Napa County Public Health is holding a tabletop exercise on 10/28/13 to discuss the response to an e. Coli outbreak. This is in conjunction with the CA Dept of Public Health and anticipation of the upcoming statewide functional exercise. Slides prepared by The Abaris Group
2. Welcome and Introductions
The 2013 Statewide Medical and Health
Exercise is sponsored by:
• California Emergency Medical Services Authority
• California Department of Public Health
In collaboration with:
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California Hospital Association
California Association of Health Facilities
California Primary Care Association
California Emergency Management
Response partners representing local health
departments, emergency medical services, public
safety and healthcare facilities
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3. Welcome and Introductions
Introduction of Exercise Planners and Facilitators
Housekeeping Issues
Agenda Review
3
4. Exercise Purpose
To evaluate current response concepts, plans,
and capabilities related to a medical surge of
patients from a foodborne illness outbreak in the
local community.
The exercise will focus on the coordination of
surveillance activities and health system
capabilities anticipated when managing a medical
surge among community healthcare partners.
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5. Exercise Target Capabilities
Public Health Epidemiology & Surveillance
Emergency Public Information & Communications
Emergency Operations Center Management &
Medical Surge
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6. Tabletop Exercise Objectives
Evaluate ability to:
Activate surge plans
Implement the Incident Command System
Request, distribute, track and return resources
in accordance with the California Public Health
Emergency Operations Manual (EOM)
Coordinate risk communication
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7. Tabletop Exercise Objectives
Evaluate ability to:
Issue public information notifications
Conduct surveillance and epidemiological
investigations
Implement necessary control measures to stop
further cases of illness or disease
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8. Tabletop Exercise Scenario
Scenario:
Napa residents are presenting to healthcare
providers with abdominal pain and bloody
diarrhea in above average numbers
Some patients are needing hospital and ICU
admission
A foodborne disease is suspected
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9. Subject Matter Experts
• Dr. Jennifer Henn, Epidemiologist
• Napa County Public Health
• Dr. Karen Smith, Health Officer
• Napa County Public Health
• Jahniah McGill, Registered Environmental Health
Specialist
• Environmental Health, Napa County
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12. FOODBORNE ILLNESSES
• Caused by ingestion of contaminated food
• Can also be spread via other modes
• Gastrointestinal tract symptoms
Nausea & vomiting
Diarrhea
Abdominal pain
• Nonspecific symptoms outside the G.I. tract
• Children under 5, older adults and medically fragile
are most vulnerable
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12
13. FOODBORNE ILLNESSES
An estimated 1 in 6 suffer from foodborne illnesses
annually leading to an estimated:
48 million cases
128,000 hospitalizations
3,000 deaths
$35 billion in medical costs & lost productivity
>1,000 outbreaks detected annually
(Painter JA, Hoekstra RM, Ayers T, Tauxe RV, Braden CR, Angulo FJ, et al. Attribution of foodborne
illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths to food commodities by using outbreak data, United States, 1998–
2008. Emerg Infect Dis [Internet]. 2013.)
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13
14. DAILY DOUBLE
What foodborne disease do these foods have in
common?
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Raw sprouts
Pizza
Cookie dough
Fresh spinach
Ground beef patties
Romaine lettuce
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14
16. E. COLI O157:H7
First recognized as pathogen in 1982
First outbreak traced to hamburgers
USDA banned sale of raw meat containing E. coli
O157:H7 in 1994
Many outbreaks now linked to contaminated raw
vegetables (e.g., sprouts, leafy greens) and other
contaminated ready to eat foods
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17. STEC OUTBREAKS
2012
Multistate Outbreak of Shiga Toxin-producing
Escherichia coli O157:H7 Infections Linked to Organic
Spinach and Spring Mix Blend
Multistate Outbreak of Shiga Toxin-producing
Escherichia coli O145 Infections
Source not identified
Multistate Outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing
Escherichia coli O26 Infections Linked to Raw Clover
Sprouts at Jimmy John's Restaurants
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18. STEC OUTBREAKS
2011
Multistate Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections
Linked to Romaine Lettuce
Outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli O104 (STEC
O104:H4) Infections Associated with Travel to
Germany (and consumption of raw sprouts)
Multistate Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections
Associated with Lebanon Bologna
Multistate Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections
Associated with In-shell Hazelnuts
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19. E. COLI CONTAMINATION
AN EXAMPLE
Multistate E. coli O157:H7 outbreak linked to baby
spinach in 2006 (205 cases, 102 hospitalizations, 3
deaths)
Outbreak strain isolated from both cattle and feral swine
feces near spinach field
Spinach from 1 field with E. coli
contamination mixed with spinach
and lettuce from other farms at
central processing plants
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21. E. COLI AND MEDICAL SURGE
AN EXAMPLE
Outbreak of E. coli O104:H4 in 2011
– 3,816 cases in Germany; 54 deaths
– 845 (22%) involved Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS)
Hospitals in most affected areas of Germany experienced
large influx of patients with HUS and other complications
due to E. coli infection
– Doubled number of staff
– Tripled machines for dialysis and plasma exchange
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22. E. COLI AND MEDICAL SURGE
AN EXAMPLE
Video news clip:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13696131
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23. SHIGA TOXIN PRODUCING E. COLI
Common reservoirs = cattle and other ruminants
Vehicles in past outbreaks = ground beef, petting zoos, raw
vegetables and fruit, unpasteurized apple cider, water, etc.
Growth requirements = facultative anaerobe, nonsporulating bacterium
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24. E. COLI - EPIDEMIOLOGY
Mode of Transmission
Ingestion of food contaminated by traces of feces or direct
contact with animals and their environment
Incubation Period
Range from 2-10 days after exposure; median 3-4 days
Period of Communicability
When the bacteria is being excreted
1 week or less (adults) or up to 3 weeks (children)
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24
25. SHIGA TOXIN PRODUCING
E. COLI (STEC)
Some E. coli bacteria produce shiga toxin
When shiga toxin enters the bloodstream it
can damage the red blood cells
Severity of illness ranges from mild diarrhea
to life threatening HUS
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25
27. SYMPTOMS
Symptoms of E. coli infection:
Watery and often bloody diarrhea
Abdominal cramping
Abdominal pain
Little or no fever
Most people will recover within 5 to 10 days
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28. HEMOLYTIC UREMIC SYNDROME
(HUS)
Life threatening condition that often
requires ICU treatment
Triad of hemolytic anemia,
thrombocytopenia, and acute renal failure
Often requires blood transfusions and
dialysis during acute phase
28
29. HEMOLYTIC UREMIC SYNDROME
(HUS)
On average, HUS occurs in ~6% of E. coli
patients
Case fatality rate of 3-5%
Most cases of HUS occur in children under 5
Use of antibiotics and anti-diarrheal
medication to treat E. coli infection increases
risk of HUS
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30. DIALYSIS
Average length of dialysis for patients with HUS due
to E. coli infection is 5-7 days (but can vary widely)
Peritoneal dialysis widely used for pediatric patients
Hemodialysis also suitable for children - may be
preferable in patients with severe abdominal pain
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31. MANAGEMENT OF HUS
Successful management of HUS includes:
• Fluid therapy
• Management of acute renal failure
- ~50% of HUS patients require dialysis
• Blood and/or plasma transfusion
- Most children require packed RBC transfusion
• Management of hypertension
• Nutritional support and pain management
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32. STEC – SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Most E. coli related HUS cases seen in children
< 5, but elderly and immunocompromised are
also at increased risk for HUS
Elderly patients at higher risk for E. coli blood
stream infection (bacteremia) and may develop
additional complications due to presence of other
illnesses
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34. OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION GOALS
Identify all cases
Find a common exposure
Determine cause
Stop the exposure
Prevent future cases
Notify providers
Inform the public
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34
36. PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE ROLE
Public Health Nurses and Disease Investigators
• Interview patients
• Collect clinical specimens from patients
• Administer questionnaires for epidemiologic
studies
• Advise patients on how to prevent spread of
illness
• Provide public health education & guidance
(i.e., health advisories and health alerts)
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36
37. PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE ROLE
Epidemiologists
• Analyze data from pathogen-specific
surveillance and identify clusters/outbreaks
• Characterize cases by time, place, and person
• Plan epidemiologic studies
• Interview cases and healthy controls
• Analyze and interprets results of epidemiologic
studies
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38. PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY
RESPONSE ROLE
Public Health Laboratory staff
• Analyze clinical, food, and environmental
specimens
• Interpret test results and “fingerprint” strains
• Advise about tests and collection, handling,
storage, and transport of specimens
• Coordinate additional testing by partner labs
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39. WHO ARE THE PUBLIC HEALTH
STATE AND FEDERAL PARTNERS?
• California Emerging Infections
Program (CEIP)
• California Department of Public
Health (CDPH)
• Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)
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42. HOW DOES ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH BECOME
AWARE OF FOOD RELATED EVENTS?
Environmental Health
• Reporting Methods
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Online complaint system
Telephone complaint
• Reporters of Illness
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Consumer complaints
Food facility operators
Health and Human Services: Public Health
• State & Federal Partners
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California Food & Drug Branch (CDPH)
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
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42
43. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
RESPONSE ROLE
Environmental Health Inspectors focus on how the
food became contaminated:
• Receive and interpret foodborne illness complaints
• Investigate suspected food and/or food establishment
− Interview food workers and managers
− Examine food storage, handling, preparation, and
service
− Identify risk factors that resulted in food contamination
− Collect environmental and food samples
− Collect paperwork
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44. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
RESPONSE ROLE
Environmental Health Inspectors focus on how the
food became contaminated:
Implement control measures
• Employee education
• Disposal of contaminated food
• Impound
• Closure of premises
• Administrative hearing process
• Probationary period
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45. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
RESPONSE ROLE
Environmental Health Inspectors refer to the following
agencies:
• CDPH Food and Drug Branch (CDPH)
− Manufacturers, Processors, Wholesale
− Seafood and Shellfish
− Recall of Foods
• CA Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA)
− All Meat and Dairy Products
• U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
− Interstate Manufactures, Processors, Wholesale
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45
46. HOW DO YOU CONTACT
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH?
PBES: Environmental Health Division
Main Phone: (707) 253-4471 or (707) 253-4417
Main E-mail: Environmental@countyofnapa.org
County Website:
http://www.countyofnapa.org/PBES/Environmental/
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46
47. Exercise Ground Rules
Do not fight the scenario
Assume the scenario is real and
may impact the jurisdiction and
the participants
Participate in a collegial
manner: share policies,
plans and practices that
may benefit others
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48. Exercise Ground Rules
Be respectful: allow others
to speak and finish their
statements
Follow communications
etiquette: turn off cell
phones, computers, and
any other electronic data
equipment
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49. Tabletop Exercise
The exercise consists of three modules plus an
addendum for planning the November 21, 2013
Functional Exercise
Each module will identify the key issues followed
by questions for discussion
Participants are encouraged to share their plans,
policies, strengths and gaps as identified in the
Organizational Self Assessments
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50. Scenario
On November 18, 2013, healthcare providers at
community health centers, private physician’s offices
and local emergency departments began seeing
previously healthy patients with complaints of
abdominal pain throughout Napa County.
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51. Scenario (Continued)
Within one day, 40 cases of bloody diarrhea had
been reported by 10 healthcare providers at
community health centers, private physician’s offices
and local emergency departments in the county.
Two days after the first reports of abdominal pain and
bloody diarrhea, 4 patients (of which, 2 are pediatric)
were admitted to the Intensive Care Unit with
symptoms of decreased urine output, lethargy and
persistent bloody diarrhea. These patients were
diagnosed with hemolytic uremic syndrome. Cases
presenting similar symptoms continue to be reported
throughout the county.
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52. Scenario (Continued)
Five days after the first
reported case, 225 patients
(approximately 10% with
HUS) have been identified
with similar presenting
symptoms at local hospitals,
community health centers
and private physician
practices.
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53. Scenario (Continued)
Healthcare facility staff has requested guidance
from the local Public Health Laboratory on
appropriate protocols for specimen collection
and laboratory techniques to confirm the
diagnosis.
Healthcare facilities are requesting guidance on
necessary levels of isolation and personal
protective equipment requirements for staff.
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54. Module 1: Public Health Surveillance
and Epidemiological Investigation
Key Issues:
Surveillance and epidemiological investigation
coordinated with the healthcare partners
Implement control measures
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55. Questions for Discussion
1. When and how would your organization/agency be
made aware of an increase in Shiga Toxin-producing
E. coli isolates within your jurisdiction?
a. Are there multiple modes of communication for this kind of
information?
2. What would prompt an investigation, and who would
undertake the investigation and analysis if an
outbreak were to occur in your jurisdiction?
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56. Questions for Discussion
3. How does your organization/agency collaborate with
the laboratories?
a. How is testing prioritized?
4. How are control measures issued by Public Health,
Environmental Health, healthcare facilities?
a. How are the control measures implemented by each?
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58. Module 2: Emergency Public
Information and Communications
Key Issues:
Alerting and notification of personnel
Internal and external communications
Risk communication messaging
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59. Questions for Discussion
1. What mechanisms and/or technologies are in place
to alert and notify your staff of activation of your
facility’s emergency operations plan?
a. How do you notify staff of activation?
b. Who is responsible to do that?
c.
How often do you test this system?
d. Has this system been used in a real event?
e. Who else do you notify of activation?
f.
How does that occur?
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60. Questions for Discussion
2. How do you share information with Public Health?
a. What information do you share?
b. What information do you expect from Public Health?
c.
How do you communicate your facility status (and bed
availability) to the local medical health system?
d. How does this information get to the state?
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61. Questions for Discussion
3. What is your risk communication plan to notify staff,
patients, clients and/or stakeholders of a foodborne
illness outbreak?
a. Who approves the information to be shared?
b. What communication methods are used?
c.
How does your organization participate in a Joint
Information System (JIS)?
d. What would warrant opening a Joint Information Center
(JIC)?
e. How do you manage inquiries from the media,
stakeholders, and the general public?
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62. Scenario (Continued)
Ambulance companies are reporting an increase in
call volume and extended delays in offloading
patients at local emergency departments.
Hospitals are experiencing continuing surge with
increasing emergency department wait times.
The initial epidemiologic investigation has not
revealed a consistent pattern of age, race,
occupation, geographic distribution or previous
symptomatology among patients which might
indicate a source of the offending agent.
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63. Module 3: Emergency Operations Center
Management and Medical Surge
Key Issues:
Response is coordinated through the use of Incident
Command System principles and Command
Centers/Emergency Operations Centers
Incident Action Plans are developed to guide and
document the response and recovery phases
Activation of Surge Plans
Request and/or response to resource requests
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64. Questions for Discussion
1. How do you plan for an influx of patients including the
access and functional needs population?
a. What types of services can be altered, postponed or relocated to
other sites?
b. Have clinical providers been active in the decision making for
alteration of services?
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65. Questions for Discussion
2. Which partner organizations can assist in providing
services that you must alter or suspend due to a medical
surge?
a. Do you have Memoranda of Understanding signed with these
partner organizations?
3. How do you request, respond to, distribute, track and/or
return resources in accordance with the California Public
Health and Medical Emergency Operations Manual?
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68. Medical & Public Health Resources
• Personnel
• Services
• Supplies and Equipment
• Transportation
• Facilities
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69. Healthcare Facility Managers
How to Obtain Resources:
• Communication through accepted local protocols
• Communicating resource arrangements
minimized duplication of efforts
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70. HC Facility Resource Utilization
• Determine if current resources will meet the anticipated
needs
• Prioritize/conserve what’s available
• Contact suppliers/contractors
• Implement existing agreements
• Request help from the HHSA/DOC - MHOAC
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71.
72. HHSA Department Operations
Center (DOC)
DOC
Director
PIO
Health
Officer
Safety
Officer
Liaison
Officer
Operations
Section
Planning
Section
Logistics
Section
Finance
Section
Medical
Branch
Health
Branch
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73. DOC Medical & Health Branch
Operations
Section
Medical
Branch
Health Branch
EMS/Transport
Patient
Tracking
Communicable
Disease
Healthcare
Facilities
Coordination
Laboratory
Alternate Care
Site
Activate
branches as
needed
Mass
Prophylaxis
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74.
75. CA Mutual Aid System
• CA disaster & Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid
Agreement (MAA)
• Discipline-Specific Mutual Aid Agreements
• Health Care Facilities Mutual Aid or Mutual
Assistance Agreements
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77. Regional Disaster Medical & Health
Coordinator/Specialist (RDMC/S)
REOC
Medical Health Branch
RDMHC/S Program
OA EOC
Med. Health Branch
MHOAC Program
OA EOC
Med. Health Branch
MHOAC Program
OA EOC
Med. Health Branch
MHOAC Program
Affected Local Jurisdictions
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78.
79. Who You Gonna Call?
Public Health/
HHSA!!!
Public Health/HHSA DOC is your
gateway to CA’s mutual aid…
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82. Planning for the November
Functional Exercise
The scenario will be a medical
surge due to foodborne illness.
Customization of the exercise
allows incorporating other
objectives as needed.
Examples include issues
identified in past exercises,
new training or equipment, or
new policies and procedures.
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83. November Exercise
Issues for Consideration
Exercise Level of Play:
What level of exercise play do the
organizations/agencies represented today anticipate
for the November 21, 2013 exercise?
Examples include communications drill, functional and
full scale exercises, level of play may include use of
simulated patients, movement of patients to healthcare
facilities, activation of the joint information center,
provision of mutual aid, etc.
Will your organization/agency activate its Command
Center/Emergency Operations Center?
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84. Role of State Agencies
On November 21, 2013, the California Department of
Public Health and the California Emergency Medical
Services Authority will open the Medical and Health
Coordination Center (Formerly the Joint Emergency
Operations Center).
The California Emergency Management Agency is
anticipated to participate by opening the State Operations
Center and the Regional Emergency Operations Centers to
support local and regional exercise play.
This will provide the opportunity for local participants to
request additional resources, submit and receive situation
status reports and respond to California Health Alert
Network (or other notification systems) messages and
receive further direction.
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86. Thank You
For Your Participation
Additional materials may be found on:
California Statewide Medical and Health
Training and Exercise Program website:
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Editor's Notes
205 cases in 26 states.Cattle are considered the primary reservoir of E. coli O157, but fecal shedding by other domestic livestock and wildlife has been described.The outbreak was amplified because the contaminated spinach from one or a few farms was mixed with spinach from numerous other farms, then bagged by a few processors, marketed under several brands, and distributed nationally and internationally.
CEIP is alerted when any foodborne outbreak is identified. They help to coordinate foodborne outbreak response in Bay Area counties (Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco) alongside CDPH
The time from when a patient eats contaminated food to the when the public health lab completes confirmatory testing and fingerprintinghttp://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/reportingtimeline.htm A series of events occurs between the time a patient is infected and the time public health officials can determine that the patient is part of an outbreak. This means that there will be a delay between when a person gets sick and confirmation that he or she is part of an outbreak. Public health officials work hard to speed up the process as much as possible. The timeline is as follows:Incubation time: The time from eating the contaminated food to the beginning of symptoms. For E. coli O157, this is typically 3-4 days.Time to sample collection: The time from the first symptom until the person seeks medical care, when a diarrhea sample is collected for laboratory testing. This is typically 1-5 days.Time to diagnosis: The time from when a person gives a stool sample to when E. coli O157 is obtained from it in a laboratory. This may be 1-3 days from the time the sample is received in the laboratory. The diagnosis of E. coli infection may be reported to the local health department at this time.E. coli isolate shipping time: The time required to ship the E. coli O157 bacteria from the laboratory to the state public health authorities that will perform “DNA fingerprinting.” This may take 0-7 days depending on transportation arrangements within a state and the distance between the clinical laboratory and public health department.Time to serotyping and “DNA fingerprinting”: The time required for the state public health authorities to perform “DNA fingerprinting” on the E. coli O157 isolate and compare it with the pattern of the outbreak strain. Ideally, this can be accomplished in 1 day. However, many public health laboratories have limited staff and space, and experience multiple emergencies at the same time. Thus, the process may take 1-4 days.The time from the beginning of a person’s illness to the confirmation that he or she was part of an outbreak is typically about 2-3 weeks
Further discussion: CMS waivers, L&C waivers (Nursing staff ratios, Surge tents, etc.) CAL OSHA guidance, State Declarations and Gubernatorial Declarations