1.
The Imposition of Participation?
The case of participatory water
management in Coastal
Bangladesh
G3:
Water
Governance
and
Community-­‐based
Organiza:ons
Camelia
Dewan
Marie-­‐Charlo0e
Buisson
Adi6
Mukherji

2.
Participation in Water Policy
From
Top-­‐down
poli.cized
to
depoli.cized
par.cipa.on
•
1950s:
Floods
and
Krug
Mission
Report
recommending
embankments
• 1960s:
BWDB
created
4000
km
of
embankments:
Top-­‐down
• 1970s-­‐1980s:
Poli.cized
par.cipa.on
• Donors
also
funding
social
empowerment
NGOs
• Water
projects
with
local
decision-­‐making
and
involvement
• Early
Implementa:on
Project
(1972-­‐1995),
Land
Reclama:on
Project
(1978-­‐1991),
Delta
Development
Project
(1981-­‐1999)
• Focus
on
marginalized
groups:
‘Target
groups’,
Landless
• 1990s-­‐2000s:
A
depoli.cized
shiM:
Par.cipa.on
as
Maintenance
• Wider
shiV
towards
decentraliza:on
to
non-­‐state
bodies
• Reduc:on
of
BWDB
from
24000
to
8000
staff
• Community-­‐Based
Natural
Resource
Management
(CBNRM)
• Effec:veness,
equitability
and
sustainability
• Guidelines
for
Par:cipatory
Water
Management
(GPWM)
• ‘Stakeholder
consulta:on’,
Labor
Contrac:ng
Socie:es
and
Water
Management
Organiza:ons

3.
Participation in Practice
Lack
of
Efficacy:
Inability
to
address
top-­‐down
engineering
• CBNRM
for
effec.ve
water
management
through
involving
communi.es
• GPWM
seeks
to
place
the
decision-­‐making
power
in
the
hands
of
stakeholders
through
Water
Management
Organiza:ons
(WMOs)
• Integrated
into:
• BWDB’s
Integrated
Planning
for
Sustainable
Water
Management
(IPSWAM)
• LGED’s
Small-­‐Scale
Water
resources
Development
Sector
Project
(SSWRDSP)
• Constraints
• BWDB:
50
year
delay
in
the
consulta:on
of
WMOs
• Project
dependence
• Several
examples
of
inadequate
technical
solu:ons
• Unsa:sfactory
number
of
regulators,
too
low
or
weakly
constructed
embankments,
flawed
sluice
gate
shubers,
and
superficial
canal
re-­‐excava:on.
• (waterlogging,
canal
silta:on
and
river
erosion)
•
Par.cipa.on
as
a
‘tool’
to
give
a
'human
face'
to
depoli:cized
and
technocra:c
projects
(Palmer-­‐Jones
et
al.,
2010).
• WMO
equated
with
community

4.
Participation in Practice
Lack
of
equity
:
WMO
obscuring
power
differences
within
communi.es
WMO’s
to
represent
all
societal
segments
BUT
• Elite
capture
of
WMOs
• Domina:on
of
rural
male
elite
• Non-­‐representa:ve
• Focuses
on
‘produc:ve’
uses
• Exclusion
of
women
&
landless
• Drinking
water,
homestead
garden,
bathing,
livestock,
cooking,
• GPWM
Percentage
of
households
quota
fails
to
empower
target
groups
• Token
members
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Elite Frequency in Executive Committee Composition.
*
From
1000
representa.ve
households
selected
in
polders
and
sub-­‐projects.
Small
farmer
(less
than
2.49
acres)
Medium
farmer
(2.5
to
7.49
acres)
Large
farmer
(more
than
7.5
acres)
In
the
popula:on*
In
the
WMOs
execu:ve
commibee
members
Ability
to
par.cipate
defined
by
‘power’
and
‘economic
status’

5.
Lack of Equity
Rural
Inequali.es
and
Conflict:
Opera.on
for
compe.ng
water
uses
• Sluice
gate
commiaees
created
regardless
of
the
presence
of
a
WMO
• Local
operators
paid
through
rice
or
fishing
rights
• Land
and
canal
grabbing
make
WMOs
redundant
• A
minority
of
gates
is
operated
through
WMOs
(land
grabs,
private
gates/pipes,
• Canals
are
drying
up
• Par:cular
problems
with
salinity
intrusion
in
brackish
gher
areas
• Respondents
did
not
equate
par.cipa.on
with
a
WMO
• WMO
as
an
external
idea
that
prompts
polder
popula:ons
to
create
commibees
in
order
to
receive
funding
for
maintenance
à
Prevent
benefits
of
water
management
for
‘all
the
stakeholders’

6.
Lack of sustainability
The
panacea
of
financial
cost-­‐sharing
• 1990s
and
‘par.cipa.on’
as
financial
cost-­‐sharing
• GPWM
encouraged
communi:es
to
contribute
to
maintenance
costs.
• Poor
condi.on
of
canals,
gates
and
embankment:
• Canal
excava:on
and
re-­‐excava:on
are
the
top
two
issues
in
survey
•
No
evidence
that
WMO
micro-­‐credit
ac:vi:es
gives
incen:ves
to
maintain
the
polder
infrastructure.
• Funding
gap
in
maintenance
• Both
communi:es
and
implemen:ng
agencies
struggle
to
meet
maintenance
demand;
Oversubscrip:on
to:
• LGED’s
Emergency
Fund
• BWDB’s
Non-­‐Revenue
Development
Budget
No
coherence
between
the
considerable
hydrological
challenges
and
the
means
by
which
the
WMOs
can
generate
funds.

7.
Conclusion – Permanent Funds
The Role of Existing Institutions
Acknowledge
coordina.on
role
Union
Parishad
and
NGOs
already
playing:
• Implica:on
in
gate
opera:on
(UP),
• Implica:on
in
conflicts
resolu:on
(UP),
• Role
in
case
of
disaster
(UP,
NGO)
• Rural
employment
schemes
(UP,
NGO,
LGED)
Perception of the responsibility for Water Management
Establish
Permanent
Maintenance
funds
• Donors
could
focus
on
suppor:ng
the
increase
of
funds
available
for
rural
employment
schemes
for
adequate
canal
excava:on
and
embankment
repairs
via
Upazila
Parishad.
• Support
autonomous
quality
assurance
body
for
payment
of
funds
aVer
sa:sfactory
comple:on.
Community
people
24%
WMO
2%
Union
Parishad
35%
BWDB
28%
LGED
9%
Other
2%