1. 1
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY – GLOBAL LIBERAL STUDIES
The ‘Moral Panic’ of U.S.
Immigration
On the Phenomenon and the Four Waves
Chelsea Larson
15 April 2015

2. 2
Table of Contents
Abstract .....................................................................................................................................3
Introduction: Immigration and the Phenomenon of ‘Moral Panic’ .............................................4
Chapter 1: What is ‘Moral Panic’?.............................................................................................5
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................5
A GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT....................................................................................7
A CLOSER LOOK AT CHARACTERISTICS......................................................................14
CONCLUSION: ‘Moral Panic’ and U.S. Immigration ...........................................................20
Chapter 2: Waves of Immigration ...........................................................................................22
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................22
1609-1775: The First Wave ...................................................................................................26
1820-1879: The Second Wave ...............................................................................................35
1881-1920: The Third Wave..................................................................................................41
CONCLUSION: The Fourth Wave ........................................................................................46
Conclusion: ‘Moral Panic,’ Immigration, and the Final Wave ..................................................48
Works Cited ............................................................................................................................56

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Abstract
This thesis focuses on ‘moral panic’ and its application in the realm of United States
immigration. The first chapter contains a brief history of ‘moral panic’ following an introduction
to the concept and its definition. There is also a more in-depth look at ‘moral panic’s’ defining
characteristics as well as situations and issues around which ‘moral panic’ has historically
occurred. The second chapter moves briefly away from the ‘moral panic’ vein by presenting and
supporting the argument that immigration to the United States can be seen in recorded waves of
high immigrant influx. Once this position is established, the second chapter looks at each wave
in individual sections, providing historical background to the period and offering evidence in
each for the existence of each of the four necessary ‘moral panic’ criteria. The thesis then
concludes with the argument that the fourth and final wave is unique in its relation to ‘moral
panic’ because of a change in the U.S. approach to immigration from defensive through
exclusionary legislation to offensive through foreign policy and the export of democracy.

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Introduction: Immigration and the Phenomenon of ‘Moral Panic’
Everyone in the United States is an immigrant, or at least used to be. Scholars believe that
even the U.S. Native Americans came from elsewhere and are actually descended from “a group
of East Asians who crossed the Bering Sea via a land bridge perhaps 16,500 years ago.”1
Similarly, everyone has experienced measures of prejudice and bigotry at some time in their
lives—whether that hatred was directed toward them or at someone else—and the phenomenon
of ‘moral panic’ is merely one step further down on the anxiety spectrum.
Despite immigration’s existence as a shared experience in the U.S. context, such deep
hostility toward immigrants has historically flourished and unfortunately continues, even today.
As immigration to the U.S. occurs in repeated cycles—most often referred to as waves—public
anti-immigrant sentiment has likewise increased, decreased, and increased again in relation to
each of these repetitive waves of incoming immigrants. Thinkers well-versed in the subject hold
that ‘moral panic’ occurs when a situation is met with concern, hostility, disproportionality, and
volatility. Immigration to the U.S. certainly resulted in tensions of a similar sort, such that ‘moral
panic’ followed each wave as one ended and then occurred again when the next wave began.
1
Handwerk, Brian. ""Great Surprise"-Native Americans Have West Eurasian Origins." National Geographic.
National Geographic Society, 22 Nov. 2013. Web. 11 Mar. 2015.

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Chapter 1: What is ‘Moral Panic’?
INTRODUCTION
What images, scenarios, words, characters, situations, spaces, or ideas does the word
‘panic’ evoke? ‘Panic’ is mental; it’s emotional. ‘Panic’ is essentially fear. Of course, fear and
‘panic’ are not completely interchangeable—fear is “the mind-killer…the little-death that brings
total obliteration,”2
while ‘panic’ carries much of the same negative connotation but is merely a
mental or emotional state which can be induced.3
‘Moral’ relates to fear only for some, yet it is also a word of great power, much like
‘panic.’ It conjures up ideas of religion—possibly even oppression; it speaks to the overarching,
age-old conflicts of good versus evil and right versus wrong. Generally, the fear of ‘panic’ is
separate from the concept of ‘moral’—except, of course, in the case of a non-religious person’s
panic over potential religious domination excused by ‘moral’ arguments. This is not to say,
however, that ‘moral’ and ‘panic’ cannot be combined; in fact, the combinative term ‘moral
panic’ takes on an entirely different meaning while simultaneously retaining at least some of the
negative connotation of ‘panic’ as well as part of the oft-legalistic—and definitely normative—
connection with ‘moral.’
‘Moral panic’ has existed in theoretical discourse for many years, and can be clearly
recognized as an occurring—and reoccurring—current—and historical—phenomenon. It was
first introduced into English language dialogue in the early 1830s,4
but went largely unaddressed
for more than one hundred years. A sudden and extensive academic treatment in the 1960s5
and
2
Herbert, Frank. Dune. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1965. Urban Dictionary. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.
3
"Panic." Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2014.
4
See The Quarterly Christian Spectator.
5
See Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media.

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1970s6
produced much of today’s literature on the subject, though only the work of a few
thinkers has proven truly ground-breaking for the observation and study of this subject matter.
The 1990s7
again saw a reemergence of ‘moral panic’ as a popular topic within academic
discussion, and theoretical conceptualizing of ‘moral panic’ has remained relatively steady in
journal literature over the past twenty years up to now.
Throughout the intensive investigation and exploration of ‘moral panic’ and its meaning,
the expression, description, and acceptance of particular characteristics have emerged as key
components of this psycho-theoretical phenomenon. The nature of these characteristics is such
that ‘moral panic’ is not recognized as existing or occurring during a particular time in history
unless the majority of these traits are perceived as present. A public crisis can then be arguably
designated as a ‘moral panic’, if and when most characteristics can be found; from a variety of
sources, these are concern, hostility, consensus, disproportionality, and volatility. Without the
presence of these distinguishing features, ‘moral panic’ cannot, and does not, happen.
As a recurring phenomenon in history, ‘moral panic’ has occurred not only during times
of great fear, but also around situations which can actually be considered morally offensive.
Historically speaking, public concern over taboos, particularly in the areas of sexual deviance
and substance abuse, has incited multiple ‘moral panics’. Texts which address ‘moral panic’ over
these issues include Cindy Kuzma’s 2005 piece, “Sex, Lies and Moral Panics”, in which she
addresses a potential ‘moral panic’ surrounding parental concern over “the “sexual chaos” on
college campuses today.”8
She extensively quotes Mary deYoung, a professor of sociology at
6
See Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers; Jock Young’s The
Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy, Drugs and Politics; and Stuart Hall et al.’s Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State,
and Law and Order.
7
See Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda’s Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance; and Kenneth
Thompson’s Moral Panics.
8
Kuzma, Cindy. "Sex, Lies, and Moral Panics." Alternet. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 28 Sept. 2005.
Web. 15 Dec. 2014.

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Michigan’s Grand Valley State University, who says that “moral panics about sex…[are] a
remarkable diversion from very real problems that affect human beings,” and that “once you've
been identified and demonized as a folk devil, your power and credibility diminish, and it
becomes much harder to fight back.”9
On substance abuse, Scottish criminologist Jock Young’s
“The Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy”, written in 1971, addresses ‘moral panic’ surrounding
substance abuse and “centers around the premise that a situation defined as real in a society will
be real in its consequences.”10
Fear over transnational difference, as well as the perpetuation of an “us” versus “them”
outlook on diversity, has lead to ‘moral panics’ as well. These can be seen in the specific
example of mugging in Britain during the early 1970s;11
this instance is of particular interest to
Stuart Hall et al. and is the basis for their ground-breaking Policing the Crisis. After the events
of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the connection between terrorism and [extremist]
Muslim persons is yet another perpetuation of ‘moral panic’—one expressed by a variety of
thinkers through multiple outlets.12
Finally, though this phenomenon has likely occurred around
many more areas of transnational difference than simply the ones mentioned here, ‘moral panic’
results from anxiety over the seemingly constant influx of U.S.-bound immigrants who “however
grateful they are for this new place, still remember the old places,”13
and choose to bring those
remembrances with them to their new home.
A GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT
9
Kuzma.
10
Young, Jock. The Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy. Drugs and Politics. Ed. Paul Elliott. Rock. New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction, 1977. Google Books. Google. Web. 7 Mar. 2015. 99.
11
Hall, Stuart et al. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. London: Macmillan, 1978. Print.
12
See Rahma Bavelaar’s ""Moral Panic" and the Muslim;" Jeffrey S. Victor’s "Why the Terrorism Scare Is a Moral
Panic."
13
Walzer, Michael. "What Does It Mean to Be an "American"?" What It Means to Be an American: Essays on the
American Experience. New Delhi: Affiliated East-West, 1992. Print. 634.

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An 1830 publication in The Quarterly Christian Spectator marks the first English
language use of the ‘moral panic’ terminology. The particular article in which the phrase appears
states that “the mind is as far as possible from stagnation, or torpor, or ‘moral panic,’”14
thereby
equating ‘moral panic’ with other negative states of being. This initial usage does not, however,
align the phrase with the contemporary understanding of the phenomenon as there are no
characteristics or historical examples offered in this journal article.
Within the next year, however, the meaning of ‘moral panic’ transformed into that which
is commonly used in social science academics today. Written in 1831 on the spread of Cholera in
the British town of Sunderland, an article in The Journal of Health records the words of a French
physician that “a physical preventative [of the spread of Cholera] would have been ineffectual
and would have produced a moral panic far more fatal than the disease is now.”15
Here, the use
of ‘moral panic’ is much more aligned with fear than in the earliest English usage; yet the full
extent of the phenomenon, its meaning, and its aspects remained largely unaddressed until
almost a century and a half after these first occasions in which ‘moral panic’ appeared.
Though the publications in which ‘moral panic’ is first mentioned can hardly be
considered “popular literature,” Marshall McLuhan’s book, Understanding Media, is one of the
first to subject ‘moral panic’ to truly stringent academic treatment. This foundational work of the
well-known Canadian philosopher was written in 1964, and Stanley Cohen, the next member of
the academy to explore the phenomenon of ‘moral panic,’ draws his definition of this concept
from McLuhan’s work. This sharing of thought is specifically mentioned by Cohen in his Folk
Devils and Moral Panics, published by Routledge in 1972. Cohen even credits McLuhan and
14
The Quarterly Christian Spectator: Conducted by an Association of Gentlemen. Vol. II. A. H. Maltby. New
Haven/ New York, 1830. Print.
15
The Journal of Health Conducted by an Association of Physicians. 1831. Print. 180.

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Folk Devils’ use of the term ‘moral panic,’ writing that he—Cohen— “probably picked it up
from…Understanding Media.”16
McLuhan’s text might have been the one to reintroduce ‘moral panic’ into modern social
science discourse, but it is Cohen’s Folk Devils book which offers one of the first comprehensive
definitions of the term. The South African sociologist defines ‘moral panic’ as a phenomenon
which occurs when a “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined
as a threat to societal values and interests;”17
he also unfortunately recognizes that “societies
appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic.”18
‘Moral panic’ is used by
Cohen to explore “the emergence of various forms of youth culture…whose behaviour is deviant
or delinquent.”19
These delinquent youths—“the Mods and Rockers”20
—are the folk devils of
Cohen’s title, and exist as “visible reminders of what we should not be.”21
Born in Jamaica and educated in the United Kingdom, Stuart Hall is an academic as well-
known as McLuhan or Cohen, and is most often referred to as the father of the Birmingham
School of Cultural Studies. In his co-authored book Policing the Crisis, Hall takes Cohen’s folk
devil and describes it as the person “on to whom all our most intense feelings about things going
wrong, and all our fears about what might undermine our fragile securities are projected.”22
The
multiple authors of Policing the Crisis, however, take more from Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral
Panics than merely the concept of a societal folk devil. Cohen is widely cited throughout Hall et
al.’s book, particularly in the defining of the onset of a ‘moral panic’ as “a shift of attention from
16
Cohen, Stanley. Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. London: MacGibbon and
Kee, 1972. ProQuest. ProQuest Ebrary, Apr. 2011. Web. Dec. 2014. 294.
17
Cohen 46.
18
Cohen 46.
19
Cohen 47.
20
Cohen 47.
21
Cohen 47.
22
Hall et al. 161.

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the deviant act…treated in isolation to the relation between the deviant act and the reaction of the
public and the control agencies to the act.”23
Despite the overwhelming use of Cohen’s work in their text, Hall et al. do depart
theoretically from some of Cohen’s points, particularly in their choice of ‘moral panic’-inducing
subject matter which relates to mugging in Britain in the early 1970s. As such, Policing the
Crisis deals largely with the relationship between ‘moral panic’ and social control for situations
in which ‘moral panic’ is purposefully ignited to create public support for strong[er] policing of a
violent crisis.
From Cohen’s initial definition of ‘moral panic’, Hall et al. create their own notion of the
phenomenon and write:
When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all
proportion to the actual threat offered, when ‘experts’, in the form of police chiefs, the
judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear
to talk ‘with one voice’ of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media
representations universally stress ‘sudden and dramatic’ increases (in numbers involved
or events) and ‘novelty’, above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could
sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic.24
Unpacked, Hall et al.’s perception of ‘moral panic’ and its onset relates to people in
different areas of society reacting overly strongly to an event or a group which is dissimilar
and/or perceived as threatening in some way. These reactions are then fermented and excited by
the actions of social leaders in politics, law, and the media particularly. This is exactly what
23
Hall et al. 17.
24
Hall et al. 16.

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occurred in the events addressed by Hall et al. in Policing the Crisis, and is, therefore, why the
authors then argue for mugging in Britain in the early 1970s as a strong example of ‘moral panic.’
Much of Hall et al.’s text is, however, more concerned with the phenomenon of mugging
than the separate, though related, phenomenon of ‘moral panic.’ Yet this is not to say that the
combined academic work of Cohen and Hall et al. did not have important ramifications in
continued studies on the subject of ‘moral panic,’ its causes, and its meaning. In fact, one
particular text of the 1990s draws specifically from the groundbreaking and foundational work of
Folk Devils and Policing the Crisis, in order to facilitate an even more extensive exploration of
‘moral panic.’
This text is Kenneth Thompson’s 1998 book, appropriately titled Moral Panics. In it,
Thompson presents a concise guide to express and compare “the various different approaches
that have been adopted in studies of moral panics.”25
He prefaces this guide with an
acknowledgment that “this [right now] is the age of moral panic,” but also that “in one sense
moral panics are nothing new”26
because “for a century or more there have been panics over
crime…[and other] threat[s] to the established way of life.”27
Despite his position that ‘moral
panic’ is a recognizable and established occurrence, he does also specify that “it would be
misleading to view the contemporary concern with moral panics as simply a continuation of a
previous pattern.”28
Yet the true intervention of Thompson’s text is not his condensed version of the ‘moral
panic’ phenomenon from its conception up to the end of the twentieth century, nor is it his
careful comparison of various instances of ‘moral panic’ throughout history and the ways in
25
"Moral Panics." Google Books. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Dec. 2014.
26
Thompson, Kenneth. Moral Panics. London: Routledge, 1998. ProQuest. ProQuest Ebrary. Web. Dec. 2014. 1.
27
Thompson 1.
28
Thompson 2.

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which those occurrences differ from the ‘moral panics’ of today. Instead, the relevance of
Thompson’s Moral Panics comes from the dichotomy it introduces between the potential roots
of ‘moral panic’ in the United States and those of the phenomenon as it arises in the United
Kingdom. On this contrast, Thompson writes the following:
American sociologists have tended to emphasize social psychological factors, such as
anxiety and stress, portraying moral panics as just another form of collective behavior, or
in terms of interest groups and social movements; whilst, for a period beginning in the
mid-1970s, British studies such as Stuart Hall et al. portrayed moral panics mainly in
terms of a crisis of capitalism and a consequent increase in state authoritarianism…The
American studies have been particularly insightful in their analyses of the role of moral
entrepreneurs and claims-makers.29
Essentially, Thompson recognizes a separation between U.S. American and British
academic approaches to the concept of ‘moral panic.’ As he says, ‘moral panic’ in the United
States is much more closely associated with social psychology, and its academics more
concerned with the morality aspects of the concept. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand,
the work of Hall et al. perpetuates the theory that “a crisis of capitalism” is intimately linked
with the incidence of a ‘moral panic.’ This difference in conceptualizing the phenomenon of
‘moral panic’ is partially due to the “use of Marxist concepts and theories concerning capitalism
and the state”30
in Policing the Crisis.
Academics on both sides of the Atlantic, however, can agree that no theoretically-
expressed, socially-occurring phenomenon is without its critics; whether approached from a U.S.
29
Thompson 16.
30
Thompson 16.

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or U.K. perspective, ‘moral panic’ is no exception. While these critiques rarely combat the
existence of ‘moral panic’ in its own right, almost every other aspect of the concept has points of
disagreement. One such contention is over the criteria of characteristics which are necessary for
‘moral panic’ to occur. Some ‘moral panic’ thinkers look at the technological growth within the
realm of media since the publishing of Folk Devils in 1972 and Policing the Crisis in 1978.
These academics argue that such progress has affected the way in which ‘moral panic’ manifests;
in response, the characteristic criteria should also transform to somehow reflect these changes in
media and its modern influence.31
Additional criticisms take issue with the separate terms from which the terminology of
‘moral panic’ is derived. ‘Panic’ has been addressed as overly inducing of fear and its related
negative connotations. Similarly, ‘moral’ has been dissected as problematic in ‘moral panic’
because the phenomenon is so often recognized as occurring in situations which do not truly
count as offending human ‘moral’ values. Instead, many of these are merely instances in which
minorities are unfairly demonized, regardless of whether or not the behavior of those groups is
actually morally offensive.32
This critique can be directly linked to aforementioned instances of
‘moral panic’ over transnational difference.
Rahma Bavelaar writes on this specifically in “‘Moral Panic’ and the Muslim.” Here,
Bavelaar challenges an argument presented by Professor Ineke Sluiter that “a significant part of
the solution [to ‘moral panic’ over Muslims in Europe] lies in care and subtlety in the diagnosis
and formulation of the problem, but more so in continuous and honest communication between
communities.”33
Bavelaar’s issue with this is not in the diagnosis of ‘moral panic’ “to describe
31
McRobbie, Angela, and Sarah L. Thornton. “Rethinking ‘Moral Panic’ for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds.” The
British Journal of Sociology 46.4 (1995): 559. JSTOR. Web. Dec. 2014.
32
Jewkes, Yvonne. Media and Crime. London: SAFE, 2004. ProQuest. ProQuest Ebrary. Web. Dec. 2014.
33
Bavelaar, Rahma. ""Moral Panic" and the Muslim." OnIslam.net. On Islam, 21 Sept. 2005. Web. Dec. 2014.

14. 14
the political and cultural tensions in much of Western Europe today;” instead, the author
critiques Sluiter’s solution to this ‘moral panic’ which assumes (1) “that the ‘problem’ primarily
lies with the ‘other,’” and (2) “that every citizen has access to the public debate and can thus
communicate with others on an equal footing.”34
In this case, at least according to Bavelaar,
‘moral panic’ may exist in the reaction of Europeans to Muslims and other immigrants, but those
minority persons are not generally morally offensive, but simply victims of prejudice and racism
in a situation where ‘moral panic’ should not really apply.
A CLOSER LOOK AT CHARACTERISTICS
Clearly, ‘moral panic’ has, over the past two hundred years or so, become a subject
widely studied and academically addressed. As a result, the keynote texts on this topic—
specifically Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics—offer a comprehensive list of
characteristics which make the phenomenon of ‘moral panic’ recognizable, even to those not
incredibly familiar with it. In Moral Panics, Kenneth Thompson recognizes that though
“different theorists may emphasize different characteristics of moral panics…on the whole there
is agreement about at least two of the characteristics”—concern and hostility—and general
consensus on the others originally found in Cohen’s text. In short, these are as follows:
I. Concern “There should be a high level [of concern]…over the behaviour of
a certain group or category of people.”35
II. Hostility “There is an increased level [of hostility]…toward the group or
category regarded as a threat.”36
34
Bavelaar.
35
Thompson 9.
36
Thompson 9.

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III. Disproportionality There is “an implicit assumption…that the threat or
danger is more substantial than is warranted by a realistic appraisal.”37
IV. Volatility “Moral panics are likely to appear suddenly and be short-lived.”38
Thompson does not, however, have much of anything to say about consensus as a key
trait of ‘moral panic,’ despite Cohen’s initial identification of consensus as an actual
characteristic of the overarching phenomenon.39
Regardless, there is more written on these
characteristics than the brief overview Thompson offers, and even consensus, though overlooked
by Thompson, is deeply explored in Cohen’s work. What follows, then, is a more in-depth look
at each of these aspects and the ways in which each manifests individually in order to combine
and induce a ‘moral panic.’
I. Concern This characteristic, at least for Thompson, can be seen as quite intimately
connected with volatility. He writes that “the level of feverish concern [which is] characteristic
of the moral panic phase is not likely to last, even if the problem itself is of long standing.”40
According to Thompson, due to the public nature of this characteristic, concern “seldom
develops as a straightforward upsurge of indignation from the grass roots;” there is, instead, “a
‘politics of social problems’”41
which then turns in to ‘moral panic’-creating levels of concern.
This concern is, therefore, “‘socially constructed’”42
and, as a result, speaks directly to Hall et
al.’s Policing the Crisis and that text’s emphasis on ‘moral panic’ as a tool of social control.
37
Thompson 9.
38
Thompson 9.
39
Cohen 13.
40
Thompson 9.
41
Thompson 12.
42
Thompson 12.

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Thompson’s treatment of this characteristic is similar to concern as addressed in Stanley
Cohen’s Folk Devils. Cohen separates concern from fear43
and relates this criterion to actions of
the media during a period of ‘moral panic.’ On media, Cohen writes that the “very reporting of
certain ‘facts’ can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic.”44
He then
offers particular instances of legal action which support the rise in concern for his particular case
study of the ‘Mods’ and ‘Rockers’ in 1960s Britain. These, he writes, “show how public concern
about a particular condition is [purposely] generated;”45
Hall et al. are again recalled here as the
active generating of concern relates strongly to the look at social control in Policing the Crisis.
II. Hostility Other than his initial recognition of hostility as one of the only two accepted
characteristics of ‘moral panic,’ Thompson again has little to say on this criterion. He does,
however, quote Cohen’s writing on this subject in multiple locations throughout Moral Panics.
Turning to Cohen and Folk Devils, therefore, reveals more about this characteristic of hostility.
Cohen identifies hostility as one of the characteristics “commentators have distinguished
[as] the separate elements in the original definition.”46
He then continues in this vein to define
hostility in terms of ‘moral panic’ as “moral outrage towards the actors (folk devils) who embody
the problem and agencies…who are ‘ultimately’ responsible (and may become folk devils
themselves).”47
In further discussions of hostility, Cohen also remarks that “a climate of hostility
to marginal groups and cultural deviance” is created when “the political crisis of the state is
43
Cohen 27.
44
Cohen 55.
45
Cohen 49.
46
Cohen 28.
47
Cohen 28.

17. 17
displaced into softer targets.”48
Here, he and Hall et al. overlap in their shared conception that
‘moral panic’ can be purposely ignited through state manipulation.
III. Disproportionality Thompson writes that it is apparently “the criterion of
disproportionality believed to be implicit in the term ‘panic’ that is most contentious.”49
This
“criticism comes from two sides” as a contrast between those who view the term as
“ideologically loaded or value-laden” and therefore impossible to gauge, and those who argue
that “there are many other conditions where the degree of risk is more calculable.”50
The
arguments Thompson presents in Moral Panics on disproportionality are mostly drawn from
writers Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda and their work on the subject in Moral Panics:
The Social Construction of Deviance. Of their approach to ‘moral panic,’ and disproportionality
in particular, Thompson writes that it “is useful for studying the relationship between a
succession of moral panic and a moral campaign linked to a social movement.”51
Thompson, Goode, and Ben-Yehuda are not, however, the only ‘moral panic’ thinkers to
contemplate this criterion. Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils, as the foundational text for most follow-
up studies on ‘moral panic,’ also takes an in-depth look at disproportionality as a characteristic
of the ‘moral panic’ phenomenon. In that text, Cohen argues that “public concern is not directly
proportionate to objective harm.”52
This disproportionality is particularly expressed in Cohen’s
definition of the term as “an exaggeration of the number or strength of the cases, in terms of the
damage caused, moral offensiveness, [or] potential risk if ignored.”53
Cohen, too, addresses
48
Cohen 28.
49
Thompson 10.
50
Thompson 10.
51
Thompson 123.
52
Cohen 28.
53
Cohen 28.

18. 18
criticisms of disproportionality, which highlight a “tension between insisting on a universal
measuring rod for determining the action/reaction gap—yet also conceding that the measurement
is socially constructed and all the time passing off as non-politically biased the decision of what
panics to ‘expose’.”54
In Cohen’s opinion, “the critics are right.”55
IV. Volatility For Thompson, this characteristic is “similar to crazes, scares and other such
forms of collective behaviour.”56
Interestingly, this perspective on volatility recalls his earlier
words on the U.S. American perspective of ‘moral panic’ as “just another form of collective
behavior;”57
it is therefore possible that Thompson considers this characteristic as appropriate
solely in the U.S. context. To discuss volatility, Thompson again draws from the work of Goode
and Ben-Yehuda; he quotes their work and writes that the volatility of ‘moral panic’ is “the fact
that, much like fads, they erupt suddenly and usually unexpectedly, and, in like manner, fairly
swiftly subside and disappear.”58
Cohen’s definition of volatility aligns nicely with Thompson’s, which, in turn, reflects
that of Goode and Ben-Yehuda. On this characteristic, he writes that “the panic erupts and
dissipates suddenly and without warning.”59
He continues in his discussion of volatility by
comparing its criticisms with those about disproportionality: essentially, the use of
disproportionality is criticized by conservatives, whereas “the critique of volatility comes from
radicals to whom the assumption of volatility is not solid or political enough.”60
54
Cohen 36.
55
Cohen 36.
56
Thompson 10.
57
Thompson 1.
58
Thompson 123; Goode, Erich, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994. Print. 52-3.
59
Cohen 28.
60
Cohen 35.

19. 19
While Thompson usually refers to Cohen, the reverse occurs for this characteristic as the
author of Folk Devils actually refers back to Thompson. As Folk Devils and Moral Panics was
written in 1972 and Thompson’s Moral Panics was not published until 1998, this is unusual.
However, Cohen’s reference to Thompson’s arguments occurs in the “Introduction to the Third
Edition” which was actually published in April of 2011. In it, Cohen writes that Thompson
claims “moral panics are succeeding each other more rapidly;”61
yet this does not “deny their
volatility,”62
at least where Cohen’s arguments are concerned. Both Thompson and Cohen are
unclear as to the precipitating factors of these rapidly occurring ‘moral panics,’ thereby allowing
the argument that ‘moral panics’ do not exclusively result from newly-emerged conflict and can
sometimes repeat.
V. Consensus There is very little on this characteristic in either Moral Panics or Folk Devils.
Cohen does, however, classify consensus as one of a number of “elements needed for the
construction of a successful moral panic.”63
Pushing aside the question of what makes a ‘moral
panic’ “successful,”64
this idea that ‘moral panic’ can be constructed again speaks to Policing the
Crisis in which Hall et al. writes that consensus is “the complementary face of domination.”65
Conversely, Cohen’s consensus is a widespread agreement “that the beliefs or actions
being denounced were not insulated entities…but integral parts of the society or else could (and
would) be unless ‘something was done’.”66
Cohen then connects consensus to racial
discrimination and writes that “clearly if there was no institutionalized racism…there could not
61
Cohen 38.
62
Cohen 38.
63
Cohen 13.
64
Cohen 13.
65
Hall et al. 216.
66
Cohen 13.

20. 20
be in the wider society.”67
Found in Folk Devils, an additional definition for consensus is also “a
widespread agreement (not necessarily total) that the threat exists, is serious and [again] that
‘something should be done’.”68
CONCLUSION: ‘Moral Panic’ and U.S. Immigration
These characteristics—concern, hostility, disproportionality, volatility, and even
consensus—are present in all the historical instances referenced by Stanley Cohen, Stuart Hall et
al., and Kenneth Thompson as occasions of ‘moral panic.’ From conflict between the youth
deviants ‘Mods’ and ‘Rockers’, to mugging in Britain in the early 1970s, ‘moral panic’ can be
seen in a variety of historical periods and over a number of quite different issues. Additionally,
over the past 50 years as the academy has expanded and its diversity increased, ‘moral panic’ has
also become more multifaceted, both in the global scope of its recognized occurrences and in the
identities of its philosophers. The Global Moral Panics Symposium showcases some excellent
examples of this growth and, in 2014 alone, contained papers on all manner of ‘moral panics’.69
These ‘moral panic’-related topics ranged from “sex/work in the Caribbean”70
and “global B-
Boying culture”71
to “the moral panic of Africa’s wars”72
and “saving the Chinese Coolie.”73
Coincidentally, the majority of the presenters for the 2014 symposium were not only
internationally-minded, but also women, thereby further expressing the changes which ‘moral
panic’ and its thinkers have recently undergone.
67
Cohen 13.
68
Cohen 28.
69
Global Moral Panics Symposium. Indiana University Bloomington, 07 Aug. 2014. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
70
Global. See Angelique Nixon’s “Vexed Relations and Touristic Desire – Sex/Work in the Caribbean.”
71
Global. See Imani Johnson’s “A Moral Panic From Below? American Cultural Hegemony & Black Erasure in
Global B-Boying Culture.”
72
Global. See Michelle Moyd’s “Save the Children: African Villains, White Saviors, and the Moral Panic of
Africa’s Wars.”
73
Global. See Elliott Young’s “Saving the Chinese Coolie: Humanitarianism and Imperialism in the Nineteenth
Century and Beyond.”

21. 21
One such globally-focused ‘moral panic’ issue of recent import and potential conflict is
immigration to the United States. Though this influx of people to the U.S. appears currently
consistent and quite strong, historians actually perceive such immigration as occurring in four
historical waves over the past two hundred or so years of the nation’s existence. Clearly,
immigration in a U.S. American context is nothing new, despite domestic and international
tension over the issue today. ‘Moral panic’ did not enter English language discourse until more
than half a century after 1776 and the establishment of the United States; yet this time lapse does
not mean that ‘moral panic’ did not occur in the U.S. before the term was introduced, just like
the habit of immigration to come in waves does not mean ‘moral panic’ over this expression of
“us” versus “them” did not originally occur and then occur again.
‘Moral panic’ possesses a transnational precedent and it is even argued by some that
immigration, “at the heart of the American identity,”74
is “America’s oldest moral panic.”75
It
can, and will, be argued, therefore, that immigration to the United States, the potential impact of
that transnational migration on U.S. American identity, and ‘moral panic’ are all intimately
connected. “From jobs, to crime, to language, immigration has been America’s perennial moral
panic;”76
this is arguably true for the last two hundred years, and—barring some revolution in
sociopolitical awareness—is unlikely to change.
74
Laughon, Joseph. “Immigration: The Perennial Moral Panic.” Café Con Leche Republicans. Café Con Leche
Republicans, n.d. Web. Dec. 2014.
75
Laughon.
76
Laughon.

22. 22
Chapter 2: Waves of Immigration
INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing aspect of the U.S. national mythos which suggests that the
United States of America is a country created, fostered, and sustained by immigration. In an
introduction to his brother’s—John F. Kennedy—A Nation of Immigrants, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy writes that “immigration is in our blood.”77
He then references this popular mythology
and continues with the idea that immigration is “part of our founding story” such that “we would
not be a great nation today without them.”78
Edward Kennedy might be the individual writer of this introductory piece, but the
position itself does not belong to him exclusively; though there is no mention of concrete popular
opinion, Kennedy writes “we” to speak for the U.S. American people and many of those for
whom he speaks would likely agree with his sentiment. Historically, the United States has
spoken pretty words to Europe and other places of a willingness to take the “tired...[and] poor,”
the “huddled masses yearning to be free,” and the “wretched refuse of…teeming shores.”79
Currently, more Americans are pro-immigration than in the past, with a documented, “clear,
steady increase in support for this…stance.”80
Despite this apparent support for over four hundred years of nearly-steady immigration,
prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment exist strongly as well. Michael Costelloe in a content
analysis of citizen perception entitled “Immigration as Threat,” recognizes this history of ill will
77
Kennedy, Edward M. "Introduction." John F. Kennedy's A Nation of Immigrants. Anti-Defamation League, n.d.
Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
78
Kennedy.
79
Lazarus, Emma. "Statue of Liberty National Monument." Liberty State Park. Liberty State Park, n.d. Web. 11 Mar.
2015.
80
Saad, Lydia. "Americans More Pro-Immigration Than in Past." Gallup Politics. Gallup, 11 July 2013. Web. 13
Mar. 2015.

23. 23
toward immigrants and writes that the United States “has a long history of treating new
immigrants…as ‘dangerous others.’”81
According to Costelloe, this perception of immigrants as
threat stems from concerns “not only to…personal safety in terms of crime but also…economic
well-being…culture…status, and even…health.”82
This potential conflict between “America as an immigrant haven and America as an anti-
immigrant outpost”83
is often attributed to the common characterization of the U.S. as a “young
nation” which “tends to have fairly short collective memory.” As a result, the nation and its
people “often find [themselves] beset with the same problems…each time…convinced they must
be new.”84
Clearly, the dual nature of U.S. perspectives on immigration fits under this argument,
particularly in immigration’s widely-accepted existence as “a cyclical phenomenon”85
which
occurs in “waves.”86
From that description, it is plausible that both historical and current public
opinion on the subject change depending on the context of the individual immigration wave,
such that most were pro-immigrant at the time of the settling of the New World during the first
wave from 1609 to 1775, but many others were anti-immigrant during the financial turmoil of
the third wave from 1881-1920.
Though most scholars agree that immigration patterns, at least to the U.S., do in fact
occur in waves, disagreement exists on the number and corresponding periods of history. For
some thinkers, major immigration to the U.S. has occurred twice in the nation’s history. These
81
Costelloe, Michael T. "Immigration as Threat: A Content Analysis of Citizen Perception." The Journal of Public
and Professional Sociology 2.1 (2008): 1-13. 2008. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
82
Costelloe 3.
83
Behdad, Ali. A Forgetful Nation: On Immigration and Cultural Identity in the United States. Durham, NC: Duke
UP, 2005. Google Books. Google. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
84
Laughon, Joseph. “Immigration: The Perennial Moral Panic.” Café Con Leche Republicans. Café Con Leche
Republicans, n.d. Web. Dec. 2014.
85
Behdad 32.
86
Kennedy, John F. A Nation of Immigrants. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Google Books. Google. Web. 13
Mar. 2015.

24. 24
historians argue that the first wave began around 1850, strengthened sometime in the 1880s, and
lasted until the mid-1920s. Under this argument, the follow-up wave “rose gradually after World
War II until the mid-1970s,”87
surged in the mid-1990s, and still continues today. Historically,
these two waves overlap with major national and global events, particularly the opening of Ellis
Island in 1892,88
the Great Depression in the 1930s, the U.S.-involved wars of the 1950s and 60s,
and the fall of Communism in the early 1990s.
Similarly, proponents of the three-wave approach argue that their waves also coincide
with history, yet these waves are grouped more on numbers of immigrant origins than the times
at which people came. The first wave “was the mass importation of slaves” that occurred
“between America's founding and the early 19 century,”89
during which time the United States
experienced multiple wars and less major, though still violent, conflicts. This period also saw
widespread national growth, particularly in the realms of religion with the Second Great
Awakening and manufacturing with the first Industrial Revolution. The second of these broadly
historical immigration waves “was the result of famine, revolution, and the emergence of
industrialization” and began “just a decade and a half before America's own civil war.”90
Finally,
this argument relates the third wave to “laborers from Central and South America” who came to
the U.S. namely via the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe and the Bracero Program (1942-64).91
An additional argument—and the one proposed for the exploration of ‘moral panic’ and
immigration here—is that immigration to the United States occurred in four recognizable waves.
87
Williamson, Jeffrey G. "Global Migration." Finance & Development. International Monetary Fund, Sept. 2006.
Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
88
Toppo, Greg, and Paul Overburg. "Second Immigration Wave Lifts Diversity to Record High." USA Today.
Gannett, 21 Oct. 2014. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.
89
Waggoner, Luke. "Immigration Reform 2013: 3 Waves Of Immigration That Changed America." Mic. Policy.Mic,
28 May 2013. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
90
Waggoner.
91
Waggoner.

25. 25
Again, even amongst proponents of this position, disagreement exists over the specific beginning
and endings of each individual wave. Generally, however, the first wave is seen as occurring
from the early 17th
century up until the beginning of the American Revolution in 1776. U.S.
America’s move from “a rural and agricultural society to the beginnings of an industrial
society”92
marks the second wave of immigration in this cyclical pattern. Eastern and Southern
Europeans made up most of the incoming population of the third wave from the late 1800s to
about 1930.93
The fourth wave is currently happening and is also categorized by the ethnicities of the
incoming immigrants, namely Hispanics and “a mixture of Asians.”94
Additionally, this wave’s
relation to ‘moral panic’ is unique from its three predecessors; this difference will not be
explored in this chapter and will feature instead in this argument’s concluding remarks.
Regardless, for the purposes of analysis all four waves are as follows: (1) 1609-1775; (2) 1820-
1870; (3) 1881-1920; (4)1965-today.95
It is in the establishment of these waves as four-fold and at least the first three as only
during concrete periods of history that supports the introduction of ‘moral panic’ into the study
of cyclical U.S. immigration. Essentially, the phenomenon of ‘moral panic’ occurred in relation
to immigration at multiple points throughout the history of the United States, as seen in the
repeated presence of the necessary ‘moral panic’ characteristics. These instances were
perpetuated by a rise in immigration during the specific periods, and are reflected, though by no
means exclusively, in anti-immigrant legislation such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and
the Immigrant Quota Act of 1924.
92
Rodgers, Drew. "Waves of Immigration." Samfunnsfaglig Engelsk. Ndla, n.d. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
93
Rodgers.
94
Rodgers.
95
Shirley, Wayne. "Immigration Waves." Immigration in America. Immigration in America, 3 July 2012. Web. 18
Dec. 2014.

26. 26
Following the events of 9/11 in the United States, anti-immigrant sentiment surged
strongly and has only recently begun to decline in the past five years.96
Fear over transnational
difference undoubtedly influenced this recent “anti-immigrant entrenchment.”97
Costelloe’s work
on threat analysis speaks to this and the thinker writes that immigrants are threatening because
those “with distinct cultural patterns infiltrate [the] country, drastically altering, diluting or
destroying American culture”98
in devastatingly irreparable ways. Thus, an “us” versus “them”
outlook on diversity is perpetuated in response to immigration waves and ‘moral panic’ arises as
an almost unsurprising result.
1609-1775: The First Wave
Though technically established in 1607, Jamestown did not truly become the first
permanent British colony in the New World until 1609 when the colonists were able to overcome
a variety of hardships and finally begin to thrive. From that point forward, the east coast of North
America saw a heavy influx of mostly-European immigrants, though the first ship of African
laborers arrived in 1619, a mere twelve years after Jamestown’s establishment.99
The famous Pilgrims came one year after the immigrants from Africa and, by 1637, ships
carrying slaves were arriving in Massachusetts.100
At this point, almost all the inhabitants of the
newly established colonies had transnational origins, so that identifier as a source of difference
had yet to transform into threat. Despite this, fear over other types of difference was still
prevalent during this first wave as was particularly evident in the Salem Witch Trials of the early
96
Saad.
97
Saad.
98
Costelloe 5.
99
Canada, Mark. "History and Culture." Colonial America, 1607-1783: History. University of North Carolina at
Pembroke, 24 Sept. 2001. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
100
Canada.

27. 27
1690s. Similarly, the Great Awakening of the 1730s swept the New World with a religious
fervor that simultaneously united those of like faith and victimized those who chose to believe
differently. Even in the face of possible religious and supernatural persecution, people continued
to flock to North America all throughout the early to mid-1700s; this pattern lasted throughout
the French and Indian War, and only really ended in 1775 with the beginnings of the U.S.
Revolutionary War.
There existed a large variety of reasons for immigration during this first wave, but the
two most common were pursuit of religious freedom—like the Quakers who arrived in 1656101
—
and hope for better economic prospects in the apparent prosperity of the New World. Those who
came for the latter reason often worked as indentured servants for a set period of time before
becoming free members of the colony in which they lived. For many, the living conditions
associated with indentured servitude were too poor to survive, yet some did eventually find
success despite the hardships.
Regardless of the reason for a person’s life-transplant from the Old World to the new,
“immigration from a variety of places…caused the population in the colonies to grow from
250,000 in 1700 to 2.5 million in 1775.”102
These were not all British immigrants, however, and
“it would be a mistake…to think of America as merely a transplanted England.”103
Instead,
people also came from France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy, and often sojourned in England for
some time before coming over to North America.104
Yet the rapid population growth in the 75
years from the beginning of the century to 1775 was not due only to incoming migrants from
these select countries; while Ireland and Germany remained strong contributors to the population
101
Canada.
102
Canada.
103
Canada.
104
Shirley.

28. 28
of what would become the United States, Scotland’s migrants also greatly impacted this dramatic
population increase.
The population grew by 900%105
in the years between 1700 and 1775; such an increase is
so drastic that backlash over immigration seems almost inevitable. In response to this growth,
colonists displayed ample concern and extreme hostility toward the incoming immigrants. These
were followed by high levels of disproportionality between the amount of potential harm done
by those immigrants and the reactionary social unease of the colonial inhabitants. Finally, though
the matter seemed overwhelmingly relevant, particularly in the 75 years of intensive immigration,
external events such as the Revolutionary War and the founding of the United States of America
lead to volatility in the way colonists reacted to the apparent immigration issue. Frankly,
colonists at that time had more pressing conflicts to worry about than a large influx of mostly
like-minded people coming from Europe to a continent with more than enough space for
everyone, even at a population of 2.5 million. Additionally, though consensus likely existed
surrounding the issue, this characteristic will not be addressed in this look at the waves of
immigration due to the disagreement among ‘moral panic’ thinkers on this criterion’s relevance.
I. Concern In an essay written for Moral Panic and the Politics of Anxiety, social science
statistician Joel Best notes that “in the classic moral panic, concern is irrational, or at least out of
proportion.”106
Such feverish anxiety, though merely a phase in most instances, is usually
expressed publicly and suggests “a ‘politics of social problems’”107
as noted by Thompson in his
text Moral Panics.
105
"Find Percentage with Percent Increase Online Calculator." Marshu. Marshu, n.d. Web. 14 Mar. 2015.
106
Best, Joel. "Locating Moral Panics within the Sociology of Social Problems." Moral Panic and the Politics of
Anxiety. Ed. Sean P. Hier. New York: Routledge, 2011. N. pag. Google Books. Web. 14 Mar. 2015.
107
Thompson, Kenneth. Moral Panics. London: Routledge, 1998. ProQuest. ProQuest Ebrary. Web. Dec. 2014. 12.

29. 29
This definition of concern as it relates to ‘moral panic’ and anti-immigration sentiment is
embedded in North American colonial history from 1609 to 1775. Such concern likely stemmed
from the fact that the original thirteen colonies were of British origin but were nevertheless filled
with non-British residents. On this, Emberson Edward Proper writes that “with but one or two
exceptions, [the English settlers] were the founders of the colonies and so formed the basis of all
secondary immigration.”108
In short, though the English were the primary settlers of this area of
the New World and comprised the majority of the 2.5 million of 1775, the number of other
European immigrants was smaller but by no means insignificant.
Undoubtedly, this kind of transnational conglomeration in the colonist demographics was
concern-inducing; so, most likely, was the mixture of languages spoken in the colonies. The
colonies were English so the predominant language was the same; the combination of so many
different languages, however, is a clear indicator of separation and can easily become “us”
versus “them.” This too is addressed by Proper, who attributes the decrease in foreign
immigrants destined for New England to an “avowed policy and studied effort to prevent any
considerable influx of foreigners, differing…in language.”109
Prejudice of this sort likely existed
prior to 1700 but truly emerged in the 75 years of heavy influx by specifically non-British
immigrants, thus creating periods of brief, though no less feverish, public concern in the ‘moral
panic’-inducing sense of the term.
An additional producer of concern in the colonies during this time was religious
difference. Many looked to the New World colonies as places of refuge from the strong religious
persecution which was rampant in Europe during the late 1600s and early to mid-1700s. This
pursuit of religious freedom would suggest a willingness to tolerate—if not accept—other strains
108
Proper, Emberson E. Colonial Immigration Laws: A Study of the Regulation of Immigration by the English
Colonies in America. New York: Columbia UP, 1900. Google Books. Google. Web. 13 Mar. 2015. 77.
109
Proper 22.

30. 30
of Christianity within the colonies; yet, the opposite was often true and the religious persecution
of Europe soon came over the Atlantic with the very people who were trying to escape.
New York in particular was “not especially inviting to these immigrants on account of the
established church of that colony.”110
Massachusetts “discouraged the coming of all who did not
agree with her policy of ecclesiastical dominion.”111
Those colonies’, and others’, anti-
immigration policies “were an important factor in the development of colonial life” in that they
maintained the colonial “characteristic existence and preserve[d]…religious ideals.”112
It is such
concern over religious differences that lead to the Salem Witch Trials, so it is no surprise that a
‘moral panic’ over immigration similarly occurred as a result.
II. Hostility In most ‘moral panic’ situations, the feverish anxiety of concern turns quickly to
strong hostility toward marginal groups which are often associated with cultural deviance. On the
connection to immigration, thinker Jeremy Seabrook is quoted by Hall et al. in Policing the
Crisis: “the immigrants act as a perverse legitimation of inexpressible fear and anguish.”113
Such
perversion of fear quickly becomes hostility as defined by most ‘moral panic’ academics—
namely misdirected moral outrage at those deemed responsible for the apparent issue114
and
displacement of a possible state political crisis.115
Following this approach to hostility in the context of the first wave of immigration to the
United States between 1609 and 1775, it is clear that immigrants were wrongly victimized as
110
Proper 79.
111
Proper 17.
112
Proper 89.
113
Hall, Stuart et al. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. London: Macmillan, 1978. Print.
160.
114
Cohen, Stanley. Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. London: MacGibbon and
Kee, 1972. ProQuest. ProQuest Ebrary, Apr. 2011. Web. Dec. 2014.
115
Cohen 28.

31. 31
proxies for colonists’ growing antagonism toward England. This is most evident toward the end
of the first wave with the Continental Congresses of 1774 and 1775, as well as the beginning of
the Revolutionary War. “Strangers were legitimate objects of suspicion in the early colonization
days,”116
and this suspicion precipitated both fear and caution around the unknown and the
different.
The apparent state political crisis during this period—clearly, the move toward
independence via revolution—was also projected onto immigrants, most of whom remained
politically inactive. Proper speaks to this, writing that “the foreign immigrants contributed
nothing to the forms of colonial political institutions.”117
Though such a lack of participation is
usually a matter of personal privacy and choice, in a time of crisis like that of the colonies in the
years before 1775, such inactivity is tantamount to political betrayal.
According to Proper, “the efforts of colonies to foster immigration were unquestionably
effective in increasing it.”118
When it came to politics, however, such success likely became
regrettable, particularly when similar attempts to foster revolutionary sentiment were much less
successful. Hence, the hostility toward immigrants at this time was not merely because of their
status as strangers in colonies run by the English, but also because of the widespread abstention
from politics on the part of those designated strangers.
To have hostility, however, there must first be concern; as a result, concern over the
religious beliefs of incoming immigrants during this wave eventually led to hostility, particularly
against Catholics. John Tracy Ellis, a historian of the Catholic Church, writes that “universal
anti-Catholic bias was brought to Jamestown in 1607 and vigilantly cultivated in all the thirteen
116
Proper 18.
117
Proper 86.
118
Proper 88.

32. 32
colonies from Massachusetts to Georgia.”119
Additionally, in his text American Catholicism,
Ellis includes a timeline of “Important Dates” in relation to Catholic Church history in North
America.120
In terms of hostility, he notes that the British Quebec Act of 1774 revived “open
hostility of Americans toward the Catholic Church.”121
Furthermore, Ellis believes that “a
century of official hostility…made Catholicism more hated than any other Christian faith.”122
III. Disproportionality Lack of political participation; classification as strangers; and a
difference in religion, language, and country of origin were, by no means, strong grounds for the
concern and resultant hostility directed at incoming immigrants during this first wave. Here, the
‘moral panic’-inducing characteristic of disproportionality is therefore clearly evident. For this
criterion, the issue is generally exaggerated and is less threatening than it seems such that the
amount of concern is greater than the actual potential for harm by the part of the marginal group.
Labor, for instance, is an area of colonial history which suggests high disproportionality
in the colonists’ attitude toward foreign immigrants. Proper writes that “during the first century
of English colonization…labor was everything,”123
so much so that the great demand for it “led
to various expedients for encouraging the importation of servants and laborers.”124
The demand
for servant labor was, in fact, so great that some southern colonies even resorted to the
importation of criminals from England to better facilitate the “plantation system.”
Though hostility existed around the arrival of foreign immigrants, it is difficult to truly
appreciate colonial concern over the matter when it was the colonists themselves who essentially
119
Ellis, John Tracy. American Catholicism. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1956. Google Books. Google. Web. 15 Apr.
2015. 19.
120
Ellis 283.
121
Ellis 285.
122
Ellis 19.
123
Proper 17.
124
Proper 15.

33. 33
created the issue in the first place. Additionally, most incoming immigrants who arrived under
indentured servitude were providing much needed labor, the benefits of which clearly
outweighed the harm the foreigners’ accompanying differences seemingly perpetuated.
It is also intriguing that an origin myth of the U.S. American Revolution is the colonists’
grievance of “no taxation without representation.” Of course, the list of complaints against the
English king was actually much longer and covered many other relevant issues, but the idea that
the colonists would not pay taxes in such an unfair environment suggests that the inhabitants of
North America were either financially depressed or economically thriving. History, however,
shows that by the mid-1700s, the colonies were growing in more than just population so it is
unlikely that the revolutionaries refused to pay taxes because there was no money to be had. On
the other hand, an unwillingness to part with hard won income for a king who seemed little
concerned with the colonists’ difficulties implies financial success.
Security derived from such economic accomplishment allowed the fifty-four members of
the first Continental Congress the freedom to present England with their myriad of grievances.
This security did not, however, apply to all colonists, particularly not those still working as
indentured servants or imported criminal laborers on plantations in the south. As a result, the
projected hostility toward foreign immigrants as misdirected concern with the social problem of
deteriorating England-colony relations was clearly disproportional since the wealthy-landowners
who signed the Declaration of Independence could afford to complain while most others could
not. This inability to participate was unavoidable for the majority of colonial residents yet it
precipitated disproportionality nonetheless.
IV. Volatility This characteristic of ‘moral panic’ relates to collective behavior as well as the
sudden and often unexpected eruption of disproportional levels of hostility and concern

34. 34
surrounding a marginal group of apparent cultural deviance. Resultantly, ‘moral panic’ is equally
volatile in its continuation since it often disappears as quickly as it appeared in the first place due
to shifting thresholds of public attention.
In the case of this first wave of immigration from 1609 to 1775, the volatility of the
‘moral panic’ emerged toward the end of the period. The sudden fervor of anti-immigrant
opinion occurred in response to such a large increase both in foreign immigrant arrival and
general colonial population. Its sudden disappearance, in turn, was likely a reaction to the U.S.
Revolutionary War (1775-83), and remained irrelevant during the initial years of the United
States while the first U.S. government attempted to design a nation unlike the one from which
most of its citizens had separated. Part of this design included immigration-deterring legislation,
which doubtless assisted in avoiding the reappearance of this first wave’s ‘moral panic.’
There is no clear event or immigrant-related issue which triggered the ‘moral panic’ of
this period, just as the Revolutionary War is one of many potential causes for its abrupt end. Of
the anti-immigrant legislation, however, one in particular stands out as specifically related to the
demise of that ‘moral panic.’ This is the Naturalization Act of 1790 which “stipulated that ‘any
alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States’”125
provided that foreign person resided in the United States for a minimum of two years. In and of
itself, this law is relatively neutral toward immigration and seems justified outlining
requirements of citizenship for a new nation populated mostly by incoming populations.
The two amendments to this Act, however, are the true deterrents to reoccurring volatility
for the ‘moral panic’ of that period.126
In 1795, the residency period necessary to obtain
citizenship was increased to five years. A mere three years following, “with xenophobia on the
125
"Significant Historic Dates in U.S. Immigration." U.S. Immigration History. Rapid Immigration, n.d. Web. 1 Mar.
2015.
126
Rowen, Beth. "Immigration Legislation." Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 1 Mar. 2015.

35. 35
rise,”127
residency was again extended, this time to 14 years; clearly, though the law may not
have been anti-immigrant initially, the requirement of almost 15 years residency to obtain
citizenship in a country which was barely that many years old is definitely a direct avoidance of
the potential volatility required for ‘moral panic.’
Though all necessary characteristics of ‘moral panic’ existed in this first period of
immigration to the United States, the occurrence of the phenomenon is far from unique in this
singular instance; just as immigration in this geographical context is considered cyclical and
repetitive, so too is ‘moral panic’ in relation to the history of this issue in U.S. America. Concern,
hostility, disproportionality, and volatility in relation to immigration were all present in the
period from 1609 to 1775. Though the resultant anti-immigrant legislation was a strong deterrent
for many years following this first wave, its power did not last and a heavy influx of immigrants
began again some fifty years later, and ‘moral panic’ about this increase reappeared soon after.
1820-1870: The Second Wave
Following the 1776 establishment of the United States of America as a nation
independent of England, more laws were instituted than simply the Naturalization Act of 1790.
Anti-immigrant sentiment seemed to cool between 1798 and 1802 when the Naturalization Act
was amended again, this time to return the residency requirement to five years from 14—the
previous, and extreme, length of time required by the second amendment to this Act.128
Evidence
of concern or hostility to immigrants remained largely nonexistent in the years from this third
amendment to the beginning of the second wave of U.S. immigration in 1820.
127
Rowen.
128
Rowen.

36. 36
Unlike the demographics of the first wave’s incoming population, this second
immigration cycle included very little migration from England—though immigration from
Ireland and Germany remained strong. This is largely a result of not only the potato famine
which struck Ireland in the 1840s, but also the acquisition of more land by the U.S. government
which, in turn, led to an increased need for farmers and other laborers to settle the American
West. Aside from these two groups, the third largest group of foreign immigrants came from an
entirely new location: China. As a result, though the British colonists already worried over
fellow-Europeans as too different for peaceful coexistence, this latest group of immigrants
dramatically increased those anti-immigrant sentiments which had prompted the first wave’s
‘moral panic’ to even more highly disproportional levels of anxiety.
The Irish came to the U.S. to escape starvation and the Germans came to farm; the
Chinese, however, migrated to the United States mainly as prospectors during the California
Gold Rush from 1848 to 1850 or as laborers on the Transcontinental Railroad between 1863 and
1869. Most of these Chinese immigrants came to the U.S. only temporarily, hoping to stay just
long enough to acquire a small fortune and return home to China as newly-wealthy citizens.129
Regardless, anti-Chinese feelings were pervasive during this second wave and the Chinese, who
had become “the most conspicuous body of foreigners in the country… had to bear the brunt of
the attacks upon the foreign element.”130
I. Concern Concern over foreign immigrants during this time essentially fostered itself as the
gold ran out and the railroad was completed; though immigrants were initially welcomed when
the Gold Rush began and laborers were needed for the building of the U.S.’ first great national
129
"California Gold Rush (1848–1858)." Aspiration, Acculturation, and Impact. Harvard University Library Open
Collections Program, n.d. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
130
Norton, Henry K. "Gold Rush and Anti-Chinese Race Hatred - 1849." The Chinese. The Virtual Museum of the
City of San Fransisco, n.d. Web. 10 Mar. 2015.

37. 37
infrastructure, those feelings of good-will quickly disappeared once the need for immigrant labor
diminished. During the period of heavy Irish immigration, however, anti-immigrant opinion still
existed, even though the Gold Rush and Transcontinental Railroad did not occur until ten to
twenty years later. This sentiment was perpetuated by the so-called Know-Nothing Party which
was established in 1843 and “displayed many of the characteristics of Protestant moralism.”131
In his essay “What Does It Mean to Be an ‘American’?” Michael Walzer writes that
while the bigotry of the Know-Nothings was predominantly “anti-Irish and anti-Catholic,”132
“in
its self-presentation…[the party] was more concerned about the civic virtue of the new
immigrants than about their ethnic lineages.”133
Many historians would disagree with Walzer’s
assessment of this political group, yet his point on the importance of civic identity is a strong one.
Of course, the ethnicity of the immigrants, particularly the Chinese, definitely played a part in
the anti-immigrant sentiment of the second wave; however, for some, like the Know-Nothings
and their colonial revolutionaries before them, lack of civic and political participation was just as
prevalent an aspect of this concern.
Politically-based bigotry of the Know-Nothings aside, the anti-Irish hatred that party
fostered did have some historical basis, at least from a purely factual perspective. As a result of
the potato famine’s devastation, most Irish who immigrated to the United States came empty
handed, both in terms of finances and marketable skills. Many settled in cities but were unable to
find work in “the industrializing urban economies” and, unfortunately, instead “turned to crime
out of boredom, desperation, and anger.”134
This too led to widespread concern, not just about
131
Walzer, Michael. "What Does It Mean to Be an "American"?" What It Means to Be an American: Essays on the
American Experience. New Delhi: Affiliated East-West, 1992. Print. 640.
132
Walzer 639.
133
Walzer 640.
134
"Great Irish Famine." Immigration in America. Immigration in America, 20 Dec. 2011. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.

38. 38
the sudden increase in Irish immigrants, but also about the crime which often followed those
immigrants’ arrival.
II. Hostility Aside from civic identity, crime, and xenophobia itself as root causes of
immigrant hatred, the political and financial conditions of the U.S. American state were far from
ideal during this second wave and created hostility as well. Tension over black slavery, a number
of violent international conflicts, and multiple financial crises also contributed to the general
social unrest of the times. Like with the first wave, this unrest ended with yet another war near
the end of the immigration wave, though the Civil War was, by nature, more internal than its
revolutionary predecessor.
These tensions, as a result, influenced the simultaneous anti-immigration position of the
U.S. public, and “with the vast numbers of German and Irish coming to America, hostility to
them erupted.”135
On the opposite side of the country, “the cry of ‘California for the Americans’
was raised and taken up on all sides”136
to such a degree that the “the state legislature was wholly
in sympathy with the anti-foreign movement, and as early as 1850 passed the Foreign Miners’
License law.”137
Henry Norton refers to this sentiment as “violent race hatred,”138
and thereby
uses terminology which directly implies the hostility necessary for the perpetuation of ‘moral
panic.’
III. Disproportionality Whether directed toward Irish, German, or Chinese immigrants,
such concern and hostility was widespread but also widely undeserved. Norton, in the
unapologetic racism which marked the beginning of the 20th
century, comments that “evil as
135
"Irish and German Immigration." Ushistory.org. Independence Hall Association, n.d. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.
136
Norton.
137
Norton.
138
Norton.

39. 39
were these characteristics of the Chinese, they were never a sufficient excuse for the outrages
that were perpetrated upon them.”139
The evilness of the Chinese immigrants is, of course, a
matter of historical opinion, but Norton’s point is valid regardless, and the incoming immigrants
of this second wave—particularly the Chinese—were in no way deserving of the bigoted
treatment many received.
The disproportionality of concern to harm is also seen in the production of the
transcontinental railroad. In the Great Trans-Continental Railroad Guide, Bill Dadd—known as
“The Scribe”—holds that all other guides on the subject convey “but a faint and imperfect idea
of the great work,”140
suggesting that not only the transcontinental railroad was a necessity, but
its builders as well. Similarly, in a collection of clippings on the subject, it’s recorded that the
railroad “will give the West the stability and employment which she asks.”141
Here the
importance of immigrant labor for the 1869 completion of the Transcontinental Railroad is again
implicit in writings on the project; thus, nativist fear over incoming immigrant laborers is clearly
disproportional to the potential harm those immigrants could cause and the amount of good most
actually participated in. Regardless of non-immigrant citizens’ opinions on the issue, the truth of
the matter is that immigrants “became involved in almost every labor-intensive endeavor in the
country” such that “much of the country was built on their backs.”142
IV. Volatility With the founding of the Know-Nothing party in 1843, the end of the Gold Rush
in 1850, the creation of the KluKluxKlan in 1866, and the completion of the Transcontinental
139
Norton.
140
Atwell, H. Wallace. Great Trans-continental Railroad Guide. Chicago [Ill.], 1869. 274pp. Sabin Americana.
Gale, Cengage Learning. New York University. 13 March 2015. 9.
141
Clippings from the California press in regard to steam across the Pacific, from March to November, 1860 ... San
Francisco, 1860. 104pp. Sabin Americana. Gale, Cengage Learning. New York University. 13 March 2015. 53.
142
"Irish and German Immigration."

40. 40
Railroad in 1869,143
that anti-immigrant sentiment surged suddenly upward in the last few years
of this second wave is unfortunate but not surprising. In that time period there emerged two
strongly bigoted politically-minded factions, just as the two biggest draws for immigrants were
ending and leaving those new citizens with little to do and not enough money to return to their
countries of origin.
To add insult to injury, these years of United States history were full of social unrest as
the nation moved away from slavery and toward civil war. Suddenly, not only were there large
populations of immigrants throughout the country, but also hundreds of thousands of black
slaves who were soon to be free. These domestic tensions peaked with the start of the U.S.
American Civil War in 1861, and the volatility of the immigration issue was such that the ‘moral
panic’ of this second wave disappeared soon after. Additionally, the Know-Nothing party
essentially dissolved after losing the political elections of 1860 and that, too, contributed to the
end of ‘moral panic’ in this period.
Like the first wave of immigration, however, war was not the sole cause of this ‘moral
panic’ volatility; instead, anti-immigrant legislation passed in the years following the end of the
second wave also contributed to the existence of this necessary ‘moral panic’ characteristic. Five
years after 1870 and the tentative end of this second immigration cycle, the U.S. federal
government passed its first exclusionary legislation, known as the Page Act;144
this law banned
“criminals, prostitutes, and Chinese contract laborers from entering the country.”145
143
"Significant Historic Dates in U.S. Immigration."
144
Rowen.
145
Rowen.

41. 41
“This [second] wave of immigration affected almost every city and almost every person
in America.”146
As a result, though the Civil War and hostile, exclusionary legislation were
influential as immigrant-deterrents up to a point, the third wave of immigration followed this
second one much more quickly than the first preceded the second. 1880, therefore, marks the
beginning of a third immigration wave, as well as the start of yet another ‘moral panic’ on the
issue.
1881-1920: The Third Wave
Beginning with the assassination of President Garfield in 1881 and ending with the
Chicago Race Riot and the “Red Scare” in 1919 and 1920, respectively,147
this third wave of
immigration to the United States was afflicted by violence, conflict, and bigotry throughout its
forty year duration. Unlike the previous two immigration cycles, the anti-immigrant,
exclusionary legislation precipitated by this third wave did not come about after but were passed
during this period, particularly in the first ten years of the 20th
century which saw 9 million
immigrate to the United States.148
Thus, the ‘moral panic’ of this wave was intimately
intertwined with the anti-immigration laws of the period, and vice versa.
This was also the period of the second Industrial Revolution which led to remarkable
progress in steel and production. The success of the Transnational Railroad also perpetuated the
building of further rail projects. Finally, the cost of transoceanic transportation decreased
dramatically during this third wave and many immigrants who were previously unable to make
the journey to the United States now found themselves financially equipped for passage across
the world’s oceans to this new land of opportunity. The combination of these three causes of
146
"Irish and German Immigration."
147
"Significant Historic Dates in U.S. Immigration."
148
"Significant Historic Dates in U.S. Immigration."

42. 42
immigration influenced historical heights of immigrant influx which in turn furthered ‘moral
panic’-inducing levels of concern and hostility.
I. Concern Most immigrants of this period came either from Europe—the North and West in
the 1880s, and the South and East from 1890 onward—or Japan.149
Additionally, a large number
of both Jewish persons and Roman Catholics made the permanent choice to move to the U.S. in
hope of better life and greater religious freedom. These demographics, however, include little-to-
none of the Chinese immigrants so pervasive in the second immigration wave. This is due to the
third wave’s first two exclusionary, anti-immigrant laws.
In 1882, Congress passed the Immigration Act and the Chinese Exclusion Act (CEA).
Though the latter is much more infamous than the former, both pieces of legislation are highly
exclusionary. The first not only implemented a new arrivals tax of $.50, but also banned
“‘convicts (except those convicted of political offenses), lunatics, idiots and persons likely to
become public charges’ from entering the U.S.”150
The second of these two anti-immigrant laws “was enacted in response to economic fears,
especially on the West Coast, where native-born Americans attributed unemployment and
declining wages to Chinese workers whom they also viewed as racially inferior.”151
Furthermore,
this act, which was signed in to law by President Arthur, “effectively halted Chinese immigration
for ten years and prohibited Chinese from becoming US citizens.”152
Six years after this initial
149
Shirley.
150
Rowen.
151
"Chinese Exclusion Act (1882)." Aspiration, Acculturation, and Impact. Harvard University Library Open
Collections Program, n.d. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.
152
"Chinese Exclusion Act (1882)."

43. 43
act, Congress also passed the Scott Act as an amendment to the CEA in order to ban Chinese
laborers already in the country from returning to the United States after they left.153
With the Chinese problem taken care of—so to speak—by the CEA and the follow-up
Scott Act, concern over the immigrant issue was transferred onto other marginalized ethnic
groups. The sudden and overwhelming increase in non-Chinese immigrants between the turn of
the century and 1910 did not lessen this projected unease either. Moreover, the historical period
of the third wave saw multiple labor strikes, as well as the assassination of two presidents in the
space of just twenty years. Clearly, the tenet of concern as a potential indicator of social
problems is highly relevant here, as is concern as it occurs in phases of feverish anxiety over a
‘moral panic’-inducing issue of public worry.
II. Hostility One of the only non-exclusionary pieces of immigration legislation instituted
during this third wave was the Naturalization Act of 1906 which created the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization.154
This act was followed one year later, however, by the
overwhelmingly exclusionary Immigration Act of 1907 which broadened “the categories of
people banned from immigrating to the U.S.”155
to essentially include the entire population of the
world outside of the United States of America. 1907 also saw the “Gentleman’s Agreement”
between Japan and the U.S.; much like the Page Act and Chinese immigrants during the second
wave, this transnational accord ended the immigration of Japanese workers to the U.S.156
With the passing of this conglomeration of anti-immigrant legislation, a minor ‘moral
panic’ in response to the 9 million immigrants which came at the start of the 1900s was closely
153
Rowen.
154
Rowen.
155
Rowen.
156
Rowen.

44. 44
avoided. Nevertheless, hostility toward those incoming foreigners was rampant, even before the
great increase began in 1900. Founded in 1894, the Immigration Restriction League consisted of
members who “believed that immigration contributed to social problems such as urban crowding,
poverty, crime, and labor unrest.”157
Such opinions on immigrants and their apparent influence
on the production of social ills doubtless influenced the intense hostility which marked this third
wave of immigration to the U.S.
The emerging theories of Social Darwinism and Eugenics were yet additional
perpetuators of the hostility which lead to this wave’s period of ‘moral panic.’ Later in the
twentieth century, the so-called science of Eugenics was used to support multiple exclusionary,
anti-immigrant laws, particularly the infamous, quota-instituting Emergency Quota and National
Origins Acts of 1921 and 1924, respectively. On this, Paul Lombardo of the University of
Virginia and the Eugenics Archive writes that “the sheer number of new arrivals [in this wave]
troubled many U.S. citizens” such that “as the numbers of immigrants increased, eugenicists
allied themselves with other interest groups to provide biological arguments to support
immigration restriction.”158
III. Disproportionality By the end of World War II, the popularity and credibility of the
Eugenics movement decreased dramatically and many of its supporters turned away from the
exclusionary law of the 1920s which Eugenics had so heavily influenced. As this third wave only
covers 1881 to 1920, however, it is often said that hindsight is 20/20, so it is easy to look ahead
to the 1950s and recognize that the hostility and concern Eugenics perpetrated was indeed
157
"Immigration Restriction League." GilderLehrman. The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, n.d. Web.
14 Mar. 2015.
158
Lombardo, Paul. "Social Origins of Eugenics." Social Origins of Eugenics. The Eugenics Archive, n.d. Web. 14
Mar. 2015.

45. 45
disproportional to the harm—in this case genetic—that could be caused by the influx of
immigrants.
Despite this, there exists further—more time appropriate—support for the presence of
disproportionality in this third wave. A pervasive myth surrounding immigration to the U.S. is
that immigrants take jobs away from hard-working and more deserving U.S. Americans. This
myth is largely untrue, particularly as this third wave of immigration “coincided with [the U.S.’s]
lowest national unemployment rate and fastest economic growth”159
which meant enough work
for all inhabitants of the U.S., not just native-born citizens. Additionally, concern over
immigration was merely one issue of many afflicting the United States during this wave; clearly,
that particular concern was disproportional simply because so many other aspects of the U.S. at
this time were much more harmful than any combination of immigrants or immigration.
IV. Volatility It is harder to recognize the volatility of this wave as it relates to ‘moral panic’
because the immigrant issue was so present between 1881 and 1920. Periods of volatility did
occur, however, particularly at the inception of the Immigration Restriction League; at the
passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882; at the arrival of 9 million immigrants to the U.S.
between 1900 and 1910; and at increase in support for Social Darwinism and Eugenics. During
each of these occasions, anti-immigrant sentiment surged upward with sudden force and usually
disappeared just as quickly.
In the case of the Immigration Restriction League specifically, the members of this
organization lobbied for, and eventually achieved passage of, a Congressional literacy bill in
159
Anchondo, Leo. "Top 10 Myths About Immigration." Immigration Policy Center. American Immigration Center,
2010. Web. 10 Mar. 2015.

46. 46
1916.160
Once the group achieved this main goal of “a literacy requirement for immigrants as a
way of limiting the entry of “new immigrants” from Eastern Europe into the United States,” it
became largely inactive. The Immigration Restriction League, therefore, expresses volatility as
an aspect of ‘moral panic’ during this wave because support for its cause was, at some point,
strong enough to influence the U.S. Congress, yet quickly diminished after the set goal was
accomplished.
‘Moral panic,’ moreover, did not last past this third wave of immigration because the
volatility characteristic of this period did not last either. An aspect of volatility as it relates to
‘moral panic’ is that it corresponds to shifting thresholds of attention; in the years following this
third wave, so much was happening both internationally and domestically, that attention shifted
off immigration as a result.
CONCLUSION: The Fourth Wave
The third wave of immigration to the U.S. lasted from 1881 to 1920 and saw the
beginning of a new century and a new type of war. When the United States entered World War I
in 1917, immigration, which had increased so dramatically since 1900, began to stall, and did not
resume with such historic strength until almost fifty years later with the start of the fourth and
final wave in 1965. Between these two immigration cycles, the United States survived its first
“Red Scare,” the Great Depression, and the beginnings of the Cold War. Similarly, the world did
not crumble in the face of Nazism and the Second World War, but instead united against such
evils, initially through the League of Nations and then with the more permanent United Nations
(UN). In short, the state of the nation and the globe in the period between was such that
immigration continued but at much lower levels.
160
"Immigration Restriction League."

47. 47
The heavy influx of immigration to the U.S. which separated the first three waves did
not—because it could not—reoccur until after such international bodies for peace—like the UN
and the North American Treaty Organization (NATO)—came to be. It is the existence of such
bodies which sets apart this fourth wave because it indicates, for the first time, an offensive
approach to ‘moral panic’ rather than the historically defensive one. For this wave—from 1965
to today—‘moral panic’ over immigration has been avoided. Though some years proved less
successful in this avoidance than others, there has been no ‘moral panic’ over this issue during
this wave because the very conditions in which previous ‘moral panic’ flourished have changed.

48. 48
Conclusion: ‘Moral Panic,’ Immigration, and the Fourth Wave
For the first time, the current events taking place during one of the four waves of
immigration to the United States contain more internationally-focused occasions and issues than
domestic ones. The U.S. experienced a number of race riots between 1965 and 1968, as well as
protests against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam; the first here is inwardly-facing, yet the
second conflict is not. Similarly, though the leaking of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 was a U.S.
federal government and public opinion issue, the fact that the Papers dealt with the still
contentious U.S. occupation of Vietnam again points to a more global perspective than in
previous waves.
Continuing in this vein, the United States withdrew from the Vietnam War in 1973; the
federal Strategic Defensive Initiative—against international foes—was released in 1983; the
Berlin Wall fell in 1989; the Soviet Union ended in 1991 under Gorbachev; and the U.S. invaded
Iraq in 2003.161
This is not to suggest that the U.S. did not experience its own share of domestic
trials over this time period, but at the very least those events were not as many or at as grand a
scale.
Either way, the ‘moral panic’ which could have potentially occurred as a result of incoming
immigration during this wave remained unrealized. For many, previous sentiment of “us” versus
“them” instead became “us against the world”; this is particularly true in relation to the spread of
Communism and the Cold War. Domestic prejudices and anti-immigrant opinion existed, of
course, but most of that antagonism has been directed elsewhere across the home front.
161
Wright, Sarah. "History and Culture." Modern America, 1914-Present. University of North Carolina at Pembroke,
17 June 2004. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.

49. 49
I. Concern From the perspective of many U.S. Americans, “the past thirty years have been
about change—change in technology, minorities, women, [and] the economy.”162
Part of this
change includes the U.S. public’s growth in perspective as it relates to immigrants. Programs
such as the Cash Acceptance Program for Immigrants (CAPI) and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) are direct results of this change as well. Today, most documented
immigrants to the United States are both eligible for and partakers of these federal benefits.
The CAPI in particular is a large indicator of transformation in opinions about
immigrants as this program is not only 100 percent state-funded, but also provides “monthly cash
benefits to aged, blind, and disabled non-citizens” who are ineligible for such welfare because of
their immigrant status.163
By financially assisting even the most dependent immigrant when
those same people would not even be welcomed into the country one hundred years ago, again
shows that public opinion on immigration has come far and concern over these foreign person
has diminished greatly.
Lack of strong concern over incoming immigration during this fourth wave is further
exemplified by the public’s emphasis on the legality of immigration without caring to consider
the question of immigrants’ effects on U.S. American society.164
On this, Op-Ed contributors to
the New York Times—John MacDonald and Robert Sampson—write that “America is neither
less safe because of immigration nor is it worse off economically.”165
They reason that public
reaction to immigration has been historically negative due to “the social changes…immigrants
bring,” yet these are generally overcome by the positive results of constant immigrant influx.
162
Wright.
163
"Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants (CAPI)." Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants (CAPI). California
Department of Social Services, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2015.
164
MacDonald, John M., and Robert J. Sampson. "Don’t Shut the Golden Door." The New York Times. The New
York Times, 19 June 2012. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
165
MacDonald.

50. 50
One such response to immigration during this wave is the association of immigration “not only
with a decrease in crime but also with economic revitalization and reductions in concentrated
poverty.”166
This result is generally seen in gateway cities; in a nation filled with multiple points
of international entry, such benefits from immigration should outweigh any increase in anti-
immigrant concern.
II. Hostility Similarly, to combat this characteristic and thereby avoid ‘moral panic’ during
this fourth wave of immigration, the U.S. federal government has passed a wash of pro-
immigrant legislation in the last fifty or so years since 1965. While the Civil Rights Act of 1964
put a legal end to internal racial discrimination, the Immigration Act of 1965 not only limited
immigration from both the eastern and western hemispheres, but also established a preference
system for family members of citizens and got rid of the Eugenics-based nationality quotas.167
Following this legal renunciation of the legal basis for genetically supported anti-immigrant
hostility, the U.S. government instituted a variety of pro-immigrant refugee laws. These assisted
in the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and have
eventually come to apply for any other refugee group, regardless of origin country.168
An additional expression of combativeness against this hostility is through the ever-
present mythos that the United States of America is a country of immigrants. Like most national
origin stories, this particular myth experienced periods of extreme support as well as fervent
backlash in terms of public opinion. More recently, however, with ever-increasing numbers of
undocumented immigrants entering the United States, this mythology remains strong and public
support for its truth is unwavering. Even the current U.S. president, Barack Obama, has
166
MacDonald.
167
Rowen, Beth. "Immigration Legislation." Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 1 Mar. 2015.
168
Rowen.

51. 51
supported the continued perpetuation of this myth by referring to the citizenship acquisition of
service members on Independence Day as a clear indicator that “America is and always has been
a nation of immigrants.”169
The President renewed this statement in commemoration speech on the 50th
anniversary of Bloody Sunday. In this address, he “appeal[s] to American exceptionalism via
embracing [U.S.] capacity for renewal, self-criticism, and inclusiveness,” particularly through his
words that all U.S. Americans are “the immigrants who stowed away on ships to reach these
shores, the huddled masses yearning to breathe free” because “that’s how [America] came to
be.”170
President Obama’s speech is not only powerful in its own right, but also in its relation to
the U.S. history of civil rights, in its recall of both the good and bad sides of U.S. history, and in
its unification of U.S. American identity regardless of ethnicity or national origin.
III. Disproportionality It stands to reason that a lack of concern and hostility over the
incoming immigration of this fourth wave would lead to a similar lack of disproportionality such
that the existence of ‘moral panic’ in this setting is practically impossible. As President Obama’s
speech shows, a measure of unity has permeated U.S. American national identity in the past fifty
years. This unification of national identity has also been projected past U.S. borders and into the
rest of the world; this, too, has contributed to the fight against the disproportionality of ‘moral
panic.’
The U.S. practice of export democracy has been a topic of contention among historians
and political theorists for many years. Thinkers on one side of the argument believe that “the
169
Lavender, Paige. "Obama: The U.S. Has Always Been A Nation Of Immigrants." The Huffington Post.
TheHuffingtonPost.com, 4 July 2014. Web. 15 Mar. 2015.
170
Fallows, James. "Finally I Hear a Politician Explain My Country Just the Way I Understand It." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 08 Mar. 2015. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.

52. 52
United States, as a default position, should refrain from intervening abroad to export liberal
democratic institutions” because the cost of U.S. American funds and lives is too great.171
Others,
however, stand behind President George W. Bush’s redefinition of U.S. foreign policy and
support making “the spread of democracy the nation's primary mission.”172
The Foreign Service branch of the U.S. Department of State is one such supporter of this
policy. U.S. Americans are employed by the Foreign Service as Public Diplomacy Officers,
whose sole purpose is to “broaden [global] understanding of American values and policies,”173
essentially promoting U.S. American ideals abroad. It seems that the goal of President Bush’s
reformed foreign policy, as well as that of this position within the Foreign Service, is to avoid
disproportionality of concern and resultant hostility over immigrants coming to the U.S. by
taking key tenets of U.S. American identity and values, and exporting those—along with
democracy—to the rest of the world.
Ideally, the result of this export of democracy is an incoming immigrant population
already so submerged in U.S. rhetoric that they’re essentially U.S. American before even leaving
their home countries. This is why the fourth wave of immigration to the U.S. relates differently
to ‘moral panic’ and its characteristics: because there are no marginalized groups when every
person’s national identity is theoretically the same. In the studied fostering of unity and
acceptance at home, as well as the reformation of foreign policy and the export of democracy
overseas, the U.S. has made it nearly impossible for ‘moral panic’—at least over immigration—
to occur.
171
Coyne, Christopher J. "Can We Export Democracy?" Cato Policy Report. Cato Institute, Jan.-Feb. 2008. Web. 15
Mar. 2015.
172
Baker, Peter. “The Realities of Exporting Democracy.” Washington Post. The Washington Post, 25 Jan. 2006.
Web. 05 Mar. 2015.
173
“Home – U.S. Department of State.” Home – U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web. 15
Mar. 2015.