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Wireless LAN Security,
Policy and Deployment
Best Practices
BRKEWN-2021

Jameson Blandford
Technical Marketing Engineer, CCIE #27687

July 2011




      BRKEWN-2021     © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   1
Agenda

                                               • Strong Encryption
Security Standards
                                               • Strong Authentication


                                               • Wireless Policy Using ACS and ISE
 User-Policy and
                                               • Per User VLAN, ACL and QoS
Device Identification
                                               • Device Fingerprinting


Rogue Management, • Rogue Classification and Containment
Attack Detection and • Adaptive wIPS Monitor Mode and ELM
  Threat Mitigation  • MFP and Wired IPS Integration


 BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   2
Strong Authentication
and Encryption




BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   3
Authentication Evolution




MAC Address                                                                   802.1x /
                                          WEP                                              WPA/WPA2
Authentication                                                              Dynamic WEP




  BRKEWN-2021    © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public              4
WPA/WPA2 Breakdown

                                                • A Snapshot of the 802.11i Standard
              WPA                               • Commonly Used with TKIP
                                                  Encryption


                                                • Final Version of 802.11i
          WPA2                                  • Commonly Used with AES
                                                  Encryption


Authentication                                  • Personal (PSK) – Home Use
 Mechanisms                                     • Enterprise (802.1x/EAP) – Office Use



BRKEWN-2021     © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   5
EAP — Protocol Flow
                                                                                           Authentication
                                                                                              Server


Client                                             Authenticator
                                                        CAPWAP




   BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                6
EAP Authentication Types

  Tunneling-Based                                                                             Certificate-
                                                                                                Based
   EAP-
   PEAP         Inner Methods
   EAP-
   TTLS
                        EAP-GTC                                             EAP-MSCHAPv2      EAP-TLS
   EAP-
   FAST


 Tunnel-based - Common deployments use a tunneling protocol
  (EAP-PEAP) combined with an inner EAP type such as EAP-
  MSCHAPv2.
   This provides security for the inner EAP type which may be vulnerable by itself.

 Certificate-based – For more security EAP-TLS provides mutual
  authentication of both the server and client.
  BRKEWN-2021    © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.      Cisco Public                  7
EAP Methods Comparison

                                                                                        EAP-TLS       PEAP     EAP-FAST


Fast Secure Roaming (CCKM)                                                                     Yes     Yes       Yes

Local WLC Authentication                                                                       Yes     Yes       Yes

OTP (One Time Password) Support                                                                No      Yes       Yes

Server Certificates                                                                            Yes     Yes       No

Client Certificates                                                                            Yes     No        No

PAC (Protected Access Credentials)*                                                            No      No        Yes

Deployment Complexity                                                                          High   Medium     Low
* PACs can be provisioned anonymously for minimal complexity.
 BRKEWN-2021         © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                              8
Choosing an EAP Method

                                                                 Security vs.
                                                                 Complexity

                                                                                           Authentication
                    Client Support                                                            Server
                                                                                              Support


                                                                   EAP
                                                                  Type(s)
                                                                 Deployed


 Most clients such as Windows, Mac OSX, Apple iOS devices support
  EAP-TLS, PEAP (MS-CHAPv2).
    Additional supplicants can add more EAP types (Cisco AnyConnect).

 Certain EAP types (TLS) can be more difficult to deploy than others
  depending on device type.
   BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                    9
Encryption Evolution




  WEP                                                       TKIP                        AES
     (RC4)                                     (RC4 and MIC)                            (CCMP)




BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public            10
Encryption Best Practices:
TKIP and AES
     TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol)
     • Use only for legacy clients without AES support
     • Often a software update for WEP clients
     • Can be run in conjunction with AES (mixed-
       mode)
     • Is being discontinued by the WiFi Alliance for
       certification.

     AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
     • Requires hardware support (~2005 chipsets or
       later)
     • Achieves line-rate speeds
     • Only encryption standard supported for 802.11n
       data rates
BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   11
User-Based Policy and
Device Identification




BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   12
Cisco User-Based Policy Offering
                                        • Dynamic Policy
                 ISE                                                                        User Specific Attributes
                                        • Device Profiling
                 ACS                    • Static Policy


                                                                                              WLC

• Cisco ACS (or other RADIUS server which can provide Vendor
  Specific Attributes) can provide static user-based policy which is
  assigned upon initial authentication.
• Cisco Identity Services Engine can provide dynamic user-based
  policy which can be assigned upon initial authentication and changed
  during a session using CoA (Change of Authorization).

   BRKEWN-2021    © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                              13
Cisco User-Based Policy Solution with ACS
                                                                                                         Employees

                                           User                                                          • Employee VLAN
                                           Specific Attributes                                           • Gold QoS

                                                                                                         Contractors

                                                                                                         • Contractor VLAN
                                                                                                         • No QoS
                                                                                                         • Restrictive ACL

                                                                                                      User Specific Attributes
                 ACS*                 • Static Policy

Employee
                                                                                                                                Employee
                                                                                                                                 VLAN

Employee                                                                                                  WLC
                                                                                                                               Contractor
                                                                                                                                 VLAN
    Contractor
                                                                                                                      ACLs
                                                                               *This could also be any RADIUS server that supports VSAs.
   BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.       Cisco Public                                             14
Cisco ACS User Policy Steps


                                                                                  Phase 1       User Authentication

                    EAP
                                                                         ACS



                                                                                 Phase 2           User Policy
                   Allowed                                              WLC
Limited
Access              User?
                                                                               QoS            • Silver

                                                                               ACL            • Allow-All
                   Allowed
                   Access
                                                                               VLAN           • Employee

     BRKEWN-2021    © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                           15
Cisco Controller User-Based Policy
Attributes

Network Access
 • ―Airespace-Interface-Name‖
   • Sets the Interface to which the client is connected.
Network Restrictions
 • ―Airespace-ACL-Name‖
   • Sets the Access Control List used to filter traffic to/from the client.
Quality of Service
 • ―Airespace-QOS-Level‖
   • Sets the maximum QoS queue level available for use by the client
     (Bronze, Silver, Gold or Platinum).
 • ―Airespace-802.1p-Tag‖ and/or ―Airespace-DSCP-Tag‖
   • Sets the maximum QoS tagging level available for use by the client.


  BRKEWN-2021    © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   16
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller ACLs
                                                                                           Inbound

                                                                                                      Wired
                                                                                                      LAN

                                                                                           Outbound




                                      Implicit Deny All at the End

• ACLs provide L3-L4 policy and can be applied per interface or per
  user.
• Cisco 5508 and WiSM2 implement line-rate ACLs.
• Upto 64 rules can be configured per ACL.
   BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                      17
Endpoint Access Challenges
•        IT is struggling with:
    -        Classifying managed vs.
             unmanaged endpoints
    -        ID devices that cannot authenticate




                                                                                                                                    Attribute X
                                                                                                         Location
    -        User <-> Device association




                                                                                                                           Device
                                                                                                                    Time
                                                                                                  User
•        But there barriers:
    -        Multiple access mediums
    -        Endpoint certainty
    -        No automated way to discover
             new endpoints


                                                                                                PC and Non-PC Devices
        BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                                                     18
Endpoint Profiling Solution - Cisco Identity
Services Engine (ISE)
•        New ground up solution
    -        Multiple sensors – rich profiling
    -        Complete visibility and tracking
    -        Holistic (wired + wireless)




                                                                                                                                    Attribute X
    -        Integrated Authentication,




                                                                                                        Location
             Authorization




                                                                                                                           Device
                                                                                                                   Time
                                                                                                 User
    -        Other services (Guest,
             Posture, Device Registration)
    -        Flexible deployment

                                                                                                                     ISE




        BRKEWN-2021    © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                                                    19
Integrated, Enhanced Device Profiling with
Cisco Identity Services Engine




                                                                                           “iPad Template”




                                                                                           “Custom Template”




Visibility for Wired and                       Simplified “Device                          Create Your Own
  Wireless Devices                              Category” Policy                           Device Templates

   BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                       20
Powerful Policy Deployments with ISE
  Consolidated Services,                                          Session Directory                                 Flexible Service
      SW Packages                                                                                                     Deployment

                 ACS
NAC Manager                                                       User ID               Device (and IP/MAC)
                                                                                                                All-in-One        Admin     M&T
                                                                                                                 HA Pair         Console
              NAC Profiler
 NAC Server                       ISE
                                                                                                                                 Distributed PDPs
              NAC Guest                                           Location                Access Rights

    Simplify Deployment and Admin                            Tracks Active Users and Devices                   Optimize Where Services Run



      Policy Extensibility                                          Manage Security                           System-Wide Monitoring
                                                                     Group Access                              and Troubleshooting

                                                                SGT               Public        Private

                                                                Staff             Permit         Permit

                                                              Guest               Permit          Deny

   Link in Policy Information Points                           Keep Existing Logical Design                   Consolidated Data, 3 Click Drill-In
          BRKEWN-2021        © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.       Cisco Public                                            21
Cisco’s User-Based Policy Solution with ISE

User and Device
Specific Attributes                                                                               • Device Profiling
                                                                                 ISE              • Dynamic Policy
  Employees
 • Employee VLAN
 • Gold QoS

  Employee Mobiles
 • Employee VLAN
 • Gold QoS
 • Restrictive ACL                                                                                                     Employee
                                                                                                                        VLAN

 Contractors
                                                                                                        WLC
 • Contractor VLAN                                                                                                     Contractor
 • No QoS                                                                                                                VLAN
 • Restrictive ACL
                                                                                 • With the ISE, Cisco wireless can
 Contractor Mobiles                                                                support multiple users and device
 • No Access                                                                       types on a single SSID.
       BRKEWN-2021    © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.     Cisco Public                                 22
Cisco ISE Device Profiling and Policy Steps


                     EAP                                                         Phase 1         Device Authentication



          MAC, DHCP, DNS, HTTP                                                   Phase 2         Device Identification
                                                                       ISE


                                                                                 Phase 3             Device Policy
                    Allowed                                            WLC
Limited
Access              Device?
                                                                                 QoS            • Silver

                                                                                 ACL            • Allow-All
                    Allowed
                    Access
                                                                                 VLAN           • Employee
      BRKEWN-2021     © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                            23
ISE Device Profiling Capabilities
                                                             Smart
                                                            Phones

                                                                                                    Minimum
                                                                                                 Confidence for a
                                                                                                      Match




                                                                                              Multiple
                                                                                          Rules to Establish
                                                                                          Confidence Level
                                                         Gaming
                                                         Consoles

                                                    Workstations

  BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                             24
ISE Device Profiling Example - iPad

                                                 • Once the device is profiled, it is stored within
                                                   the ISE for future associations:
 Is the MAC Address
      from Apple?


 Does the Hostname
  Contain “iPad”?


 Is the Web Browser
  Safari on an iPad?


                ISE


                                                                                 Apple iPad
  BRKEWN-2021         © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.     Cisco Public       25
Cisco ISE Provides Policy for Wired and
Wireless LANs


                                                                                        NCS        Centralized Monitoring
                                                                                                   of Wired and Wireless
                                                                           ISE                     Networking, Users and
                                                                                                         Endpoints


                                                                                            Central Point of Policy for
                                                                                            Wired and Wireless Users
                                                                                            and Endpoints




 • Unified wired and wireless policy (ISE) and management (NCS).

  BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.         Cisco Public                               26
Client Type and Policy Visibility with NCS
and ISE Integration




                                                            Device Identity
                                                              from ISE
                                                             Integration


                                                               AAA Override
                                                                Parameters
                                                                 Applied to
                                                                   Client
                                                                     Policy
                                                                  Information
                                                                   Including
                                                                    Posture
  BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   27
NCS Provides Cross-Linking to ISE Reports
on Profiling




  BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   28
Rogue Management, Attack
Detection and Threat Mitigation




 BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   29
WLAN Security
    Vulnerabilities and Threats
 On-Wire Attacks                Over-the-Air Attacks
Ad-Hoc Wireless Bridge                                 Evil Twin/Honeypot AP                                       Reconnaissance
                     HACKER                                                                      HACKER‟S                           HACKER
                                                                                                      AP




Client-to-Client Backdoor Access                           Connection to Malicious AP                        Seeking Network Vulnerabilities


  Rogue Access Points                                           Denial of Service                                  Cracking Tools
                        HACKER                                                                                                      HACKER

                                                                                   DENIAL OF
                                                                                   SERVICE


  Backdoor Network Access                                            Service Disruption                       Sniffing and Eavesdropping

                                                       Non-802.11 Attacks
                Backdoor Access
  BLUETOOTH AP                   Service Disruption MICROWAVE                                          BLUETOOTH    RF-JAMMERS    RADAR
       BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.        Cisco Public                                      30
Cisco Rogue Management Diagram
Multiple Methods

              Switchport Tracing
                                                                                                                          Network
                                                                                   Si




                                                                              Si        Si
                                                                                                                             Core
Wireless Control
 System (WCS)

               Wireless                                                                                                Distribution
                 LAN
               Controller


                                                                                                                           Access
                                             RRM
              RLDP                           Scanning


 Rogue                                                                                  Rogue                Rogue        Rogue
  AP                   Authorized                                                        AP                 Detector       AP
                          AP




BRKEWN-2021        © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.                  Cisco Public                         31
Listening for Rogues                                                                                      Detect
      Two Different AP Modes for RRM Scanning


 Local Mode Access                                        Monitor Mode                          Rogue Detection
       Points                                             Access Points                          Mechanisms
• Serves clients with                         • Dedicated to                                  • Any AP not
  time-slicing off                              scanning                                        broadcasting the
  channel scanning                            • Listens for 1.2s on                             same RF Group
• Listens for 50ms                              each channel                                    name or part of the
  on each channel                             • Scans all channels                              same mobility
• Configurable to                                                                               group is
  scan:                                                                                         considered a rogue
  • All Channels                                                                              • Automatic white
                                                                                                listing for
  • Country
                                                                                                autonomous APs
    Channels
                                                                                                managed by WCS
    (Default)
  • DCA Channels


      BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                       32
RRM Channel Scanning                                                                                                                                          Detect
   Local Mode AP


                  AP on Channel 1 - 802.11 b/g/n – US Country Channels

             10ms 10ms

          16s 50ms 16s 50ms                           16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s

             1        2        1           3            1           4            1             5        1          6        1        7        1    …




    Every 16s, a new channel is scanned for 50ms (180sec / 11 channels = ~16s)

        AP on Channel 36 - 802.11 a/n – US Country Channels (without UNII-2 Extended)

  10ms 10ms

14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms

 36     40       36       44          36           48          36          52             36       56         36       60       36       64       36   149   …




 Every 14.5s, a new channel is scanned for 50ms (180sec / 12 channels = ~14.5s)
   BRKEWN-2021                 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.            Cisco Public                                                    33
RRM Channel Scanning                                                                                                                                        Detect
       Monitor Mode AP


                                                       802.11b/g/n – All Channels
                   10ms 10ms

              1.2s 1.2s          1.2s 1.2s                 1.2s         1.2s         1.2s 1.2s               1.2s 1.2s         1.2s 1.2s      1.2s

                   1        2         3            4           5           6            7             8         9        10     11      12     …



 Each channel is scanned a total of ~10.7s ((180s / 1.2s) / 14ch) within the 180s channel scan duration


                                                                      802.11a/n – All Channels

      10ms 10ms

     1.2s   1.2s       1.2s 1.2s          1.2s 1.2s                1.2s        1.2s 1.2s 1.2s                       1.2s 1.2s        1.2s 1.2s     1.2s 1.2s

      36    40         44       48          52           56          60          64             100       104       108       112    116     132   136   140   …




 Each channel is scanned a total of ~6.8s ((180s / 1.2s) / 22ch) within the 180s channel scan duration

       BRKEWN-2021                   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.             Cisco Public                                               34
Detect
802.11n Rogue Detection


      802.11n - Mixed Mode

     • Detectable by 11a/g devices
     • The most common mode of 11n access points
     • Facilitates backwards compatibility with 802.11a/g
       clients by using 11a/g modulation for
       management and control frames.

      802.11n – Greenfield Mode

     • Only detectable by 802.11n devices
     • In this case, management, control and data
       frames are sent using 11n modulation schemes
BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public     35
Rogue Classification Rules                                                                                Classify
Concept


 Classification based on threat severity and mitigation action
 Rules tailored to customer risk model


 Lower Severity                                                                         Higher Severity

  Off-Network                                                                            On-Network
    Secured                                                                                  Open
 Foreign SSID                                                                              Our SSID
  Weak RSSI                                                                              Strong RSSI
Distant Location                                                                        On-Site Location
   No Clients                                                                           Attracts Clients


BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                        36
Rogue Classification Rules                                                                           Classify
 Examples



                                                        Rogue Rule:
                                                                                            Marked as
                                                       SSID: tmobile
                                                                                             Friendly
                                                       RSSI: -80dBm

                                                     Rogue Rule:
Detected as                                                                                 Marked as
                                                   SSID: Corporate
  Rogue                                                                                     Malicious
                                                    RSSI: -70dBm

                                                           Rogues
                                                                                             Marked as
                                                          Matching No
                                                                                            Unclassified
                                                             Rule

          Rules Are Stored and Executed on the Wireless LAN Controller
  BRKEWN-2021     © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                  37
Rogue Classification Rules                                                                 Classify
Configuration



                                                                                        Rules
                                                                                        Sorted
                                                                                          by
                                                                                        Priority




BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public         38
Classify
WCS Security Dashboard
                                                                                               Controller IDS and
                                                                                                Adaptive wIPS
                                                                                                    Alarms

              Security Index




                  Rogues by
                   Category




BRKEWN-2021          © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                           39
Rogue Detector AP Mode                                                                               Classify
      Concept

                                                                                              Rogue AP
                                 Authorized AP



                                                                                                    Client ARP


                                                                       L2 Switched Network
                                                                                                     Trunk Port
Wired Rogue Detector AP
 Detects all rogue client and Access Point ARP‟s
 Controller queries rogue detector to determine if                                            Rogue
  rogue clients are on the network                                                            Detector
 Does not work with NAT APs
      BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                   40
Rogue Detector AP Mode                                                                              Classify
          Example Deployment Scenario
Floor 3




                                                                                                   Rogue Detector
                                                                                                      Floor 3
Floor 2




                                                                                                   Rogue Detector
                                                                                                      Floor 2
Floor 1




                                                                                                   Rogue Detector
                                                                                                      Floor 1


           Install one rogue detector at each Layer 3 boundary.
           Put more simply - ensure all VLANs are monitored by a
            rogue detector.
           BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                 41
Rogue Detector AP Mode                                                                                      Classify
     Operation




 WCS                                                                          Alarm Changed from Minor to Critical


                                               Security Alert: Rogue with MAC Address: 00:09:5b:9c:87:68
 WLC                                           Has Been Detected on the Wired Network




                                                  0009.5b9c.8768
                                                                                              0021.4458.6652
                                     > debug capwap rm rogue detector
 Rogue                               ROGUE_DET: Found a match for rogue entry 0021.4458.6652
Detector                             ROGUE_DET: Sending notification to switch
                                     ROGUE_DET: Sent rogue 0021.4458.6652 found on net msg


     BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.    Cisco Public                          42
Rogue Detector AP Mode                                                                              Classify
     Configuration




 WLC
                                                                                                    All Radios
                                                                                                     Become
                                                                                                     Disabled
                                                                                                  in This Mode



                   interface GigabitEthernet1/0/5
                    description Rogue Detector
                    switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q
Switch              switchport trunk native vlan 113                                                  AP
                    switchport mode trunk                                                            VLAN
                    spanning-tree portfast
     BRKEWN-2021        © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public             43
Rogue Location Discovery Protocol                                                                       Classify
     Concept
                                                                                 Connect as
                                                                                   Client

                                             Managed AP                                       Rogue AP




                                                                                                      Send Packet
                                                       Routed/Switched Network                          to WLC




RLDP (Rogue Location Discovery Protocol)
 Connects to Rogue AP as a client
 Sends a packet to controller‟s IP address                                                   Controller
 Only works with open rogue access points
      BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                     44
Rogue Location Discovery Protocol                                                                           Classify
          Operation




  WCS                                                                              Alarm Changed from Minor to Critical


                                            Security Alert: Rogue with MAC Address: 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0 Has
   WLC                                      Been Detected on the Wired Network
                                            > debug dot11 rldp
                                            Successfully associated with rogue: 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0
                                            Sending DHCP packet through rogue AP 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0
                                            RLDP DHCP BOUND state for rogue 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0 Returning
                                            IP 172.20.226.253, netmask 255.255.255.192, gw
                                            172.20.226.193
                                            Send ARLDP to 172.20.226.197 (00:1F:9E:9B:29:80)
                                            Received 32 byte ARLDP message from: 172.20.226.253:52142

                                                    %LWAPP-5-RLDP: RLDP started on slot 0.
                                                    %LINK-5-CHANGED: Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to
                                                    reset
                                                    %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up
                                                    %LWAPP-5-RLDP: RLDP stopped on slot 0.
00:13:5f:fa:27:c0
          BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.    Cisco Public                          45
Rogue Location Discovery Protocol                                                          Classify
 Automatic Operation




 Two automatic modes of operation:
      „AllAPs‟ – Uses both local and monitor Aps
      „MonitorModeAPs‟ – Uses only monitor mode APs

 Recommended: Monitor Mode APs – RLDP can impact service on
  client serving APs


 BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public      46
Switchport Tracing                                                                                                     Classify
      Concept
                                                                                                                   Match
                                                                                                                   Found
                                                                                    2                  3
                                                                                               CAM          CAM
                                                                                               Table        Table

 WCS

                    1
                           Show CDP
                           Neighbors
                                                                                   Managed AP          Rogue AP
WCS Switchport Tracing
                                                                                                       SPT Matches On:
 Identifies CDP Neighbors of APs detecting the rogue                                                  Rogue Client MAC Address
                                                                                                       Rogue Vendor OUI
 Queries the switches CAM table for the rogue‟s MAC                                                   Rogue MAC +1/-1
                                                                                                       Rogue MAC Address
 Works for rogues with security and NAT
      BRKEWN-2021       © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.        Cisco Public                              47
WCS Switchport Tracing                                                                                       Classify
   Operation (Cont.)




 Uncheck
 to Shut                                                Match Type                          Number of MACs
 the Port                                                                                   Found on the Port




WCS
    BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                          48
Rogue Location                                                                           Mitigate
 On-Demand with WCS




 Allows an individual rogue AP to be located on-demand
 Keeps no historical record of rogue location
 Does not locate rogue clients

                                                                                         WCS
 BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public       49
Rogue Location                                                                           Mitigate
 In Real-Time with WCS and MSE Context-Aware




 Track of multiple rogues in real-time (up to MSE limits)
 Can track and store rogue location historically
 Provides location of rogue clients
 Provides location of rouge ad-hoc networks

                                                                                         WCS
 BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public         50
Rogue Containment                                                                                   Mitigate
     Concept
Mitigate
                                                                                             Rogue Client
                                        Authorized AP


                                                                                 De-Auth
                                                                                 Packets

                                                                                              Rogue AP



Rogue AP Containment
 Sends De-Authentication (or Disassociation) Packets to Client and AP
 Can use local, monitor mode or H-REAP APs
 Impacts client performance on local/H-REAP APs
 A temporary solution till the rogue can be tracked down.
     BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                  51
Rogue Containment                                                                                            Mitigate
    Local Mode APs




                                                                           Broadcast and Unicast Deauth Frames
        De-Auth



3
                    A local mode AP can contain 3 rogues per radio
Local Mode          Containment packets sent every 500ms

     BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                       52
Rogue Containment                                                                               Mitigate
       Monitor Mode APs




        De-Auth
                                                           Unicast Deauth and Unicast Disassociation Frames
     Dis-Association



 6                    A monitor mode AP can contain 6 rogues per radio
                      Containment packet sent every 100ms
Monitor Mode

       BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public           53
Rogue Containment                                                                                      Mitigate
  Auto-Containment Configuration

                                                                              Ability to Use Only
                                                                      Monitor Mode APs for Containment
                                                                        to Prevent Impact to Clients
WLC




  Use auto-containment to nullify the most alarming threats
  Containment can have legal consequences when used improperly
  BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                     54
Cisco’s Attack Detection Mechanisms

                                                                                            Adaptive
     Base IDS
                                                                                             wIPS
              Built-In to
              Controller                                                                    Requires MSE
              Software

    Uses Local and                                                                        Uses wIPS
     Monitor Mode                                                                        Monitor Mode
         APs                                                                            and/or Local APs
BRKEWN-2021       © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                  55
Adaptive wIPS
Components and Functions



              AP                              Attack
                                             Detection
                                                                                 24x7
                                                                               Scanning
                                                                                              Over-the-Air Detection



        WLC                                                  Configuration
                                                                                              wIPS AP Management



         MSE                                    Alarm
                                               Archival
                                                                                Capture
                                                                                Storage
                                                                                             Complex Attack Analysis,
                                                                                                Forensics, Events

         WCS /                             Centralized                         Historic
                                           Monitoring                         Reporting
         NCS
                                                                                                   Monitoring,
                                                                                                   Reporting



BRKEWN-2021        © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                              56
Cisco Adaptive wIPS with Dedicated
Monitor Mode APs

 Adaptive wIPS monitor mode is available for
  1130/1240, 1040/1140/1250, 1260 and 3500
  Access Points




BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   57
Adaptive wIPS Monitor Mode
Deployment Recommendations
                                                                              Monitor-mode wIPS APs do
                                                                               not serve clients, thus have
                                                                               greater range
                                                                                         Client-serving AP typically
                                                                                          covers 3000-5000 square feet

                                                                                         wIPS AP typically covers
                                                                                          15,000–35,000 square feet

                                                                              Ratio of wIPS monitor-
                                                                               mode APs to local-mode
                                                                               traffic APs varies by
                                                                               network design, but 1:5
                                                                               ratio is reasonable estimate
                                                                              wIPS APs can
                                                                               simultaneously run context-
                                                                               aware location in monitor-
                                                                               mode


BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                                    58
Cisco Adaptive wIPS with Enhanced
     Local Mode (ELM)

      Adaptive wIPS scanning in data serving access points, including H-
       REAP mode APs.
      Provides protection without needing a separate overlay network.
      ELM supported APs: 1040, 1140, 1250, 1260 & 3500
             Without ELM                                                                             With ELM
Data Serving                  wIPS Monitor Mode                                                 Single Data and wIPS AP




                   Cisco Adaptive Wireless IPS with Enhanced Local
                   Mode Can Reduce Capital Investment by > 50%
     BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                             59
Mobility Services Engine
 Support for Cisco Motion Services

3310 Mobility Services Engine                                                 3355 Mobility Services Engine




Supports Adaptive wIPS for up to                                             Supports Adaptive wIPS for up to
   2000 Monitor Mode APs                                                        3000 Monitor Mode APs
Supports Context Aware for up to                                             Supports Context Aware for up to
    2000 Tracked Devices                                                         18000 Tracked Devices
 Services can co-exist on the same MSE, but per-service maximums decrease.
     For Example, the MSE3310 can handle 1000 wIPS APs + 1000 Context Tracked Items.

 Mobility services may have different WLC/WCS software requirements
 Adaptive wIPS is licensed on a per-AP basis (both monitor mode and ELM APs
  count the same)
 BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                       60
Comparison Between Base IDS and
Adaptive wIPS

                                                                                                        wIPS
                                 Local                              Monitor                 wIPS ELM
                                                                                                       Monitor
Client Service                      Yes                                  X                    Yes        X
Rogue
Detection and                       Yes                                  Yes                  Yes       Yes
Containment
Attacks
                                      17                                 17                    39        45
Detected
Attack
                                       X                                 X                    Yes       Yes
Encyclopedia
Forensics                              X                                 X                    Yes       Yes
Anomaly
                                       X                                 X                    Yes       Yes
Detection
MSE Required                           X                                 X                    Yes       Yes
WCS Required                           X                                 X                    Yes       Yes
BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.       Cisco Public                        61
Management Frame Protection
   Concept

Problem                                                                             Solution
 Wireless management frames are not                                                 Insert a signature (Message Integrity
  authenticated, encrypted, or signed                                                 Code/MIC) into the management frames
 A common vector for exploits                                                       Clients and APs use MIC to validate
                                                                                      authenticity of management frame
                                                                                     APs can instantly identify
                                                                                      rogue/exploited management frames


                                         Infrastructure MFP Protected
CCXv5                    AP Beacons
                                                                          Probe Requests/
                                                                          Probe Responses
                 Associations/Re-Associations                              Disassociations
                       Authentications/
                                                                 Action Management Frames
                      De-Authentications

                                              Client MFP Protected




   BRKEWN-2021           © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.    Cisco Public                             62
Cisco Wired IPS Integration
 Unified Intrusion Prevention

Business Challenge

Mitigate Network Misuse, Hacking and
Malware from WLAN Clients
                                                                                              Client Shun

  Inspects traffic flow for harmful
   applications and blocks wireless
   client connections                                                                                  Malicious Traffic
                                                                                L2
                                                                                IDS
  Layer 3-7 Deep Packet
   Inspection                                                                                                   L3-7
                                                                                                                IDS
  Eliminates risk of contamination
                                                                                                 Enterprise
   from                                                                                           Intranet
   wireless clients
  Zero-day response to viruses,
   malware and suspect signatures
                                                                                                        Cisco ASA
                                                                                                         with IPS

 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk722/tk809/technologies_configuration_example09186a008080dc8c.shtml
 BRKEWN-2021        © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                                63
WLAN Security
    Vulnerabilities and Threats
 On-Wire Attacks                Over-the-Air Attacks
Ad-Hoc Wireless Bridge                                 Evil Twin/Honeypot AP                                  Reconnaissance
                                                    MFP Neutralizes All
                                                                    HACKER‟S
                     HACKER                                                                                                    HACKER
                                                    Management Frame AP
                                                  Exploits, Such as Man-in-
                                                     the-Middle Attacks
   Rogue Detection,
Client-to-Client Backdoor Access                           Connection to Malicious AP                         WPA2/802.11i
                                                                                                        Seeking Network Vulnerabilities
   Classification and
                                                                                                           Neutralizes Recon
  Mitigation Addresses
  Rogue Access Points                                           Denial of Service                         and Cracking Attacks
                                                                                                            Cracking Tools
      These Attacks
                        HACKER                                                                                                 HACKER

                                                             wIPS Detects These
                                                                   DENIAL OF
                                                                  Attacks
                                                                   SERVICE


  Backdoor Network Access                                            Service Disruption                  Sniffing and Eavesdropping

                                                       Non-802.11 Attacks
                Backdoor Access
  BLUETOOTH AP                   Service Disruption MICROWAVE                                     BLUETOOTH    RF-JAMMERS    RADAR
       BRKEWN-2021      © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                                      64
Interference Also Presents a Security
      Concern
                                                                                                           Throughput
                                                                                                            Reduction
                                                                                                          Near       Far
                                                                                     Interference Type    (25 ft)   (75 ft)
    End User Impact
                                                                                               Jammer     100%      100%
   Reduced network capacity
    and coverage                                                                   Video Camera           100%      57%
   Poor quality voice and video
                                                                                                  Wi-Fi
                                                                                                          90%       75%
   Potential Denial of Service                                                    (busy neighbor)

                                                                                         Microwave
                                                                                              Oven
                                                                                                          63%       53%
    IT Manager Impact
                                                                                              Bluetooth
 Potential security breaches                                                                  Headset
                                                                                                          20%       17%

 Support calls                                                                      DECT Phone           18%       10%
 Increased cost of operation
      BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                                   65
CleanAir is Purpose Built to Deal with
Interference Issues

                                                                                                         Detect and Classify
                                                                          97
                                                                                                         •   Uniquely identify and
                                                                                              100            track multiple interferers
                                                               63                                        •   Detects security-risk
                                                                               90                            interferers like RF
                                                                                                    20
                                                                                                             Jammers and Video
                                                                                                             Camera.
                                                                               35                        •   Assess unique impact to
                                                                                                             Wi-Fi performance
                                                                                                         •   Monitor AirQuality




                      High-Resolution Interference Detection and
   Cisco              Classification Logic Built-In to Cisco‟s 802.11n Wi-Fi
CleanAir              Chip Design. Inline Operation with No CPU or
 BRKEWN-2021
                      Performance Impact.                                      Cisco Public
               © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.                                                            66
WLAN Security
    Vulnerabilities and Threats
 On-Wire Attacks                Over-the-Air Attacks
Ad-Hoc Wireless Bridge                                Evil Twin/Honeypot AP                                  Reconnaissance
                                                   MFP Neutralizes All
                                                                   HACKER‟S
                     HACKER                                                                                                   HACKER
                                                   Management Frame AP
                                                 Exploits, Such as Man-in-
                                                    the-Middle Attacks
   Rogue Detection,
Client-to-Client Backdoor Access                          Connection to Malicious AP                         WPA2/802.11i
                                                                                                       Seeking Network Vulnerabilities
   Classification and
                                                                                                          Neutralizes Recon
  Mitigation Addresses
  Rogue Access Points                                          Denial of Service                         and Cracking Attacks
                                                                                                           Cracking Tools
      These Attacks
                       HACKER                                                                                                 HACKER

                                                            wIPS Detects These
                                                                  DENIAL OF
                                                                 Attacks
                                                                  SERVICE


  Backdoor Network Access                                           Service Disruption                  Sniffing and Eavesdropping

                                                      Non-802.11 Attacks
        Cisco CleanAir Detects These Attacks
          Backdoor Access
  BLUETOOTH AP                  Service Disruption MICROWAVE                                     BLUETOOTH    RF-JAMMERS    RADAR
       BRKEWN-2021     © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public                                      67
Complete Your Online
Session Evaluation

 Receive 25 Cisco Preferred Access points for each session
  evaluation you complete.
 Give us your feedback and you could win fabulous prizes.
  Points are calculated on a daily basis. Winners will be notified
  by email after July 22nd.
 Complete your session evaluation online now (open a browser
  through our wireless network to access our portal) or visit one
  of the Internet stations throughout the Convention Center.
 Don‟t forget to activate your Cisco Live and Networkers Virtual
  account for access to all session materials, communities, and
  on-demand and live activities throughout the year. Activate
  your account at any internet station or visit
  www.ciscolivevirtual.com.


BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   68
Visit the Cisco Store for
               Related Titles
        http://theciscostores.com




BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   69
BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   70
Thank you.




BRKEWN-2021   © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.   Cisco Public   71

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WLANSecBestPracDeployGuide

  • 1. Wireless LAN Security, Policy and Deployment Best Practices BRKEWN-2021 Jameson Blandford Technical Marketing Engineer, CCIE #27687 July 2011 BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1
  • 2. Agenda • Strong Encryption Security Standards • Strong Authentication • Wireless Policy Using ACS and ISE User-Policy and • Per User VLAN, ACL and QoS Device Identification • Device Fingerprinting Rogue Management, • Rogue Classification and Containment Attack Detection and • Adaptive wIPS Monitor Mode and ELM Threat Mitigation • MFP and Wired IPS Integration BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 2
  • 3. Strong Authentication and Encryption BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 3
  • 4. Authentication Evolution MAC Address 802.1x / WEP WPA/WPA2 Authentication Dynamic WEP BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 4
  • 5. WPA/WPA2 Breakdown • A Snapshot of the 802.11i Standard WPA • Commonly Used with TKIP Encryption • Final Version of 802.11i WPA2 • Commonly Used with AES Encryption Authentication • Personal (PSK) – Home Use Mechanisms • Enterprise (802.1x/EAP) – Office Use BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5
  • 6. EAP — Protocol Flow Authentication Server Client Authenticator CAPWAP BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 6
  • 7. EAP Authentication Types Tunneling-Based Certificate- Based EAP- PEAP Inner Methods EAP- TTLS EAP-GTC EAP-MSCHAPv2 EAP-TLS EAP- FAST  Tunnel-based - Common deployments use a tunneling protocol (EAP-PEAP) combined with an inner EAP type such as EAP- MSCHAPv2. This provides security for the inner EAP type which may be vulnerable by itself.  Certificate-based – For more security EAP-TLS provides mutual authentication of both the server and client. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7
  • 8. EAP Methods Comparison EAP-TLS PEAP EAP-FAST Fast Secure Roaming (CCKM) Yes Yes Yes Local WLC Authentication Yes Yes Yes OTP (One Time Password) Support No Yes Yes Server Certificates Yes Yes No Client Certificates Yes No No PAC (Protected Access Credentials)* No No Yes Deployment Complexity High Medium Low * PACs can be provisioned anonymously for minimal complexity. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 8
  • 9. Choosing an EAP Method Security vs. Complexity Authentication Client Support Server Support EAP Type(s) Deployed  Most clients such as Windows, Mac OSX, Apple iOS devices support EAP-TLS, PEAP (MS-CHAPv2). Additional supplicants can add more EAP types (Cisco AnyConnect).  Certain EAP types (TLS) can be more difficult to deploy than others depending on device type. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 9
  • 10. Encryption Evolution WEP TKIP AES (RC4) (RC4 and MIC) (CCMP) BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10
  • 11. Encryption Best Practices: TKIP and AES TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) • Use only for legacy clients without AES support • Often a software update for WEP clients • Can be run in conjunction with AES (mixed- mode) • Is being discontinued by the WiFi Alliance for certification. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) • Requires hardware support (~2005 chipsets or later) • Achieves line-rate speeds • Only encryption standard supported for 802.11n data rates BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 11
  • 12. User-Based Policy and Device Identification BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 12
  • 13. Cisco User-Based Policy Offering • Dynamic Policy ISE User Specific Attributes • Device Profiling ACS • Static Policy WLC • Cisco ACS (or other RADIUS server which can provide Vendor Specific Attributes) can provide static user-based policy which is assigned upon initial authentication. • Cisco Identity Services Engine can provide dynamic user-based policy which can be assigned upon initial authentication and changed during a session using CoA (Change of Authorization). BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 13
  • 14. Cisco User-Based Policy Solution with ACS Employees User • Employee VLAN Specific Attributes • Gold QoS Contractors • Contractor VLAN • No QoS • Restrictive ACL User Specific Attributes ACS* • Static Policy Employee Employee VLAN Employee WLC Contractor VLAN Contractor ACLs *This could also be any RADIUS server that supports VSAs. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 14
  • 15. Cisco ACS User Policy Steps Phase 1 User Authentication EAP ACS Phase 2 User Policy Allowed WLC Limited Access User? QoS • Silver ACL • Allow-All Allowed Access VLAN • Employee BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 15
  • 16. Cisco Controller User-Based Policy Attributes Network Access • ―Airespace-Interface-Name‖ • Sets the Interface to which the client is connected. Network Restrictions • ―Airespace-ACL-Name‖ • Sets the Access Control List used to filter traffic to/from the client. Quality of Service • ―Airespace-QOS-Level‖ • Sets the maximum QoS queue level available for use by the client (Bronze, Silver, Gold or Platinum). • ―Airespace-802.1p-Tag‖ and/or ―Airespace-DSCP-Tag‖ • Sets the maximum QoS tagging level available for use by the client. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 16
  • 17. Cisco Wireless LAN Controller ACLs Inbound Wired LAN Outbound Implicit Deny All at the End • ACLs provide L3-L4 policy and can be applied per interface or per user. • Cisco 5508 and WiSM2 implement line-rate ACLs. • Upto 64 rules can be configured per ACL. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 17
  • 18. Endpoint Access Challenges • IT is struggling with: - Classifying managed vs. unmanaged endpoints - ID devices that cannot authenticate Attribute X Location - User <-> Device association Device Time User • But there barriers: - Multiple access mediums - Endpoint certainty - No automated way to discover new endpoints PC and Non-PC Devices BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 18
  • 19. Endpoint Profiling Solution - Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) • New ground up solution - Multiple sensors – rich profiling - Complete visibility and tracking - Holistic (wired + wireless) Attribute X - Integrated Authentication, Location Authorization Device Time User - Other services (Guest, Posture, Device Registration) - Flexible deployment ISE BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 19
  • 20. Integrated, Enhanced Device Profiling with Cisco Identity Services Engine “iPad Template” “Custom Template” Visibility for Wired and Simplified “Device Create Your Own Wireless Devices Category” Policy Device Templates BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 20
  • 21. Powerful Policy Deployments with ISE Consolidated Services, Session Directory Flexible Service SW Packages Deployment ACS NAC Manager User ID Device (and IP/MAC) All-in-One Admin M&T HA Pair Console NAC Profiler NAC Server ISE Distributed PDPs NAC Guest Location Access Rights Simplify Deployment and Admin Tracks Active Users and Devices Optimize Where Services Run Policy Extensibility Manage Security System-Wide Monitoring Group Access and Troubleshooting SGT Public Private Staff Permit Permit Guest Permit Deny Link in Policy Information Points Keep Existing Logical Design Consolidated Data, 3 Click Drill-In BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 21
  • 22. Cisco’s User-Based Policy Solution with ISE User and Device Specific Attributes • Device Profiling ISE • Dynamic Policy Employees • Employee VLAN • Gold QoS Employee Mobiles • Employee VLAN • Gold QoS • Restrictive ACL Employee VLAN Contractors WLC • Contractor VLAN Contractor • No QoS VLAN • Restrictive ACL • With the ISE, Cisco wireless can Contractor Mobiles support multiple users and device • No Access types on a single SSID. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 22
  • 23. Cisco ISE Device Profiling and Policy Steps EAP Phase 1 Device Authentication MAC, DHCP, DNS, HTTP Phase 2 Device Identification ISE Phase 3 Device Policy Allowed WLC Limited Access Device? QoS • Silver ACL • Allow-All Allowed Access VLAN • Employee BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 23
  • 24. ISE Device Profiling Capabilities Smart Phones Minimum Confidence for a Match Multiple Rules to Establish Confidence Level Gaming Consoles Workstations BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 24
  • 25. ISE Device Profiling Example - iPad • Once the device is profiled, it is stored within the ISE for future associations: Is the MAC Address from Apple? Does the Hostname Contain “iPad”? Is the Web Browser Safari on an iPad? ISE Apple iPad BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 25
  • 26. Cisco ISE Provides Policy for Wired and Wireless LANs NCS Centralized Monitoring of Wired and Wireless ISE Networking, Users and Endpoints Central Point of Policy for Wired and Wireless Users and Endpoints • Unified wired and wireless policy (ISE) and management (NCS). BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 26
  • 27. Client Type and Policy Visibility with NCS and ISE Integration Device Identity from ISE Integration AAA Override Parameters Applied to Client Policy Information Including Posture BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 27
  • 28. NCS Provides Cross-Linking to ISE Reports on Profiling BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 28
  • 29. Rogue Management, Attack Detection and Threat Mitigation BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 29
  • 30. WLAN Security Vulnerabilities and Threats On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks Ad-Hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance HACKER HACKER‟S HACKER AP Client-to-Client Backdoor Access Connection to Malicious AP Seeking Network Vulnerabilities Rogue Access Points Denial of Service Cracking Tools HACKER HACKER DENIAL OF SERVICE Backdoor Network Access Service Disruption Sniffing and Eavesdropping Non-802.11 Attacks Backdoor Access BLUETOOTH AP Service Disruption MICROWAVE BLUETOOTH RF-JAMMERS RADAR BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 30
  • 31. Cisco Rogue Management Diagram Multiple Methods Switchport Tracing Network Si Si Si Core Wireless Control System (WCS) Wireless Distribution LAN Controller Access RRM RLDP Scanning Rogue Rogue Rogue Rogue AP Authorized AP Detector AP AP BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 31
  • 32. Listening for Rogues Detect Two Different AP Modes for RRM Scanning Local Mode Access Monitor Mode Rogue Detection Points Access Points Mechanisms • Serves clients with • Dedicated to • Any AP not time-slicing off scanning broadcasting the channel scanning • Listens for 1.2s on same RF Group • Listens for 50ms each channel name or part of the on each channel • Scans all channels same mobility • Configurable to group is scan: considered a rogue • All Channels • Automatic white listing for • Country autonomous APs Channels managed by WCS (Default) • DCA Channels BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 32
  • 33. RRM Channel Scanning Detect Local Mode AP AP on Channel 1 - 802.11 b/g/n – US Country Channels 10ms 10ms 16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s 50ms 16s 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 …  Every 16s, a new channel is scanned for 50ms (180sec / 11 channels = ~16s) AP on Channel 36 - 802.11 a/n – US Country Channels (without UNII-2 Extended) 10ms 10ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 14.5s 50ms 36 40 36 44 36 48 36 52 36 56 36 60 36 64 36 149 …  Every 14.5s, a new channel is scanned for 50ms (180sec / 12 channels = ~14.5s) BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 33
  • 34. RRM Channel Scanning Detect Monitor Mode AP 802.11b/g/n – All Channels 10ms 10ms 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 …  Each channel is scanned a total of ~10.7s ((180s / 1.2s) / 14ch) within the 180s channel scan duration 802.11a/n – All Channels 10ms 10ms 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 1.2s 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 100 104 108 112 116 132 136 140 …  Each channel is scanned a total of ~6.8s ((180s / 1.2s) / 22ch) within the 180s channel scan duration BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 34
  • 35. Detect 802.11n Rogue Detection 802.11n - Mixed Mode • Detectable by 11a/g devices • The most common mode of 11n access points • Facilitates backwards compatibility with 802.11a/g clients by using 11a/g modulation for management and control frames. 802.11n – Greenfield Mode • Only detectable by 802.11n devices • In this case, management, control and data frames are sent using 11n modulation schemes BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 35
  • 36. Rogue Classification Rules Classify Concept  Classification based on threat severity and mitigation action  Rules tailored to customer risk model Lower Severity Higher Severity Off-Network On-Network Secured Open Foreign SSID Our SSID Weak RSSI Strong RSSI Distant Location On-Site Location No Clients Attracts Clients BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 36
  • 37. Rogue Classification Rules Classify Examples Rogue Rule: Marked as SSID: tmobile Friendly RSSI: -80dBm Rogue Rule: Detected as Marked as SSID: Corporate Rogue Malicious RSSI: -70dBm Rogues Marked as Matching No Unclassified Rule Rules Are Stored and Executed on the Wireless LAN Controller BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 37
  • 38. Rogue Classification Rules Classify Configuration Rules Sorted by Priority BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 38
  • 39. Classify WCS Security Dashboard Controller IDS and Adaptive wIPS Alarms Security Index Rogues by Category BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 39
  • 40. Rogue Detector AP Mode Classify Concept Rogue AP Authorized AP Client ARP L2 Switched Network Trunk Port Wired Rogue Detector AP  Detects all rogue client and Access Point ARP‟s  Controller queries rogue detector to determine if Rogue rogue clients are on the network Detector  Does not work with NAT APs BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 40
  • 41. Rogue Detector AP Mode Classify Example Deployment Scenario Floor 3 Rogue Detector Floor 3 Floor 2 Rogue Detector Floor 2 Floor 1 Rogue Detector Floor 1  Install one rogue detector at each Layer 3 boundary.  Put more simply - ensure all VLANs are monitored by a rogue detector. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 41
  • 42. Rogue Detector AP Mode Classify Operation WCS Alarm Changed from Minor to Critical Security Alert: Rogue with MAC Address: 00:09:5b:9c:87:68 WLC Has Been Detected on the Wired Network 0009.5b9c.8768 0021.4458.6652 > debug capwap rm rogue detector Rogue ROGUE_DET: Found a match for rogue entry 0021.4458.6652 Detector ROGUE_DET: Sending notification to switch ROGUE_DET: Sent rogue 0021.4458.6652 found on net msg BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 42
  • 43. Rogue Detector AP Mode Classify Configuration WLC All Radios Become Disabled in This Mode interface GigabitEthernet1/0/5 description Rogue Detector switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q Switch switchport trunk native vlan 113 AP switchport mode trunk VLAN spanning-tree portfast BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 43
  • 44. Rogue Location Discovery Protocol Classify Concept Connect as Client Managed AP Rogue AP Send Packet Routed/Switched Network to WLC RLDP (Rogue Location Discovery Protocol)  Connects to Rogue AP as a client  Sends a packet to controller‟s IP address Controller  Only works with open rogue access points BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 44
  • 45. Rogue Location Discovery Protocol Classify Operation WCS Alarm Changed from Minor to Critical Security Alert: Rogue with MAC Address: 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0 Has WLC Been Detected on the Wired Network > debug dot11 rldp Successfully associated with rogue: 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0 Sending DHCP packet through rogue AP 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0 RLDP DHCP BOUND state for rogue 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0 Returning IP 172.20.226.253, netmask 255.255.255.192, gw 172.20.226.193 Send ARLDP to 172.20.226.197 (00:1F:9E:9B:29:80) Received 32 byte ARLDP message from: 172.20.226.253:52142 %LWAPP-5-RLDP: RLDP started on slot 0. %LINK-5-CHANGED: Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to reset %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up %LWAPP-5-RLDP: RLDP stopped on slot 0. 00:13:5f:fa:27:c0 BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 45
  • 46. Rogue Location Discovery Protocol Classify Automatic Operation  Two automatic modes of operation: „AllAPs‟ – Uses both local and monitor Aps „MonitorModeAPs‟ – Uses only monitor mode APs  Recommended: Monitor Mode APs – RLDP can impact service on client serving APs BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 46
  • 47. Switchport Tracing Classify Concept Match Found 2 3 CAM CAM Table Table WCS 1 Show CDP Neighbors Managed AP Rogue AP WCS Switchport Tracing SPT Matches On:  Identifies CDP Neighbors of APs detecting the rogue Rogue Client MAC Address Rogue Vendor OUI  Queries the switches CAM table for the rogue‟s MAC Rogue MAC +1/-1 Rogue MAC Address  Works for rogues with security and NAT BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 47
  • 48. WCS Switchport Tracing Classify Operation (Cont.) Uncheck to Shut Match Type Number of MACs the Port Found on the Port WCS BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 48
  • 49. Rogue Location Mitigate On-Demand with WCS  Allows an individual rogue AP to be located on-demand  Keeps no historical record of rogue location  Does not locate rogue clients WCS BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 49
  • 50. Rogue Location Mitigate In Real-Time with WCS and MSE Context-Aware  Track of multiple rogues in real-time (up to MSE limits)  Can track and store rogue location historically  Provides location of rogue clients  Provides location of rouge ad-hoc networks WCS BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 50
  • 51. Rogue Containment Mitigate Concept Mitigate Rogue Client Authorized AP De-Auth Packets Rogue AP Rogue AP Containment  Sends De-Authentication (or Disassociation) Packets to Client and AP  Can use local, monitor mode or H-REAP APs  Impacts client performance on local/H-REAP APs  A temporary solution till the rogue can be tracked down. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 51
  • 52. Rogue Containment Mitigate Local Mode APs Broadcast and Unicast Deauth Frames De-Auth 3  A local mode AP can contain 3 rogues per radio Local Mode  Containment packets sent every 500ms BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 52
  • 53. Rogue Containment Mitigate Monitor Mode APs De-Auth Unicast Deauth and Unicast Disassociation Frames Dis-Association 6  A monitor mode AP can contain 6 rogues per radio  Containment packet sent every 100ms Monitor Mode BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 53
  • 54. Rogue Containment Mitigate Auto-Containment Configuration Ability to Use Only Monitor Mode APs for Containment to Prevent Impact to Clients WLC  Use auto-containment to nullify the most alarming threats  Containment can have legal consequences when used improperly BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 54
  • 55. Cisco’s Attack Detection Mechanisms Adaptive Base IDS wIPS Built-In to Controller Requires MSE Software Uses Local and Uses wIPS Monitor Mode Monitor Mode APs and/or Local APs BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 55
  • 56. Adaptive wIPS Components and Functions AP Attack Detection 24x7 Scanning Over-the-Air Detection WLC Configuration wIPS AP Management MSE Alarm Archival Capture Storage Complex Attack Analysis, Forensics, Events WCS / Centralized Historic Monitoring Reporting NCS Monitoring, Reporting BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 56
  • 57. Cisco Adaptive wIPS with Dedicated Monitor Mode APs  Adaptive wIPS monitor mode is available for 1130/1240, 1040/1140/1250, 1260 and 3500 Access Points BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 57
  • 58. Adaptive wIPS Monitor Mode Deployment Recommendations  Monitor-mode wIPS APs do not serve clients, thus have greater range  Client-serving AP typically covers 3000-5000 square feet  wIPS AP typically covers 15,000–35,000 square feet  Ratio of wIPS monitor- mode APs to local-mode traffic APs varies by network design, but 1:5 ratio is reasonable estimate  wIPS APs can simultaneously run context- aware location in monitor- mode BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 58
  • 59. Cisco Adaptive wIPS with Enhanced Local Mode (ELM)  Adaptive wIPS scanning in data serving access points, including H- REAP mode APs.  Provides protection without needing a separate overlay network.  ELM supported APs: 1040, 1140, 1250, 1260 & 3500 Without ELM With ELM Data Serving wIPS Monitor Mode Single Data and wIPS AP Cisco Adaptive Wireless IPS with Enhanced Local Mode Can Reduce Capital Investment by > 50% BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 59
  • 60. Mobility Services Engine Support for Cisco Motion Services 3310 Mobility Services Engine 3355 Mobility Services Engine Supports Adaptive wIPS for up to Supports Adaptive wIPS for up to 2000 Monitor Mode APs 3000 Monitor Mode APs Supports Context Aware for up to Supports Context Aware for up to 2000 Tracked Devices 18000 Tracked Devices  Services can co-exist on the same MSE, but per-service maximums decrease. For Example, the MSE3310 can handle 1000 wIPS APs + 1000 Context Tracked Items.  Mobility services may have different WLC/WCS software requirements  Adaptive wIPS is licensed on a per-AP basis (both monitor mode and ELM APs count the same) BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 60
  • 61. Comparison Between Base IDS and Adaptive wIPS wIPS Local Monitor wIPS ELM Monitor Client Service Yes X Yes X Rogue Detection and Yes Yes Yes Yes Containment Attacks 17 17 39 45 Detected Attack X X Yes Yes Encyclopedia Forensics X X Yes Yes Anomaly X X Yes Yes Detection MSE Required X X Yes Yes WCS Required X X Yes Yes BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 61
  • 62. Management Frame Protection Concept Problem Solution  Wireless management frames are not  Insert a signature (Message Integrity authenticated, encrypted, or signed Code/MIC) into the management frames  A common vector for exploits  Clients and APs use MIC to validate authenticity of management frame  APs can instantly identify rogue/exploited management frames Infrastructure MFP Protected CCXv5 AP Beacons Probe Requests/ Probe Responses Associations/Re-Associations Disassociations Authentications/ Action Management Frames De-Authentications Client MFP Protected BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 62
  • 63. Cisco Wired IPS Integration Unified Intrusion Prevention Business Challenge Mitigate Network Misuse, Hacking and Malware from WLAN Clients Client Shun  Inspects traffic flow for harmful applications and blocks wireless client connections Malicious Traffic L2 IDS  Layer 3-7 Deep Packet Inspection L3-7 IDS  Eliminates risk of contamination Enterprise from Intranet wireless clients  Zero-day response to viruses, malware and suspect signatures Cisco ASA with IPS http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk722/tk809/technologies_configuration_example09186a008080dc8c.shtml BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 63
  • 64. WLAN Security Vulnerabilities and Threats On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks Ad-Hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance MFP Neutralizes All HACKER‟S HACKER HACKER Management Frame AP Exploits, Such as Man-in- the-Middle Attacks Rogue Detection, Client-to-Client Backdoor Access Connection to Malicious AP WPA2/802.11i Seeking Network Vulnerabilities Classification and Neutralizes Recon Mitigation Addresses Rogue Access Points Denial of Service and Cracking Attacks Cracking Tools These Attacks HACKER HACKER wIPS Detects These DENIAL OF Attacks SERVICE Backdoor Network Access Service Disruption Sniffing and Eavesdropping Non-802.11 Attacks Backdoor Access BLUETOOTH AP Service Disruption MICROWAVE BLUETOOTH RF-JAMMERS RADAR BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 64
  • 65. Interference Also Presents a Security Concern Throughput Reduction Near Far Interference Type (25 ft) (75 ft) End User Impact Jammer 100% 100%  Reduced network capacity and coverage Video Camera 100% 57%  Poor quality voice and video Wi-Fi 90% 75%  Potential Denial of Service (busy neighbor) Microwave Oven 63% 53% IT Manager Impact Bluetooth  Potential security breaches Headset 20% 17%  Support calls DECT Phone 18% 10%  Increased cost of operation BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 65
  • 66. CleanAir is Purpose Built to Deal with Interference Issues Detect and Classify 97 • Uniquely identify and 100 track multiple interferers 63 • Detects security-risk 90 interferers like RF 20 Jammers and Video Camera. 35 • Assess unique impact to Wi-Fi performance • Monitor AirQuality High-Resolution Interference Detection and Cisco Classification Logic Built-In to Cisco‟s 802.11n Wi-Fi CleanAir Chip Design. Inline Operation with No CPU or BRKEWN-2021 Performance Impact. Cisco Public © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 66
  • 67. WLAN Security Vulnerabilities and Threats On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks Ad-Hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance MFP Neutralizes All HACKER‟S HACKER HACKER Management Frame AP Exploits, Such as Man-in- the-Middle Attacks Rogue Detection, Client-to-Client Backdoor Access Connection to Malicious AP WPA2/802.11i Seeking Network Vulnerabilities Classification and Neutralizes Recon Mitigation Addresses Rogue Access Points Denial of Service and Cracking Attacks Cracking Tools These Attacks HACKER HACKER wIPS Detects These DENIAL OF Attacks SERVICE Backdoor Network Access Service Disruption Sniffing and Eavesdropping Non-802.11 Attacks Cisco CleanAir Detects These Attacks Backdoor Access BLUETOOTH AP Service Disruption MICROWAVE BLUETOOTH RF-JAMMERS RADAR BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 67
  • 68. Complete Your Online Session Evaluation  Receive 25 Cisco Preferred Access points for each session evaluation you complete.  Give us your feedback and you could win fabulous prizes. Points are calculated on a daily basis. Winners will be notified by email after July 22nd.  Complete your session evaluation online now (open a browser through our wireless network to access our portal) or visit one of the Internet stations throughout the Convention Center.  Don‟t forget to activate your Cisco Live and Networkers Virtual account for access to all session materials, communities, and on-demand and live activities throughout the year. Activate your account at any internet station or visit www.ciscolivevirtual.com. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 68
  • 69. Visit the Cisco Store for Related Titles http://theciscostores.com BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 69
  • 70. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 70
  • 71. Thank you. BRKEWN-2021 © 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 71