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Neoparamilitarism and new massacres
1. COMISIÓN COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS
Organización no gubernamental con status consultivo ante la ONU
Filial de la Comisión Internacional de Juristas (Ginebra) y de la Comisión Andina de Juristas (Lima)
PERSONERÍA JURÍDICA: RESOLUCIÓN 1060, AGOSTO DE 1988 DE LA ALCALDÍA MAYOR DE BOGOTÁ
Bulletin No 29: Series on the rights of the victims and the application of Law 975
Neoparamilitarism and new massacres
The atrocities that should have stopped after the supposed “demobilization” of the paramilitary
groups not only never ended but have reappeared with even greater force. In the year 2008
massacres of civilians, affecting mostly peasants, have been registered in growing numbers,
perpetrated by illegal armed groups labeled as “emerging gangs” by the State security forces or the
Government, which refuse to recognize them as paramilitaries.
Repetition of the atrocities
The massacre committed this past July 20 in the municipality of Puerto Libertador (Córdoba), in
which seven people died, among them a community leader and two children, at the hands of illegal
armed groups traveling in a pick-up truck and dressed in civilian clothing, hooded and armed, is a
painful reminder of this.
However, it is not the only case. At least four other massacres presumably attributable to
paramilitary groups have been registered this year. One, which occurred on January 11 in the city of
Santa Marta (Magdalena), in which five community leaders were killed and three other persons
wounded after armed men broke up a family gathering and shot the people taking part in it.
Another, on February 23 in the municipality of San Juan del Cesar (La Guajira), in which four
members of the same family died after armed and hooded men wearing clothing exclusively for use
by State security forces broke into a farm where the peasant family was staying. Another massacre
took place between April 27 and 28 in the municipality of Pizarro (Chocó), in which nine fishermen
were assassinated and six other persons were disappeared. Still another took place in June in the
rural area of the municipality of Istmina (Chocó), in which four sawyers died, causing the forced
displacement of 69 people toward the seat of the municipality.
These massacres have two common elements: on the one hand, they have been attributed to the so-
called “emerging gangs;” but, on the other, they are acts that follow the usual patterns and modus
operandi of the paramilitaries. It has been established that these massacres have been directed
against the civilian population, which has traditionally been the target of these groups. It is the case
of the five massacres described, in which fishermen, peasants, and community leaders died who had
been demanding respect for their rights. Likewise, the massacres were committed by men dressed
in civilian clothing, armed and hooded, as was the case in the massacres of Puerto Libertador and
San Juan del Cesar. Also, some of the massacres were announced beforehand, as was the case of the
massacre of Puerto Libertador, in which local peasants had previously alerted the authorities about
the threats the population had been subjected to; this led the Ombudsman’s Office to send three
reports to Bogotá in which it warned of the risk situation affecting the municipalities of
Montelíbano, Tierralta, Valencia and Puerto Libertador. 1
The Colombian Commission of Jurists has been able to ascertain that between December 1, 2002
and December 31, 2007, at least 4,019 persons were registered as victims of violations of the right
1
El Tiempo newspaper, “Guerra de bandas ex ‘paras’ desangra a 7 departamentos” (War of gangs of former paramilitaries bleeds 7
departments), July 28, 2008, p.1-2.
Calle 72 Nº 12-65 piso 7 PBX: (571) 3768200 – (571) 3434710 Fax : (571) 3768230
Email : ccj@coljuristas.org Website: www.coljuristas.org
Bogotá, Colombia
2. to life attributed presumably to paramilitary groups in 27 of the country’s 32 departments. The
figures in themselves contradict the so-called “cease of hostilities;” but in addition to these figures,
and to the massacres mentioned before, other deeds have occurred each year that show a dramatic
increase in the violations of the right to life that were registered. Indeed, various civil authorities
have expressed concern about the increase in assassinations, particularly in two places in the
country. According to information from the National Police, in the department of Córdoba alone
283 homicides have been committed in 20082; and in the city of Medellín, the authorities speak of
530 persons having been assassinated between January and June 2008.3
Dangerous euphemisms regarding paramilitarism
For all the above reasons, it is a source of concern that the Government should insist on stating the
paramilitarism no longer exists in Colombia; or that it should claim, as did the president of the
National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR in Spanish), that the cycle of
violence in Colombia is in its final phase:
“… the cycle of violence is in its final phase and we Colombians are teaching a lesson that has
universal value: it is one of the only countries in Latin America where the crimes of the past are being
faced with courage and impunity is being avoided as a means of moving from war to peace, or from
dictatorship to democracy.” 4
Declarations such as these and, in general, those that seek to show that the crimes of paramilitarism
are a thing of the past do nothing more than to blatantly disregard reality while, at the same time,
making invisible the victims of the present, laying the groundwork for a renewed and greater
impunity.
One of the main objectives of any peace process that aspires to be real must be to make available all
necessary mechanisms and actions to guarantee that the atrocities will not be repeated. However,
almost three years since the beginning of negotiations between paramilitaries and the Government,
and three years since the application of the law of “justice and peace,” it cannot be said the civilian
population can count on guarantees that the crimes will not occur again, simply because they have
never stopped happening and because, additionally, the control strategy most widely used by the
paramilitary groups to spread fear among the civilian population – massacres – are being repeated.
Indeed, the records on the commission of massacres demonstrate that the claims made by the
Government and the president of the CNRR are not true. Although a decrease took place in the
collective assassinations registered in the period between 2006 and 2007,5 it must not be forgotten
that this drop was not the result of the paramilitaries’ stopping their actions. On the contrary, they
continued acting – only differently. For example, some paramilitaries have admitted that the
2
Iván Cepeda, “La ficción del Posconflicto” (The Post-Conflict Fiction) , in newspaper El Espectador on line August 2 2008.
3
El Espectador newspaper on line, “Desmovilizados, en tinieblas” (Demobilized, in Darkness), July 29 2008.
4
Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, “La violencia no es maldición bíblica” (Violence is not a biblical curse), El Tiempo newspaper, July 28,
2005, p. 1-15.
5
Indeed, a decrease was registered between 2006 and 2007 in violations of the right to life in massacres; during that period, five
massacres were registered, whereas between 2002 and 2003 456 massacres were registered. At the same time, however, the high number
of selective assassinations and forced disappearances attributed to paramilitary groups remained constant. In that regard, see: Colombian
Commission of Jurists, Colombia: El espejismo de la justicia y la paz. Balance sobre la aplicación de la ley 975 de 2005 (Colombia: the
Mirage of Justice and Peace. Overview of the Application of Law 975 of 2005), Bogotá, March 2008, p. 74.
2
3. paramilitary groups stopped committing massacres because it is no longer politically profitable for
them, so they turned to committing selective assassinations instead.6
Nevertheless, this decrease in massacres has been accompanied by an increase in the commission of
extrajudicial executions directly attributable to the State security forces,7 and by the use of threats
by the paramilitaries against the civilian population in order to maintain the power they hold over
the communities, which they were able to achieve through the terror spread by the thousands of
massacres throughout the country committed by these groups since they were set up.8
The reality on the “emerging gangs”
On the other hand, as was mentioned before, the increase in the number of homicides as well as
massacres has been attributed to the “emerging gangs,” even though it is known that the patterns of
these types of acts are the same as those used by paramilitary groups. Why insist, then, on claiming
that the so-called “emerging gangs” are not paramilitary groups?
According to a report by the Institute for Studies on Development and Peace (Instituto de Estudios
para el Desarrollo y la Paz - Indepaz), as of November 2007 there were 67 paramilitary groups with
6,377 active members.9 Other organizations, such as Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, have stated
more recently that even after the ‘demobilization” there are at least 10,000 active paramilitaries. 10
This assertion is credible since, according to intelligence sources, the group under the command of
alias “Don Mario,” in the north of the country, is made up of three thousand combatants; and the
one under the command of alias “Cuchillo,” in the Eastern plains, is also made of up three thousand
men. It does not seem strange, then, that in the more than 65 groups that remain there should be
more than four thousand additional combatants.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in her report on the human rights
situation in Colombia for 2007, pointed out the following on the so-called emerging gangs:
“These groups are strongly armed, have military organization and responsible command, and they
have the capacity to exercise territorial control and carry out military action against other armed
actors. They are an active factor in the intensity of the armed conflict, with direct and grievous
consequences for the civilian population. Information has been received suggesting links,
acquiescence, or tolerance of some members of the State security forces in actions attributed to some
of these groups.”11
6
Free-version hearing of Éver Veloza García, alias “HH,” November 7 2007. In that regard, see: Colombian Commission of Jurists,
Colombia: El espejismo de la justicia y la paz. Balance sobre la aplicación de la ley 975 de 2005 (Colombia: the Mirage of Justice and
Peace. Overview of the Application of Law 975 of 2005), Bogotá, March 2008, p. 74.
7
Between July 2002 and December 2007, at least 1,122 cases were registered of extrajudicial executions directly attributable to the State
security forces, against 669 cases registered between January 1997 and June 2002.
8
The Colombian Commission of Jurists has been able to ascertain that between December 1 2002 and December 31 2007, at least 4,213
persons were victims of threats from paramilitary groups.
9
Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Indepaz), “Nuevos grupos paramilitares” (New Paramilitary Groups), November 26
2007 (modified on December 3 2007). See: www.indepaz.org.co
10
Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, “¿Desapareció el paramilitarismo?” (Did Paramilitarism Disappear?), June 2008. See:
www.nuevoarcoiris.org.co
11
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Colombia , Doc. A/HRC/7/39,
February 28 2008, paragraph 39.
3
4. The report’s description of this type of groups resembles, rather, a description of paramilitary
groups. It thus becomes evident that we are not facing “new” or “small” groups, as the government
has stated. This is why the High Commissioner, further along in the same report, emphasized that
“labeling all these new structures as mere criminal gangs does not reflect the complexity, variety,
plurality and risks of the phenomenon.” 12
Indeed, to reduce the objectives of these “criminal gangs” to their struggle for control of coca
cultivation, coca-processing laboratories, and drug-trafficking routes is naïve, to say the least. Some
of the names of these groups, such as “Rondas Campesinas Populares” (Peoples’ Peasant Patrols),
“Ejército Revolucionario Popular Anticomunista” (Peoples’ Anti-Communist Revolutionary Army),
and “Héroes de Castaño” (Castaño’s Heroes) suggest that their aims go beyond that. Other groups,
such as “Los paisas” or “Águilas Negras” (Black Eagles), although their names might not be so
telling, do reveal much through their actions aimed against social activists and the civilian
population.
Although it is true that, apparently, some of these groups are fighting among themselves, this is not
the reason or the explanation for all the deaths of peasants and community leaders in massacres.
Much has been said about the confrontation between the paramilitary group led by Daniel Rendón
Herrera, alias “Don Mario,” and the group “Los Paisas”, formerly “Oficina de Envigado” (Envigado
Office). However, the deaths that are being attributed to these groups are not totally the product of
the clashes among them, since the truth is that many of those deaths are the result of the actions that
these groups pursue directly against the civilian population. Also, it must not be forgotten that,
although the State security forces have tried to present Daniel Rendón Herrera as simply a powerful
drug trafficker with a criminal gang at his service, alias “Don Mario” is also a landowner who holds
properties in Córdoba and Urabá illegally seized from peasants who were assassinated, threatened,
or displaced, and who is interested in maintaining his grip over them due to his participation in fruit
concerns. 13
It is not beside the point to mention also that the war among paramilitary groups is not new in the
Colombian conflict. It suffices to remember that the “Cacique Nutibara” front, under the command
of alias “Don Berna” waged war against the “Bloque Metro,” under the command of alias “Doble
Cero,” resulting in the extermination of this second group and the death of its paramilitary boss. Or
the war between two paramilitary groups operating in the Eastern plains: the group led by Martín
Llanos and that which used to be led by Miguel Arroyave. However, these wars were no obstacle to
all these groups’ carrying out activities against the civilian population.
New impunity in sight
In order to confront this “new” wave of violence, the State security forces have constituted an “élite
group” made up of members of the Prosecutor’s Office, the State security agency - DAS, the
technical investigation corps - CTI, the Army and the Police, for combating the so-called “emerging
gangs.” 14 Nonetheless, all these organs have been involved with the paramilitary groups since their
12
Ibíd., paragraph 40.
13
Iván Cepeda, “La ficción del Posconflicto” (The Post-Conflict Fiction) , in newspaper El Espectador on line August 2 2008.
14
Some communications media announced that members of the State security forces will present before the Ministry of Defense a plan to
set up five élite groups with the aim of combating the “emerging gangs.” See in this regard El Tiempo newspaper, “Guerra de bandas ex
‘paras’ desangra a 7 departamentos”, (War of gangs of former paramilitaries bleeds 7 departments), July 28, 2008, p.1-2.
4
5. inception, which makes this solution not only inadequate but maybe even harmful. The President
has even mentioned bringing to justice the persons who make up these groups in terms that are
hardly adequate for someone who represents a State with rule of law, and which suggest rather the
violation of the fundamental principles of that same rule of law:
“There is nothing that attracts more investment, Dear Generals, than the task that you are
carrying out against these bandits that remain here. One is told that alias ‘El Yiyo,’ that alias
‘El Memín,’ are still active with the Oficina de Envigado, that some of those bandits are still
there. Finish them off, I take responsibility for it, and don’t worry, General.” 15
The truth is that the paramilitaries have never ceased to exist. They simply have changed names and
modus operandi; but the guarantees of non repetition they gave the Government and Law 975 of
2005 have yet to materialize. And they will be even further from materializing if the existence of
paramilitarism continues to be denied and the victims continue to be made invisible. Inappropriate
responses will continue to be given to crimes that unfortunately do not belong only to the past but
remain very much in the present.
For more information, please contact Gustavo Gallón-Giraldo, Director of the CCJ, at Tel. (571) 376 8200, Ext. 115.
Bogotá, September 3, 2008
Occidente newspaper,on line “Grupos élite contra bandas emergentes” (Élite groups vs. emerging gangs), August 20 2008.
15
El Espectador on line, “Uribe ordena eliminar la oficina de Envigado” (Uribe orders the elimination of the Envigado Office), July 29,
2008.
5