1. Crider 1
The Constitutionality of Red Light Cameras.
by
Brandon S. Crider
The University of Texas at Arlington
POLS 5301-001
Professor Ignagni
12/09/2013

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Abstract
This research attempts to predict if the Supreme Court would rule red light cameras to be
unconstitutional. Prima facie red light cameras are in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Fifth
Amendment and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The method of analysis
implemented to conduct this research is based upon the Attitudinal Model of Judicial Behavior
by Harold Spaeth’s predictive paradigm. This framework introduced by Harold Spaeth of
judicial decision-making is rooted in the argument of general theory or ideas of particular
variables which allow one to understand, explain, and predict the outcome of U.S. Supreme
Court cases. This research poses two hypotheses: H1: If the constitutionality of red light cameras
were to be challenged and litigated to be heard by the US Supreme Court they would adjudicate
that red light cameras are unconstitutional per one’s right to privacy as delineated in the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and, H2: No “compelling state interest” exists which
would preclude the application of the Fourth Amendment in respect to its Right to Privacy clause
and thereby give the states the right to violate one’s right per the U.S. Constitution. The findings
from this research support both hypotheses.
Introduction
The research question posed herein is of importance as it addresses one’s most coveted
and sacred rights which is their right to privacy. However, one’s right to privacy is a nebulous
concept that is ever evolving and must take into consideration context, constitutionality, the
ultimate societal interest of a matter, and is constantly threatened and being redefined as
technology advances. The right to privacy is not delineated in or explicitly guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution as reiterated in Griswold v. Connecticut when it is expressed that;

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The Court talks about a constitutional “right of privacy” as though there is some
constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might
abridge the “privacy” of individuals. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in
certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at
certain times and places with respect to certain activities. Such, for example, is the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” But I think it
belittles that Amendment to talk about it as though it protects nothing but “privacy.”1
Nonetheless, heretofore the “right to privacy” has been deemed by many as an axiomatic
attribute of a general democracy, and more specifically, has been perpetuated—per an
extrapolation of the intent of the framers when effectuating the U.S. Constitution—to be a vital
cog in the American form of democracy referred to by James Madison as a “compound
republic”.2 In certain cases the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed certain invasion to one’s privacy
if a “compelling state interest” can be proven. However, when certain “fundamental rights” are
involved any legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake.3 This research operates under the assumption that no compelling interest of the
state exists given that red light cameras have shown to increase crashes, and based on the fact
that other solutions exist to reduce the likelihood one is to run a red light.4
The protection against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment5, and the
right to confront one’s accuser is delineated in the Sixth Amendment which states in pertinent
part; “the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him”.6 For the
purpose of this research the disenfranchisement of one’s rights effectuated by the use of red light
cameras will be in examined in respect to the Fourth Amendment and its Unreasonable Search
1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)
2 Martha Derthick, Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism, (Washington,D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press,2001).
3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705,35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)
4 Langland-Orban,Pracht,and Large. "Red Light RunningCameras: Would Crashes,Injuries and Automobile
InsuranceRates IncreaseIf They Are Used in Florida?."
5 The U.S. Constitution; Amendment V: (1791)
6 The U.S. Constitution; Amendment VI: (1791)

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and Seizure provision that lends to one’s “right to privacy” which has been promulgated insofar
as to be believed by many as a constitutionally guaranteed right. As aforementioned the U.S.
Constitution does not directly venerate a solidified concept of ones right to privacy, nor does it
directly delineate the guarantee of any such privacy right. An explanation of how this “right to
privacy” –unspoken of in the U.S. Constitution—came about is expounded upon by Justice
Blackmun when he conveyed the opinion of the Court concerning the matter of Roe v. Wade
which states in pertinent part;
In a line of decisions, however, the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In
varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of
that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); in the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); in the penumbras of the Bill
Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486(Goldberg, J.,
concurring) or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 8
Literature Review
Wherein the power of the U.S. Supreme Court to influence policy lies is within their
interpretation of statutes pursuant to such aspects as precedent and the framer’s intention at the
time a given policy was instituted. The most prominent guiding force for the U.S. Supreme Court
is the U.S. Constitution as it is recognized as “the law of the land”. The authority for the U.S.
Supreme Court to interpret questions of constitutionality was venerated in the decision of
Marbury v. Madison which was adjudicated in 1803. It set such precedents such as; “a legislative
act contrary to the Constitution is not law and it is emphatically the province and duty of the
7 Joseph Ignagni, Influential and Controversial Reading in American Politics, (United States of America: The
McGraw-Hill Companies,2005).
8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705,35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)

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judicial department to say what the law is”.9 This authority of the court is known as “judicial
review” and was effectuated when Chief Justice John Marshall ruled in Marbury v. Madison that,
the Supreme Court had no power to order Madison to deliver the commission because a
portion of the relevant law under which they were hearing the case was unconstitutional.
Thus, there was no need to directly confront the executive branch—and a direct
confrontation with the Jeffersonians (added from earlier in the quote)—, while at the
same time establishing the principle of reviewing the actions and laws of other branches
of government.10
In respect to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has
rendered many landmark decisions which has set precedent and influenced policy. One of the
Supreme Court’s most prominent decisions was rendered in Gitlow v. People of New York
(1925) when they interpreted the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment to extend the rights of the majority of the Bill of Rights to the states and adjudicated
the matter accordingly.11
The Oxford English Dictionary records instances of the use of the word privacy in pre-
eighteenth and eighteenth century literature. Therefore the fact that the U.S. Constitution does
not mention privacy explicitly leads to a belief that no such “right to privacy” exists. However
certain matters were respected in the U.S. Constitution such as property, religion, and speech and
therefore mentioned specifically.12 Contemporary privacy jurisprudence has employed the
following, grim chain of reasoning:
(1) Only objectively reasonable privacy expectations are protected under the Fourth
Amendment; (2) There is no need to provide a criterion for identifying these expectations
because it is clear that whenever someone knowingly exposes an object or information to
the public, that person cannot claim to have an objectively reasonable privacy
expectation;" and (3) The terms "knowingly," "exposed," and "public" should be
9 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
10Joseph Ignagni, Influential and Controversial Reading in American Politics, (United States of America: The
McGraw-Hill Companies,2005),137.
11 Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
12 WilliamHeffernan,"Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 92, no.
1/2 (Autumn, 2001- Winter, 2002): 1-126,http://www.jstor.org/stable/1144208 . (accessed December 1, 2013).

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interpreted as broadly as possible. Whenever there is uncertainty about whether exposure
was knowing or inadvertent, it should be classified as "knowing.” Even a fleeting
opportunity to view an object should be interpreted as "exposure." Finally, the term
"public" should be defined expansively to include not simply randomly encountered
strangers but also providers of services indispensable to life in modern society.13 14
As expounded upon in Cohen et. al. (2007; 808) the Fourth Amendment was effectuated
pursuant to two principal sources which were based upon the English and American experiences
of virtually unrestrained and judicially unsupervised searches, and the action that had already
been taken by some of the states to guard constitutionally against a recurrence of this abuse.15
The right for one to privacy has been extrapolated by the U.S. Supreme Court from the Fourth
Amendment which is delineated as follows;
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized16.
This concept was initiated by James Madison in the First Congress. Madison’s initial concept
was not exactly delineated as aforementioned due to some revising by the committee which
Madison referred his initial proposal to.17 Nonetheless it ultimately passed, was ratified by the
states, and evolved. One of the evolutions the Fourth Amendment which is pertinent to this
research is the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement which allows law enforcement
officers to search an automobile without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminality. The scope of the search may extend
13 Miller v.United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
14 Smith v. Maryland,442 U.S. 735 (1979)
15 WilliamCohen,David Danelski,and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York,
NY: Foundation Press,2007).
16Amendment IV, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)
17 WilliamCohen,David Danelski,and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York,
NY: Foundation Press,2007).

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to all parts of the vehicle in which contraband or evidence could be concealed, including closed
compartments and trunks. 18
Arizona v. Johnson (2009) was one of six cases adjudicated by the Robert’s Court which
dealt with one’s right to privacy per unreasonable search in seizures as delineated in the Fourth
Amendment. This case ultimately presented the issue of whether or not a pat down, or “Terry
Type”, search conducted by the officer on the defendant violated his rights per the Fourth
Amendment. It was deemed that “Terry Type” search is a valid exception to a warrant and
allows an officer of the law to violate the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the
Fourth Amendment as it serves to protect both the officer and the public. Moreover, this type of
exception to a warrant is justified by the fact that traffic stops by nature have a heightened risk to
the officer which can be minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of
the situation. To justify a pat down of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however,
just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must
harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.19
Ultimately this case rendered a unanimous decision to reverse the Arizona Court of
Appeals and remanded the case. The reasoning for this decision was rooted in the fact that the
officer had conducted the “Terry Type” search due to his previous encounter with the defendant
which led him to believe he was involved in gang activity, and not because the officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect was armed and dangerous in the premise which
gave rise to the immediate cause.20
A second of the six unreasonable search and seizure cases dealt with by the Robert’s
Court was Arizona v. Gant (2009). This case presented the issue of the exception to a warrant
18 United States v. Young, 38 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994).
19 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,(1968)
20 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781,172 L. Ed. 2d 694, (2009)

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known as search-incident-to-arrest. This exception to a warrant allows an officer of the law to
search an individual being lawfully arrested and a reasonable search of their vehicle. The
defendant in this case was arrested for the offense of driving on a suspended license. After being
detained by the officer and placed in the back seat of the officer’s patrol car a search of the
defendant’s car was then conducted. During the search of the defendant’s car the officer found
cocaine in the pocket of a jacket that was in the back seat which led to the defendant also being
charged and convicted of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Arizona State Supreme Court in a
5-4 decision which contained one concurrence and two dissents. It was determined by the Court
that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did
not justify the search because (1) police could not reasonably have believed that respondent
could have accessed his car at the time of the search since the five officers outnumbered the three
arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers
searched respondent's car, and (2) police could not reasonably have believed that evidence of the
offense for which respondent was arrested might have been found in the car since he was
arrested for driving with a suspended license, an offense for which police could not expect to
find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car.21
Another unreasonable search and seizure case seen by the Robert’s court was Brendlin v.
California (2007). Within this case the defendant was a passenger in a car that was pulled over
due to the officer merely wanting to check for registration and not due to any suspected violation
of the law. After it was discovered that the defendant was a parole violator he was arrested and
detained in the back seat of the officer’s car. After the defendant was formally arrested the
21 Arizona v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640, (2007)

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officer searched the car, him, and the other occupants of the vehicle. During this search
methamphetamine paraphernalia inter alia was discovered which led to the defendant being
charged and convicted of possession and manufacture of that substance.
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment during a traffic stop the occupants of a car are
temporarily seized. Wherefore premises considered the issue raised by this case is whether or not
the seizure of the officer per the traffic stop was unconstitutional given that there was no legal
justification for the officer to have done so. The U.S. Supreme Court voted unanimously to
vacate and remand the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the officer’s
search of his person and the car he was a passenger in. This decision was reached in part when
the state conceded the officer did not have adequate justification to perform the traffic stop.
Therefore it was rendered that a seizure of the defendant per an interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment was effectuated from the onset of the traffic stop and not at the time he was
formally arrested which constituted an unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the
aforementioned unjustified traffic stop.22
A fourth case for consideration of an unreasonable search and seizure reviewed by the
Robert’s Court was Davis v. United States (2011). The defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of a firearm after a police search of the vehicle he was traveling in found the firearm
in the defendant’s jacket. This case presented the exception to a search warrant known as
“grabbing distance”. The concept of the “grabbing distance” exclusion to a search warrant
requirement allows officers the authority to search any adjacent area to an individual which the
individual could access without ambulation. This search is specifically to insure that no weapons
can be accessed by an individual and promote the safety of an officer.
22 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249,127 S. Ct. 2400,168 L. Ed. 2d 132, (2007)

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The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a 7-2 decision which
contained one concurrence and one dissent. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, while the search
violated the Fourth Amendment under its new precedent, the exclusionary rule did not apply to
require suppression of the firearm since the police conducted the search in objectively reasonable
reliance on existing and binding judicial precedent. The sole purpose of the exclusionary rule
was to deter deliberate or reckless disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the police acted with
an objectively reasonable and good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful, and the
exclusionary rule did not require deterrence of such conduct.23
Scott v. Harris (2007) was another unreasonable search and seizure case ruled upon by
the Robert’s Court. In this case an officer chose to terminate a high speed pursuit of a suspect by
applying the push bumper of his car into the rear of the suspect’s vehicle thereby causing the
suspect’s vehicle to violently spinout. The actions of the officer caused quadriplegia of the
suspect who was the age of nineteen. There was no contestation that the officer’s decision to
terminate the high speed pursuit in such a manner constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment.
The issue raised by this case is whether the officer’s actions was excessive force and
thereby constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The actions taken by
the pursuing deputy were deemed in violation of the Fourth Amendment which led him to appeal
based on qualified immunity. The district court denied petitioner deputy’s summary judgment
motion and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory
appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision.24
23 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285,(2011)
24Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372; 127 S. Ct. 1769; 167 L. Ed. 2d 686;(2007)

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The most recent case involving an issue of unreasonable search and seizure adjudicated
by the U.S. Supreme Court is United States v. Jones (2012). In this case officers attached a
global-positioning-system (GPS) to suspected drug dealers car to attain valuable evidence which
later led to his conviction of drug conspiracy. The GPS device was placed without a warrant on
the suspect’s car while it was parked in a public parking lot. The aforementioned is similar to the
issue presented by red light cameras. Although it was never argued, the government officials
responsible for installing the aforementioned GPS unit where confident that they had probable
cause insofar as to obtain a warrant, or meet the criteria for one of the exceptions to a search
warrant. In and of itself, this was more logically based use of an electronic device per prima
facie probable cause more so than what was exuded by any premise concerning red light
cameras.
The issue raised by this case was whether the installation of the GPS unit and its use to
monitor the suspect by the Government constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. It
was deemed to be so by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore they affirmed the decision of the
appellate court with a vote of 9-0 which contained two concurrences. “Awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the
Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is
susceptible to abuse.”25
It seems that many state officials anticipated that the use of red light cameras being in
violation of the U.S. Constitution and took precautions such as subcontracting the operation of
red light cameras out to privately run entities.26 This is an attempt to circumvent the U.S.
Constitution and disenfranchise the citizens of their rights guaranteed to them per the U.S.
25 United States v. Jones , 132 S. Ct. 945,181 L. Ed. 2d 911, (2012)
26 Photographic Traffic Signal Enforcement System; “Texas Transportation Code”; Title 7, “Vehicles and Traffic”;
Subtitle I., “Enforcement of Traffic Laws”; Chapter 707.003 (1) &(2).

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Constitution given that the Constitution was effectuated as an instrument to regulate the
government and not private entities. The employment of this means by local governments to
disenfranchise the citizens of a state for mere monetary gain is in direct contradiction to the spirit
of U.S. Constitution and what it stands to protect. This is substantiated by Justice Brandeis’
dissent in Olmstead v. United States when he states in pertinent part;
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life
are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.27
Moreover, the courts are to be an arbiter or neutral and detached magistrate between the people
and the government, and to keep the government in check when it oversteps its authority. James
Madison best encompasses the potential when an instrument of the government or a citizen
attempt to circumvent the courts when he wrote, “Judiciary is truly the only defensive armor of
the Federal Government, or rather for the Constitution and laws of the United States. Strip it of
that armor and the door is wide open for nullification, anarchy and convulsion”.28
Wilson v. Lane (1999) was a case involving an officer who allowed members of the
media to accompany him into a suspect’s home to execute a search warrant. The U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously held that the state and federal law officers violated the Fourth Amendment by
allowing the media to intrude upon the petitioners' privacy without their presence explicitly
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.CT. 564,72 L.Ed. 944 (1928)
28 Henry Abraham, The Judicial Process, (New York: Oxford University Press,1998).

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being stated in the bounds of the warrant.29 This opened the door for what was solidified in Bills
v. Aseltine (1992) when it was promulgated that, “unless otherwise specified by the warrant,
police officers may not allow third parties to enter a home”.30 As aforementioned many local
governments subcontract red light camera operation and monitoring to third party private entities
to avoid the U.S. Constitution from cutting into the profits being made by the implementation of
red light cameras. That raises the question; if a live officer, who is apt in the law and has the
capacity to discern, needs authority from a warrant to introduce a third party…then should not a
warrantless electronic device at the very least be held to those same standards?
Hypothesis/ Argument
H1: If the constitutionality of red light cameras were to be challenged and litigated to be
heard by the US Supreme Court they would adjudicate that red light cameras are
unconstitutional per one’s right to privacy as delineated in the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
The classic statement of purpose of the warrant requirement is that of Justice Robert Jackson in
Johnson v. United States (1948) when he asserted, “When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a police man or
government enforcement agent.”31 32 Rudimentary logic would render one to believe that if a
police officer or government enforcement agent does not possess the right to decipher when to
infringe on one’s privacy, than neither should an electronic device such as a red light camera.
29 Brian Chun, "The Unclearly Established RuleagainstUnreasonableSearches and Seizures," The Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology, 90,no. 3 (2000),http://www.jstor.org/stable/1144277 . (accessed December 4,
2013).
30 Bills v.Aseltine,958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
31 WilliamCohen,David Danelski,and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York,
NY: Foundation Press,2007),835.
32 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)

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H2: No “compelling state interests” exists which would preclude the application of the
Fourth Amendment in respect to its Right to Privacy clause and thereby give the states
the right to violate one’s right per the U.S. Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in a manner which will conserve not only the rights of
individual citizens, but must seek to uphold public interests as well and what is best for the state
as a whole.33 Given that individual rights are likely to be affected, a compelling state interest
must be dire and imminent to take precedent over any right guaranteed per the U.S. Constitution.
Moreover, when discussing the liberty entrenched in privacy as autonomy, John Stuart
Mill states in pertinent part;
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent the harm to others….The only part of the conduct of anyone
for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.34
Method
The method of analysis implemented to conduct this research is based upon the
Attitudinal Model of Judicial Behavior per Harold Spaeth’s predictive paradigm. This framework
introduced by Harold Spaeth of judicial decision-making is rooted in the argument of general
theory or ideas of particular variables which allow one understand, explain, and predict the
outcome of U.S. Supreme Court cases. A necessity that must be intrinsic of the aforementioned
is the compilation of accurate and pertinent information along with a competent understanding of
33 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)
34 WilliamCohen,David Danelski,and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York,
NY: Foundation Press,2007),880.

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the three elements which comprise the framework. These three elements are goals, rules, and the
contextual situation.
This theory works under the assertion that judges or justices are predisposed to having
particular goals. It is further assumed that the ultimate goal of these judges or justices is for them
to achieve their personal policy preferences, and therefore, the judicial decisions which they
render will match up with these aforementioned personal policy preferences. Essentially when
applying this to the U.S. Supreme Court it suggests that the biggest influence on how a justice
votes is based upon what they personally believe is right. The second element is the rules or
protocol of the court which requires that these rules do not inhibit or restrict the justices from
achieving their goals and/ or implementing their personal policy preference. Although such rules
do exist, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have more freedom to do what they desire more
so than any other decision-maker in Washington D.C. There are several facets which lends to the
broad discretion of interpretation and freedoms enjoyed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The freedom
of the justices is perpetuated due to the fact that they are appointed for life, they are not
electorally accountable, and that no justice has ever been removed from the U.S. Supreme court.
There has been one impeachment case concerning a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, however the
matter was never voted on by the Senate. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court is the court of last
resort and for this reason inter alia these Justices do not possess the ambition to seek a higher
office. The third and final element of Spaeth’s framework takes into account the situation or
context of the matter being adjudicated. Although the general population will not influence the
way a justice votes, the U.S. Supreme Court has altered its decisions over the years prima facie
due to world events and they have restricted freedom during wartime.35
35Joseph Ignagni.“Attitudes, Values,and Decision Making.”Class lecture,Political Science5301-001:Judicial
Politicsand the U.S. Supreme Court, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington,TX, September 23, 2013.

16. Crider 16
Within this framework the goals of a justice are extrapolated by examining three
elements. In sequence of importance these three elements are the beliefs, attitudes, and values
intrinsic of a justice. Pursuant to Mr. Spaeth’s framework these elements are recognized as
follows;
Belief—any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, that may be inferred from
what a person says or does, and that is capable of being preceded by the phrase, ‘I believe
that…
Attitude—a relatively enduring set of interrelated beliefs that describe, evaluate, and
advocate action with regard to some object or situation.
Value—an interrelated set of attitudes.36
Within this framework of prediction there are six potential problems. These problems are limited
sources of information, determining the issue of the case, multiple issues within the case, how
extreme the case is, if there not a judicial track record that set a precedent, and when a justice
deviates from his past voting patterns. Nonetheless the framework implemented for this research
has a track record of predicting U.S. Supreme Court decisions at over 90%. Furthermore, it has a
track record of 85% of the time accurately predicating how each individual Supreme Court
Justice will vote. This is an admirable statistic given that the odds of accurately predicting the
nine Supreme Court Justice’s vote at random are 511 to 1.37
Results
After implementing Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court Data Base it presented six U.S.
Supreme Court cases, out of eight thousand four hundred and eighty-six possibilities, which
addressed the issue of Fourth Amendment search and seizures in respect to automobiles. This
analysis rendered the following analysis overview;
36Harold Spaeth. Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction,( New York, NY: W.H.Freeman & Co Ltd,
1979) 119 & 125).
37Joseph Ignagni.“Attitudes, Values,and Decision Making.” Class lecture,Political Science5301-001:Judicial
Politicsand the U.S. Supreme Court, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington,TX, September 30, 2013.

17. Crider 17
Analysis Specifications Analysis Outcome
Unit of Analysis Citation
Term Scope 1946 - 2012
Natural Court All Roberts Courts
Fine Issues 1 Criminal Procedure issue
Analysis Case Count 6 (of 8,486 possible records)
Relevant Scope 2006 - 2011
Using Data Release SCDB_2013_01
Search Reference Code 1301-TURNCOAT-7799
Case Frequency
Decision Direction
38
38 Harold,Spaeth. National ScienceFoundation,"The Supreme Court Database."Last modified July 17, 2013.
Accessed December 6, 2013.http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php.

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Per Mr. Spaeth’s extremeness scale we will decipher which case most resembles the privacy and
unreasonable search and seizure issue presented by red light cameras. For the purpose of this
research it is deemed that United States v. Jones (2012) most adequately depicts the issues raised
by red light cameras. That is, warrantless monitoring by the Government which constitutes a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment. The warrantless GPS which was placed while the car
was in a public parking lot is similar to the red light cameras that are placed on public streets.
Although the Government may assert access to anyone is granted in public places and therefore
have less of an expectation of privacy, Katz v. United States (1967) suggests otherwise when it
promulgates, “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places…what one seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”.39
In the six cases decided by the Robert’s Court which involved issues of unreasonable
search and seizures there is an even direction of decision amongst both conservative and liberal.
However, the decision rendered in United States v. Jones (2012) suggests that the issue of
warrantless government monitoring is an issue deemed unconstitutional by both liberal and
conservative justices. It must further be conveyed that United States v. Jones was adjudicated in
2012 which means it is indicative of the ideology of the current Robert’s Court as it was decided
after the most recent associate justice—Elena Kagan—had been appointed. She took her seat on
August 7, 2010.40 Moreover, this research exudes that the current Robert’s Court venerates the
precedent set in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) when it states in pertinent part, “there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence”41, and the precedent set in Kyllo v. United States (2001) when it recognizes that, “It
39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)
40 The Supreme Court of the United States, "Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court." Last modified
December 09, 2013.Accessed December 09, 2013. http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx.
41 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003).

19. Crider 19
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology”.42
Wherefore premises considered there should be no known prejudice which estops the
current Robert’s court from holding true to Mr. Spaeth’s predictive paradigm and thereby it can
be deemed with a 90% level of confidence that the U.S. Supreme Court would adjudicate the
matter of red light cameras as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s Unreasonable Search and
Seizure provision and thereby unconstitutional. Moreover, the evidence presented in this
research sufficiently casts doubt that any “compelling state interest” exists which would give
authority to a local government to violate its citizen’s Fourth Amendment Rights by
implementing red light cameras. In light of this research both of the aforementioned hypotheses
are supported.
Conclusion
The fact that local governments would seek out private entities to implement and monitor
their red light programs suggest that they are unscrupulous programs by nature and it speaks
highly to the confidence, or lack thereof, that local officials can establish a legitimate
“compelling state interest” that isn’t fiscal in nature. Furthermore, a legitimate “compelling state
interest” is unlikely to be established given that “red light violations can be reduced through
engineering measures such as signal modifications.”43 Moreover, as the literature review herein
revealed was that intrinsic of every exception to a search warrant were the interests of keeping
the officer safe or ensuring the public’s safety. Since many studies reveal that red light cameras
42 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038,150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)
43 Richard A. Retting, Allan F.Williams,and Michael A.Greene. "Red-light running and sensiblecountermeasures:
summary of research findings." Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board
1640,no. 1 (1998):23-26.

20. Crider 20
have not caused accidents at intersections to go down and in some cases have even seen the rate
of accidents go up44, there should be no known reason beyond monetary gain which contributes
to the perpetuation of red light cameras.
Further research on this matter would greatly benefit from using Mr. Spaeth’s predictive
model introducing other U.S. Constitution violations effectuated per the implementation of red-
light cameras. Of most pertinence are the Fifth Amendment’s provision against self-
incrimination45 and the Sixth Amendment’s provision which allows one to confront their
accuser.46 As it stands now, upon the issuance of a red light camera citation it is automatically
assumed that the owner of the vehicle is the driver and therefore he has the burden of proving he
was not the driver if he is going to extricate himself from the red light camera citation and the
consequences thereof.
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment’s right for the accused to confront their accuser is an
interesting piece of legal maneuvering by local governments to say the least. In essence the red
light camera is the accuser. How is one going to confront a red light camera in a court of law?
The current matter of course concerning red light camera citations has the deputy who monitored
or reviewed the red light camera’s images to sign the citation as if he were the officer on the
scene to issue the citation himself. Therefore it would follow rudimentary logic that the deputy
who signed a particular red light camera citation would show up in court as the “accuser”. Surely
this would open up a whole other “can of worms” wherein it would be argued that the deputy
only knows what the red light camera conveyed to him which therefore renders the deputy’s
knowledge as hearsay, which cannot be allowed as evidence in a court of law. Nonetheless,
44 Langland-Orban,Pracht,and Large. "Red Light RunningCameras: Would Crashes,Injuries and Automobile
InsuranceRates IncreaseIf They Are Used in Florida?."
45 Amendment V, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)
46 Amendment VI, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)

21. Crider 21
given that only the Government can violate one’s constitutional right all of this is for naught if an
injunction cannot be attained which orders the proscription of third party private entities to
implement, monitor, and issue citations and collect the payments effectuated by red light
cameras.

22. Crider 22
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