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Courtney Rupe
ENGL 425-01
Professor Swiencicki
21 April 2016
Margaret Thatcher and the 1984-85 Miners’ Strike: An Ideologically Conflicting Rhetorical
Ecology
On October 12, 1984 at 2:54 A.M., a bomb exploded in the Brighton Grand Hotel where
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet were staying. The Irish Republican Army
(IRA), which said they “planted” the bomb (Thatcher “Speech” 213), was a terrorist group that
sought to rid Northern Ireland of British rule and reunite Ireland (Arthur). The IRA thought that
if it could murder Thatcher, it would have a better chance of seeing Ireland reunited (Bingham).
At the time of the Brighton bombing, Thatcher was facing one of the greatest crises of her
political career: the 1984-85 miners’ strike. The IRA was not connected to the miners’ strike.
However, it decided to take advantage of its exigence to state that it would no longer put up with
Thatcher and her British rule (Arthur).
Margaret Thatcher had already condemned the 1984-85 miners’ strike as being the
“enemy within” the British government and an enemy to democracy. However, in the original
draft of her “Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, Brighton, 12 October 1984,”
Thatcher planned to extend this title to the whole Labour Party (Travis). In the wake of the
Brighton bombing, however, Thatcher realized she had to revise her speech (Thatcher “Speech”
213). As Lord Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party, intimated, if Thatcher had kept her
scathing comments against the Labour Party in her speech, her political career might have been
destroyed (Travis). Instead then, Thatcher decided to focus her speech solely on the miners’

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strike, foreign affairs and defense, and unemployment (Fraser 12). However, Thatcher’s
language still implicitly condemned the miners’ strike, its leader, Arthur Scargill, and ultimately
the Labour Party as being dangerous to democracy and free enterprise in Great Britain.
I will focus on how Thatcher’s rhetoric regarding the miners’ strike indirectly condemned
Arthur Scargill and the Labour Party and analyze Thatcher’s rhetorical choices. Thatcher
declared that the miners’ strike was an insurrection against democracy and an attempt to
dismantle the government and its laws (Thatcher “Speech” 224). By doing so, she intended to
strengthen her ethos as a female Prime Minister who would not let chaos, as inflicted upon
British society by the miners’ strike, destroy Britain. Thatcher constructed herself agentically, or
in a more determined way with traits ascribed to masculinity (Hall and Donaghue 633-34), in
order to aggressively assert her political stance. She did this to make sure her anti-Labour
ideologies became Britain’s reality. Thatcher used ethos and logos appeals that described the
economic damage keeping unproductive mine pits open was doing to the economy. She also
addressed how investments in new pits were making Britain’s economy stronger. In addition,
Thatcher employed pathos appeals related to the still-working miners and finished her speech
with ethos appeals to British nationalism and the government’s strength. Thatcher made these
arguments to solidify her authority as Great Britain’s female Prime Minister and to ensure that
her Conservative ideologies became Britain’s reality. Thatcher wanted this because she believed
that Conservatism was ultimately best for the British people as a whole.
The analytical method I am using in this essay is derived from Jenny Edbauer’s, Laurie
E. Gries’, and Sonja K. Foss’ methods of rhetorical analysis. Edbauer employs a method called
rhetorical ecological analysis. It diverges from Lloyd Bitzer’s in that it is an analysis that does
not focus on rhetorical situations as static circumstances that are caught within one particular

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historical moment. Instead, an ecological analysis studies the evolution of an argument’s rhetoric
and looks at the consequences of it and its relatively fixed rhetorical circumstances. This is done
instead of solely focusing on the argument and its unchanging rhetorical situation (Edbauer 9).
Gries’ method of rhetorical analysis goes a bit beyond Edbauer’s. Her new materialist method of
analysis studies an argument’s evolution throughout space and time, recognizing that arguments
are not static but are constantly shaping and being shaped by the various factors with which they
come into contact (Gries 7). As such, concepts such as a rhetoric’s assemblage, which is an
overlap of several ecological circumstances (61), an argument’s consequentiality, circulation,
distribution, and process of becoming are analyzed (86, 119-23). Foss’ method of rhetorical
analysis focuses on studying ideologies. These belief systems, she asserts, constitute the
motivations behind arguments. If these ideologies are hegemonic, or are the “dominant way[s] of
seeing the world,” they “represent … experience in ways that support the interests of those who
hold more power” in society (Foss 242). As such, Foss analyzes rhetoric to see how the
ideologies it relies on are used to “renew … reinforce … and defend” certain positions (243).
Throughout this essay, then, I will analyze Thatcher’s “Speech to the Conservative Party
Conference, Brighton, 12 October 1984” using these rhetorical methods. This will present a
diverse ecology of Thatcher’s speech and its consequences.
The 1984-85 miners’ strike occurred during Thatcher’s premiership. During World War
II and soon thereafter, Britain’s coal industry, which was nationalized in 1947, was relatively
stable. However, when the alternative fuel industry started to grow, it replaced the need for coal.
This resulted in mass layoffs, downsizing the coal industry from 700,000 employees in 1957 to
only 300,000 in 1970 (“The 1984”). In response, miners participated in mass strikes in 1972 and
1974, which successfully increased their pay. Additionally, the “international oil crisis” in 1973

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once again increased the demand for coal, making it a desirable unit for “electricity generation”
(“The 1984”).
However, in 1980, an economic recession hit Britain. This decreased the need for coal
and the pits that were not bringing in much money were disclosed. The Conservative government
had long wanted to privatize the energy sector and needed to reorganize the coal industry to do
so. As such, it planned to close many pits in 1981 (The 1984”). However, strikes rose up in
protest and the government had to halt its plans. It was not prepared to face the onset of strikes
until it acquired a new chairman of the National Coal Board (NCB), Ian MacGregor (The
1984”).
In March 1984, unauthorized strikes erupted in Scotland and Yorkshire when five pits
were closed without “proper review” (“The 1984”). The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
supported these strikes and called on other coal towns to join them. It believed that more strikes
had to happen to prevent the coal industry and towns from shutting down altogether. Many towns
did strike. However, the NUM’s call for a national ballot failed because the striking miners
feared that if the strike was voted against, they would have to accept the closure of their pits and
loss of their jobs. The striking miners also did not want to be responsible for causing any other
miner to lose his job (“The 1984”). The British government deployed police to face the picket
lines and a lot of violence resulted (“Thatcher”). The police were at war with the strikers until
March 1985, when the NUM voted to end the strike without any results (“The 1984”).
The miners’ strike started with the NUM’s president, Arthur Scargill. He did not believe
that any pits should be closed unless they were causing “[un]safety or geological exhaustion”
(Campbell 314). As such, Scargill disregarded the fact that “The economic case for shrinking the
coal industry was incontestable” (313). In fact, since the 1960s, both Conservative and Labour

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government leaders agreed that the coal industry needed to be downsized and had taken steps
toward so doing (313). In 1983-84 alone, the coal industry was facing a loss of £250 million due
to the overproduction of coal. As a result, the NCB decided it would close pits in “traditional
mining areas” and consolidate mining operations in “profitable modern pits” (314). This would
once again make the coal industry financially successful (314).
Nevertheless, Scargill, who was from one of Britain’s largest traditional coal-mining
areas, campaigned against this government movement. He stood on the principle that no working
man should have to lose his job (Campbell 314). However, beneath his pretense of goodwill
toward the working class, Scargill was plotting to lead a miners’ strike to destroy Thatcher’s
government (312). Previously, Scargill had led a successful “mass picketing of the Saltley Gate
coke works” in the 1970s, which has been attributed as an event that “forced” the previous Prime
Minister, Heath, “to cave in to the miners in 1972” (314). Partially as a result of this strike, the
Conservative Heath government collapsed. In the same way, then, Scargill was intent upon
tarnishing Thatcher’s government (312). He “openly boasted of leading a socialist – more
accurately a syndicalist – revolution to overthrow capitalism” (314), which was Thatcher’s
economic platform. Furthermore, when Thatcher was reelected to the premiership, Scargill stated
that “extra-parliamentary action was ‘the only course open to the working class and the labour
movement’” (qtd. in Campbell 314). As a result, Scargill began to lead a miners’ strike that was,
in fact, illegal (314).
In order to try to make his political agenda a reality, Scargill held three different ballots
in the NUM calling for a strike in 1982-83. However, these resulted in a substantial majority
voting against a strike. Due to the success of the strikes Scargill led in the 1970s, workers whose
jobs were not threatened did not want to go on strike; they already had everything they needed.

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Furthermore, the NCBwas giving large redundancy payments to those miners who were going to
lose their jobs due to pit closures. As such, there was no real reason for the workers to go on
strike to gain any benefits. All of these factors added up to create a situation in which Scargill
could not get the strike he wanted (Campbell 314). As a result, he circumscribed the NUM’s
constitution by not holding a national ballot and started a national strike all on his own. Scargill
did so by inciting “regional strikes” in areas that particularly relied on the coal industry for their
way of life (315). His vice president Mick McGahey believed that once these areas went on
strike, it would create a “‘domino effect’” in the other regions (qtd. in Campbell 315). However,
only three mining regions, which did not hold ballots, were completely behind the strike. As a
result, Scargill managed to divide the union, which before had been a strong, likeminded
organization. His “refus[al] to hold a ballot … not only set area against area but miner against
miner within each area, pit and village” (qtd. in Campbell 315). In this way, even though Scargill
claimed to be representing those who would lose their jobs if pits were to close, he was actually
using the event as a political springboard to destroy Thatcher’s government.
Margaret Thatcher was the head of the Conservative Party, which valued deregulated
industry, free market economic operations, and limited government intervention. It also wanted
to privatize the coal industry and did not support the strikes. As a Conservative, Thatcher
believed that keeping less productive pits open was detrimental to Britain’s economy. However,
she faced the opposition of the NUM and the Labour Party. Arthur Scargill held Marxist beliefs
and had begun the strike “almost singlehandedly” by not calling for a national ballot (Revzin).
He declared that Thatcher was “‘out to destroy the working class of [Britain]’” and did not
believe that pits should be closed when they were unproductive (qtd. in Revzin). However, even
though Thatcher was partially unsupportive of the coal industry because she believed that “the

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future … lay with clean, modern nuclear energy” (qtd. in Campbell 316), she was also forced to
say positive things about consolidating coal production in “profitable pits.” Thatcher had to do
this to refute Scargill’s accusations that her government was intent upon destroying the coal
industry (316). Furthermore, Thatcher faced the fact that the Labour Party worked with Scargill
to continue the strike (Revzin). Thus, Thatcher believed that the Labour Party was conspiring
with the strikers to bring more liberal policies into the government. This is one of the many
ecological situations Thatcher faced in which she pitched ideological battles as a type of “‘us’
against ‘them’” war (qtd. in Campbell 311). As a result, in her original speech, Thatcher was
going to condemn the Labour Party’s leaders as the root problem against “‘parliamentary
democracy and the rule of law,’” since they did not speak against “‘picket-line violence’” (qtd. in
Travis). However, after the Brighton bombing, Thatcher changed her speech in order to salvage
her political reputation.
Thatcher began by addressing the Brighton bombing: “The bomb attack on the Grand
Hotel early this morning was first and foremost an inhuman, undiscriminating attempt to
massacre innocent unsuspecting men and women staying in Brighton for our Conservative
Conference.” The Conservative Party Conference was Britain’s version of America’s Republican
or Democratic National Convention. Thatcher then continued, “Our first thoughts must at once
be for those who died and for those who are now in hospital recovering from their injuries”
(Thatcher “Speech” 213). This hot language (“inhuman,” “undiscriminating,” “massacre”)
established Thatcher’s pathos for British citizens subjected to the bombing. In turn, this boosted
her ethos as a caring politician. Here, Thatcher combined agentic (masculine/aggressive)
qualities with communal (feminine/nurturing) undertones. She did this to structure herself as
what political communication researchers call an androgynous female politician. Androgyny is a

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quality of someone who exhibits both masculine and feminine traits in a persuasive manner (Hall
and Donaghue 634). However, Thatcher quickly turned her attention to what she thought the
bombing really symbolized: “… the bomb clearly signified … an attempt not only to disrupt and
terminate our Conference; it was an attempt to cripple Her Majesty’s democratically elected
Government” (Thatcher “Speech” 213). Thus, Thatcher thought that the IRA, which planted the
bomb, wanted to disrupt the Conservative Party’s agenda and bring down Britain’s government.
By referring to the Conservative Conference as “our conference” and referencing “Her Majesty’s
democratically elected Government,” Thatcher elicited feelings of nationalism from her
audience. Additionally, as seen in her strong language here as well as further in her speech,
Thatcher tactfully refuted all accusations that might have arisen against her due to her gender and
strengthened her ethos as a governing woman fit to rule: “the fact that we are gathered here
now—shocked, but composed and determined—is a sign not only that this attack has failed, but
that all attempts to destroy democracy by terrorism will fail” (Thatcher “Speech” 213).
Thatcher next addressed the miners’ strike by stating that in Conference debates “We
have heard … some of the aspects that have made this debate so repugnant to so many people”
(Thatcher “Speech” 223). She called out the fact that the debate was “repugnant” because it was
an ideological battle between Conservative and Labour views. She then continued, “We were
reminded by a colliery manager that the NUM always used to accept that a pit should close when
the losses were too great to keep it open, and that the miners set great store by investment in new
pits and new seams” (Thatcher “Speech” 223). Thatcher first used the voice of a colliery
manager, one who operates pits (Church and Outram 273-74), to boost her credibility. As such,
Thatcher portrayed herself as someone who listened to voices from both sides of the miners’
argument. This strengthened her ethos as a caring politician with integrity. Thatcher also used the

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colliery manager’s statement to question the credibility of the NUM: they had never fought
against the Conservative commonplace that the economy does better when unproductive pits are
closed. In addition, Thatcher stated that the NUM had always agreed that once unproductive pits
are closed, miners do better economically by investing “in new pits and new seams.” By doing
so, Thatcher strengthened her ethos as a female politician who knew how the best economy
operated. She also established her pathos for the miners and rebutted any accusations that she did
not care about their economic welfare. Her next statement reveals this: “under this Government
… new investment is happening in abundance. … £2 million in capital investment in the mines
for every day this Government has been in power” (Thatcher “Speech” 223). Thatcher thereby
strengthened the ethos of her government: it knew what was best for the British economy and the
miners affected by it.
Thatcher then ignited the pathos of the audience for the miners who were still working.
She began, “We heard moving accounts from two working miners about just what they have to
face as they try to make their way to work. The sheer bravery of those men and thousands like
them who kept the mining industry alive is beyond praise” (Thatcher “Speech” 223). There was a
lot of violence between the picketers and the police during the strike and those who crossed the
picket lines to work faced a large brunt of it (“Thatcher”). Thatcher mentioned the two working
miners’ stories to call the audience to sympathize with all working miners. She also glorified
them to reveal that it was because of working miners that the mining industry had not shut down.
This was a clever way for Thatcher to point out an error in Scargill’s logic. The industry he had
so desperately wanted to save by leading a strike had survived only because some miners had
refused to strike. In this way, Thatcher divided and demonized the conflict between the striking
miners partnered with Scargill and her Conservative government. Thatcher continued to praise

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the miners who had continued working: “‘Scabs’, their former workmates call them. Scabs?
They are lions!” (Thatcher “Speech” 223). In calling out the working miners’ bravery as being
that of “lions,” Thatcher continued to pull on the audience’s pathos toward them. Everyone could
relate to the working miners’ situation: they were doing something that they felt was right, but
for which they were criticized. Since the audience was able to empathize, they were more willing
to listen to Thatcher’s arguments. They were also persuaded to feel as Thatcher did: it is “a
tragedy … when striking miners attack their workmates” (Thatcher “Speech” 223).
Next, Thatcher utilized her most logos-based ethical appeal on the audience. She brought
to light the fact that Scargill was utilizing a faulty method to preserve the coal industry: “the
working miner is saving both their[s and the striking miners’] futures, because it is the working
miners … who have kept faith with those who buy our coal” (Thatcher “Speech” 223). Here,
Thatcher used logos to further establish her ethos as a fit politician. She revealed the grave
economic reality: if the working miners had gone on strike, then the striking miners would have
lost their jobs and the pay for which they were fighting. This in turn would have led to the
downfall of the coal industry which Scargill wanted to continue. Additionally, Thatcher
polarized the situation by contrasting the working miners from the strikers. The working miners
had kept the coal industry alive. However, if all the miners had gone on strike, they would have
destroyed the coal industry and pushed away its potential investors. By creating this binary
between the striking and working miners, Thatcher established her political identity as a Prime
Minister who would not let chaos destroy Britain.
Thatcher further asserted the main idea of her argument. She accused the miners
participating in the strike as advocates of anarchy (Thatcher “Speech” 225). She made this
declaration because Scargill created the strike by circumventing the customary national ballot

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process (Revzin). As such, the strike was technically illegal and an affront to the British
government. Thatcher stated that Britain is “the home of democracy. But the sanction for change
is in the ballot box. It seems that there are some who are out to destroy any properly elected
Government” (Thatcher “Speech” 225). Here, Thatcher put the blame on the striking miners,
partnered with Arthur Scargill, for upsetting the British government and its operations. In this
way, Thatcher further called miners’ ethos into question. She then appealed to neoliberalism by
implicitly stating that traditional Parliamentary government is the best for everyone (Hall and
O’Shea 9): “what is the law [the miners] seek to defy? It is the common law, created by fearless
judges and passed down across the centuries. It is legislation scrutinized and enacted by the
Parliament of a free people” (Thatcher “Speech” 225). Thatcher referred to British Parliamentary
law as “common law” that had been “passed down across the centuries” and voted for by “a free
people” in order to emphasize a Conservative warrant. This warrant stated that the British
Parliamentary law was “common” and had existed for a long time because everyone believed
that it was the best kind of law. Thatcher also mentioned the common law and Parliament to
appeal to British history, which was a way of inciting nationalism and causing the British people
to remember their government’s roots. If Thatcher could successfully cause her audience to be
captivated by how British government began, then they would want to continue Britain’s legacy.
Thatcher thereby created an invented ethos for herself as a champion for human rights, which the
striking miners and Scargill were seeking to destroy. In this way, Thatcher flipped the conflict on
its head. Additionally, any of the audience’s ideological constraints were broken down because,
after all, they were all British nationalists and did not want anything to get in the way of their
legal system. Thatcher further played to nationalism by emphasizing British tradition and

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international respect for it: “This is the way our law was fashioned, and that is why British
justice is renowned across the world” (Thatcher “Speech” 225).
Thatcher consequently decided to quote Theodore Roosevelt, one of the most respected
American presidents in history:
No government owns the law. It is the law of the land, the heritage of the people.
No man is above the law and no man is below it. Nor do we ask any man’s
permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as
a right, not as a favor (qtd. in Thatcher “Speech” 225).
Thatcher used this quote from Roosevelt to call out the miners’ strike as an illegal operation that
was seeking to rebel against the law. This was a clever move, as Thatcher was able to use a
liberal president’s rhetoric to shame the striking miners and Scargill and appeal not only to
Conservatives, but also to members of the Labour Party. If no man is above or below the law, he
absolutely has to obey it and there are no excuses. Additionally, a warrant of this quote is that the
people created the law for their own protection. This is why it was the “law of the land,” as well
as the people’s “heritage” and their “right” to obey it. By so doing, Thatcher solidified the
miners’ strike as a battle against the government and the purity for which it stood.
Thatcher finished her speech by stressing her ultimate motive. She wanted to run a
government that looked out for the interests of everybody: “We are fighting … for the weak as
well as for the strong. We are fighting for great and good causes. We are fighting to defend them
against the power and might of those who rise up to challenge them” (Thatcher “Speech” 226).
Here, Thatcher used a neoliberal commonplace that asserted that everyone agreed with citizens’
equality. In this way, Thatcher promoted the view that the Government knew what was best for
the people (Hall and O’Shea 8). Thatcher had constructed the miners’ strike as a battle of the

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common people against the strikers and Scargill. If the miners’ strike did not end, then British
law as the people have known it may very well end. As a result, Thatcher called her audience to
rally around her and not support the strike. After all, she had portrayed the striking miners and
Scargill as the enemies of the common people (Campbell 311), so they would want to be on her
side.
Audience reception to Margaret Thatcher after she delivered her speech was diverse and
widespread. Nonetheless, it is difficult to find cultural reaction directly related to Thatcher’s
speech or to find miners’ reactions to Thatcher’s Conservative policies. All of this ecology’s
aftermath pertains to the various assemblages that intra-acted with the speech. One of these
assemblages is Thatcher’s bravery in the face of delivering her speech after the Brighton
bombing. Thatcher’s private secretary John Coles applauded this, saying, ‘‘We shall
remember—not the bomb or the ruined building—but your courage, calm and nobility in the
aftermath. I can imagine how much shock and sorrow you had to overcome to show those
qualities so splendidly. You turned evil into inspiration’” (qtd. in Lyons). Many people echoed
this sentiment. Thatcher’s “popularity soared” due to the fact that she still decided to speak even
after the Brighton bombing (Jones). She was also painted as incredibly “defiant” (Bingham;
Jones) and even more agentic than she usually was. President Ronald Reagan, a close friend and
ally of Thatcher’s, also called Thatcher to express his condolences:
I sent a message about that terrible bomb attack but I just wanted to call you
myself to also tell you how happy and grateful we are that you were not
personally injured and our wishes and prayers go for those who were injured. And
I think this just demonstrates, once again, that we must do all we can to stop

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terrorism. They’ll always have some success, but we can make their job a little
tougher” (Reagan and Thatcher).
Even though Thatcher was brave by still choosing to speak after the IRA’s assassination
attempt, she also received harsh criticism. Labour Party member John O’Farrell, who has been
involved in politics since he was seventeen years old (“John”), hated Thatcher so much that in
2013 he said, “‘when the Brighton bomb went off, I felt a surge of excitement at the nearness of
[Thatcher’s] demise and yet disappointment that such a chance had been missed’” (qtd. in
Walters). However, “jibphillips,” who commented on this article from Manila, Philippines,
asserted that since O’Farrell is also a “comic writer,” he was just “us[ing] exaggeration and
shock for effect” in his statement. However, O’Farrell may have taken his supposed comedy too
far when he asserted, “‘I would invent all sorts of elaborate scenarios whereby [Thatcher] would
cease to be Prime Minister of Britain. Some … involved me popping up with a machine-gun at
the Conservative Party Conference’” (qtd. in Walters). Although O’Farrell’s hatred was not
directly fueled by Thatcher’s speech after the bombing, it is apparent by his comments that
Thatcher was still abhorred by many, even though she courageously stood against terrorism by
still speaking after the Brighton bombing.
Another assemblage in this ecology is the press that reported on Thatcher’s death and her
legacy of how she handled the miners’ strike. This eclipsed the legacy of Thatcher’s actual
speech. A miner who participated in the entire yearlong duration of the strike, Darren Vaines,
said upon Thatcher’s death that “‘It [was] a very strange emotional feeling because her death
[brought] back a lot of memories and open[ed] up a wound that [had] never really healed. The
cut went so deep, people have never been able to forget about it. It’s something they can never
get out of their system.’” Vaines also accused Thatcher of “‘us[ing] miners as a political

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springboard. She knew what she was doing and it was a horrible way of going about it’” (qtd. in
Coldrick). In other words, Vaines believed that Thatcher thought the miners’ strike was a
kairotic circumstance from which she could push her Conservative ideologies into the British
government and thereby solidify her rule. The way Thatcher would do this was by privatizing the
coal industry, which would eliminate some jobs. Additionally, Chris Kitchen, the “Yorkshire-
based NUM general secretary,” emphasized that one “‘only need[s] to go round the mining
community and see the devastation that [Thatcher] left behind in her wake and also the
nationalised industry that she ran down for the sake of short-term profit. … with the devastation
she brought to the country she doesn’t deserve any remorse or respect from me’” (qtd. in
Coldrick). The “devastation” to which Kitchen referred was the many mine closures that took
place during Thatcher’s administration. These left the coal industry less profitable than it was
before, which was not what Thatcher intended (Coldrick). She believed that closing less-
profitable pits and consolidating and investing in new ones would make the coal industry
profitable again (Thatcher “Speech” 223). Unfortunately, it did not. However, Moore states that
Thatcher’s defeat of the miners’ strike resulted in “economic benefits [that] were huge,” so it
seems that the economic implications of Thatcher’s policies are supported primarily along party
lines.
In addition, there was much more cultural reaction to the speech Thatcher had originally
intended to deliver than the one she actually did. This constitutes a large ecological assemblage.
When notes from Thatcher’s original speech were found that condemned not only the miners’
strike but the Labour Party as the “enemy within,” many were outraged. Former Labour Party
leader Lord Neil Kinnock said that Thatcher’s notes were “‘further proof, if any more be needed,
of the degree to which she was determined to politicise the dispute … Week after week she used

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to tell me that the dispute was between the miners and the National Coal Board, nothing to do
with the government. So she was a serial misleader’” (qtd. in Travis). Lord Kinnock believed
that Thatcher used the miners’ strike to promote her bigger agenda of making the government
completely Conservative. Although she wanted to do this, Thatcher’s motivation stemmed from
her belief that Conservatism was the best political policy for everyone. Her speech showed that
Thatcher was not acting as a “serial misleader.” However, Lord Kinnock further criticized
Thatcher’s ethos by claiming that “‘All subsequent cabinet paper disclosures have shown she
was desperate to make political capital out of the dispute, to the extent of firing off such absurd
allegations’” (qtd. in Travis).
Conversely, Mick Dickinson, a former employee at the Fryston Colliery, appeared to
praise Thatcher for her economic policies: “‘She will go down in history as one of the greatest
post-war prime ministers thanks to the privatisation she was driving the country into, and some
of the nationalized industries did need to change.’” However, Dickinson then said that Thatcher
“‘took the miners’ strike too personally and that it became a personal crusade. We have hate and
resentment for what she did to the industry’” (qtd. in Coldrick). In other words, Dickinson and
others like him loathed the results of Thatcher’s economic policies towards the mining industry
and thought that Thatcher was using these policies to solidify her own political power. Lord
Norman Tebbit, who was with Thatcher when the Brighton bomb exploded and who was injured
by it (Jones), stated that if he had known about Thatcher’s original draft of her speech, he would
have “advised her against” delivering it. However, he announced what its ecology has ultimately
made of Thatcher’s political reputation: “In the event, the attack by the other ‘enemy within’ [the
never-delivered speech] changed everything. The wave of horror from the public and Labour

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leaders alike changed everything. It was only a pity that the text of the speech she never made
survived” (Tebbit).
Another assemblage that comes into play in this ecology is a gendered one. According to
Joshua Kennon, misogyny was a large factor that affected British perception of Thatcher. As he
revealed, the circumstances of the miners’ strike involved an intelligent, educated woman
fighting against lower-class men who, in a patriarchal system, were trying to earn a living. This
was a large reason why Thatcher earned such hatred. In addition, female power was not
something generally seen in the world at this time, not even in the United States (Kennon).
Nevertheless, it is interesting to analyze how Thatcher chose to portray herself as a female
politician. She asserted that she “‘owe[d] nothing to women’s [liberation]’” and she “never, in
theory, rejected the idea that a woman’s place [was] in the home” (qtd. in Moore). In fact,
Thatcher seemed to pride herself on being a housewife. When she first rose to power in 1979,
Thatcher argued that “‘any woman who underst[ood] the problems of running a home [would] be
nearer to understanding the problems of running [a] country’” (qtd. in Moore). Thatcher
portrayed herself as a female politician who respected and rooted herself in the communal world,
but who aggressively pursued agentic rhetoric to make sure her Conservative beliefs became
Britain’s reality. This is an interesting example of a dynamic blend between agentic and
communal traits, which resulted in Thatcher being an androgynous politician (Hall and
Donaghue 635).
The ecology created around Margaret Thatcher’s “Speech to the Conservative Party
Conference, Brighton, 12 October 1984” comprises many complicated, interwoven assemblages
and is ideologically intense. Thatcher’s fellow Conservatives and supporting citizens believed
that her stance against the miners’ strike was the right one. As Kennon stated,

18. Rupe 18
If you [were] a member of the middle class or upper class [many of whom were
Conservatives], with a good education, engaged in some sort of knowledge work
where you, yourself, are the asset, and responsible, Margaret Thatcher’s policies
benefited you enormously. … your employment options [were] greater [and] your
opportunity to make a lot of money expanded.
However, many others, like the mining communities and their families, believed that Thatcher
was taking away from them their only chance at making a living. In some cases, she
unfortunately did:
“If, on the other hand, you [were] a lower class, undereducated manual worker
relying on government subsidies, Thatcher’s policies were
economically devastating in a way that is hard to overstate. You lost your home,
your job, and your self-respect. You now exist[ed] on an endless stream of
welfare checks in one of countless villages that [were] shells of what they once
were” (Kennon).
The 1984-85 miners’ strike comprised a very sad set of circumstances and was an extremely
tough rhetorical situation in which to argue. However, Thatcher stood by her political beliefs no
matter what and, even though the results of some of her policies were not what she intended and
she expressed them with much agency, Thatcher gracefully did so in one of the worst moments
in British history. Thus, I agree with Thatcher’s argument, respect her, and hope that other
leaders like her—who stick to their beliefs no matter what faces them—will assert themselves in
a similar way and rise to prominence.
Ultimately, this ecology teaches us that language spoken within ideologically tense
situations, even if it is spoken out of the integrity of the speaker’s heart, cannot change a

19. Rupe 19
polarizing situation. The language may accomplish what the speaker wants it to, but it will not
win everyone over to his/her side of the argument. There will always be people who agree with
the speaker’s argument and those who disagree with it. As such, analyzing Margaret Thatcher’s
speech against the 1984-85 miners’ strike can teach us this valuable lesson.

20. Rupe 20
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