce
ticket prices, 95% think that when a game is moved for TV coverage, while some
of the money earned by clubs should be used to compensate fans for
inconvenience via lower ticket prices and 96% of fans support existing
campaigns for standard pricing for all away fans (Arsenal Supporters Trust,
2015). Regardless of the moral imperative, there are valid commercial reasons
why lowering prices would be good for business; football would immediately
become more affordable for youngsters, or indeed parents who would like to
take their children to games but cannot afford it currently, which in response
will create the clubs future generation of customers. Furthermore, filling up
stadiums leads to a better quality atmosphere that in theory helps the team
perform better, treating the supporters as their ‘twelfth man’.
The majority of Arsenals revenue, to be expected due to TV deals in the Premier
League, comes from broadcasting (£123.2million), which is 41% of their total.
The rest of Arsenals revenue is made up by commercial deals, ranging from
sponsorship deals and shirt sales, which combine to make £77.1million annually
(26%). The impact of Arsenal’s main sponsor Fly Emirates, along with their
recent shirt manufacturer, Puma, could see Arsenal consolidating their top 10
position in the money league and close the gap to the teams above them.

38
In complete contrast, Bayern Munich makes a total revenue of £407.7million
pounds, making them the 3rd wealthiest football club in the world. Despite an
average attendance of 71,131 fans, Bayern Munich make their least amount of
revenue through match day ticket sales- £73.6million (18%). This highlights the
exceptional morality of the owners, with ridiculously low-ticket prices. Given
their exciting brand of football and the regular success it brings, Bayern would
have every right to charge a premium rate, yet their prices are among the lowest
available in the division, with the cheapest season ticket just £104 (Shergold,
2013). This is a part of the Bundesliga’s success story whereby every club is
careful not to charge too much, a culture zealously guarded by supporters groups
(Conn, 2013c). Their second highest source of revenue comes from broadcasting
deals, earning £90.1million annually (22%). This seems to be exceptionally low
in regard to their success, especially when contrasted with the total earned by
bottom placed Premier League clubs. Indeed, this is an underdeveloped area
within German football; with a lack of management attention meaning the
Bundesliga did not even sell TV rights internationally until 2005.
The greatest source of income for Bayern Munich by far comes from the
commercial aspect, making an astounding £244million, which accounts for 60%
of their revenue. This is due in part to their ownership structure. At Bayern,
225,000 members own 82% of the club and vote every three years for the senior
board members. These are generally former players regarded as legends in the
game who use their status to draw in sponsorship. Moreover, German clubs form
“close ties with local firms, who turn out to be big global companies” (Evans,
2013). In the case of Bayern this happens to be German business giants Audi,

39
Adidas and Allianz, who own an 8.3% stake each in the club. This helps a great
deal in the financial aspect of the game; especially considering no other club has
as powerful a sponsor as these. Indeed, within Germany the club is viewed as a
“ruthless, over-commercialised, clinical winning machine” (Conn, 2013c).
Furthermore, Bayern is a prime example of how German firms collaborate with
one another, which is a stated feature of Coordinated Market Economies such as
Germany. Bayern Munich showed its generosity in 2004, when they bailed out
struggling rivals Borussia Dortmund with a €2million, interest free loan, having
previously helped St. Pauli and 1860 Munich. As stated by former general
manager Uli Hoeness, “When they couldn’t even pay their salaries we thought we
should help. I’m a big fan of tradition in sport and I think it was the right thing to
do” (Hoeness in Taylor, 2013). This is an amazing act of sportsmanship, and
unfortunately one we are highly unlikely to witness in the UK. Perhaps the FA
should take this on board to ensure that instead of competing with one another
within a deregulated sector, clubs should seek to collaborate and develop
together.

40
Chapter 5: Does football need more politics to counter the strength of
economic forces?
In this chapter, I will look to provide a conclusion by providing suggestions on
possible alterations within English football via the government, the Football
Association and clubs to curtail the vast increase in media power within football.
I have largely shown that while the Premier League is way above all other
leagues in terms of providing a commercial market generating billions, the
Bundesliga offers a far more sustainable model due to certain regulations placed
upon it. Thus, here I will argue that football does need more political regulation
to counter the strength of economic forces to ensure the game is treated as more
than a marketable commodity. I fundamentally believe the current trend of
holding a profit maximising conception of football must be changed into a more
sustainable, community orientated one.
Government
As football is socially, politically and economically so important, it is crucial that
the British government does not neglect the sport. Though I believe it would be
wrong to interfere directly with football matters as this is not an area of
specialisation for the government, I strongly judge that it is crucial for the
government to protect from the vulnerability of economic forces and offer
protection to clubs in danger of going into administration. One way of achieving
this would perhaps be a policy whereby clubs can be offered an interest free loan
in extreme cases, in which time the government can control the funds of a club
until the loan is paid back to ensure it does not enter administration and
dissolve. This should only be used in extreme cases whereby it ensures clubs

41
stay afloat. I believe this would be beneficial in the long term for the community
surrounding a club. Furthermore, the government should keep regular checks on
the FA to ensure its budget is helping the greater community and not just the
elites at the head of clubs.
I would also suggest that the time has come for the government to evaluate its
decision to prevent the use of standing sections in stadiums. This would have to
follow a large-scale review initiated by the government to assess stadiums and
instruct clubs to improve their infrastructures if it is required before this can
take place at all grounds.
It is essential that the government back up the regulations enforced by the FA to
ensure every club meets them. The government should hold a role as being an
enforcer of regulations set principally by the FA, who specialise in football. While
self-regulation of the FA is important, the government must protect the general
public by issuing certain safeguards. Thus, the British government should take
note of the German government, who operate under a corporate market
economy, whereby it promotes greater collaboration between companies. I
believe this political economy is highly beneficial in sport and the UK should look
to incorporate it within the realm of football.
The Football Association
I believe the Football Association should take the most responsibility for
governing British football. Setting its own budget and regularly reporting back to
the government, the FA should focus its capital on grassroots football and the

42
lower leagues. Indeed, it was reported “84% involved in the game’s grassroots
cited poor facilities as their most pressing concern” (Conn, 2013a). Dealing with
this issue would ensure continuous development in the sport while
simultaneously ensuring sustainability- if an owner suddenly pulls out of a club
in serious debt, the club will need to rely on its youth team players, whom cannot
be developed efficiently unless investments are made at grassroots. This would
also largely benefit the English national football team, as it would increase the
facilities for youth to get into football, thus enlarging the national pool to choose
players from.
To ensure clubs don’t enter into administration I believe the FA should impose
regulations on ownership. For example, owners should be made to commit to a
10 year plan at the respective club, and set out a key timeline of its plans
(amount it will invest in club etc.). This would ensure stability at clubs and ease
the worries of fans that worry for their clubs when businessmen take over their
clubs. Furthermore, it is vital not the isolate smaller clubs who simply cannot
escape the economic forces faced by all lower division clubs due to a small
number of fans, limited commercial, television and merchandise income and
unsustainable wages leading to a constant threat of bankruptcy. This is why the
FA controlling the distribution of income within English football would be
beneficial for all.
The greatest regulation I believe the FA should do is to put a quota on the
amount football clubs can charge supporters. I believe this would have to be
done with fairly open quotas at first, for example the best sections of stadiums

43
could be priced at a maximum of £40, while less attractive sections could be
priced at £20, with no club allowed to exceed this limit. While this would be less
profitable for clubs, I believe it would be highly advantageous in the long term, as
it would sustain their fan base for future generations while enhancing
atmospheres within stadiums. Furthermore, if standing sections are
reintroduced in stadiums, this would expand the capacities of stadium
significantly, which would in turn lead to the same revenue made by selling
slightly cheaper tickets to more supporters as selling expensive tickets to less
fans.
Another reform that should take place is enabling a voice for supporters in clubs
by placing elected fans on the boards of clubs. This would lead to a more direct
means in affecting club policy. I am suggesting for this to be regulated by the FA
as it is especially unlikely for clubs to accept this given their own jurisdiction. I
believe this would greatly benefit all clubs, as fans, before anything else, want the
very best for their teams. While the German ‘50+1’ ownership model is evidently
effective and sustainable, and would be a positive development, it would simply
be impossible to put into practice. Shares in clubs, especially the top clubs in the
Premier League, would simply cost too much which immediately ends any hope
of this being achieved. Thus, simply placing representative on club boards would
help alleviate the non-representation of supporters within football clubs while
not taking power away from current shareholders.
As with the case of Financial Fair Play in Europe and the system adopted in the
Bundesliga, whereby clubs are deducted points if they fail to meet the financial

44
status required, a similar principle should be set in the Premier League to
regulate spending. Immediately this would prevent clubs from risking
bankruptcy by spending ridiculous amounts of money on a single player. This
would lead to clubs re-thinking transfer policy, which would lead to less
bemusing transfers such as Stewart Downing and Andy Carroll, brought by
Liverpool FC for a combined fee of £55million, and having failed miserably, sold
for a total of £20million just two years later. It would also ensure greater
equality between clubs, which could lead to more entertaining matches.
Overall, I believe the FA should look to impose its grip on clubs a greater deal by
forming regular independent audits on clubs’ checks and balances, and reporting
this back to the government if deemed in danger. Unfortunately, clubs are highly
unlikely to take into account the wishes of supporters for cheaper match day
tickets, and thus the implementation of price quotas would be the best means of
meeting the demands of the supporters, which would in turn help community
moral which would help the economy in the long run.
Clubs
Premier League football clubs should look to cooperate with the government and
FA by meeting regulations that are set. Increased regulation would be for the
overall benefit of all, as it would also reduce the risk of a club failing financially
as regular checks would take place, thus relieving some pressure off the owners.
Clubs should seek to consolidate a permanent place for fans on boards to have a
say in the way the club is run. Any hindrances caused by FA regulations, such as
the quota on ticket prices, would be compensated by the recent television deal,

45
enabling teams to remain in profit while appeasing fans. This would result in
better atmospheres, which would in turn lead to a better spectacle, which would
most likely increase the price of the next TV deal due in 3 years.
Club shareholders should also be wary in selling their shares to the worlds
super-rich, as it would be a great risk for the longevity of a club should the need
of relying on the wealth of one person arise. Further, it should be noted that
within the commercial boom of the Premier League, the England national team is
“far from a priority for clubs mostly owned by oversees financial interests”
(Conn, 2013b). Where possible clubs should incorporate fans in all aspects of
decision making, and if not selling shares to supporters, efforts should be made
to having their voices heard on club boards. I believe this is an aspect of the
German model which is highly beneficial for the all-round stability of a club,
though would be difficult to enact to the max by Premier League clubs due to the
costs of shares. This is a suggestion that has already been voiced by numerous
MP’s, with it being demanded that the “government takes urgent action to force
professional football clubs and the FA to involve supporters substantially more
in their decision making” (Conn, 2014a). This system would see a form of
ownership based on what people could put back into the game rather than on
what wealthy elites can take out of it. There are also specific advantages to clubs
being supporter owned, such as it leading to a greater sense of engagement and
inclusion with wider fans and stakeholders; better integration within the
community, more openness and responsible governance, good relationships with
local authorities and partnerships with voluntary organizations’ (Conn, 2010).

46
As the Bundesliga lacks the capacity to attract as many viewers as the Premier
League, their TV deals will be less financially rewarding. German clubs have thus
minimilised this loss by focusing on other areas such as sponsorship. The
Bundesliga, for all its qualities, “is being judged for failing to meet the most
important aspect of football: competitiveness” (Conn, 2013c). As the Premier
League has already achieved this, being the most exciting league in the world to
watch, it would create the best of both worlds if it could accommodate its fans,
which in theory it should be able to as there would be no loss incurred due to the
immense TV revenue. Perhaps the clubs themselves could decide to split the TV
rights’ share completely evenly if it wishes to collaborative with one another and
increase competitiveness, though I believe the current structuring is one that is
fair. It would be satisfying to see clubs coming together in unison to support
these regulations.

47
Conclusion
To sum up this project, I have attempted to first make explicit the importance of
football in our contemporary world. I have then shown two entirely different
models, which both have its positives and negatives, before offering a
perspective on how these negatives can be removed in the case of the Premier
League. Football does need more regulation to counter the growing strength of
economic forces, and the best way to achieve this would be to enable the FA to
make significant reforms to regulate the finances of clubs, which would in turn
be enforced by the government. The Premier League has an amazing platform to
build on if it so wishes to create an ideal scenario for all parties involved. Indeed,
this project agrees considerably with the concluding comments of Wyn Grant,
who states “football needs more politics not less to counter the strength of
economic forces and to ensure the game is treated as more than a marketable
commodity” (Grant, 2007, 30). This is undeniably a difficult process as there is a
lack of understanding of politics within football, with its tendency to think of
itself as a separate world, which should be free from external interference. Yet,
football is not immune to the conflicts between public regulation and private
power and thus greater political intervention within football is justified.
Ultimately, only states and major political institutions possess the necessary
power and resources to provide a framework for corporate governance and
social responsibility, that will ensure that the pursuit of private self-interest does
not undermine the broader interests of sport as a whole” (Lee, 2004, 127).
Unfortunately, this has been an area largely ignored by academics, yet, as stated
by Rogan Taylor, the power of football to “contribute to the formation of a sense

48
of the ‘self’ for many millions of people is surely worthy of our best academic
efforts” (Taylor, 2004, 129).
As the Bundesliga is certainly showing Europe’s other leagues that “success on
the pitch does not have to come at a crippling price” (The Economist, 2012),
some lessons must be learned from the German model. It is not simply a
coincidence that while Premier League clubs can generate astonishing revenue
through television deals, this is rarely reflected in end of year profit: the
complete opposite of German clubs. Thus, a side from a limited number of clubs
in the Premier League, English football operates under a failed business model,
which is connected with the problematic belief that the only way to stay
competitive is to sell extortionately high tickets. This is simply not the case and
the sooner clubs and football associations realise that the true problem lies
within structural problems, the better.

49
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