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Malware Most Wanted: Security Ecosystem

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Malware Most Wanted: Security Ecosystem

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Dr. Fengmin Gong, Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer, presents why an ecosystem-based approach is necessary to defend against modern malware threats. Discussion continues with what it takes to implement cybersecurity using this approach. He also presents a number of use cases where multi-vendor products interacting in a security ecosystem provide the most effective protection for enterprises.

Dr. Fengmin Gong, Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer, presents why an ecosystem-based approach is necessary to defend against modern malware threats. Discussion continues with what it takes to implement cybersecurity using this approach. He also presents a number of use cases where multi-vendor products interacting in a security ecosystem provide the most effective protection for enterprises.

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Malware Most Wanted: Security Ecosystem

  1. 1. It Takes An Ecosystem To Defend Against APT Fengmin Gong Chief Strategy Officer
  2. 2. Your speakers today Dr. Fengmin Gong Chief Strategy Officer and Co-Founder Anthony James VP of Products & Marketing
  3. 3. Agenda o Open Secret: Malware is winning o Orientation: What’s going on? o Decision: New defense paradigm o Action: Building a secure ecosystem o Tell – The only promise for us to win the war against modern threats is to build an effective security ecosystem of defenders! o Show – How ecosystem approach works by examples o Wrap-up and Q&A CyphortLabsT-shirt
  4. 4. Threat Monitoring & Research team ________ 24X7 monitoring for malware events ________ Assist customers with their Forensics and Incident Response We enhance malware detection accuracy ________ False positives/negatives ________ Deep-dive research We work with the security ecosystem ________ Contribute to and learn from malware KB ________ Best of 3rd Party threat data
  5. 5. 6
  6. 6. Open Secret, Sad Reality Cyber bad actors are winning Well known direct victims o Sony: PlayStation network, DDoS, & Sony Pictures breach o Target, 40milion cards+70milion other accounts, CEO ousted o “Nemanja” POS botnets of 1478 hosts in 36 countries Indirect victims o Card issuers, merchants & consumers Why So Sad & Bad o Too late: discovered after many months o Too much: name, address, DOB, SSN & driver’s license # o Too little: “Will help you monitor your credit reports!” o Too easy: most attacks did not even use 0-day exploit 7
  7. 7. Not Only The Naïve Fall Victim What: March 17, 2011, RSA warned of SecurID threats What’s Stolen: RSA One-Time-Password Sensitive Info Conclusion: It probably made Rivest, Samir, and Adleman want to withdraw their names from RSA  8 Spear-phising Attack “2011 Recruitment plan.xls” RSA Pre Office 2010 Flash pre 3/21 Patch RAT 2 Adobe Flash Player 0-Day 2-FACTOR SECRETS 3 1
  8. 8. Threat Life Cycle – Generic Kill Chain 9 Action Manual and/or auto mitigation and policy enforcement. Reconnaissance Attacker analyzes potential targets.Command & Control Malware misses mom and calls home. Weaponize Malware is groomed for success. Install Malware installs exploitive features on system. Deliver Malware payload infiltrates host system. Exploit Malware finds access point. Threat Potential threat is born or reborn. .
  9. 9. Exfiltrate: DataTheft Spam Phishing DDoSInstall: HTTP SocialNet P2P Threat Life Cycle – Detection Insights 10 Download: HTTP FileShare FTP P2P • Traffic anomaly • Exec anomaly • Content anomaly • Exploit sig • App anomaly • Attack sig • Traffic anomaly • Reputation • Behavior anomaly • Reputation • Malware sig • CnC sig • Traffic anomaly • Reputation • App anomaly • CnC sig • Traffic anomaly • Reputation Infect: Exploit Pack Drive-By Social Engineering Email Target
  10. 10. Modern Threats TTP (Technique, Tactic, & Procedure) 11 o Web Based + Social Engineering o Multiple Infection Vector o Obfuscated & Encrypted o Multi-Component Delivery o Anti-static analysis & sandboxing o Network Distributed – Botnets o Polymorphism & Self Update 1.Hard To Capture Using Simple Sigs 2.Hard To Detect Using Single Approach 3.Impossible To Prevent From A Single Point
  11. 11. Many Actors: Context Is Important 12 CnC Servers Upload/ Download Servers Legit Merchants Financial Institutions Consumers Legit Corporations Questionable Providers Malware Writers Bot Herders Spam/Phish Pushers Questionable Advertisers/ Merchants Illegal merchants Pushers ID/Account Stealers Infection Servers Espionage Direct (Infect) Victim Indirect (Fraud) Victim CrimeValueChain
  12. 12. Users Are A Critical Success Factor 13 Enterprise Security Challenges • Advanced TTP • Industrialized cyber crime • Corporate & nation state actors • Problems on the ground • Urgency for tools • Expectation for “fit” • Global • Mobile • Consumerization • Big Data • SaaS Cloud • Blurred Intra-Extra- Internet • Virtualization & cloud delivery • Unified business infrastructure: ERP, ICS & IoT • SD-X: Software- defined X
  13. 13. SQL Injection Cross-Site Script Web plugIn/Apps Exploit Social Engineering User-Gen Content Malvertizing Lost Generation, Lost Paradigm SaaS Msg Security Web Security Sig Heuristics Reputation Sandboxing Network SMG SWG IPS UTM NGFW Sig Anomaly Sandboxing Host AV IPS UTM Sig Heuristics MemProt Virus OS/Server Exploit Client Exploits Network Worm Mail Worm Industrialized Production of Exploits/Packer/ Coder/Malware Corporate Nation State Multi-vector, targeted, multi-component, network-enabled, & automated AGAINST largely single-method, blind, siloed, & manual
  14. 14. Quick Poll Break
  15. 15. New Paradigm - Security Ecosystem o An environment in which all security devices & applications can share actionable threat intelligence (ATI) across IT infrastructure, locations, and organization boundaries, to mitigate security threats. o We must focus on minimizing the attack consequences! 16
  16. 16. Practicing Ecosystem Defense o All solutions support some Threat Intelligence Sharing protocols/APIs o All access will be controlled with Strong Authentication o The Access Control in operation still resides with the Owner, i.e. customer participating the ecosystem Security Products Can Support Ecosystem Without Losing Their Competitive Edge, Customers Will Benefit From All The Best Of Breed Solutions! 17
  17. 17. Quick Poll Break
  18. 18. Ecosystem Actions By Example 1. BackOff: CnC gen, infection detection, & exfiltration prevention o First sight, one store; benefit more stores, to stop any infiltration by the same family 2. Sony Wiper: fingerprinting <dst-IP, initiator-MD5> for forensic analysis, containment, & cleanup o First sight, one infected machine; identify & protect all infected in the organization 3. Infection Site Discovery: advanced warning & threat campaign tracking o Early detection of infected site, exploit pack (EP) analysis, global protection, & campaign trending 19
  19. 19. Backoff: Reliable Snort CnC Rule 20 alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”BackOff HTTP Callback"; flow:established,to_server; content:”POST”; http_method; content:”$op=”; http_uri; content:”&id=”; http_uri; content:”&ui=”; http_uri; content:”&wv=“; http_uri; content:”&gr=“; http_uri; content:”&bv=“; http_uri; content:”/windebug/updcheck.php”; http_uri; classtype:trojan- activity; sid:891000; rev:2;)
  20. 20. Backoff: Reliable System IOC o Unique Persistency o Existence of mutex named “nUndsa8301nskal” o Existence of file “%APPDATA%nsskrnl”, RC4 encrypted with the password “Password” o Existence of clear text file “%APPDATA%OracleJavaLog.txt” for keystrokes o ATI Extract & share… o Verify infiltration of a POS machine by checking the above persistent artifacts o Detect & block CnC using the simple Snort rule o Anyone, anywhere, thereafter shall be protected 21
  21. 21. Sony Wiper: Seeing Once Is Enough 22
  22. 22. Static & Dynamic IOCs o strings (D1C27EE7CE18675974EDF42D4EEA25C6) o calc.exe o 88.53.215.64 o 217.96.33.164 o 203.131.222.102 o igfxtrayex.exe o net_ver.dat o process (760c35a80d758f032d02cf4db12d3e55) behavior o Igfxtrayex.exe creates files “taskhost%random%.exe” o Igfxtrayex.exe is identical to “taskhost%random%.exe” o Any EXE with those strings output is suspect; dropped EXE with the process behavior must be removed! 23
  23. 23. From IOC To Threat Fingerprints o IOCs so far focus on detecting & verifying any infection o Threat fingerprinting puts more emphasis on identifying specifics of particular infection o Specific TTP o Malware family o Actors & intent o ATI extract & share… o Host-X: HTTP_connections to dst {203.131.222.102|217.96.33.164|88.53.215.64}, initiated by process {Y}, created from image {filename=“igfxtrayex.exe“|md5=“760c35a80d758f032d02cf4db12d3e5 5”} 24
  24. 24. Global Discovery & Sharing – Better Defense o Cyphort Crawler Network o Discovering 1684 infected sites o Collected 421 bad IPs serving malware o Collected hundreds of pcaps for web exploit pack o Sharing ATI, power to all defenders! 25 Infected list for site owners, site visitors, SWGs, threat researchers IP blacklist for FW/IPS/NGFW users, threat researchers What EP is active, used by whom, targeting whom, for all defenders
  25. 25. Q and A o Information sharing and advanced threats resources o Blogs on latest threats and findings o Tools for identifying malware
  26. 26. Thank You!

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