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N E W E R A O F S O F T WA R E W I T H
M O D E R N A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y
V E R S I O N 1 . 0 ( 1 9 / M A R / 2 0 1 6 )
C O D E M O T I O N R O M E
@ D I N I S C R U Z
C O U P L E D I S C L A M E R S
• This presentation has 233 slides and is designed to guide the delivery of
this presentation and provide background information for offline reading
• I speak really fast (for an English audience)
• I have too much content - even when I deliver three-day courses :)
• I abuse the term ‘Unit Testing’ :
• for me the ‘Unit’ can be anything, from just a method to a full browser
automation workflow
• if it can be executed with a Unit Test Framework (NUnit, Mocha, Karma)
then it is a Unit Test ( even if it is called an e2e or Integration test)
M E
• Developer for 25 years
• AppSec for 13 years
• Day jobs:
• Leader OWASP O2 Platform
project
• Head of Application Security at
The Hut Group
• Application Security Training
for JBI Training
• AppSec Consultant and Mentor
P E R F O R M E D H U N D R E D S O F S E C U R I T Y
R E V I E W S
• Found critical vulnerabilities in high profile applications
(impacting millions of users)
• desktop apps, websites, mobile apps, web services,
security tools, frameworks, telephony, networks, etc…
• Reported zero days to software vendors (before bug
bounties)
• 0wned data centres, networks, apps, databases
D E L I V E R E D T R A I N I N G T O 1 0 0 0 S O F
D E V E L O P E R S
• BBC
• BAE Applied Intelligence
• O2
• Alaska Airlines
• Ocado
• Capita (Orbit)
• BSkyB
• Harrods
• Microsoft
• Verifone
• OWASP Conferences
• BlackHat
• TotalJobs
• Cashflows
• RunEscape
• The Hut Group
I ’ M A D E V E L O P E R
• Have shipped code
• Have managed dev teams
• Have written tests (with 100% code coverage)
• Have created CI and CD environments (DevOps)
• Worked on Secure Software Architecture and
workflows (SecDevOps)
G R A P H S
• I love Graphs
• Recently I have realised that I have spend most of my
life thinking about graphs and coding graphs
• Graphs are great for data analysis and modelling
• … but this is a topic for another presentation
@ D I N I S C R U Z
B L O G . D I N I S C R U Z . C O M
B O O K S
• Published at Leanpub (http://leanpub.com/u/DinisCruz)
• Minimum price: 0 €
O WA S P O 2 P L AT F O R M
• My brain in a tool
• Very powerful but not easy to start using
N E W E R A O F
S O F T WA R E W I T H
M O D E R N
A P P L I C AT I O N
S E C U R I T Y
My thesis is that
Application Security can be used to 

define and measure Software Quality
• TDD with Code Coverage
• Threat Models
• Docker and Containers
• Test Automation
• SAST/DAST/IAST/WAF
M O D E R N A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y
• Clever Fuzzing
• JIRA Risk workflows
• Kanban for Quality fixes
• Web Services visualisation
• ELK
J I R A W O R K F L O W
lets start with a view of the problem
S O F T WA R E I S E AT I N G AT TA C K I N G T H E
W O R L D
W H O I S AT TA C K I N G Y O U
I F T H E
AT TA C K E R T E L L S
Y O U A B O U T T H E
AT TA C K
Y O U S H O U L D
T H A N K T H E M
The dangerous ones are the
commercially focused
criminals
It’s all about the money
… to hack you …
Buy botnet for $110
How much it cost to be an ‘internal user’
100% Anti-virus non detection guarantee
But the credit cards were protected
E X A M P L E S O F AT TA C K S
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WASC_Web_Hacking_Incidents_Database_Project
S Q L I N J E C T I O N
S Q L I N J E C T I O N T O O L - H AV I J
XSS
X S S AT TA C K - A PA C H E . O R G
https://blogs.apache.org/infra/entry/apache_org_04_09_2010
X S S W O R M - M Y S PA C E
G E T PAY E D T O F I N D X S S
Man-in-the-middle
T J X ( PA R T O F T X M A X )
• 94 Million customer’s data compromised
• $256 Million USD Settlement with Visa, MasterCard,
Customers
• Estimated cost to deal with incident (and improve
security): 1 Billion USD
D O N ’ T A C C E P T I T
AT TA C K I N G C A R S
http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Car_Hacking.pdf
D o S
( D e n i a l o f S e r v i c e )
S Y N F L O O D S 

( c r a s h i n g t h e f i re w a l l )
Brute force attacks
L O G I N AT T E M P T S
Attacking the Cloud
https://speakerdeck.com/silvexis/bringing-a-machete-to-the-amazon-blackhat-eu-2014
Google Dorks
Punkspider
Web crawler that performs penetration
tests and indexes sites based on the
vulnerabilities they have.
UK sites that have XSS and SQL injection
UK sites that have XSS and SQL injection
Attacking the
Internet of Things (IoT)
Cyberwar
Attacking markets
R U S S I A N H A C K E R S M O V E D R U B L E R AT E
W I T H M A LWA R E
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-08/russian-hackers-moved-currency-rate-with-malware-group-ib-says
A G U Y C H A L L E N G E D H A C K E R S AT D E F C O N
T O H A C K H I M …
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjYhmX_OUQQ
Attacks coming soon…
1. Mass supermarket failure (no food, milk, water
available)
2. Bank or Financial Company collapse
3. Fabricated News
4. Mass loss, sale and exploitation of Individuals Private
information
5. Mass Identify Theft!
• Can you prove that YOU are YOU?
• What if the ‘Computer says differently’?
• What if your picture ‘in the computer’ is modified?
• What if your date-of-birth and family name are modified?
• What if you are shown as DEAD in the system?
• How many databases would it take to kill you digitally
• What if there is NO record at ALL that you ever existed?
• in ID database
• in Financial database
• in Hospital databases
• etc...?
6. Medical systems exploitation:
• Wrong medicaments delivered, sold
• Manipulating hospital systems
• Corruption of medial records
• Sale of medial records
7. Car/Plane/Train crashes:
• all lights are made green at the same time
• maintenance records are fiddled or manipulated (Fake parts
scam)
• Remote control and manipulation
• Manipulation of traffic guidance systems
8. ID cards/Passport exploits
• Government loses ability to issue new ID cards
• Massive ID Card fraud
9. Companies are selling Fake ID carts with no ability to
stop them
10.No Cashpoints
11.New laws introduced in parliament (without formal
discussion/approval)
12.Fighter jet fires missile into crowd / building / city
13. Mass hysteria at stadium, where a big message on screen says:
•"...RUN!!!!!! The stadium is going to blow in 2 minutes..."
•"...There is a terrorist in the stadium, here is his picture! Find him
and kill him!!..."
14. Water poisoning
15. Manipulation of controls that introduce or remove chemicals in water
16. Attacks on electric grid
17. Mass compromise of online email systems
18.Corruption of Inland Revenue database (if they did not know who
owed what and they could not be able to collect money from taxes)
19. Websites massively attack users and users are afraid to go online
20. Localised or global Internet shutdowns
I think you get the idea
for more examples read:
TA L K TA L K
Where is 

AppSec?
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/
committees-a-z/commons-select/culture-media-and-
sport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/cyber-
security-15-16/
“After police & PWC
investigation TalkTalk
CEO admits firm
'underestimated'
cybersecurity and touts
change in culture”
“Investigation by PwC shown TalkTalk has been acting like a startup
rather than a major company, (new services, innovate, move fast) and
they saw security as a technology issue, not a business one and
underestimated the challenge.”
…moving on to user’s
identities
H AV E Y O U B E E N P W N E D ?
B U G B O U N T I E S
Bug bounties are a sign of
Application Security
Maturity
If you don’t have one
you are saying
… I’m a good target to attack …
G I T H U B
G O O G L E
L E T ’ S H A C K ( A L I T T L E B I T )
H T T P : / / N E W S . B B C . C O . U K 

H T T P : / / M A N I F E S T O . S O F T WA R E C R A F T S M A N S H I P. O R G /
Demo
…..basically…..
…..but…..
D O N T PA N I C
Unless you are directly
targeted …
…the probability of 

you, your company or your apps
being attacked
is still low
… not because you are secure
… but because there are not
enough attackers
… and the business model of the current
attackers has not evolved to the next level 



(where they find a way to make money with your assets)
N E W G E N E R AT I O N
O F A P P L I C AT I O N
S E C U R I T Y
T H I N K I N G
1.TDD with Code Coverage
2.Threat Models
3.Docker and Containers
4.Test Automation
5.SAST/DAST/IAST/WAF
6.Clever Fuzzing
7.JIRA Risk workflows
8.Kanban for Quality fixes
9.Web Services visualisation
10.ELK
These tools/techniques are designed to 



A) Improve code Quality



B) Make AppSec possible
1 ) T D D W I T H C O D E C O V E R A G E
• All code changes must have tests
• Code Coverage is key to understand the impact of
those changes
• Devs, QA and Security teams should be
communicating using tests
2 ) T H R E AT M O D E L S
2 ) T H R E AT M O D E L S
• Are ‘technical briefs’ (i.e. better briefs)
• Should be the ‘source of truth’ in an organisation
about their apps and code
• Should be done for:
• Applications
• Components
• Features
3 ) D O C K E R A N D C O N TA I N E R S
3 ) D O C K E R A N D C O N TA I N E R S
• Provide repeatable and destroyable QA environments
• Enable DevOps
• Next paradigm of Secure Applications
• Dramatically improve the quality and resilience of Tests
4 ) S A S T / D A S T / I A S T / WA F
• SAST - Static Application Security Testing
• DAST - Dynamic Application Security Testing
• IAST - Interactive Application Security Testing
• WAF - Web Application Security Firewall
5 ) T E S T A U T O M AT I O N
• Tests must run automatically on all commits of all
branches
• AppSec tests must be used to ‘identify changes to
attack surface’
• Empower two CI pipelines
• Super fast - push to production
• Pause - needs review
5 ) C L E V E R F U Z Z I N G
6 ) J I R A R I S K W O R K F L O W S
7 ) K A N B A N F O R Q U A L I T Y F I X E S
• SCRUM tends to be more of a Religion than Agile
• Kanban WIP (Work in Progress) is key for Application Security Fixes
8 ) W E B S E R V I C E S V I S U A L I S AT I O N
9 ) E L K
• ElasticSearch + LogStash + Kibana
• Use it everywhere and everybody customises it
• Also for developers (not just Ops)
Just to say it again ….
These tools/techniques are designed to 



A) Improve code Quality



B) Make AppSec possible
Without them you are not really doing
Application Security
… and you have a 



Development Problem
not an



Application Security Problem
A P P S E C A N D Q U A L I T Y
Software Craftsmanship is about
Software Quality
“I like my code to be elegant and efficient"

Bjarne Stroustup, inventor of C++
“Clean code is simple and direct. Clean
code reads like well-designed prose”

Grady Booch, author
“Clean code can be read, and enhanced by
a developer other than its original author”

”Big” Dave Thomas, founder of OTI
“Clean code always looks like it was written
by someone that how cares”

Michael Feathers, author
“You know you are working on clean code when each routine you
read turns out to be pretty much what you expected”

Ward Cunningham, inventor of Wiki
a big problem with the previous comments and the
Software Craftsmanship concept is


‘How to define Quality?’
Everybody knows that Quality is key
… but …
‘how to measure Quality?’
My thesis is that
Application Security can be used to 

define and measure Software Quality
Not all Software Quality issues are 

Application Security issues



But all Application Security issues are 

Software Quality issues
S h e r i f M a n s o u r, E x p e d i a
Application Security is all about the
non-functional requirements of software*
* s o f t w a re = a p p s , w e b s i t e s , w e b s e r v i c e s , a p i s , t o o l s , b u i l d s c r i p t s = c o d e
Application Security is all about understanding 



HOW the software works*
* v s h o w s o f t w a re b e h a v e s
Using Application Security 



I can measure the quality of software
Because Application Security 



measures the unintended side effects of coding
T H E P O L L U T I O N A N A L O G Y
T E C H N I C A L D E B T I S A B A D A N A L O G Y
• The developers are the ones who pays the debt
• Pollution is a much better analogy
• The key is to make the business accept the risk (i.e the
debt)
• Which is done using the JIRA RISK Workflows
W R I T I N G S E C U R E C O D E M Y T H
“If only software developers had security
knowledge they would be able write secure code”
This is a myth because secure code has little to do
with developer’s skills and craftsmanship
Software security (or insecurity) is a consequence
of the Software development environment 



(namely the business and managers focus)
And I know that this is a myth because
I cannot write ‘secure code’ 



when I’m programming
J I R A R I S K
W O R K F L O W
http://blog.diniscruz.com/2016/03/updated-jira-risk-workflow-now-with.html
‘ F I X I N G ’ F L O W
`
‘ R I S K A P P R O VA L’ F L O W
F U L L W O R K F L O W 

( f ro m D e v p o i n t o f v i e w )
1. Vulnerability/issue is found (RISK ticket opened) 
2. Dev understands the issue, writes test that replicates the issue,
opens ticket in his project’s JIRA and tries to figure out the best
way to fix it 
3. Dev asks for guidance to AppSec team
4. AppSec team points to WIKI page (existing or newly created)
5. Dev uses guidance to fix it (and updates test so that is is now a
regression test)
6. Commit(s) are made, RISK ticket is updated with link to commit(s)
7. Dev asks AppSec to review fix
8. AppSec reviews fix, and if all looks ok, close the RISK ticket
M A P P I N G T O I N F O S E C R I S K S
Labels for
reporting
and
filters
M A P P I N G J I R A T I C K E T S T O T E S T S
J I R A D A S H B O A R D S
W E E K LY E M A I L S W I T H R I S K S TAT U S
K E Y C O N C E P T S O F T H I S W O R K F L O W
• All tests should pass all the time
• Tests that check/confirm vulnerabilities should also
pass
• The key to make this work is to: 



Make business owners understand the risks of their
decisions (and click on the ‘accept risk’ button)
You have to make sure that it is your
boss that gets fired
… he/she should make sure that it is
his/hers boss that gets fired …
… all the way to the CTO
(i.e. Board level responsibility)
T E S T I N G
If you make a change and 

don’t have a test
You are making
random changes
http://blog.kj187.de/how-do-i-convince-my-manager-that-unittests-are-important/
How to solve this problem?
You don’t
You sack your manager
As a developer you need to have pressure from
management to deliver code that is:

Solid
Secure
Testable
Provable
Readable
Maintainable


Basically, deliver Quality Code
9 9 % C O D E C O V E R A G E
…is not the destination


…it is ‘base camp’
With 99% code coverage you are here
Without 99% code coverage


you have not solved really hard
problems in the testability of your
code
Import note:


If 99% code coverage is just an
‘management requirement’


… and is being gamed by devs

… and you have LOTS of stupid
‘Unit tests’ 

i.e. 99 x 1% code coverage or

999 x 0.1 % code coverage
then you also
need to sack your manager
You manager’s job is to help you to deliver:
Solid
Secure
Testable
Provable
Readable
Maintainable
Code
To make testing effective …

…testing (from Unit Testing to
Integration tests) needs to done in
the IDE with real-time execution and
Code coverage
Q A , R E G R E S S I O N A N D S E C U R I T Y T E S T S
Wallaby’s realtime
Unit test Execution
and Code Coverage
M I S S I N G T E S T S 

( a n d 1 0 0 % c o d e c o v e r a g e )
R E A L W O R L D M U TAT I O N T E S T I N G
• http://pitest.org/
W H Y D O A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y ?
Because you care about: 

your users

good engineering
your application
your company
You have been lucky so far due
to lack of commercially focused
attackers
This has been a
Blessing and Curse
You are making an


Hedged bet
the
Security of your code
vs
Skill and motivation of attacks
will not change in next 2 years
Your hedge bet is that :
Most of you are creating the
perfect storm ….
User personalisation
+
Digital Payments
+
APIs
How insecure is your code?

How many risks/vulnerabilities are
you aware of?

And have Accepted?
How long does it take you to
Fix Security/Quality
issues?
E X T E R N A L S I G N S O F L A C K O F F O C U S
& L A C K O F A P P S E C P O W E R
• Not 100% SSL (with HSTS and Secure Cookies)
• No consolidation of Javascripts, which implies No CI (Continuous
Integration)
• Cookie Salad (caused by lack of State Service in back end)
• Easy DoS by normal business activities
• “We’re hiring for AppSec” jobs posts
• Easy-to-find vulnerabilities (low-hanging-fruit)
• No public bug bounty
D O E S Y O U R C O M PA N Y / T E A M H AV E :
• AppSec team/person
• Security Champion
• Secure coding standards
• Threat Models
• OWASP contributors
• Secure code reviews
If your answer was not YES to all of them... 

then


Your Application WILL have a high
number of Security Vulnerabilities
And you need to invest in Application
Security

Which if done correctly will improve the
Quality of your code
M A N A G E R S
A N D B U S I N E S S
O W N E R S
S E N I O R M A N A G E M E N T O V E R S I G H T
• ‘Security Memo’ (from God)
• Incident response plans
• Emergency response exercises (can you detect them?)
• Cyber Insurance
• Enterprise Cyber Risk management
• Which C-level executive will get fired?
6 M O N T H A P P S E C I N V E S T M E N T
What Description Cost
Head Of Appsec 1 x person £100K
Senior Developers 2 x persons £120K
Appsec Ops 2 x persons £80K
External Security Company 100 x days £100K
Security Tools
Static, Dynamic, Interactive
Scanners
£100K
Dev App Sec Tools
CI , Collaboration, Cloud,
IDE plugins
£50K
Education
Training, Conferences, Bug
Bounties,
£50K
Total £600K
W E H AV E S O L U T I O N S
O WA S P ! ! ! !
G R E AT P R E S E N TAT I O N O N S E C D E V O P S
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQblKuMuS0Y
O p e n S A M M ( S e c u r i t y A s s u r a n c e S e c u r i t y M o d e l )
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:Software_Assurance_Maturity_Model
B S I M M ( B u i l d i n g S e c u r i t y i n M a t u r i t y M o d e l )
S E C U R I T Y D E V E L O P M E N T L I F E C Y C L E
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/process/design.aspx
T I P S F O R B U I L D I N G A M O D E R N
S E C U R I T Y E N G I N E E R I N G O R G A N I S AT I O N
https://georgianpartners.com/tips-for-building-a-modern-security-engineering-organization
H O W T O B U I L D S E C U R E W E B A P P L I C AT I O N
http://blog.knoldus.com/2016/02/03/how-to-build-secure-web-application/
N E W S E C U R I T Y S E R V I C E S - 2 FA
D E P L O Y, D E P L O Y, D E P L O Y
• Push to production and refactor without fear
• Be like GitHub and use CI/CD to deploy 175 times in
one day and 12,602 times in one year
https://github.com/blog/1241-deploying-at-github
• https://labs.spotify.com/2014/03/27/spotify-engineering-culture-part-1/
• https://labs.spotify.com/2014/09/20/spotify-engineering-culture-part-2/
F I N A L T H O U G H T S
U N W R I T T E N R U L E S O F A P I S
“Every API is destined to be connected to the internet”
U N W R I T T E N R U L E S O F A P I S
“All API data wants to be exposed in a Web Page”
“Would you fly in a plane that has the code quality
of your APIs”
Application Security
can be used to


define and measure
Software Quality
Thanks, any questions?

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New Era of Software with modern Application Security v1.0

  • 1. N E W E R A O F S O F T WA R E W I T H M O D E R N A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y V E R S I O N 1 . 0 ( 1 9 / M A R / 2 0 1 6 ) C O D E M O T I O N R O M E @ D I N I S C R U Z
  • 2. C O U P L E D I S C L A M E R S • This presentation has 233 slides and is designed to guide the delivery of this presentation and provide background information for offline reading • I speak really fast (for an English audience) • I have too much content - even when I deliver three-day courses :) • I abuse the term ‘Unit Testing’ : • for me the ‘Unit’ can be anything, from just a method to a full browser automation workflow • if it can be executed with a Unit Test Framework (NUnit, Mocha, Karma) then it is a Unit Test ( even if it is called an e2e or Integration test)
  • 3. M E • Developer for 25 years • AppSec for 13 years • Day jobs: • Leader OWASP O2 Platform project • Head of Application Security at The Hut Group • Application Security Training for JBI Training • AppSec Consultant and Mentor
  • 4. P E R F O R M E D H U N D R E D S O F S E C U R I T Y R E V I E W S • Found critical vulnerabilities in high profile applications (impacting millions of users) • desktop apps, websites, mobile apps, web services, security tools, frameworks, telephony, networks, etc… • Reported zero days to software vendors (before bug bounties) • 0wned data centres, networks, apps, databases
  • 5. D E L I V E R E D T R A I N I N G T O 1 0 0 0 S O F D E V E L O P E R S • BBC • BAE Applied Intelligence • O2 • Alaska Airlines • Ocado • Capita (Orbit) • BSkyB • Harrods • Microsoft • Verifone • OWASP Conferences • BlackHat • TotalJobs • Cashflows • RunEscape • The Hut Group
  • 6. I ’ M A D E V E L O P E R • Have shipped code • Have managed dev teams • Have written tests (with 100% code coverage) • Have created CI and CD environments (DevOps) • Worked on Secure Software Architecture and workflows (SecDevOps)
  • 7. G R A P H S • I love Graphs • Recently I have realised that I have spend most of my life thinking about graphs and coding graphs • Graphs are great for data analysis and modelling • … but this is a topic for another presentation
  • 8. @ D I N I S C R U Z
  • 9. B L O G . D I N I S C R U Z . C O M
  • 10. B O O K S • Published at Leanpub (http://leanpub.com/u/DinisCruz) • Minimum price: 0 €
  • 11. O WA S P O 2 P L AT F O R M • My brain in a tool • Very powerful but not easy to start using
  • 12. N E W E R A O F S O F T WA R E W I T H M O D E R N A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y
  • 13. My thesis is that Application Security can be used to 
 define and measure Software Quality
  • 14. • TDD with Code Coverage • Threat Models • Docker and Containers • Test Automation • SAST/DAST/IAST/WAF M O D E R N A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y • Clever Fuzzing • JIRA Risk workflows • Kanban for Quality fixes • Web Services visualisation • ELK
  • 15. J I R A W O R K F L O W
  • 16. lets start with a view of the problem
  • 17. S O F T WA R E I S E AT I N G AT TA C K I N G T H E W O R L D
  • 18. W H O I S AT TA C K I N G Y O U
  • 19. I F T H E AT TA C K E R T E L L S Y O U A B O U T T H E AT TA C K
  • 20. Y O U S H O U L D T H A N K T H E M
  • 21. The dangerous ones are the commercially focused criminals
  • 22. It’s all about the money
  • 23.
  • 24. … to hack you …
  • 26. How much it cost to be an ‘internal user’
  • 27. 100% Anti-virus non detection guarantee
  • 28. But the credit cards were protected
  • 29. E X A M P L E S O F AT TA C K S
  • 31. S Q L I N J E C T I O N
  • 32. S Q L I N J E C T I O N T O O L - H AV I J
  • 33. XSS
  • 34. X S S AT TA C K - A PA C H E . O R G https://blogs.apache.org/infra/entry/apache_org_04_09_2010
  • 35.
  • 36. X S S W O R M - M Y S PA C E
  • 37. G E T PAY E D T O F I N D X S S
  • 39. T J X ( PA R T O F T X M A X ) • 94 Million customer’s data compromised • $256 Million USD Settlement with Visa, MasterCard, Customers • Estimated cost to deal with incident (and improve security): 1 Billion USD
  • 40.
  • 41.
  • 42.
  • 43.
  • 44. D O N ’ T A C C E P T I T
  • 45.
  • 46. AT TA C K I N G C A R S
  • 48. D o S ( D e n i a l o f S e r v i c e )
  • 49. S Y N F L O O D S 
 ( c r a s h i n g t h e f i re w a l l )
  • 51. L O G I N AT T E M P T S
  • 54.
  • 56.
  • 57.
  • 59. Web crawler that performs penetration tests and indexes sites based on the vulnerabilities they have. UK sites that have XSS and SQL injection
  • 60. UK sites that have XSS and SQL injection
  • 62.
  • 64.
  • 66. R U S S I A N H A C K E R S M O V E D R U B L E R AT E W I T H M A LWA R E http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-08/russian-hackers-moved-currency-rate-with-malware-group-ib-says
  • 67.
  • 68.
  • 69. A G U Y C H A L L E N G E D H A C K E R S AT D E F C O N T O H A C K H I M … https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjYhmX_OUQQ
  • 71. 1. Mass supermarket failure (no food, milk, water available) 2. Bank or Financial Company collapse 3. Fabricated News 4. Mass loss, sale and exploitation of Individuals Private information
  • 72. 5. Mass Identify Theft! • Can you prove that YOU are YOU? • What if the ‘Computer says differently’? • What if your picture ‘in the computer’ is modified? • What if your date-of-birth and family name are modified? • What if you are shown as DEAD in the system? • How many databases would it take to kill you digitally • What if there is NO record at ALL that you ever existed? • in ID database • in Financial database • in Hospital databases • etc...?
  • 73. 6. Medical systems exploitation: • Wrong medicaments delivered, sold • Manipulating hospital systems • Corruption of medial records • Sale of medial records 7. Car/Plane/Train crashes: • all lights are made green at the same time • maintenance records are fiddled or manipulated (Fake parts scam) • Remote control and manipulation • Manipulation of traffic guidance systems
  • 74. 8. ID cards/Passport exploits • Government loses ability to issue new ID cards • Massive ID Card fraud 9. Companies are selling Fake ID carts with no ability to stop them 10.No Cashpoints 11.New laws introduced in parliament (without formal discussion/approval) 12.Fighter jet fires missile into crowd / building / city
  • 75. 13. Mass hysteria at stadium, where a big message on screen says: •"...RUN!!!!!! The stadium is going to blow in 2 minutes..." •"...There is a terrorist in the stadium, here is his picture! Find him and kill him!!..." 14. Water poisoning 15. Manipulation of controls that introduce or remove chemicals in water 16. Attacks on electric grid 17. Mass compromise of online email systems 18.Corruption of Inland Revenue database (if they did not know who owed what and they could not be able to collect money from taxes) 19. Websites massively attack users and users are afraid to go online 20. Localised or global Internet shutdowns
  • 76. I think you get the idea for more examples read:
  • 77. TA L K TA L K
  • 78.
  • 79.
  • 80.
  • 81.
  • 83.
  • 84.
  • 85.
  • 87.
  • 88.
  • 89.
  • 90.
  • 91. “After police & PWC investigation TalkTalk CEO admits firm 'underestimated' cybersecurity and touts change in culture” “Investigation by PwC shown TalkTalk has been acting like a startup rather than a major company, (new services, innovate, move fast) and they saw security as a technology issue, not a business one and underestimated the challenge.”
  • 92. …moving on to user’s identities
  • 93. H AV E Y O U B E E N P W N E D ?
  • 94.
  • 95.
  • 96.
  • 97.
  • 98.
  • 99.
  • 100.
  • 101.
  • 102.
  • 103.
  • 104.
  • 105.
  • 106.
  • 107. B U G B O U N T I E S
  • 108. Bug bounties are a sign of Application Security Maturity
  • 109. If you don’t have one you are saying … I’m a good target to attack …
  • 110.
  • 111.
  • 112. G I T H U B
  • 113. G O O G L E
  • 114.
  • 115. L E T ’ S H A C K ( A L I T T L E B I T ) H T T P : / / N E W S . B B C . C O . U K 
 H T T P : / / M A N I F E S T O . S O F T WA R E C R A F T S M A N S H I P. O R G / Demo
  • 117.
  • 119. D O N T PA N I C
  • 120. Unless you are directly targeted …
  • 121. …the probability of 
 you, your company or your apps being attacked is still low
  • 122. … not because you are secure
  • 123. … but because there are not enough attackers
  • 124. … and the business model of the current attackers has not evolved to the next level 
 
 (where they find a way to make money with your assets)
  • 125. N E W G E N E R AT I O N O F A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y T H I N K I N G
  • 126. 1.TDD with Code Coverage 2.Threat Models 3.Docker and Containers 4.Test Automation 5.SAST/DAST/IAST/WAF 6.Clever Fuzzing 7.JIRA Risk workflows 8.Kanban for Quality fixes 9.Web Services visualisation 10.ELK
  • 127. These tools/techniques are designed to 
 
 A) Improve code Quality
 
 B) Make AppSec possible
  • 128. 1 ) T D D W I T H C O D E C O V E R A G E • All code changes must have tests • Code Coverage is key to understand the impact of those changes • Devs, QA and Security teams should be communicating using tests
  • 129. 2 ) T H R E AT M O D E L S
  • 130. 2 ) T H R E AT M O D E L S • Are ‘technical briefs’ (i.e. better briefs) • Should be the ‘source of truth’ in an organisation about their apps and code • Should be done for: • Applications • Components • Features
  • 131. 3 ) D O C K E R A N D C O N TA I N E R S
  • 132. 3 ) D O C K E R A N D C O N TA I N E R S • Provide repeatable and destroyable QA environments • Enable DevOps • Next paradigm of Secure Applications • Dramatically improve the quality and resilience of Tests
  • 133. 4 ) S A S T / D A S T / I A S T / WA F • SAST - Static Application Security Testing • DAST - Dynamic Application Security Testing • IAST - Interactive Application Security Testing • WAF - Web Application Security Firewall
  • 134. 5 ) T E S T A U T O M AT I O N • Tests must run automatically on all commits of all branches • AppSec tests must be used to ‘identify changes to attack surface’ • Empower two CI pipelines • Super fast - push to production • Pause - needs review
  • 135. 5 ) C L E V E R F U Z Z I N G
  • 136. 6 ) J I R A R I S K W O R K F L O W S
  • 137. 7 ) K A N B A N F O R Q U A L I T Y F I X E S • SCRUM tends to be more of a Religion than Agile • Kanban WIP (Work in Progress) is key for Application Security Fixes
  • 138. 8 ) W E B S E R V I C E S V I S U A L I S AT I O N
  • 139. 9 ) E L K • ElasticSearch + LogStash + Kibana • Use it everywhere and everybody customises it • Also for developers (not just Ops)
  • 140. Just to say it again …. These tools/techniques are designed to 
 
 A) Improve code Quality
 
 B) Make AppSec possible
  • 141. Without them you are not really doing Application Security
  • 142. … and you have a 
 
 Development Problem not an
 
 Application Security Problem
  • 143. A P P S E C A N D Q U A L I T Y
  • 144. Software Craftsmanship is about Software Quality
  • 145. “I like my code to be elegant and efficient"
 Bjarne Stroustup, inventor of C++ “Clean code is simple and direct. Clean code reads like well-designed prose”
 Grady Booch, author “Clean code can be read, and enhanced by a developer other than its original author”
 ”Big” Dave Thomas, founder of OTI “Clean code always looks like it was written by someone that how cares”
 Michael Feathers, author “You know you are working on clean code when each routine you read turns out to be pretty much what you expected”
 Ward Cunningham, inventor of Wiki
  • 146. a big problem with the previous comments and the Software Craftsmanship concept is 
 ‘How to define Quality?’
  • 147. Everybody knows that Quality is key … but … ‘how to measure Quality?’
  • 148. My thesis is that Application Security can be used to 
 define and measure Software Quality
  • 149. Not all Software Quality issues are 
 Application Security issues
 
 But all Application Security issues are 
 Software Quality issues S h e r i f M a n s o u r, E x p e d i a
  • 150. Application Security is all about the non-functional requirements of software* * s o f t w a re = a p p s , w e b s i t e s , w e b s e r v i c e s , a p i s , t o o l s , b u i l d s c r i p t s = c o d e
  • 151. Application Security is all about understanding 
 
 HOW the software works* * v s h o w s o f t w a re b e h a v e s
  • 152. Using Application Security 
 
 I can measure the quality of software
  • 153. Because Application Security 
 
 measures the unintended side effects of coding
  • 154. T H E P O L L U T I O N A N A L O G Y
  • 155. T E C H N I C A L D E B T I S A B A D A N A L O G Y • The developers are the ones who pays the debt • Pollution is a much better analogy • The key is to make the business accept the risk (i.e the debt) • Which is done using the JIRA RISK Workflows
  • 156. W R I T I N G S E C U R E C O D E M Y T H
  • 157. “If only software developers had security knowledge they would be able write secure code”
  • 158. This is a myth because secure code has little to do with developer’s skills and craftsmanship
  • 159. Software security (or insecurity) is a consequence of the Software development environment 
 
 (namely the business and managers focus)
  • 160. And I know that this is a myth because I cannot write ‘secure code’ 
 
 when I’m programming
  • 161. J I R A R I S K W O R K F L O W
  • 163. ‘ F I X I N G ’ F L O W
  • 164. ` ‘ R I S K A P P R O VA L’ F L O W
  • 165. F U L L W O R K F L O W 
 ( f ro m D e v p o i n t o f v i e w ) 1. Vulnerability/issue is found (RISK ticket opened)  2. Dev understands the issue, writes test that replicates the issue, opens ticket in his project’s JIRA and tries to figure out the best way to fix it  3. Dev asks for guidance to AppSec team 4. AppSec team points to WIKI page (existing or newly created) 5. Dev uses guidance to fix it (and updates test so that is is now a regression test) 6. Commit(s) are made, RISK ticket is updated with link to commit(s) 7. Dev asks AppSec to review fix 8. AppSec reviews fix, and if all looks ok, close the RISK ticket
  • 166. M A P P I N G T O I N F O S E C R I S K S Labels for reporting and filters
  • 167. M A P P I N G J I R A T I C K E T S T O T E S T S
  • 168. J I R A D A S H B O A R D S
  • 169. W E E K LY E M A I L S W I T H R I S K S TAT U S
  • 170. K E Y C O N C E P T S O F T H I S W O R K F L O W • All tests should pass all the time • Tests that check/confirm vulnerabilities should also pass • The key to make this work is to: 
 
 Make business owners understand the risks of their decisions (and click on the ‘accept risk’ button)
  • 171. You have to make sure that it is your boss that gets fired
  • 172. … he/she should make sure that it is his/hers boss that gets fired …
  • 173. … all the way to the CTO (i.e. Board level responsibility)
  • 174. T E S T I N G
  • 175. If you make a change and 
 don’t have a test You are making random changes
  • 177. You don’t You sack your manager
  • 178. As a developer you need to have pressure from management to deliver code that is:
 Solid Secure Testable Provable Readable Maintainable 
 Basically, deliver Quality Code
  • 179. 9 9 % C O D E C O V E R A G E …is not the destination 
 …it is ‘base camp’
  • 180. With 99% code coverage you are here
  • 181. Without 99% code coverage 
 you have not solved really hard problems in the testability of your code
  • 182. Import note: 
 If 99% code coverage is just an ‘management requirement’ 
 … and is being gamed by devs
 … and you have LOTS of stupid ‘Unit tests’ 
 i.e. 99 x 1% code coverage or
 999 x 0.1 % code coverage
  • 183. then you also need to sack your manager
  • 184. You manager’s job is to help you to deliver: Solid Secure Testable Provable Readable Maintainable Code
  • 185. To make testing effective …
 …testing (from Unit Testing to Integration tests) needs to done in the IDE with real-time execution and Code coverage
  • 186. Q A , R E G R E S S I O N A N D S E C U R I T Y T E S T S
  • 187. Wallaby’s realtime Unit test Execution and Code Coverage
  • 188. M I S S I N G T E S T S 
 ( a n d 1 0 0 % c o d e c o v e r a g e )
  • 189.
  • 190.
  • 191.
  • 192.
  • 193.
  • 194.
  • 195.
  • 196.
  • 197.
  • 198.
  • 199.
  • 200.
  • 201. R E A L W O R L D M U TAT I O N T E S T I N G • http://pitest.org/
  • 202. W H Y D O A P P L I C AT I O N S E C U R I T Y ?
  • 203. Because you care about: 
 your users
 good engineering your application your company
  • 204. You have been lucky so far due to lack of commercially focused attackers
  • 205. This has been a Blessing and Curse
  • 206. You are making an 
 Hedged bet
  • 207. the Security of your code vs Skill and motivation of attacks will not change in next 2 years Your hedge bet is that :
  • 208. Most of you are creating the perfect storm ….
  • 210. How insecure is your code?
 How many risks/vulnerabilities are you aware of?
 And have Accepted?
  • 211. How long does it take you to Fix Security/Quality issues?
  • 212. E X T E R N A L S I G N S O F L A C K O F F O C U S & L A C K O F A P P S E C P O W E R • Not 100% SSL (with HSTS and Secure Cookies) • No consolidation of Javascripts, which implies No CI (Continuous Integration) • Cookie Salad (caused by lack of State Service in back end) • Easy DoS by normal business activities • “We’re hiring for AppSec” jobs posts • Easy-to-find vulnerabilities (low-hanging-fruit) • No public bug bounty
  • 213. D O E S Y O U R C O M PA N Y / T E A M H AV E : • AppSec team/person • Security Champion • Secure coding standards • Threat Models • OWASP contributors • Secure code reviews
  • 214. If your answer was not YES to all of them... 
 then 
 Your Application WILL have a high number of Security Vulnerabilities
  • 215. And you need to invest in Application Security
 Which if done correctly will improve the Quality of your code
  • 216. M A N A G E R S A N D B U S I N E S S O W N E R S
  • 217. S E N I O R M A N A G E M E N T O V E R S I G H T • ‘Security Memo’ (from God) • Incident response plans • Emergency response exercises (can you detect them?) • Cyber Insurance • Enterprise Cyber Risk management • Which C-level executive will get fired?
  • 218. 6 M O N T H A P P S E C I N V E S T M E N T What Description Cost Head Of Appsec 1 x person £100K Senior Developers 2 x persons £120K Appsec Ops 2 x persons £80K External Security Company 100 x days £100K Security Tools Static, Dynamic, Interactive Scanners £100K Dev App Sec Tools CI , Collaboration, Cloud, IDE plugins £50K Education Training, Conferences, Bug Bounties, £50K Total £600K
  • 219. W E H AV E S O L U T I O N S
  • 220. O WA S P ! ! ! !
  • 221. G R E AT P R E S E N TAT I O N O N S E C D E V O P S https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQblKuMuS0Y
  • 222. O p e n S A M M ( S e c u r i t y A s s u r a n c e S e c u r i t y M o d e l ) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:Software_Assurance_Maturity_Model
  • 223. B S I M M ( B u i l d i n g S e c u r i t y i n M a t u r i t y M o d e l )
  • 224. S E C U R I T Y D E V E L O P M E N T L I F E C Y C L E https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/process/design.aspx
  • 225. T I P S F O R B U I L D I N G A M O D E R N S E C U R I T Y E N G I N E E R I N G O R G A N I S AT I O N https://georgianpartners.com/tips-for-building-a-modern-security-engineering-organization
  • 226. H O W T O B U I L D S E C U R E W E B A P P L I C AT I O N http://blog.knoldus.com/2016/02/03/how-to-build-secure-web-application/
  • 227. N E W S E C U R I T Y S E R V I C E S - 2 FA
  • 228. D E P L O Y, D E P L O Y, D E P L O Y • Push to production and refactor without fear • Be like GitHub and use CI/CD to deploy 175 times in one day and 12,602 times in one year https://github.com/blog/1241-deploying-at-github
  • 231. F I N A L T H O U G H T S
  • 232. U N W R I T T E N R U L E S O F A P I S “Every API is destined to be connected to the internet”
  • 233. U N W R I T T E N R U L E S O F A P I S “All API data wants to be exposed in a Web Page”
  • 234. “Would you fly in a plane that has the code quality of your APIs”
  • 235. Application Security can be used to 
 define and measure Software Quality