SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 86
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Fourth Quarter 2020
TO OUR INVESTORS
Q U A R T E R L Y R E P O R T
Bestinver Madrid
Dear investor,
We would like to begin our final report of the year by remembering once again the victims of Covid-19 and their
families, and thanking everyone who continues to tackle the virus. 2020 was a year to forget, although it did give us a
good opportunity to pause and review some of our priorities.
The pandemic has highlighted our society's vulnerability but also revealed the large doses of compassion, solidarity
and honesty it is capable of. These values and actions have not only helped hold back the tides of adversity we have
faced during these challenging times but have also fuelled the search for new and better forms of cooperation,
management, politics and business. Ultimately, these will be the legacy of a pandemic that, thankfully, appears to
have an expiry date.
We say it seems to have an expiry date because the results of the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines —which have
proven to offer a high level of protection against the virus— have provided people and investors with a glimpse of
the beginning of the end of the pandemic. This catalyst and the outcome of the US elections and the ever-present
central banks led to the equities markets performing extremely well at the back end of the year.
All our funds posted gains in the last quarter, and all have played a major role in the strategies most exposed to the
economic cycle that performed the worst in the first half of the year. As we discussed with you at our 19th Annual
Investors Conference, market positioning and relative valuations were very extreme; consequently, the turnover we
have seen has been understandably high.
Lessons learned in 2020
There are a number of conclusions we can draw from the latter months of 2020, which will go down in history.
The first (crucial) one is the importance of being invested. At Bestinver, we conducted a study showing how a
Bestinver Internacional investor missing out on the fund's best 10 days in the last decade would have seen their
return halve from a compound annual rate of 7.6% to 3.2%. Had this been 30 days rather than 10, we would be
talking about a negative return. As you can see, the impact is huge and underlines the importance of watching
our savings, especially during difficult times, not as a snapshot (showing a moment in time) rather a film (over
the long term).
+7,6%
(+108% cumulative)
+3,2%
(+37% cumulative)
+0,2%
(+2% cumulative) -2,4%
(-21% cumulative)
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
-4%
ALWAYS INVESTED IF YOU MISS THE BEST 10 DAYS IF YOU MISS THE BEST 20 DAYS IF YOU MISS THE BEST 30 DAYS
Bestinver Internacional FI
(Compound annual return 31-12-2009-31-12-2020)
Through our funds, you are the owners of decent, well managed and prudently financed businesses. It can therefore
be expected that the goods and services they provide to society will continue to be valuable for a long time to come.
One should also not overlook the management teams who invest time and money in enhancing the flexibility and
productivity of these businesses' operations. In view of this, their capacity to generate value for society and therefore
for us —their shareholders— may undoubtedly be weakened by the economic cycle but not damaged forever.
There is also an additional layer of protection we should not overlook: price. What do we mean by this? That
our work not only involves finding businesses that work for us during good and bad times, but also that we must
prudently project the results these businesses will generate, that we demand an adequate return from them, and that
we then apply a margin of safety in case things do not turn out as we expected or we have slipped up in our analysis.
Only then can we sit back and patiently wait until the market affords us the opportunity to acquire positions in these
businesses at prices we believe, based on our analysis, to be right.
And the second big lesson is, again, recognising the importance of patience in the world of investments. The last
quarter highlighted the value that existed in a group of companies or sectors trading at extremely discounted prices
and that, we believe, presented an extraordinary investment opportunity. This value is something we have been able
to benefit from thanks to our patience and which we are sure we will once again be able to benefit from in the future.
What we expect in 2021?
Turning to the year we have just started, the consensus is that the economy will struggle in the first half due to what
is still a fragile recovery, although the market will continue to offer positive returns. There is considerable consensus
—at least now— that the group of shares comprising the global indexes with a “value” style are going to outperform
the “growth” indexes.
While we believe such suppositions are worthy exercises of extrapolating the present, what is most important is that
they are completely irrelevant when it comes to investing. Well, they may be if what one wants to do is speculate.
They generate noise and volatility, prompting many investors —or more accurately, speculators— to jump ship when
the markets do not do what they had expected. At Bestinver, we see such movements as opportunity (and value)
being transferred from one part of the market to us (to you) to build stronger portfolios.
The situation is still extremely complicated. Large doses of prudence and a long view are needed and we must be
aware that the pandemic has and continues to pose a tremendous challenge to the economy and society as a whole.
However, at the same time we should acknowledge that it has also accelerated trends and been a catalyst of changes
that should lead us to a very different world, a world in which we at Bestinver place our trust and which we will strive
to make better.
Inclusion of ESG criteria
Last September at our 19th Annual Investors Conference, we announced our pledge to integrate Environmental,
Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) criteria into our fund management processes and investment strategies.
These criteria are a perfect fit with our investment philosophy: fundamental analysis, risk management and a long
view.
It is worth emphasising that this integration will help us – is helping us – to identify, audit and assess additional risks in the
companies we look at in our search to maximise yields on our funds in the long term.
We firmly believe that, as managers of your savings, we have a role to play in moving towards a more prosperous and
sustainable world through the companies in which we invest, allocating our capital to those that not only turn a profit but also
make a positive contribution to society.
In this entire process, Bestinver will avail of specific ESG resources that complement and strengthen our capabilities to
drill down into the business models we analyse. We will enhance our analysis by drawing on the support of top-notch
external providers, while the investment team will be responsible for examining and interpreting their ratings and
factoring them into our investment decisions. We have also developed an in-house scoring system that weights the
importance of these factors. The scores will be an additional input that is feed in when assigning intrinsic value to the
companies we analyse.
The most controversial companies insofar as ESG is concerned will only be included in Bestinver's investment universe
if they have a clear road map to improve their performance in this area (quantifiable milestones to decarbonisation,
pay linked to certain objectives, changes in corporate governance that ensure best practices in the organisation etc.).
Companies will be excluded if we deem these improvements are not possible due to the nature of their businesses or
if their management teams fail to act or lack initiative.
Bestinver also commits to proactively influencing the companies in which it invests through policies and actions that
we will document and report periodically to our unitholders and the market.
Use of ESG criteria – Different approaches to including them
Exclusion of controversial companies, sectors and activities
Market
coverage
GENERALIST
FUNDS
90%
DEDICATED
ESG FUNDS
50%
THEMATIC
FUNDS
5%
ESG integration:
ESG criteria are seen as an
additional input when
analysing companies (risk
audit). It is possible to
invest in most sectors,
provided they fulfil certain
requirements. Other
qualitative criteria are also
considered (fundamental
changes regarding
environmental, social and
corporate governance
matters), along with scores.
Best-in-class approach:
Investment concentrated in
companies with the best ESG
performance (internal and
external criteria).
These funds tend to adopt a
more quantitative approach
(normally without discrimina-
ting on the grounds of scoring).
Thematic approach:
Extremely small investment
universe. ESG criteria are
considered an additional input
in analysis.
GENERALIST FUNDS
BESTINVER
MEGATENDENCIAS
Hybrid best-in-class
+ Thematic
THEMATIC
BEST-IN
CLASS
INTEGRATION
ESG CRITERIA
ESG and value investing
Incorporating these values will strengthen our value investing philosophy. The ESG agenda should not compromise
profitability and the generation of wealth, rather promote and drive it. This does not mean putting achieving a series
of socio-environmental goals before our fiduciary duty to you. Instead, it entails enhancing our performance as
savers, influencing and improving the corporate culture of companies and creating ties with those that encourage
the use of responsible practices concerning the environment and their employees, suppliers and, of course,
shareholders.
It is clearly and objectively beneficial to everyone when a
company or industry aims to serve society as best it can or, if it
is not doing so, has a credible plan to do so without eroding the
long-term value for shareholders. It is a completely different
story if all this is discounted in the current price
—and therefore has no value— or if the plans are not fulfilled
or are achieved to the detriment of generating wealth for the
company's owners —thus destroying value.
At Bestinver, we are clear in our minds. We do not have
any qualms about buying a company with fantastic ESG
credentials, if it is cheap. We also do not if it is a company with
an ESG profile that is not currently class leading but which
we believe will improve; again, if it is cheap. We obviously do
not demand the same profitability from one or the other and
this profitability, of course, depending on many other factors.
However, in both cases we do need the price we pay for them
to be lower than the actual value of their businesses. This is
what is defined as being a value investor.
It is about doing things right. We believe the obsession with
labelling and associating a concept —value— with a series of
attributes such as growth, sustainability, governance and quality is a mistake and a fundamental error, even though,
in this case, they are all absolutely marvellous. Bestinver is not going to enter into this type of futile debate. What we
think is better for you —for everyone— is to try and be relevant, have an impact on decision-making, identify risks
and opportunities and, ultimately, connect ESG agendas with competitiveness, differentiation and profitability. These
are all essential ingredients to create (sustainable) value.
We are of the view that, like us in the way we manage your investments, a company without defined and appropriate
competencies vis-à-vis environmental, social and corporate governance matters is not duly prepared to protect
and nurture long-term value creation. We use fundamental analysis —the basis of our investment decisions— to
determine these capabilities. We will therefore try to identify the parameters that help us determine the financial and
non-financial risks to which we are exposed when investing in a business. Similarly, we will strive to quantify those
variables that dictate the sustainability of that business's competitive position, growth and profitability. Ultimately,
none of this new for us. It is about continuing to do what we have always done, albeit in somewhat more of an
explicit and documented fashion: analyse from a qualitative and quantitative perspective the different aspects that
make a company valuable.
Bestinver's competitive advantages
Greater awareness in society and a more stringent regulatory framework have led to ESG agendas being
spotlighted in most listed companies. There is a risk, in some instances, that this shift becomes a mere
formality to attract investments (or finance). In other words, the act of meeting a series of criteria to be rated
not qualified.
It is therefore vitally important that as savers, we do our homework and are able to separate the wheat from the
chaff. In other words, discriminate between commendable and important practices and others that are totally
pointless or, even worse, corrupt. In a world increasingly dominated by passive investing, these risks are extremely
significant.
At Bestinver, we are going to ensure the companies we invest in have a clear desire to implement policies that
include environmental, social and corporate governance criteria. We are also going to verify that such plans
are real, honest and, above all, in line with the fiduciary duties these companies have to their shareholders.
We are aware that these strategies sometimes require sacrifices; sacrifices that Bestinver will applaud and
support.
In such a short-sighted world that judges major corporate strategies in quarters rather than years and
demands instant returns on investment without the necessary maturation periods, in markets in which we see
with astonishment that the average time investors hold shares is five months, Bestinver's corporate culture is
acknowledged by companies wanting to generate long-term value.
We have a competitive advantage that we know how to and must exploit. Thanks to your faith and support, our
size and investment philosophy matter. We are the leading independent investment management company in
Spain and have a top shareholder that provides robustness
and constancy. This often means we hold majority stakes
in the companies in which we invest. This privilege, and
also responsibility, allows us to put forward ideas to these
businesses' management teams and oversee their strategies
and their impact on generating value for their shareholders
and society as a whole.
The aim of this letter is not to talk about passive
management (a term that has all the hallmarks of being
an oxymoron), but it does appear to be difficult to carry
out such an exhaustive screening as what we have set
out here in a passive manner. It also does not seem
possible to passively replicate our involvement with the
management teams we have just described. We have the
impression that active management and investing with
ESG criteria in mind must go hand-in-hand in the years
ahead.
An opportunity we must exploit
As we said at the start, the pandemic has given us time to reflect. We are aware that every crisis brings with it an
opportunity. How we react after though depends on the model of society we want to move towards.
Incorporating ESG criteria more comprehensively and formally into our analysis process not only provides us with
another tool to better manage the risks and profitability of your portfolios but also represents our contribution to
speeding up construction of a better world. This is not a latent desire or ambition, rather a firm commitment to invest
in more sustainable businesses that aspire to create wealth without renouncing social progress and respect for the
environment.
Bestinver will continue to provide you with tools you can use to build your long-term investments, but we also
aspire for you to see us from now on as a vehicle that can serve to champion and channel the changes that will
boost the well-being of current and future generations. You, through your savings, and us, by managing them,
will be able to nurture the clear synergies that exist between corporate success and the progress of society as a
whole. We cannot think of a better legacy of the pandemic which, thanks to all our efforts, now appears to have
an expiry date.
New infrastructure fund
At a corporate level, we are very pleased to inform you of the launch of Bestinver Infra: our venture capital fund
investing in infrastructure. The prevailing low interest rates and performance of this type of asset on the side lines of
the economic cycle are attractive for those wanting to diversify their investments. Bestinver Infra will open the door
to institutional and retail investors alike to global investments in top-notch infrastructure. Francisco del Pozo and
his experienced team will lead on managing the fund, following the principles that are shared throughout Bestinver:
fundamental analysis, appropriate risk management and an investment time horizon that is common to investors and
fund managers alike.
We will now leave you with a round-up of the management of each of our funds, giving you a chance to find out
about the specific vision of each of their managers and the main movements in the individual portfolios.
Best regards
The investment team
Return
13.53% annualised return
for Bestinfond since launch
Fund assets
We manage over EUR
6.4 billion
Investors
50,000
Bestinver in numbers
Awards obtained
More than 100 in the
last 20 years
Independence
100% Acciona Group
Figures as at 31/12/2020. Bestinfond start date: 13/01/1993
13
CONTENTS
Investment funds	 16
Equities	 17
 
‰ Bestinfond	 17
 
‰ Bestinver Internacional	 23
 
‰ Bestvalue	 29
 
‰ Bestinver Bolsa	 35
 
‰ Bestinver Grandes Compañías	 38
 
‰ Bestinver Latam	 41
 
‰ Bestinver Megatendencias	 44
Mixed and fixed income 	 47
 
‰ Bestinver Mixto	 47
 
‰ Bestinver Patrimonio	 49
 
‰ Bestinver Deuda Corporativa	 51
 
‰ Bestinver Renta	 53
 
‰ Bestinver Corto Plazo	 55
Hedge funds	 57
 
‰ Bestinver Hedge Value Fund	 57
 
‰ Bestinver Tordesillas	 60
Pension funds	 64
Equities	 65
 
‰ Bestinver Global	 65
Mixed and fixed income	 71
 
‰ Bestinver Plan Mixto	 71
14
This document has been prepared by Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC for information purposes only, and may not be considered, under any circumstances, an
offer to invest in its investment funds. The information has been compiled by Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC using sources considered reliable. Nevertheless,
and although reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that the information is correct, Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC does not guarantee that it is
accurate, complete or up-to-date.
All of the opinions and estimations included in this document represent the opinion of Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC on the date to which they refer
and may vary without prior warning. All of the opinions contained herein have been issued on a general basis, without taking into account the specific
investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of each person.
Under no circumstances shall Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC, its administrators, employees or authorised personnel be held responsible for any harm of
any kind that may proceed, directly or indirectly, from the use of the information contained in this document. A statement of past performance does not
constitute, under any circumstances, a promise or guarantee of future returns.
All of Bestinver’s returns are expressed in € and in net terms, after expenses and commissions.
Potential: The growth potential that, in the opinion of Bestinver’s managers, the fund has at any given time, calculated as the difference between the
current PER and the target PER. This does not represent the gain that the fund will make in a certain period, given that, although the fund will achieve a
specific return, the objective of the managers is to increase, or at least maintain, that potential.
PER: The free cash-flow price at which the fund trades, based on the PER estimated by Bestinver’s managers for each company (including adjustments
such as: debt, point in the cycle, price, currency, etc.).
Target Price: the Net Asset Value that the shares in the fund may reach on the basis of the intrinsic value that all of the stocks that form the portfolio have,
in the opinion of Bestinver’s managers.
LEGAL WARNING
 
‰ Bestinver Plan Renta	 73
 
‰ Bestinver Plan Patrimonio	 75
Voluntary mutual benefit society (EPSV) 	 78
Equities	 79
 
‰ Bestinver Crecimiento	 79
Mixed and fixed income 	 81
 
‰ Bestinver Futuro	 81
 
‰ Bestinver Consolidación	 83
15
16
Bestinver Barcelona
Investment
funds
17
2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch
Bestinfond -3,83% 20,81% 0,21% 4,48% 6,87% 6,74% 13,53%
Reference index* 6,33% 30,02% 9,40% 9,30% 9,54% 6,24% 9,80%
Table of annualised returns
BESTINFOND
Invests in global equities, especially in European companies.
Investment funds
Annualised returns
Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 13/01/1993. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has
included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data
obtained for the index in force at any given time.
Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral
concentration risk.
The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
0%
5%
-5%
10%
15%
20%
30%
25%
2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch
Bestinfond Reference index
-20%
-15%
-10%
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO
Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution
Consumer 27,7%
Financial 10,0%
Industrial 40,1%
Communication
& Technology
17,3%
Liquidity 4,9%
Europe 66,9%
Iberia 9,1%
Other 19,1%
Liquidity 4,9%
Fund managers
Tomás Pintó
International Equities
Director
Jorge Sources
International Equities
Manager
18
Investment funds
FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 2,67%
ING GROUP 1,78%
INTESA SANPAOLO 1,18%
COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO
INFORMA 3,21%
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 2,98%
AMS 2,71%
INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
ASHTEAD GROUP 2,58%
KONECRANES 2,36%
SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP 2,01%
CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO
HELLOFRESH 3,95%
DELIVERY HERO 3,68%
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 2,55%
Main positions by sector
BestinFond ended the year clearly outperforming the main benchmark indexes. Many of our companies, which
had been left behind since the March recovery, made up a lot of ground in the last quarter thanks to the
development of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Their high degree of efficacy against the virus paves the way
for a quicker economy recovery, benefiting to a greater extent the businesses and sectors worst affected by the
pandemic.
It is strange that it was the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine, a day after the US election result was declared,
that diverted the market's gaze to this group of companies trading at never-before-seen extreme relative
valuations. We say strange because until not so long ago, the market was seen as a mechanism that discounted
events. Now, though, it appears to be a mechanism that reacts to them.
Whatever the case, over the final quarter of last year, the fund racked up significant gains (+20.13%), which
brightened —but not disguised— a challenging year during which we lost money (-3.83%). It has been an
extremely complicated time for everyone, but we have learned several lessons that will bear fruits for you in the
future thanks to your patience and trust.
As we said, a bitter-sweet 2020 for many reasons. One of these is the fact that three of our companies have been
the subjects of takeover bids in recent weeks. It is always satisfying when this happens as, to a certain degree, it
validates our investment philosophy. However, this is definitely not the case when the premium offered by the buyers
is inadequate. This is the case with the copper mining company, KAZ Minerals, or the producer of silicon wafers for
microchip manufacturing, Siltronic. We believe the offers made do not reflect the true value of these companies'
assets, although it is the case that they are 70-75% above the price at which we began to invest in both firms last
April. The situation is different regarding the third point of contention: Tikkurila. The purchase offer for the North
American company, PPG, with an 85% premium, puts the price above the intrinsic value we had set internally for this
Finnish paint manufacturer. Our public thanks go to Colin Gibson, Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, who discovered and
promoted this investment idea that has generated such decent returns for the portfolio.
Value investing and "the ability to suffer"
In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund.
We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a
whole represents the best use of our capital. Incorporating this methodology into our daily work does not change our
nature as value investors, it enhances it.
Manager’s round-up
19
We also told you that the pandemic has given us a moment to review some of our priorities. Social networks
and the digital world have markedly raised the awareness of society, which is now demanding a long-term action
plan on matters that are commonly accepted as not only advisable but essential. This new reality should, among
other things, question the short-sightedness some companies are guilty of (as well as some investors) that
generates such little value for society.
In the business world, generating long-term value requires careful planning and investments over an extensive
time horizon. Businesses adopting these strategies tend to have three characteristics: they generate a lot of
cash, they are prudently financed and they have an owner (or management team) that is prepared to sacrifice
gains today for (greater) returns tomorrow. Perhaps this is the best hallmark of quality when judging a company.
Tom Russo called it "the capacity to suffer". There are companies that invest with a twenty-year view, primarily
because they can. They have the capacity to make mistakes without hindering their ability to generate value
(today) for their customers and shareholders.
Many of these companies with the capacity to suffer make investments that do not generate an immediate
return. Some of these investments will fail —and they are able to assume these— while others will involve new
lines of business that will generate additional sources of wealth for their owners. This is the type of business we
want to include in our portfolios. They are stable and profitable today (thanks to their past investments) and so
have the wherewithal (because they can) and the willingness (thanks to their corporate culture) to think and
invest long or very long term. This ability to maximise profits today, without mortgaging value creation in the
future is the fine line separating decent companies from marvellous ones.
So, how does one evaluate what cannot be seen but that one suspects will (eventually) be visible? This is the
sort of question we long-term investors ask ourselves. They do not have any easy answers but they are very
relevant when analysing currently profitable businesses that take a long-term view and are therefore able to try,
fail and potentially succeed.
Fortunately, we have a brilliant team of analysts who help us in this regard. Without the contributions of Senior
TMT Sector Analysis, Vighnesh Padiachy, it would be a lot more difficult to understand Samsung's long-term ability
to invest and the formidable barriers to entry that have been built up over the years. The same is true with Jaime
Vázquez, Senior Consumer Sector Analysts, and Miguel Dolz, Consumer and TMT Analyst, who have enabled us to
understand why the business models of HelloFresh or Booking, to cite just two examples, are class leading. Both
boast dominant positions in their sectors and are so profitable today because of the competitive advantages they
have been forging for a long time. They chose not to follow the herd, to channel current profits into the search for
future competitiveness (and profitability). This vision and capacity (to suffer) have shaped what they are today.
We pursue the same goal when building our portfolios. We are talking about having the capacity to suffer in our
management role. We will therefore search for companies that offer the recourse and profitability needed to
fund potentially far more lucrative ideas. This approach entails being able to assume occasional failures in our
most risky investments without the profitability of our portfolios taking a major (or permanent) hit. To achieve
this, it is therefore necessary to have a certain weight of proven businesses that are well prepared for when the
cycle turns against them, do not have a terrific opportunity to grow but, on the other hand, offer us stability and
predictability.
Berkshire Hathaway
Berkshire Hathaway is a prime example of what we mean. It is not easy to find a firm that is more honestly and
intelligently managed as Berkshire. It owns a large number of profitable companies generating huge volume of free
Investment funds
20
cash. Its capital structure is a strength, its accounting conservative, and its shareholders are seen and treated as
exactly what they are: owners.
The heart of Berkshire is still its insurance arm. The raft of insurance companies operating under its wings boast the
most solvent capital position in the sector, and have historically been able to assume risk while turning a very decent
profit. In other words, the sum of claims for the cover they have provided plus the expenses incurred running their
businesses has been substantially lower than the premiums charged to their policyholders.
These profits, plus the additional investment capacity they have due to the time lag between receiving premiums
and having to pay out on policies they have sold —the so-called "float"— have enabled Warren Buffett to buy over
the years companies in such diverse sectors as: railways (BNSF); electricity distribution and generation (Berkshire
Hathaway Energy); and manufacturing and retail (Precision Castparts, Lubrizol, Clayton Homes, Marmon, ISCAR, etc.).
And of course, a portfolio of listed securities with names as well known as Apple, Coca-Cola, American Express and
Bank of America.
We have been monitoring and analysing Berkshire for a long time and cannot recall when its shares were as cheap
as they are today. We have been building up a significant position in the funds since the summer because we believe
Berkshire is a great place for our capital. The fact that many of its businesses are not linked to the economic cycle
along with the prudent way they are managed protect Berkshire's long-term intrinsic value. We are aware that the
impressive growth in other decades is irrepeatable, but its book value (and intrinsic value) has risen by a cumulative
10% over the last 10 years. We see no reason why it may not continue along the same path over the next decade.
Perhaps we can make one small observation in this respect. You might call us old-fashioned, but we refer to book
value because, in this case (and so many others), it is significant. There is a strong desire to delegitimise the validity
of this metric for valuing a company that we cannot understand. This may be because of the recent discovery of the
value of intangible assets in some corners of the market, or perhaps the result of the use of labels that simplifies
everything to the point of the absurd.
It is worth remembering that intangible assets were not invented the day before yesterday, and that not all listed
companies only have this type of asset on their balance sheets. We know that investing in intangible assets normally
goes through profit and loss and is not reflected in the cash flow statement. Consequently, it does not appear on
the balance sheet. We are well aware that it is possible, even desirable, for a company investing heavily during a
favourable point in the economic cycle to have an income statement that shows massive losses – losses that are
totally irrelevant when it comes to valuing the business. Thus, these "traditional" valuation metrics are irrelevant in
some cases. However, this is not true for Berkshire or for a large number of listed companies in Europe (and equally
some of those on our books such as Delivery Hero, to cite one example).
Warren Buffett has lamented that the lack of decent investment opportunities in recent years has led Berkshire
accumulating huge sums of cash on its balance sheet (close to USD 150 billion at the end of September). The fact
that it does not pay dividends and share buybacks have been very few and far between over the years is an indication
of its disciplined investment approach. We see this vast cash pile as being very valuable in Warren Buffett's hands.
We see it as “antifragile”, to quote Nassim Taleb, where, it is worth remembering, the concept of antfragility involves
looking for assets or investments that not only shield us from adverse events (such as cash) but also enable us to
benefit from the disorder, stress or chaos associated with such headwinds (such as cash in Buffet's hands).
As we have pointed out to you, Berkshire offers a fabulous option should the markets slump —which they will do
eventually— and until then, we expect it will buy back significant quantities of its shares as it has already started to do
(USD 9 billion in the third quarter, taking total buybacks in the first nine months of 2020 to USD 15.7 billion). These
Investment funds
21
buybacks suggest its treasury shares are now the greatest investments in Berkshire's history, which may indicate that
Warren Buffett also considers they have value at today's prices.
According to our calculations, it is trading at 1.10x its book value and 30-40% below its intrinsic value. All this without
giving credit to its immense anti-fragility. Of course, there may be reasons justifying these low valuations. There is
a groundswell of opinion criticising the merits of the investments made by Berkshire —or, more accurately, the lack
of investments— in recent years. Warren Buffett has lost his “touch”, they say. There is a past precedent when at
the end of the dotcom boom, he was criticised for a lack of exposure to technology shares and focus on banks and
consumer non-durables companies. That approach did not do him any harm then, and it cannot be discounted that
it won't stand him in good stead again if the stock market cycle changes. Nevertheless, more than this, people forget
that in just two years, he has tripled Berkshire's investment in Apple: the greatest investment in the company's history.
Nobody has Buffett's experience, wisdom and track record, and his advanced age (he is 90 years old) may explain
why part of the market is not interested in Berkshire shares. Buffett is irreplaceable and will be a big loss when he
leaves the helm of the company. He himself has been telegraphing this in considerable detail in the road map for his
succession. We therefore have little doubt about who his successors or who the right people to occupy his positions
will be. Berkshire will be headed up by a CEO, probably Greg Abel or Ajit Jain, and will also have a chief investment
officer, most likely Todd Combs or Ted Weschler —both excellent investors.
We are not going to delve further into the valuation because there is not enough space in this report, but we urge
you to find out about these and other qualities of the Berkshire investment case in a forthcoming blog article by the
investment team, which we are sure you will find interesting.
Main movements in the portfolio
We added some new companies to the portfolio over the quarter. This includes Peugeot, which we expect to generate
considerable value thanks to its merger with FCA. Stellantis (the name of the new group) will be headed up by Carlos
Tavares, one of the best if not the best, CEO in the automotive industry (a sector we have covered in our investment
blog you can read on our website). Another addition to our portfolio is Smurfit Kappa. We have taken advantage of a
liquidity event (capital increase) to obtain an equity stake in a group that is fabulously managed by the Smurfit family
and, undoubtedly, offers one of the most interesting solutions to replacing single-use plastics in our daily lives. Another
new acquisition is Univar, a restructuring idea in a sector we know well, thanks to Senior Industrial Sector Analyst,
Carlos Arenillas: chemical products distribution.
We have increased our stake in Berkshire Hathaway, as we have done with GSK, given that the market is still not
giving any credit to the forthcoming spin-off of the latter's consumer and pharma divisions, and HelloFresh where
we foresee that very notable growth (albeit not explosive like in 2020) will provide a much clearer view of the real
profitability of this business. HeidelbergCement is another new play, despite its magnificent performance since the
March lows. We still see the German cement producer as cyclical with defensive qualities at an extremely attractive
price (a valuation we will explain in the forthcoming investment team blog). We have also continued to increase our
positions in Grifols, Inditex and Naturgy; all of which we continue to view as frankly interesting at the current prices.
On the contrary, we have wound up our position in JustEat. The takeaway home delivery giant has brought us much
to celebrate, but its competitive position is beginning to weaken in some markets, and at a strategic level we do not
understand its reticence to explore new vertical propositions in distribution. We also do not think its acquisition of
its competitor, Grubhub, was ideal. We have also sold Andritz. We are not comfortable with the Austrian company's
lack of growth, particularly given the challenges it has faced in recent years to convert reported profits into cash. We
have more appealing propositions in which to invest our capital. Lastly, we have exited AP Moeller-Maersk after its
Investment funds
22
Investment funds
Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver
ADDITIONS INCREASES
SMURFIT KAPPA
PEUGEOT
UNIVAR
HEILDERBERG CEMENT
GLAXO
BERSKSHIRE HATHAWAY
HELLO FRESH
INDITEX
NATURGY
EXITS REDUCTIONS
ZOOPLUS
UNICFREDITO
AP MOLLER MAERSK
JUST EAT
RIO TINTO
STANDARD CHARTERED
BNP
Movements in the portfolio
shares gained 40% over the quarter. The clear improvement in its profitability is well reflected by the prices at which
it is currently trading and we do not discount its cash generation profile taking a hit due to greater investments in the
coming years.
We have reduced our exposure in Rio Tinto, which has benefited from the hike in iron ore prices that we do not
foresee is sustainable. We have also continued to reduce the weight of the banking sector; specifically, by selling our
position in Unicredito. The departure of its CEO, Mustier, who had prioritised return on equity to shareholders over
mergers, has clouded the investment thesis for the Italian bank, especially in light of the talks it is having with the
Italian Treasury to purchase Monte dei Paschi.
As we said at the start of this report, the fund enjoyed a frankly decent quarter of the year. Since the current team
took over management at the start of April, the fund has posted a cumulative return 14.1% higher than the general
European index – the MSCI Europe, including dividends, and 7.33% higher than the MSCI Global Index, including
dividends. This decent performance partially offsets the challenges during the year that would have been difficult to
avoid without the team's patience and knowledge of the world of investments.
We will sign off now wishing you a magnificent 2021. We will continue to strive to offer you a more liquid, better
balanced portfolio with wide margins of safety and greater upside potential. A major shareholder that provides solidity
and permanence, an eclectic investment team committed to finding value, and knowledgeable, prudent and patient
clients —who are our greatest asset— form a formidable combination to exploit existing opportunities and those that
come our way in the future.
23
Investment funds
BESTINVER INTERNACIONAL
Invests globally, although it mainly focuses on listed companies in Europe, excluding Spain and Portugal.
Tabla de Annualised returns
2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch
Bestinver Internacional -1,38% 23,34% 1,46% 5,37% 7,58% 7,44% 9,27%
Reference index* 6,33% 30,02% 10,02% 9,64% 9,77% 5,63% 4,69%
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO
Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution
Europe 73,4%
Iberia 0,0%
Other 21,3%
Liquidity 5,2%
Consumer 25,7%
Financial 9,4%
Industrial 40,4%
Communication
& Technology
19,3%
Liquidity 5,2%
Fund managers
Tomás Pintó
International Equities
Director
Jorge Sources
International Equities
International
Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 19/11/1997. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has
included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data
obtained for the index in force at any given time.
Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral
concentration risk.
The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
Annualised returns
Bestinver internacional Reference index
2020 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch
-20%
2019
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
-10%
-15%
-5%
0%
24
Investment funds
FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL B 2,95%
ING GROUP 1,97%
INTESA SANPAOLO 1,30%
COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO
INFORMA 3,55%
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 3,38%
AMS 2,99%
INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
ASHTEAD GROUP 2,85%
KONECRANES 2,67%
SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP 2,23%
CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO
HELLOFRESH 4,37%
DELIVERY HERO 4,07%
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 2,81%
Main positions by sector
Bestinver Internacional ended the year clearly outperforming the main benchmark indexes. Many of our
companies, which had been left behind since the March recovery, made up a lot of ground in the last quarter
thanks to the development of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Their high degree of efficacy against the virus
paves the way for a quicker economy recovery, benefiting to a greater extent the businesses and sectors worst
affected by the pandemic.
It is strange that it was the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine, a day after the US election result was declared, that
diverted the market's gaze to this group of companies trading at never-before-seen extreme relative valuations. We
say strange because until not so long ago, the market was seen as a mechanism that discounted events. Now, though,
it appears to be a mechanism that reacts to them.
Whatever the case, over the final quarter of last year, the fund racked up significant gains (+21.28%), which brightened
—but not disguised— a challenging year during which we lost money (-1.38%). It has been an extremely complicated
time for everyone, but we have learned several lessons that will bear fruits for you in the future thanks to your
patience and trust.
As we said, a bitter-sweet 2020 for many reasons. One of these is the fact that three of our companies have been
the subjects of takeover bids in recent weeks. It is always satisfying when this happens as, to a certain degree, it
validates our investment philosophy. However, this is definitely not the case when the premium offered by the
buyers is inadequate. This is the case with the copper mining company, KAZ Minerals, or the producer of silicon
wafers for microchip manufacturing, Siltronic. We believe the offers made do not reflect the true value of these
companies' assets, although it is the case that they are 70-75% above the price at which we began to invest in
both firms last April. The situation is different regarding the third point of contention: Tikkurila. The purchase offer
for the North American company, PPG, with an 85% premium, puts the price above the intrinsic value we had
set internally for this Finnish paint manufacturer. Our public thanks go to Colin Gibson, Senior Industrial Sector
Analyst, who discovered and promoted this investment idea that has generated such decent returns for the
portfolio.
Value investing and "the ability to suffer"
In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund. We
believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a whole
makes the best use of our capital. Incorporating this methodology into our daily work does not change our nature as
value investors, it enhances it.
Manager’s round-up
25
Investment funds
We also told you that the pandemic has given us a moment to review some of our priorities. Social networks and
the digital world have markedly raised the awareness of society, which is now demanding a long-term action plan on
matters that are commonly accepted as not only advisable but essential. This new reality should, among other things,
question the short-sightedness some companies are guilty of (as well as some investors) that generates such little
value for society.
In the business world, generating long-term value requires careful planning and investments over an extensive time
horizon. Businesses adopting these strategies tend to have three characteristics: they generate a lot of cash, they
are prudently financed and they have an owner (or management team) that is prepared to sacrifice gains today for
(greater) returns tomorrow. Perhaps this is the best hallmark of quality when judging a company. Tom Russo called it
"the capacity to suffer". There are companies that invest with a twenty-year view, primarily because they can. They
have the capacity to make mistakes without hindering their ability to generate value (today) for their customers and
shareholders.
Many of these companies with the capacity to suffer make investments that do not generate an immediate return.
Some of these investments will fail —and they are able to assume these— while others will involve new lines of
business that will generate additional sources of wealth for their owners. This is the type of business we want to
include in our portfolios. They are stable and profitable today (thanks to their past investments) and so have the
wherewithal (because they can) and the willingness (thanks to their corporate culture) to think and invest long or
very long term. This ability to maximise profits today, without mortgaging value creation in the future is the fine line
separating decent companies from marvellous ones.
So, how does one evaluate what cannot be seen but that one suspects will (eventually) be visible? This is the sort of
question we long-term investors ask ourselves. They do not have any easy answers but they are very relevant when
analysing currently profitable businesses that take a long-term view and are therefore able to try, fail and potentially
succeed.
Fortunately, we have a brilliant team of analysts who help us in this regard. Without the contributions of Senior
TMT Sector Analysis, Vighnesh Padiachy, it would be a lot more difficult to understand Samsung's long-term ability
to invest and the formidable barriers to entry that have been built up over the years. The same is true with Jaime
Vázquez, Senior Consumer Sector Analysts, and Miguel Dolz, Consumer and TMT Analyst, who have enabled us to
understand why the business models of HelloFresh or Booking, to cite just two examples, are class leading. Both
boast dominant positions in their sectors and are so profitable today because of the competitive advantages they
have been forging for a long time. They chose not to follow the herd, to channel current profits into the search for
future competitiveness (and profitability). This vision and capacity (to suffer) have shaped what they are today.
We pursue the same goal when building our portfolios. We are talking about having the capacity to suffer in
our management role. We therefore search for companies that offer the recourse and profitability needed to
fund potentially far more lucrative ideas. This approach entails being able to assume occasional failures in our
most risky investments without the profitability of our portfolios taking a major (or permanent) hit. To achieve
this, it is therefore necessary to have a certain weight of proven businesses that are well prepared for when the
cycle turns against them, do not have a terrific opportunity to grow but, on the other hand, offer us stability and
predictability.
Berkshire Hathaway
Berkshire Hathaway is a prime example of what we mean. It is not easy to find a firm that is more honestly and
intelligently managed as Berkshire. It owns a large number of profitable companies that generate huge volume of
26
free cash. Its capital structure is a strength, its accounting conservative, and its shareholders are seen and treated as
exactly what they are: owners.
The heart of Berkshire is still its insurance arm. The raft of insurance companies operating under its wings boast the
most solvent capital position in the sector, and have historically been able to assume risk while turning a very decent
profit. In other words, the sum of claims for the cover they have provided plus the expenses incurred running their
businesses has been substantially lower than the premiums charged to their policyholders.
These profits, plus the additional investment capacity they have due to the time lag between receiving premiums
and having to pay out on policies they have sold —the so-called "float"— have enabled Warren Buffett to buy over
the years companies in such diverse sectors as: railways (BNSF); electricity distribution and generation (Berkshire
Hathaway Energy); and manufacturing and retail (Precision Castparts, Lubrizol, Clayton Homes, Marmon, ISCAR, etc.).
And of course, a portfolio of listed securities with names as well known as Apple, Coca-Cola, American Express and
Bank of America.
We have been monitoring and analysing Berkshire for a long time and cannot recall when its shares were as cheap
as they are today. We have been building up a significant position in the funds since the summer because we believe
Berkshire is a great place for our capital. The fact that many of its businesses are not linked to the economic cycle
along with the prudent way they are managed protect Berkshire's long-term intrinsic value. We are aware that the
impressive growth in other decades is irrepeatable, but its book value (and intrinsic value) has risen by a cumulative
10% over the last 10 years. We see no reason why it may not continue along the same path over the next decade.
Perhaps we can make one small observation in this respect. You might call us old-fashioned, but we refer to book
value because, in this case (and so many others), it is significant. There is a strong desire to delegitimise the validity
of this metric for valuing a company that we cannot understand. This may be because of the recent discovery of the
value of intangible assets in some corners of the market, or perhaps the result of the use of labels that simplifies
everything to the point of the absurd.
It is worth remembering that intangible assets were not invented the day before yesterday, and that not all listed
companies only have this type of asset on their balance sheets. We know that investing in intangible assets normally
goes through profit and loss and is not reflected in the cash flow statement. Consequently, it does not appear on
the balance sheet. We are well aware that it is possible, even desirable, for a company investing heavily during a
favourable point in the economic cycle to have an income statement that shows massive losses – losses that are
totally irrelevant when it comes to valuing the business. Thus, these "traditional" valuation metrics are irrelevant in
some cases. However, this is not true for Berkshire or for a large number of listed companies in Europe (and equally
some of those on our books such as Delivery Hero, to cite one example).
Warren Buffett has lamented that the lack of decent investment opportunities in recent years has led Berkshire
accumulating huge sums of cash on its balance sheet (close to USD 150 billion at the end of September). The fact
that it does not pay dividends and share buybacks have been very few and far between over the years is an indication
of its disciplined investment approach. We see this vast cash pile as being very valuable in Warren Buffett's hands.
We see it as “antifragile”, to quote Nassim Taleb, where, it is worth remembering, the concept of antfragility involves
looking for assets or investments that not only shield us from adverse events (such as cash) but also enable us to
benefit from the disorder, stress or chaos associated with such headwinds (such as cash in Buffet's hands).
As we have pointed out to you, Berkshire offers a fabulous option should the markets slump —which they will do
eventually— and until then, we expect it will buy back significant quantities of its shares as it has already started to do
(USD 9 billion in the third quarter, taking total buybacks in the first nine months of 2020 to USD 15.7 billion). These
Investment funds
27
buybacks suggest its treasury shares are now the greatest investments in Berkshire's history, which may indicate that
Warren Buffett also considers they have value at today's prices.
According to our calculations, it is trading at 1.10x its book value and 30-40% below its intrinsic value. All this without
giving credit to its immense anti-fragility. Of course, there may be reasons justifying these low valuations. There is
a groundswell of opinion criticising the merits of the investments made by Berkshire —or, more accurately, the lack
of investments— in recent years. Warren Buffett has lost his “touch”, they say. There is a past precedent when at
the end of the dotcom boom, he was criticised for a lack of exposure to technology shares and focus on banks and
consumer non-durables companies. That approach did not do him any harm then, and it cannot be discounted that
it won't stand him in good stead again if the stock market cycle changes. Nevertheless, more than this, people forget
that in just two years, he has tripled Berkshire's investment in Apple: the greatest investment in the company's history.
Nobody has Buffett's experience, wisdom and track record, and his advanced age (he is 90 years old) may explain
why part of the market is not interested in Berkshire shares. Buffett is irreplaceable and will be a big loss when he
leaves the helm of the company. He himself has been telegraphing this in considerable detail in the road map for his
succession. We therefore have little doubt about who will be his successors or who the right people to occupy his
positions. Berkshire will be headed up by a CEO, probably Greg Abel or Ajit Jain, and will also have a chief investment
officer, most likely Todd Combs or Ted Weschler —both excellent investors.
We are not going to delve further into the valuation because there is not enough space in this report, but we urge
you to find out about these and other qualities of the Berkshire investment case in a forthcoming blog article by the
investment team, which we are sure you will find interesting.
Main movements in the portfolio
We added some new companies to the portfolio over the quarter. This includes Peugeot, which we expect to
generate considerable value thanks to its merger with FCA. Stellantis (the name of the new group) will be headed up
by Carlos Tavares, one of the best if not the best, CEO in the automotive industry (a sector we have covered in our
investment blog you can read on our website). Another addition to our portfolio is Smurfit Kappa. We have taken
advantage of a liquidity event (capital increase) to obtain an equity stake in a group that is fabulously managed by the
Smurfit family and, undoubtedly, offers one of the most interesting solutions to replacing single-use plastics in our
daily lives. Another new acquisition is Univar, a restructuring idea in a sector we know well, thanks to Senior Industrial
Sector Analyst, Carlos Arenillas: chemical products distribution.
We have increased our stake in Berkshire Hathaway, as we have done with GSK, given that the market is still not
giving any credit to the forthcoming spin-off of the latter's consumer and pharma divisions, and HelloFresh where
we foresee that very notable growth (albeit not explosive like in 2020) will provide a much clearer view of the real
profitability of this business. HeidelbergCement is another new play, despite its magnificent performance since the
March lows. We still see the German cement producer as cyclical with defensive qualities at an extremely attractive
price (a valuation we will explain in the forthcoming investment team blog).
On the contrary, we have wound up our position in JustEat. The takeaway home delivery giant has brought us much
to celebrate, but its competitive position is beginning to weaken in some markets, and at a strategic level we do not
understand its reticence to explore new vertical propositions in distribution. We also do not think its acquisition of
its competitor, Grubhub, was ideal. We have also sold Andritz. We are not comfortable with the Austrian company's
lack of growth, particularly given the challenges it has faced in recent years to convert reported profits into cash. We
have more appealing propositions in which to invest our capital. Lastly, we have exited AP Moeller-Maersk after its
shares gained 40% over the quarter. The clear improvement in its profitability is well reflected by the prices at which
Investment funds
28
it is currently trading and we do not discount its cash generation profile taking a hit due to greater investments in the
coming years.
We have reduced our exposure in Rio Tinto, which has benefited from the hike in iron ore prices that we do not
foresee is sustainable. We have also continued to reduce the weight of the banking sector; specifically, by selling our
position in Unicredito. The departure of its CEO, Mustier, who had prioritised return on equity to shareholders over
mergers, has clouded the investment thesis for the Italian bank, especially in light of the talks it is having with the
Italian Treasury to purchase Monte dei Paschi.
As we said at the start of this report, the fund enjoyed a frankly decent quarter of the year. Since the current team
took over management at the start of April, the fund has posted a cumulative return 17.35% higher than the general
European index – the MSCI Europe, including dividends, and 10.58% higher than the MSCI Global Index, including
dividends. This decent performance partially offsets the challenges during the year that would have been difficult to
avoid without the team's patience and knowledge of the world of investments.
We will sign off now wishing you a magnificent 2021. We will continue to strive to offer you a more liquid, better
balanced portfolio with wide margins of safety and greater upside potential. A major shareholder that provides
solidity and permanence, an eclectic investment team committed to finding value, and knowledgeable, prudent and
patient clients —who are our greatest asset— form a formidable combination to exploit existing opportunities and
those that come our way in the future.
ADDITIONS INCREASES
SMURFIT KAPPA
PEUGEOT
UNIVAR
GLAXO
BERSKSHIRE HATHAWAY
HELLO FRESH
HEILDERBERG CEMENT
EXITS REDUCTIONS
ZOOPLUS
UNICFREDITO
AP MOLLER MAERSK
JUST EAT
RIO TINTO
STANDARD CHARTERED
BNP
Movements in the portfolio
Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver
Investment funds
29
BESTVALUE
Invests in global equities, especially in European companies.
Investment funds
Tabla de Annualised returns
2020 2019 3 years 5 years Launch
Bestvalue -4,29% 20,95 0,09% 4,37% 6,68%
Index (70% IGBM / 30% PSI) 6,33% 30,02% 9,40% 9,30% 9,99%
Fund managers
Tomás Pintó
International Equities
Director
Annualised returns
Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 02/12/2010. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has
included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data
obtained for the index in force at any given time.
Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral
concentration risk.
The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
0%
5%
-5%
10%
15%
20%
30%
25%
2019 3 years 5 years Launch
Bestvalue Reference index
-20%
-25%
-15%
-10%
2020
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO
Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution
Consumer 23,7%
Financial 10,5%
Industrial 42,8%
Communication
& Technology
17,9%
Liquidity 5,2%
Europe 63,4%
Iberia 13,1%
Other 18,3%
Liquidity 5,2%
Ricardo Seixas
Iberian Equities
Director
30
FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 2,52%
ING GROUP 1,68%
INTESA SANPAOLO 1,11%
COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO
INFORMA 3,03%
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 2,89%
AMS 2,55%
INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
ASHTEAD GROUP 2,44%
KONECRANES 2,32%
BEFESA MEDIO AMBIENTE 1,93%
CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO
HELLOFRESH 3,74%
DELIVERY HERO 3,48%
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 2,40%
Main positions by sector
BestValue ended the year clearly outperforming the main reference indexes. Many of our companies, which had
been left behind since the March recovery, made up a lot of ground in the last quarter thanks to the development
of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Their high degree of efficacy against the virus paves the way for a quicker
economy recovery, benefiting to a greater extent the businesses and sectors worst affected by the pandemic.
It is strange that it was the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine, a day after the US election result was declared,
that diverted the market's gaze to this group of companies trading at never-before-seen extreme relative
valuations. We say strange because until not so long ago, the market was seen as a mechanism that discounted
events. Now, though, it appears to be a mechanism that reacts to them.
Whatever the case, over the final quarter of last year, the fund racked up significant gains (+21%), which
brightened —but not disguised— a challenging year during which we lost money (-4.3%). It has been an
extremely complicated time for everyone, but we have learned several lessons that will bear fruits for you in
the future thanks to your patience and trust.
As we said, a bitter-sweet 2020 for many reasons. One of these is the fact that three of our companies have been
the subjects of takeover bids in recent weeks. It is always satisfying when this happens as, to a certain degree, it
validates our investment philosophy. However, this is definitely not the case when the premium offered by the buyers
is inadequate. This is the case with the copper mining company, KAZ Minerals, or the producer of silicon wafers for
microchip manufacturing, Siltronic. We believe the offers made do not reflect the true value of these companies'
assets, although it is the case that they are 70-75% above the price at which we began to invest in both firms last
April. The situation is different regarding the third point of contention: Tikkurila. The purchase offer for the North
American company, PPG, with an 85% premium, puts the price above the intrinsic value we had set internally for this
Finnish paint manufacturer. Our public thanks go to Colin Gibson, Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, who discovered and
promoted this investment idea that has generated such decent returns for the portfolio.
Value investing and "the ability to suffer"
In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your
fund. We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and
society as a whole makes the best use of our capital. Incorporating this methodology into our daily work does
not change our nature as value investors, it enhances it.
We also told you that the pandemic has given us a moment to review some of our priorities. Social networks and
the digital world have markedly raised the awareness of society, which is now demanding a long-term action plan on
Manager’s round-up
Investment funds
31
matters that are commonly accepted as not only advisable but essential. This new reality should, among other things,
question the short-sightedness some companies are guilty of (as well as some investors) that generates such little
value for society.
In the business world, generating long-term value requires careful planning and investments over an extensive time
horizon. Businesses adopting these strategies tend to have three characteristics: they generate a lot of cash, they
are prudently financed and they have an owner (or management team) that is prepared to sacrifice gains today for
(greater) returns tomorrow. Perhaps this is the best hallmark of quality when judging a company. Tom Russo called it
"the capacity to suffer". There are companies that invest with a twenty-year view, primarily because they can. They
have the capacity to make mistakes without hindering their ability to generate value (today) for their customers and
shareholders.
Many of these companies with the capacity to suffer make investments that do not generate an immediate return.
Some of these investments will fail —and they are able to assume these— while others will involve new lines of
business that will generate additional sources of wealth for their owners. This is the type of business we want to
include in our portfolios. They are stable and profitable today (thanks to their past investments) and so have the
wherewithal (because they can) and the willingness (thanks to their corporate culture) to think and invest long or
very long term. This ability to maximise profits today, without mortgaging value creation in the future is the fine line
separating decent companies from marvellous ones.
So, how does one evaluate what cannot be seen but that one suspects will (eventually) be visible? This is the sort of
question we long-term investors ask ourselves. They do not have any easy answers but they are very relevant when
analysing currently profitable businesses that take a long-term view and are therefore able to try, fail and potentially
succeed.
Fortunately, we have a brilliant team of analysts who help us in this regard. Without the contributions of Vighnesh
Padiachy, it would be a lot more difficult to understand Samsung's long-term ability to invest and the formidable barriers
to entry that have been built up over the years. The same is true with Jaime Vázquez and Miguel Dolz, who have enabled
us to understand why the business models of HelloFresh or Booking, to give just two examples, are class leading. Both
boast dominant positions in their sectors and are so profitable today because of the competitive advantages they have
been forging for a long time. They chose not to follow the herd, to channel current profits into the search for future
competitiveness (and profitability). This vision and capacity (to suffer) have shaped what they are today.
We pursue the same goal when building our portfolios. We are talking about having the capacity to suffer in our
management role. We will therefore search for companies that offer the recourse and profitability needed to fund
potentially far more lucrative ideas. This approach entails being able to assume occasional failures in our most
risky investments without the profitability of our portfolios taking a major (or permanent) hit. To achieve this, it is
therefore necessary to have a certain weight of proven businesses that are well prepared for when the cycle turns
against them, do not have a terrific opportunity to grow but, on the other hand, offer us stability and predictability.
Berkshire Hathaway
Berkshire Hathaway is a prime example of what we mean. It is not easy to find a firm that is more honestly and
intelligently managed as Berkshire. It owns a large number of profitable companies that generate huge volume of
free cash. Its capital structure is a strength, its accounting conservative, and its shareholders are seen and treated as
exactly what they are: owners.
The heart of Berkshire is still its insurance arm. The raft of insurance companies operating under its wings boast the
most solvent capital position in the sector, and have historically been able to assume risk while turning a very decent
Investment funds
32
Investment funds
profit. In other words, the sum of claims for the cover they have provided plus the expenses incurred running their
businesses has been substantially lower than the premiums charged to their policyholders.
These profits, plus the additional investment capacity they have due to the time lag between receiving premiums and
having to pay out on the policies they have sold —the so-called "float"— have enabled Warren Buffett to buy over
the years companies in such diverse sectors as: railways (BNSF); electricity distribution and generation (Berkshire
Hathaway Energy); and manufacturing and retail (Precision Castparts, Lubrizol, Clayton Homes, Marmon, ISCAR, etc.).
And of course, a portfolio of listed securities with names as well known as Apple, Coca-Cola, American Express and
Bank of America.
We have been monitoring and analysing Berkshire for a long time and cannot recall when its shares were as cheap
as they are today. We have been building up a significant position in the funds since the summer because we believe
Berkshire is a great place for our capital. The fact that many of its businesses are not linked to the economic cycle
along with the prudent way they are managed protect Berkshire's long-term intrinsic value. We are aware that the
impressive growth in other decades is irrepeatable, but its book value (and intrinsic value) has risen by a cumulative
10% over the last 10 years. We see no reason why it may not continue along the same path over the next decade.
Perhaps we can make one small observation in this respect. You might call us old-fashioned, but we refer to book
value because, in this case (and so many others), it is significant. There is a strong desire to delegitimise the validity
of this metric for valuing a company that we cannot understand. This may be because of the recent discovery of the
value of intangible assets in some corners of the market, or perhaps the result of the use of labels that simplifies
everything to the point of the absurd.
It is worth remembering that intangible assets were not invented the day before yesterday, and that not all listed
companies only have this type of asset on their balance sheets. We know that investing in intangible assets normally
goes through profit and loss and is not reflected in the cash flow statement. Consequently, it does not appear on
the balance sheet. We are well aware that it is possible, even desirable, for a company investing heavily during a
favourable point in the economic cycle to have an income statement that shows massive losses – losses that are
totally irrelevant when it comes to valuing the business. Thus, these "traditional" valuation metrics are irrelevant in
some cases. However, this is not true for Berkshire or for a large number of listed companies in Europe (and equally
some of those on our books such as Delivery Hero, to cite one example).
Warren Buffett has lamented that the lack of decent investment opportunities in recent years has led Berkshire
accumulating huge sums of cash on its balance sheet (close to USD 150 billion at the end of September). The fact
that it does not pay dividends and share buybacks have been very few and far between over the years is an indication
of its disciplined investment approach. We see this vast cash pile as being very valuable in Warren Buffett's hands.
We see it as “antifragile”, to quote Nassim Taleb, where, it is worth remembering, the concept of antfragility involves
looking for assets or investments that not only shield us from adverse events (such as cash) but also enable us to
benefit from the disorder, stress or chaos associated with such headwinds (such as cash in Buffet's hands).
As we have pointed out to you, Berkshire offers a fabulous option should the markets slump —which they will do
eventually— and until then, we expect it will buy back significant quantities of its shares as it has already started to do
(USD 9 billion in the third quarter, taking total buybacks in the first nine months of 2020 to USD 15.7 billion). These
buybacks suggest its treasury shares are now the greatest investments in Berkshire's history, which may indicate that
Warren Buffett also considers they have value at today's prices.
According to our calculations, it is trading at 1.10x its book value and 30-40% below its intrinsic value. All this
without giving credit to its immense anti-fragility. Of course, there may be reasons justifying these low valuations.
There is a groundswell of opinion criticising the merits of the investments made by Berkshire —or, more
accurately, the lack of investments— in recent years. Warren Buffett has lost his “touch”, they say. There is a past
33
Investment funds
precedent when at the end of the dotcom boom, he was criticised for a lack of exposure to technology shares
and focus on banks and consumer non-durables companies. That approach did not do him any harm then, and it
cannot be discounted that it won't stand him in good stead again if the stock market cycle changes. Nevertheless,
more than this, people forget that in just two years, he has tripled Berkshire's investment in Apple: the greatest
investment in the company's history.
Nobody has Buffett's experience, wisdom and track record, and his advanced age (he is 90 years old) may explain
why part of the market is not interested in Berkshire shares. Buffett is irreplaceable and will be a big loss when he
leaves the helm of the company. He himself has been telegraphing this in considerable detail in the road map for his
succession. We therefore have little doubt about who will be his successors or who the right people to occupy his
positions. Berkshire will be headed up by a CEO, probably Greg Abel or Ajit Jain, and will also have a chief investment
officer, most likely Todd Combs or Ted Weschler – both excellent investors.
We are not going to delve further into the valuation because there is not enough space in this report, but we urge
you to find out about these and other qualities of the Berkshire investment case in a forthcoming blog article by the
investment team, which we are sure you will find interesting.
Main movements in the portfolio
We added some new companies to the portfolio over the quarter. This includes Peugeot, which we expect to generate
considerable value thanks to its merger with FCA. Stellantis (the name of the new group) will be headed up by Carlos
Tavares, one of the best if not the best, CEO in the automotive industry (a sector we have covered in our investment
blog you can read on our website). Another addition to our portfolio is Smurfit Kappa. We have taken advantage of a
liquidity event (capital increase) to obtain an equity stake in a group that is fabulously managed by the Smurfit family
and, undoubtedly, offers one of the most interesting solutions to replacing single-use plastics in our daily lives. Another
new acquisition is Univar, a restructuring idea in a sector we know well, thanks to Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, Carlos
Arenillas: chemical products distribution.
We have increased our stake in Berkshire Hathaway, as we have done with GSK, given that the market is still not giving
any credit to the forthcoming spin-off of the latter's consumer and pharma divisions, and HelloFresh where we foresee
that very notable growth (albeit not explosive like in 2020) will provide a much clearer view of the real profitability of
this business. HeidelbergCement is another new play, despite its magnificent performance since the March lows. We still
see the German cement producer as cyclical with defensive qualities at an extremely attractive price (a valuation we will
explain in the forthcoming investment team blog).
On the contrary, we have wound up our position in JustEat. The takeaway home delivery giant has brought us much
to celebrate, but its competitive position is beginning to weaken in some markets, and at a strategic level we do not
understand its reticence to export new vertical propositions in distribution. We also do not think its acquisition of its
competitor, Grubhub, was ideal. We have also sold Andritz. We are not comfortable with the Austrian company's
lack of growth, particularly given the challenges it has faced in recent years to convert reported profits into cash. We
have more appealing propositions in which to invest our capital. Lastly, we have exited AP Moeller-Maersk after its
shares gained 40% over the quarter. The clear improvement in its profitability is well reflected by the prices at which
it is currently trading and we do not discount its cash generation profile taking a hit due to greater investments in the
coming years.
We have reduced our exposure in Rio Tinto, which has benefited from the hike in iron ore prices that we do not foresee
is sustainable. We have also continued to reduce the weight of the banking sector; specifically, by selling our position in
Unicredito. The departure of its CEO, Mustier, who had prioritised return on equity to shareholders over mergers, has
clouded the investment thesis for the Italian bank, especially in light of the talks it is having with the Italian Treasury to
purchase Monte dei Paschi.
34
Investment funds
ADDITIONS INCREASES
SMURFIT KAPPA
PEUGEOT
UNIVAR
ACS
AMADEUS
GLAXO
BERSKSHIRE HATHAWAY
HELLO FRESH
ENCE
CAF
HEILDERBERG CEMENT
EXITS REDUCTIONS
ZOOPLUS
UNICFREDITO
AP MOLLER MAERSK
JUST EAT
LOGISTA
NOS
RIO TINTO
STANDARD CHARTERED
BNP
CELLNEX
ROVI
Movements in the portfolio
Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver
Our most notable moves in the Iberian market are to reduce the weight of Cellnex and Rovi, which performed
exceptionally in 2020, to increase the weight of Acerinox and take a stake in the holding company ACS: more cyclical
securities that we see have greater potential. We have also sold our stake in Logista.
As we said at the start of this report, the fund enjoyed a frankly decent quarter of the year. Since the current team took
over management at the start of April, the fund has posted a cumulative return 13.9% higher than the general European
index – the MSCI Europe, including dividends, and 7.2% higher than the MSCI Global Index, including dividends. This
decent performance partially offsets the challenges during the year that would have been difficult to avoid without the
team's patience and knowledge of the world of investments.
We will sign off now wishing you a magnificent 2021. We will continue to strive to offer you a more liquid, better balanced
portfolio with wide margins of safety and greater upside potential. A major shareholder that provides solidity and
permanence, an eclectic investment team committed to finding value, and knowledgeable, prudent and patient clients
—who are our greatest asset— form a formidable combination to exploit existing opportunities and those that come our
way in the future.
35
BESTINVER BOLSA
Invests in listed companies in Spain and Portugal.
Investment funds
Tabla de Annualised returns
2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch
Bestinver Bolsa -14,01% 10,51% -4,61% 0,81% 3,64% 4,24% 9,13%
Index (70% IGBM / 30%
PSI)
-5,20% 16,40% -0,40% 2,51% 0,86% -0,07% 2,80%
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO
Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution
Consumer 14,1%
Financial 16,4%
Industrial 55,4%
Communication
& Technology
9,8%
Liquidity 4,4%
Spain 79,6%
Portugal 13,1%
Europe 2,9%
Liquidity 4,4%
Fund managers
Ricardo Seixas
Iberian Equities
Director
Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 01/12/1997. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has
included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, and geographical and sectoral concentration risk. The full prospectus, periodic
reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
Annualised returns
Bestinver bolsa Index (70% IGBM / 30% PSI)
5%
10%
15%
20%
2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
-25%
-30%
0%
36
FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
BANCO SANTANDER 5,97%
CAIXABANK 5,63%
UNICAJA BANCO 2,50%
COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO
AMADEUS IT GROUP 2,84%
INDRA SISTEMAS 2,16%
TELEFONICA 2,07%
INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
ARCELORMITTAL 5,53%
ACERINOX 4,99%
ACS ACTIVIDADES CONS Y SERV 4,89%
CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO
IBERSOL 5,05%
INDUSTRIAL DE DISENO TEXTIL 3,80%
LABORATORIOS FARMAC. ROVI 3,56%
Main positions by sector
Bestinver Bolsa is a fund for investors with a long-term view that aims to generate returns by identifying undervalued
companies in Spain and Portugal. We therefore have a team of four specialists focusing exclusively on the Iberian
market who, along with the specific knowledge of our sector experts from the international team, provides us with a
unique competitive advantage to invest in the region.
The widespread gains in the stock markets at the back end of the year were especially pronounced in Spain, where
the IBEX 35 posted the highest returns among Europe's leading indexes. If there was any doubt, the last quarter
clearly showed that the Spanish market is one of the best options to exploit the valuation mismatches caused by the
pandemic. The fund ended the quarter following the steep rise enjoyed by its reference markets, gaining 18.28%. This
left the fund's annual return at -14% compared to the -12.7% and -2.7% (including dividends) posted by the IBEX 35
and PSI 20, respectively.
Despite the sharp rise and speed of it, the ongoing recovery of business profits and attractive prices have led us to
remain very deeply invested. The rebound of the sectors that were completely paralysed last year and investment of
the recovery funds from Europe should give growth a big boost in Spain in 2021.
The most notable changes in the portfolio are the reduction in the weight of Cellnex and Rovi, which performed
exceptionally in 2020, to increase the weight of Acerinox and take a stake in the holding company ACS: more cyclical
securities that we see have greater potential. We have also sold our stake in Logista.
There are several reasons for increasing the weight of Acerinox. The company has posted very reasonable results,
even during such a complicated period as the second quarter of last year. This allowed it to pay out a dividend of
7% without having to borrow in 2020. We also expect a significant operational improvement given its geographical
exposure and the performance of its end markets (automotive, electrical appliances, construction, etc.). In this
respect, we see Acerinox as an obvious candidate because it is set to benefit from the fiscal stimulus plans being
rolled out in the US and Europe. Lastly, it recently completed a transformational purchase enabling it to enter
segments with greater value-added products and where we expect to see substantial synergies once demand
normalises.
In addition to these arguments, we believe the differentiating factor was the unusual margin of safety we found
in the security at the time of buying. The theory goes that one should buy industrial businesses when they are
struggling – provided they have an adequate liquidity position and healthy balance sheet to weather the storm – and
wait until things improve. In this context, relying on earnings picking up requires one to base an investment decision
on valuations normalised long-term as this exercise tends to also entail paying very high multiples on current-year
earnings. In Acerinox's case, it was trading cheaply, even compared to the gloomy snapshot of earnings and cash
generation in 2020, and so the risk of our investment was actually low.
Manager’s round-up
Investment funds
37
It is always difficult to value a company such as Acerinox, which operates in a sector that has surplus capacity, is
exposed to different economic (and geographic) cycles, and is continuously implementing efficiency plans, not
to mention its recent acquisition of VDM. It is not an easy task to normalise its earnings. What we do though is to
put a replacement value on its assets, which we have estimated to be around EUR 7 per share. These represent
approximately half of a long-term valuation of the business we calculate using a series of very reasonable
assumptions for its most complex market (Europe) and without factoring in the synergies that will come from the
aforesaid purchase of VDM.
It is also worth mentioning that its exposure to a robust US market continues to bear fruit, providing a stable footing
– and a 4% dividend at current prices – until its more cyclical operations (Europe and alloys in particular) see their
activity and profitability return to normal in the coming quarters.
In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund. We
believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a whole
makes the best use of our capital.
We would like to end by highlighting the opportunity we see in our fund to benefit from the economic recovery in
Spain and unquestionable attractiveness of the prices at which it is trading in our market. An opportunity that we at
Bestinver know how to exploit thanks to our patience and, above all, your faith in us.
ADDITIONS INCREASES
AMADEUS
TELEFONICA
ACS
SANTANDER
ENCE
CIE
CAF
ACERINOX
EXITS REDUCTIONS
LOGISTA
TECNICAS REUNIDAS
NOS
CELLNEX
ROVI
EDP
Movements in the portfolio
Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver
Investment funds
38
Investment funds
2020 2019 3 years 5 years Launch
Bestinver Grandes Compañías 12,66% 23,37% 8,06% 8,45% 10,30%
Reference index* 6,33% 30,02% 9,12% 9,12% 10,90%
Tabla de Annualised returns
BESTINVER GRANDES COMPAÑÍAS
Focuses on our selection of large companies. Reflects all of our investment ideas.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO
Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution
Consumer 45,8%
Financial 0,0%
Industrial 24,2%
Communication
& Technology
15,5%
Liquidity 14,5%
Europe 58,0%
Iberia 2,9%
Other 24,6%
Liquidity 14,5%
Tomás Pintó
International Equities
Director
Carlos Arenillas
Industrial Sector Analyst
Co-manager of Large Companies
Fund managers
Annualised returns
Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 19/12/2011. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has
included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data
obtained for the index in force at any given time.
Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral
concentration risk.
The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
2020 2019 3 years 5 years Launch
5%
10%
15%
20%
30%
35%
25%
Grandes Compañías Reference index
-5%
-10%
0%
39
COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO
TENCENT HOLDINGS 3,53%
RELX 2,99%
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 2,83%
INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
EPIROC 3,89%
SAF HOLLAND 3,45%
LEGRAND 3,14%
CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO
PRADA 4,03%
BOOKING HOLDINGS 3,86%
DELIVERY HERO 3,25%
Main positions by sector
Bestinver Grandes Compañías invests in extraordinary companies at reasonable prices guided by the investment
team’s fundamental analysis. By extraordinary businesses we mean those that combine robust corporate governance
with a business model that offers long-lasting competitive advantages. We work very hard to identify this type of
business and once we find them, patience becomes one of our allies, enabling us to benefit from the high returns on
our stakes in them and compound growth in their profits for many years.
Stryker and Booking
During the year, we identified two businesses with these characteristics. The first is Stryker: a leader in the medical
and surgical equipment sector founded in 1941 by the orthopaedic surgeon, Homer Stryker. His granddaughter,
Ronda Stryker, is still the biggest shareholder of a fantastically well managed group that still has its founder's spirit of
innovation. It is not a coincidence that in 2016, Stryker was the first to bring to market a robot that could assist with
knee surgery, which has been a big commercial success. Customers have seen the initial major outlay compensated
by more precision in operations and a subsequent reduction in the number of post-surgery complications. Being the
first to offer a solution of this nature has given Stryker a notable competitive advantage; an advantage it has known
how to strengthen and exploit by adding functionalities to and enhancing a product that already has a large base of
satisfied customers.
There is a long-term risk we have identified —and are monitoring— that is the potential reform of a North American
healthcare system with a cost per patient that is far higher than in other countries. Stryker is aware of the problem
and is trying to play its part in solving it. It is therefore developing an extensive programme of technological
innovations to boost the productivity of this healthcare spending.
The second business is Booking Holdings – an investment we share with all Bestinver's international equity portfolios.
Booking is a great example of an extraordinary company trading at reasonable prices. Primarily, it is a business in the
leisure or tourism sector, but thanks to its technology it is transforming an analogue world into a digital one. This is
a platform that matches supply and demand for accommodation, streamlining the booking process for travellers
and offering hotels a powerful global marketing tool (it enables a small hotel in any Spanish city to reach a Korean
clientèle for instance). It also offers a top-notch customer service (allowing hotels to focus on guests once they
begin their stay), which helps to significantly drive down costs. Booking charges a commission for these services. Its
business model includes fabulous barriers to entry and networking effects.
Booking is the biggest online travel agency in Europe (despite being listed in the US). Ten percent of all hotel
reservations on the European continent are made through its application. It is the case that 20% of its sales are
Manager’s round-up
Investment funds
40
ADDITIONS INCREASES
SEA LIMITED
SMURFIT KAPPA
UNIVAR
RELX
LEGRAND
TENCENT
EXITS REDUCTIONS
SAP
DÍETEREN
BURLINGTON
DASSAULT AVIATION
SCHINDLER
AIR LIQUIDE
Movements in the portfolio
Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver
business trips and it is too soon to know how affected these will be (structurally) by remote working, but it is also the
case that demand for its services may be even higher if hotel operators see the need to offset this loss of business.
This extreme, never-before-seen crisis has highlighted the variability of its costs (it has generated a positive cash
flow) and robustness of its balance sheet. The sector undoubtedly depends on the economic cycle but Booking has a
defensive, anti-cyclical profile (when demand weakens, it benefits from a cheaper "inventory"); something we view as
valuable. Its governance is perfect. Serving and former employees on the board hold shares valued at over USD 200
million and capital has always been allocated consistently and successfully.
In short, it is hard to find businesses with such a long-standing platform on which to grow in a profitable manner
while generating as much cash as Booking does. It is obviously not as cheap as a few years ago, but it is trading at
attractive prices that will allow us to benefit for many years from its high returns and compound growth of its profits.
The fund ended the quarter with a gain of 10.4%, which translates into a return of 12.7% in 2020: quite satisfactory
and easily outstripping that of its reference indexes.
In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund.
Bestinver Grandes Compañías has been the fund that has served as a pilot project for integrating these criteria in our
generalist funds. We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders
and society as a whole makes the best use of our capital.
Investment funds
41
BESTINVER LATAM
Equity investment fund that primarily invests in Latin America.
Investment funds
Tabla de Annualised returns
2020 2019 3 years Launch
Bestinver LatAm -6,91 % - - 2,47 %
BESTINVER LATIN AMERICA SICAV -6,02 % 32,67 % 7,59 % 10,06 %
SP LATIN AMERICA 40NR -18,82 % 15,90 % -2,57 % -0,37 %
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO
Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution
Consumer 29,6%
Financial 15,9%
Industrial 22,4%
Communication
& Technology
23,0%
Liquidity 9,0%
Brazil 60,3%
Argentina 1,9%
Chile 12,8%
Colombia 2,1%
Mexico 8,0%
Peru 5,9%
Liquidity 9,0%
Fund managers
Ignacio Arnau
Bestinver LatAm Manager
Figures as at close of business on 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Date of launch of Bestinver Latam FI: 18/01/2019. Date of launch of Bestinver Latin America SICAV: 05/07/2017.
Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund Bestinver Latam FI are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es.
Bestinver Latin America belongs to Bestinver SICAV (registered in Luxembourg). It is not registered with the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) and is therefore
not commercialised in Spain.
Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral
concentration risk.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 7 years.
Annualised returns
Bestinver Latam Reference index
Bestinver Latin America Sicav
-20%
0%
-10%
10%
30%
40%
20%
2020 Launch
3 years
2019
42
FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
BANCO DO BRAZIL ON 3,63%
IGUATEMI EMP DE SHOPPING 3,48%
MRV ENGENHARIA E PARTICIPACOES 2,82%
COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO
LOCAWEB SERVICOS DE INTERNET 6,19%
ARCO PLATFORM LTD - CLASS A 4,95%
TOTVS ON 4,27%
INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO
COMPANHIA DE LOCACAO 4,27%
CIA SUD AMERICANA DE VAPORES 3,59%
QUIMICA Y MINERA DE CHILE 3,21%
CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO
VIA VAREJO 4,96%
CIA BRAZILEIRA 3,94%
HYPERMARCAS 3,46%
Main positions by sector
BI LatAm primarily invests in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru, following the same investment process and
philosophy as the rest of our international equity funds. The aim of the strategy is to be very different from the
reference indexes and other investment alternatives in the region – all highly exposed to commodities, infrastructures
and banking. Our strategy is primarily centred on all aspects related with consumption and the expansion of the
middle classes in these countries.
After months of being overlooked by the investor community and providing far lower returns that most of the
international markets, the main indexes in the region posted record highs over the last quarter of both cash inflows
(primarily passive through ETFs) and price gains (the S&P Latin America 40 was up 34% over the quarter).
In spite of this big rebound, Bestinver LatAm clearly outperformed the market in 2020. Thanks to our unique
approach, it performed notably during the market downturns. We therefore ended the year down 6.9% compared
to the S&P Latin America 40, which suffered a loss of 18.8%. This better performance, which since the fund started
has resulted in a return 40% higher than that of the reference index, can be partly explained by the adoption of
ESG principles from the beginning. These, especially regarding governance in emerging markets, have enabled us to
mitigate the risk to which our investments are exposed in the short, medium and long term.
The portfolio currently comprises 35 companies that, in our opinion, are the best investment opportunities in the
region. One of these great opportunities we found recently in the form of Iguatemi, which owns the most exclusive
shopping centres in Brazil. Founded and controlled by the Jereissati family, Iguatemi's shopping centres are like Fifth
Avenue in New York: aspirational, safe places to meet, dine and have a great time.
2020 has been a really hard year for Latin America. Markets in the region have been the hardest hit by the Covid-19
crisis but, in our opinion, they could become some of the greatest beneficiaries of the recovery. This is because of a
raft of factors such as the potential rebound of their currencies due to a weaker dollar (US foreign exchange policy)
or the massive global stimulus packages that favour global growth that is particularly beneficial for economies in
the region, without forgetting a return to the structural reforms being implemented and fiscal orthodoxy in many
countries on the continent. And of course, the unarguable attractiveness of their prices in absolute and relative terms,
plus global investors' historically low levels of exposure to LatAm.
These expectations mean we are very optimistic about the possibility of the leading Latin American economies
rebounding soon and also our ability to continue extracting higher absolute positive returns in the long term.
Manager’s round-up
Investment funds
43
ADDITIONS INCREASES
IGUATEMI
HYPERMARCAS
TOTVS
COMPANHIA LOCACAO
EXITS REDUCTIONS
DESPEGAR.COM
PAGSEGURO DIGITAL
CEMEX LATAM HOLDINGS
BANCO ABC BRAZIL
ALICORP
Movements in the portfolio
Investment funds
Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains
Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Pablo fernandez 100 questions on finance
Pablo fernandez   100 questions on financePablo fernandez   100 questions on finance
Pablo fernandez 100 questions on financemvskrishna
 
Perspectives / Ashcourt Rowan
Perspectives / Ashcourt RowanPerspectives / Ashcourt Rowan
Perspectives / Ashcourt RowanSpinning Top
 
Tax Efficient Planning for Business Owners
Tax Efficient Planning for Business OwnersTax Efficient Planning for Business Owners
Tax Efficient Planning for Business OwnersBizSmart Select
 
How Global Finacial Bridge Works
How Global Finacial Bridge WorksHow Global Finacial Bridge Works
How Global Finacial Bridge WorksAndre Gien
 
TaxCharitytm 15mar2015
TaxCharitytm 15mar2015TaxCharitytm 15mar2015
TaxCharitytm 15mar2015Hans Goetze
 
Raising Venture Capital
Raising Venture CapitalRaising Venture Capital
Raising Venture CapitalDamien Steel
 
BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16Hans Goetze
 
ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013
ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013
ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013Hans Goetze
 
Tax charitytm updates 15jan14
Tax charitytm updates 15jan14Tax charitytm updates 15jan14
Tax charitytm updates 15jan14Hans Goetze
 
BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16Hans Goetze
 
Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014
Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014
Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014Hans Goetze
 
BookBuilderTM 30sep14
BookBuilderTM 30sep14BookBuilderTM 30sep14
BookBuilderTM 30sep14Hans Goetze
 
TaxCharityTM 15aug2015
TaxCharityTM 15aug2015TaxCharityTM 15aug2015
TaxCharityTM 15aug2015Hans Goetze
 

Was ist angesagt? (15)

Pablo fernandez 100 questions on finance
Pablo fernandez   100 questions on financePablo fernandez   100 questions on finance
Pablo fernandez 100 questions on finance
 
Perspectives / Ashcourt Rowan
Perspectives / Ashcourt RowanPerspectives / Ashcourt Rowan
Perspectives / Ashcourt Rowan
 
Tax Efficient Planning for Business Owners
Tax Efficient Planning for Business OwnersTax Efficient Planning for Business Owners
Tax Efficient Planning for Business Owners
 
How Global Finacial Bridge Works
How Global Finacial Bridge WorksHow Global Finacial Bridge Works
How Global Finacial Bridge Works
 
(286) why so much cash 2
(286)  why so much cash 2(286)  why so much cash 2
(286) why so much cash 2
 
TaxCharitytm 15mar2015
TaxCharitytm 15mar2015TaxCharitytm 15mar2015
TaxCharitytm 15mar2015
 
Raising Venture Capital
Raising Venture CapitalRaising Venture Capital
Raising Venture Capital
 
BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22nov16
 
ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013
ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013
ABCs defense of capital tax charity 22aug2013
 
Tax charitytm updates 15jan14
Tax charitytm updates 15jan14Tax charitytm updates 15jan14
Tax charitytm updates 15jan14
 
BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16
BlackSwanTradingTM 22apr16
 
Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014
Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014
Stock takers capital taxcharitytm 15feb2014
 
BookBuilderTM 30sep14
BookBuilderTM 30sep14BookBuilderTM 30sep14
BookBuilderTM 30sep14
 
EBITDA
EBITDAEBITDA
EBITDA
 
TaxCharityTM 15aug2015
TaxCharityTM 15aug2015TaxCharityTM 15aug2015
TaxCharityTM 15aug2015
 

Ähnlich wie Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains

Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018BESTINVER
 
[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal Posts
[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal Posts[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal Posts
[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal PostsMSL
 
Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]
Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]
Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]Ed Dodds
 
True-Insight-Spring-2016-1
True-Insight-Spring-2016-1True-Insight-Spring-2016-1
True-Insight-Spring-2016-1Barrie Kent
 
Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021
Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021  Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021
Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021 Mercer Capital
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019BESTINVER
 
Robert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutions
Robert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutionsRobert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutions
Robert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutionsPutnam Investments
 
Financial management
Financial managementFinancial management
Financial managementsmumbahelp
 
Financial management
Financial managementFinancial management
Financial managementsmumbahelp
 
Financial management
Financial managementFinancial management
Financial managementsmumbahelp
 
Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21
Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21
Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21RAJATGHOSH31
 
2020 Alternative Asset Manager Update
2020 Alternative Asset Manager Update2020 Alternative Asset Manager Update
2020 Alternative Asset Manager UpdateMercer Capital
 
Roland Berger: Winning in the packaging world
Roland Berger: Winning in the packaging worldRoland Berger: Winning in the packaging world
Roland Berger: Winning in the packaging worldRoland Berger
 
FOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docx
FOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docxFOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docx
FOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docxAKHIL969626
 
Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017
Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017
Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017Kumar Kanaujia
 
DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21
DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21
DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21Bhavesh Shah
 
DSP Equity Oppotunities Fund
DSP Equity Oppotunities FundDSP Equity Oppotunities Fund
DSP Equity Oppotunities FundDSP Mutual Fund
 
My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020
My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020
My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020Drs Alcanne Houtzaager MA
 
Viewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investments
Viewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investmentsViewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investments
Viewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investmentsLeanne Clements
 

Ähnlich wie Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains (20)

Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth Quarter 2018
 
[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal Posts
[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal Posts[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal Posts
[Salterbaxter Directions] Moving The Goal Posts
 
Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]
Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]
Pdf generation-sustainable-capitalism-v1[1]
 
True-Insight-Spring-2016-1
True-Insight-Spring-2016-1True-Insight-Spring-2016-1
True-Insight-Spring-2016-1
 
Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021
Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021  Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021
Mercer Capital's Value Focus: FinTech Industry | Third Quarter 2021
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Fourth quarter 2019
 
Robert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutions
Robert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutionsRobert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutions
Robert L. Reynolds: New thinking, new solutions
 
Financial management
Financial managementFinancial management
Financial management
 
Financial management
Financial managementFinancial management
Financial management
 
Financial management
Financial managementFinancial management
Financial management
 
Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21
Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21
Invrajat finserve-newsletter-oct-21
 
2020 Alternative Asset Manager Update
2020 Alternative Asset Manager Update2020 Alternative Asset Manager Update
2020 Alternative Asset Manager Update
 
Roland Berger: Winning in the packaging world
Roland Berger: Winning in the packaging worldRoland Berger: Winning in the packaging world
Roland Berger: Winning in the packaging world
 
FOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docx
FOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docxFOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docx
FOR DISCLOSURES AND OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION, PLEASE RE.docx
 
Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017
Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017
Corporate Digest Magazine December 2017
 
DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21
DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21
DoublePlus-Newsletter-Oct-21
 
DSP Equity Oppotunities Fund
DSP Equity Oppotunities FundDSP Equity Oppotunities Fund
DSP Equity Oppotunities Fund
 
7KCR Newsletter-OCT-21
7KCR Newsletter-OCT-217KCR Newsletter-OCT-21
7KCR Newsletter-OCT-21
 
My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020
My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020
My pandemic proof portfolio the state of impact investing in 2020
 
Viewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investments
Viewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investmentsViewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investments
Viewpoint-feature-Roundtable-on-sustainable-and-responsible-investments
 

Mehr von BESTINVER

Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020BESTINVER
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020BESTINVER
 
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020BESTINVER
 
Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019
Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019
Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019BESTINVER
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019BESTINVER
 
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018BESTINVER
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018BESTINVER
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018BESTINVER
 

Mehr von BESTINVER (20)

Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4o Trimestre de 2020
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2020
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - Second quarter 2020
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2º Trimestre de 2020
 
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2020
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2020
 
Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019
Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019
Carta trimestral bestinver - 4º trimestre 2019
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2019
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2019
 
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019
Quarterly report for our investors - First Quarter 2019
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 1er Trimestre de 2019
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 4to Trimestre de 2018
 
Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018
Quarterly report for our investors - Third Quarter 2018
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 3er Trimestre de 2018
 
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018
Carta Trimestral Bestinver - 2° Trimestre de 2018
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

magnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdf
magnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdfmagnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdf
magnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdfHenry Tapper
 
The Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh Kumar
The Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh KumarThe Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh Kumar
The Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh KumarHarsh Kumar
 
NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...
NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...
NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...Amil baba
 
AnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.ppt
AnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.pptAnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.ppt
AnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.pptPriyankaSharma89719
 
PMFBY , Pradhan Mantri Fasal bima yojna
PMFBY , Pradhan Mantri  Fasal bima yojnaPMFBY , Pradhan Mantri  Fasal bima yojna
PMFBY , Pradhan Mantri Fasal bima yojnaDharmendra Kumar
 
(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一S SDS
 
Stock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdfStock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdfMichael Silva
 
fca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdf
fca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdffca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdf
fca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdfHenry Tapper
 
project management information system lecture notes
project management information system lecture notesproject management information system lecture notes
project management information system lecture notesongomchris
 
Managing Finances in a Small Business (yes).pdf
Managing Finances  in a Small Business (yes).pdfManaging Finances  in a Small Business (yes).pdf
Managing Finances in a Small Business (yes).pdfmar yame
 
(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)
(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)
(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)twfkn8xj
 
Financial analysis on Risk and Return.ppt
Financial analysis on Risk and Return.pptFinancial analysis on Risk and Return.ppt
Financial analysis on Risk and Return.ppttadegebreyesus
 
Vp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsApp
Vp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsAppVp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsApp
Vp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsAppmiss dipika
 
Tenets of Physiocracy History of Economic
Tenets of Physiocracy History of EconomicTenets of Physiocracy History of Economic
Tenets of Physiocracy History of Economiccinemoviesu
 
NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...
NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...
NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...Amil baba
 
Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024
Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024
Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024Devarsh Vakil
 
Stock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdfStock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdfMichael Silva
 
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...Amil baba
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

magnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdf
magnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdfmagnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdf
magnetic-pensions-a-new-blueprint-for-the-dc-landscape.pdf
 
The Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh Kumar
The Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh KumarThe Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh Kumar
The Triple Threat | Article on Global Resession | Harsh Kumar
 
NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...
NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...
NO1 WorldWide Genuine vashikaran specialist Vashikaran baba near Lahore Vashi...
 
AnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.ppt
AnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.pptAnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.ppt
AnyConv.com__FSS Advance Retail & Distribution - 15.06.17.ppt
 
PMFBY , Pradhan Mantri Fasal bima yojna
PMFBY , Pradhan Mantri  Fasal bima yojnaPMFBY , Pradhan Mantri  Fasal bima yojna
PMFBY , Pradhan Mantri Fasal bima yojna
 
(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)加拿大萨省大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
 
Stock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdfStock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck FOR 4/17 video.pdf
 
fca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdf
fca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdffca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdf
fca-bsps-decision-letter-redacted (1).pdf
 
project management information system lecture notes
project management information system lecture notesproject management information system lecture notes
project management information system lecture notes
 
Managing Finances in a Small Business (yes).pdf
Managing Finances  in a Small Business (yes).pdfManaging Finances  in a Small Business (yes).pdf
Managing Finances in a Small Business (yes).pdf
 
(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)
(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)
(中央兰开夏大学毕业证学位证成绩单-案例)
 
Financial analysis on Risk and Return.ppt
Financial analysis on Risk and Return.pptFinancial analysis on Risk and Return.ppt
Financial analysis on Risk and Return.ppt
 
Vp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsApp
Vp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsAppVp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsApp
Vp Girls near me Delhi Call Now or WhatsApp
 
Tenets of Physiocracy History of Economic
Tenets of Physiocracy History of EconomicTenets of Physiocracy History of Economic
Tenets of Physiocracy History of Economic
 
🔝+919953056974 🔝young Delhi Escort service Pusa Road
🔝+919953056974 🔝young Delhi Escort service Pusa Road🔝+919953056974 🔝young Delhi Escort service Pusa Road
🔝+919953056974 🔝young Delhi Escort service Pusa Road
 
Q1 2024 Newsletter | Financial Synergies Wealth Advisors
Q1 2024 Newsletter | Financial Synergies Wealth AdvisorsQ1 2024 Newsletter | Financial Synergies Wealth Advisors
Q1 2024 Newsletter | Financial Synergies Wealth Advisors
 
NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...
NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...
NO1 Certified Amil Baba In Lahore Kala Jadu In Lahore Best Amil In Lahore Ami...
 
Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024
Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024
Market Morning Updates for 16th April 2024
 
Stock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdfStock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdf
Stock Market Brief Deck for "this does not happen often".pdf
 
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
 

Fourth Quarter 2020 Report Highlights Continued Gains

  • 1. Fourth Quarter 2020 TO OUR INVESTORS Q U A R T E R L Y R E P O R T
  • 2.
  • 4. Dear investor, We would like to begin our final report of the year by remembering once again the victims of Covid-19 and their families, and thanking everyone who continues to tackle the virus. 2020 was a year to forget, although it did give us a good opportunity to pause and review some of our priorities. The pandemic has highlighted our society's vulnerability but also revealed the large doses of compassion, solidarity and honesty it is capable of. These values and actions have not only helped hold back the tides of adversity we have faced during these challenging times but have also fuelled the search for new and better forms of cooperation, management, politics and business. Ultimately, these will be the legacy of a pandemic that, thankfully, appears to have an expiry date. We say it seems to have an expiry date because the results of the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines —which have proven to offer a high level of protection against the virus— have provided people and investors with a glimpse of the beginning of the end of the pandemic. This catalyst and the outcome of the US elections and the ever-present central banks led to the equities markets performing extremely well at the back end of the year. All our funds posted gains in the last quarter, and all have played a major role in the strategies most exposed to the economic cycle that performed the worst in the first half of the year. As we discussed with you at our 19th Annual Investors Conference, market positioning and relative valuations were very extreme; consequently, the turnover we have seen has been understandably high. Lessons learned in 2020 There are a number of conclusions we can draw from the latter months of 2020, which will go down in history. The first (crucial) one is the importance of being invested. At Bestinver, we conducted a study showing how a Bestinver Internacional investor missing out on the fund's best 10 days in the last decade would have seen their return halve from a compound annual rate of 7.6% to 3.2%. Had this been 30 days rather than 10, we would be talking about a negative return. As you can see, the impact is huge and underlines the importance of watching our savings, especially during difficult times, not as a snapshot (showing a moment in time) rather a film (over the long term). +7,6% (+108% cumulative) +3,2% (+37% cumulative) +0,2% (+2% cumulative) -2,4% (-21% cumulative) 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% -2% -4% ALWAYS INVESTED IF YOU MISS THE BEST 10 DAYS IF YOU MISS THE BEST 20 DAYS IF YOU MISS THE BEST 30 DAYS Bestinver Internacional FI (Compound annual return 31-12-2009-31-12-2020)
  • 5. Through our funds, you are the owners of decent, well managed and prudently financed businesses. It can therefore be expected that the goods and services they provide to society will continue to be valuable for a long time to come. One should also not overlook the management teams who invest time and money in enhancing the flexibility and productivity of these businesses' operations. In view of this, their capacity to generate value for society and therefore for us —their shareholders— may undoubtedly be weakened by the economic cycle but not damaged forever. There is also an additional layer of protection we should not overlook: price. What do we mean by this? That our work not only involves finding businesses that work for us during good and bad times, but also that we must prudently project the results these businesses will generate, that we demand an adequate return from them, and that we then apply a margin of safety in case things do not turn out as we expected or we have slipped up in our analysis. Only then can we sit back and patiently wait until the market affords us the opportunity to acquire positions in these businesses at prices we believe, based on our analysis, to be right. And the second big lesson is, again, recognising the importance of patience in the world of investments. The last quarter highlighted the value that existed in a group of companies or sectors trading at extremely discounted prices and that, we believe, presented an extraordinary investment opportunity. This value is something we have been able to benefit from thanks to our patience and which we are sure we will once again be able to benefit from in the future. What we expect in 2021? Turning to the year we have just started, the consensus is that the economy will struggle in the first half due to what is still a fragile recovery, although the market will continue to offer positive returns. There is considerable consensus —at least now— that the group of shares comprising the global indexes with a “value” style are going to outperform the “growth” indexes. While we believe such suppositions are worthy exercises of extrapolating the present, what is most important is that they are completely irrelevant when it comes to investing. Well, they may be if what one wants to do is speculate. They generate noise and volatility, prompting many investors —or more accurately, speculators— to jump ship when the markets do not do what they had expected. At Bestinver, we see such movements as opportunity (and value) being transferred from one part of the market to us (to you) to build stronger portfolios. The situation is still extremely complicated. Large doses of prudence and a long view are needed and we must be aware that the pandemic has and continues to pose a tremendous challenge to the economy and society as a whole. However, at the same time we should acknowledge that it has also accelerated trends and been a catalyst of changes that should lead us to a very different world, a world in which we at Bestinver place our trust and which we will strive to make better. Inclusion of ESG criteria Last September at our 19th Annual Investors Conference, we announced our pledge to integrate Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) criteria into our fund management processes and investment strategies. These criteria are a perfect fit with our investment philosophy: fundamental analysis, risk management and a long view.
  • 6. It is worth emphasising that this integration will help us – is helping us – to identify, audit and assess additional risks in the companies we look at in our search to maximise yields on our funds in the long term. We firmly believe that, as managers of your savings, we have a role to play in moving towards a more prosperous and sustainable world through the companies in which we invest, allocating our capital to those that not only turn a profit but also make a positive contribution to society. In this entire process, Bestinver will avail of specific ESG resources that complement and strengthen our capabilities to drill down into the business models we analyse. We will enhance our analysis by drawing on the support of top-notch external providers, while the investment team will be responsible for examining and interpreting their ratings and factoring them into our investment decisions. We have also developed an in-house scoring system that weights the importance of these factors. The scores will be an additional input that is feed in when assigning intrinsic value to the companies we analyse. The most controversial companies insofar as ESG is concerned will only be included in Bestinver's investment universe if they have a clear road map to improve their performance in this area (quantifiable milestones to decarbonisation, pay linked to certain objectives, changes in corporate governance that ensure best practices in the organisation etc.). Companies will be excluded if we deem these improvements are not possible due to the nature of their businesses or if their management teams fail to act or lack initiative. Bestinver also commits to proactively influencing the companies in which it invests through policies and actions that we will document and report periodically to our unitholders and the market. Use of ESG criteria – Different approaches to including them Exclusion of controversial companies, sectors and activities Market coverage GENERALIST FUNDS 90% DEDICATED ESG FUNDS 50% THEMATIC FUNDS 5% ESG integration: ESG criteria are seen as an additional input when analysing companies (risk audit). It is possible to invest in most sectors, provided they fulfil certain requirements. Other qualitative criteria are also considered (fundamental changes regarding environmental, social and corporate governance matters), along with scores. Best-in-class approach: Investment concentrated in companies with the best ESG performance (internal and external criteria). These funds tend to adopt a more quantitative approach (normally without discrimina- ting on the grounds of scoring). Thematic approach: Extremely small investment universe. ESG criteria are considered an additional input in analysis. GENERALIST FUNDS BESTINVER MEGATENDENCIAS Hybrid best-in-class + Thematic THEMATIC BEST-IN CLASS INTEGRATION ESG CRITERIA
  • 7. ESG and value investing Incorporating these values will strengthen our value investing philosophy. The ESG agenda should not compromise profitability and the generation of wealth, rather promote and drive it. This does not mean putting achieving a series of socio-environmental goals before our fiduciary duty to you. Instead, it entails enhancing our performance as savers, influencing and improving the corporate culture of companies and creating ties with those that encourage the use of responsible practices concerning the environment and their employees, suppliers and, of course, shareholders. It is clearly and objectively beneficial to everyone when a company or industry aims to serve society as best it can or, if it is not doing so, has a credible plan to do so without eroding the long-term value for shareholders. It is a completely different story if all this is discounted in the current price —and therefore has no value— or if the plans are not fulfilled or are achieved to the detriment of generating wealth for the company's owners —thus destroying value. At Bestinver, we are clear in our minds. We do not have any qualms about buying a company with fantastic ESG credentials, if it is cheap. We also do not if it is a company with an ESG profile that is not currently class leading but which we believe will improve; again, if it is cheap. We obviously do not demand the same profitability from one or the other and this profitability, of course, depending on many other factors. However, in both cases we do need the price we pay for them to be lower than the actual value of their businesses. This is what is defined as being a value investor. It is about doing things right. We believe the obsession with labelling and associating a concept —value— with a series of attributes such as growth, sustainability, governance and quality is a mistake and a fundamental error, even though, in this case, they are all absolutely marvellous. Bestinver is not going to enter into this type of futile debate. What we think is better for you —for everyone— is to try and be relevant, have an impact on decision-making, identify risks and opportunities and, ultimately, connect ESG agendas with competitiveness, differentiation and profitability. These are all essential ingredients to create (sustainable) value. We are of the view that, like us in the way we manage your investments, a company without defined and appropriate competencies vis-à-vis environmental, social and corporate governance matters is not duly prepared to protect and nurture long-term value creation. We use fundamental analysis —the basis of our investment decisions— to determine these capabilities. We will therefore try to identify the parameters that help us determine the financial and non-financial risks to which we are exposed when investing in a business. Similarly, we will strive to quantify those variables that dictate the sustainability of that business's competitive position, growth and profitability. Ultimately, none of this new for us. It is about continuing to do what we have always done, albeit in somewhat more of an explicit and documented fashion: analyse from a qualitative and quantitative perspective the different aspects that make a company valuable.
  • 8. Bestinver's competitive advantages Greater awareness in society and a more stringent regulatory framework have led to ESG agendas being spotlighted in most listed companies. There is a risk, in some instances, that this shift becomes a mere formality to attract investments (or finance). In other words, the act of meeting a series of criteria to be rated not qualified. It is therefore vitally important that as savers, we do our homework and are able to separate the wheat from the chaff. In other words, discriminate between commendable and important practices and others that are totally pointless or, even worse, corrupt. In a world increasingly dominated by passive investing, these risks are extremely significant. At Bestinver, we are going to ensure the companies we invest in have a clear desire to implement policies that include environmental, social and corporate governance criteria. We are also going to verify that such plans are real, honest and, above all, in line with the fiduciary duties these companies have to their shareholders. We are aware that these strategies sometimes require sacrifices; sacrifices that Bestinver will applaud and support. In such a short-sighted world that judges major corporate strategies in quarters rather than years and demands instant returns on investment without the necessary maturation periods, in markets in which we see with astonishment that the average time investors hold shares is five months, Bestinver's corporate culture is acknowledged by companies wanting to generate long-term value. We have a competitive advantage that we know how to and must exploit. Thanks to your faith and support, our size and investment philosophy matter. We are the leading independent investment management company in Spain and have a top shareholder that provides robustness and constancy. This often means we hold majority stakes in the companies in which we invest. This privilege, and also responsibility, allows us to put forward ideas to these businesses' management teams and oversee their strategies and their impact on generating value for their shareholders and society as a whole. The aim of this letter is not to talk about passive management (a term that has all the hallmarks of being an oxymoron), but it does appear to be difficult to carry out such an exhaustive screening as what we have set out here in a passive manner. It also does not seem possible to passively replicate our involvement with the management teams we have just described. We have the impression that active management and investing with ESG criteria in mind must go hand-in-hand in the years ahead.
  • 9. An opportunity we must exploit As we said at the start, the pandemic has given us time to reflect. We are aware that every crisis brings with it an opportunity. How we react after though depends on the model of society we want to move towards. Incorporating ESG criteria more comprehensively and formally into our analysis process not only provides us with another tool to better manage the risks and profitability of your portfolios but also represents our contribution to speeding up construction of a better world. This is not a latent desire or ambition, rather a firm commitment to invest in more sustainable businesses that aspire to create wealth without renouncing social progress and respect for the environment. Bestinver will continue to provide you with tools you can use to build your long-term investments, but we also aspire for you to see us from now on as a vehicle that can serve to champion and channel the changes that will boost the well-being of current and future generations. You, through your savings, and us, by managing them, will be able to nurture the clear synergies that exist between corporate success and the progress of society as a whole. We cannot think of a better legacy of the pandemic which, thanks to all our efforts, now appears to have an expiry date. New infrastructure fund At a corporate level, we are very pleased to inform you of the launch of Bestinver Infra: our venture capital fund investing in infrastructure. The prevailing low interest rates and performance of this type of asset on the side lines of the economic cycle are attractive for those wanting to diversify their investments. Bestinver Infra will open the door to institutional and retail investors alike to global investments in top-notch infrastructure. Francisco del Pozo and his experienced team will lead on managing the fund, following the principles that are shared throughout Bestinver: fundamental analysis, appropriate risk management and an investment time horizon that is common to investors and fund managers alike. We will now leave you with a round-up of the management of each of our funds, giving you a chance to find out about the specific vision of each of their managers and the main movements in the individual portfolios. Best regards The investment team
  • 10.
  • 11. Return 13.53% annualised return for Bestinfond since launch Fund assets We manage over EUR 6.4 billion Investors 50,000 Bestinver in numbers Awards obtained More than 100 in the last 20 years Independence 100% Acciona Group Figures as at 31/12/2020. Bestinfond start date: 13/01/1993
  • 12. 13 CONTENTS Investment funds 16 Equities 17   ‰ Bestinfond 17   ‰ Bestinver Internacional 23   ‰ Bestvalue 29   ‰ Bestinver Bolsa 35   ‰ Bestinver Grandes Compañías 38   ‰ Bestinver Latam 41   ‰ Bestinver Megatendencias 44 Mixed and fixed income 47   ‰ Bestinver Mixto 47   ‰ Bestinver Patrimonio 49   ‰ Bestinver Deuda Corporativa 51   ‰ Bestinver Renta 53   ‰ Bestinver Corto Plazo 55 Hedge funds 57   ‰ Bestinver Hedge Value Fund 57   ‰ Bestinver Tordesillas 60 Pension funds 64 Equities 65   ‰ Bestinver Global 65 Mixed and fixed income 71   ‰ Bestinver Plan Mixto 71
  • 13. 14 This document has been prepared by Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC for information purposes only, and may not be considered, under any circumstances, an offer to invest in its investment funds. The information has been compiled by Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC using sources considered reliable. Nevertheless, and although reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that the information is correct, Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC does not guarantee that it is accurate, complete or up-to-date. All of the opinions and estimations included in this document represent the opinion of Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC on the date to which they refer and may vary without prior warning. All of the opinions contained herein have been issued on a general basis, without taking into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of each person. Under no circumstances shall Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC, its administrators, employees or authorised personnel be held responsible for any harm of any kind that may proceed, directly or indirectly, from the use of the information contained in this document. A statement of past performance does not constitute, under any circumstances, a promise or guarantee of future returns. All of Bestinver’s returns are expressed in € and in net terms, after expenses and commissions. Potential: The growth potential that, in the opinion of Bestinver’s managers, the fund has at any given time, calculated as the difference between the current PER and the target PER. This does not represent the gain that the fund will make in a certain period, given that, although the fund will achieve a specific return, the objective of the managers is to increase, or at least maintain, that potential. PER: The free cash-flow price at which the fund trades, based on the PER estimated by Bestinver’s managers for each company (including adjustments such as: debt, point in the cycle, price, currency, etc.). Target Price: the Net Asset Value that the shares in the fund may reach on the basis of the intrinsic value that all of the stocks that form the portfolio have, in the opinion of Bestinver’s managers. LEGAL WARNING   ‰ Bestinver Plan Renta 73   ‰ Bestinver Plan Patrimonio 75 Voluntary mutual benefit society (EPSV) 78 Equities 79   ‰ Bestinver Crecimiento 79 Mixed and fixed income 81   ‰ Bestinver Futuro 81   ‰ Bestinver Consolidación 83
  • 14. 15
  • 16. 17 2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch Bestinfond -3,83% 20,81% 0,21% 4,48% 6,87% 6,74% 13,53% Reference index* 6,33% 30,02% 9,40% 9,30% 9,54% 6,24% 9,80% Table of annualised returns BESTINFOND Invests in global equities, especially in European companies. Investment funds Annualised returns Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 13/01/1993. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. *The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data obtained for the index in force at any given time. Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral concentration risk. The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es. Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years. 0% 5% -5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 25% 2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch Bestinfond Reference index -20% -15% -10% DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution Consumer 27,7% Financial 10,0% Industrial 40,1% Communication & Technology 17,3% Liquidity 4,9% Europe 66,9% Iberia 9,1% Other 19,1% Liquidity 4,9% Fund managers Tomás Pintó International Equities Director Jorge Sources International Equities Manager
  • 17. 18 Investment funds FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 2,67% ING GROUP 1,78% INTESA SANPAOLO 1,18% COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO INFORMA 3,21% SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 2,98% AMS 2,71% INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO ASHTEAD GROUP 2,58% KONECRANES 2,36% SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP 2,01% CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO HELLOFRESH 3,95% DELIVERY HERO 3,68% GLAXOSMITHKLINE 2,55% Main positions by sector BestinFond ended the year clearly outperforming the main benchmark indexes. Many of our companies, which had been left behind since the March recovery, made up a lot of ground in the last quarter thanks to the development of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Their high degree of efficacy against the virus paves the way for a quicker economy recovery, benefiting to a greater extent the businesses and sectors worst affected by the pandemic. It is strange that it was the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine, a day after the US election result was declared, that diverted the market's gaze to this group of companies trading at never-before-seen extreme relative valuations. We say strange because until not so long ago, the market was seen as a mechanism that discounted events. Now, though, it appears to be a mechanism that reacts to them. Whatever the case, over the final quarter of last year, the fund racked up significant gains (+20.13%), which brightened —but not disguised— a challenging year during which we lost money (-3.83%). It has been an extremely complicated time for everyone, but we have learned several lessons that will bear fruits for you in the future thanks to your patience and trust. As we said, a bitter-sweet 2020 for many reasons. One of these is the fact that three of our companies have been the subjects of takeover bids in recent weeks. It is always satisfying when this happens as, to a certain degree, it validates our investment philosophy. However, this is definitely not the case when the premium offered by the buyers is inadequate. This is the case with the copper mining company, KAZ Minerals, or the producer of silicon wafers for microchip manufacturing, Siltronic. We believe the offers made do not reflect the true value of these companies' assets, although it is the case that they are 70-75% above the price at which we began to invest in both firms last April. The situation is different regarding the third point of contention: Tikkurila. The purchase offer for the North American company, PPG, with an 85% premium, puts the price above the intrinsic value we had set internally for this Finnish paint manufacturer. Our public thanks go to Colin Gibson, Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, who discovered and promoted this investment idea that has generated such decent returns for the portfolio. Value investing and "the ability to suffer" In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund. We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a whole represents the best use of our capital. Incorporating this methodology into our daily work does not change our nature as value investors, it enhances it. Manager’s round-up
  • 18. 19 We also told you that the pandemic has given us a moment to review some of our priorities. Social networks and the digital world have markedly raised the awareness of society, which is now demanding a long-term action plan on matters that are commonly accepted as not only advisable but essential. This new reality should, among other things, question the short-sightedness some companies are guilty of (as well as some investors) that generates such little value for society. In the business world, generating long-term value requires careful planning and investments over an extensive time horizon. Businesses adopting these strategies tend to have three characteristics: they generate a lot of cash, they are prudently financed and they have an owner (or management team) that is prepared to sacrifice gains today for (greater) returns tomorrow. Perhaps this is the best hallmark of quality when judging a company. Tom Russo called it "the capacity to suffer". There are companies that invest with a twenty-year view, primarily because they can. They have the capacity to make mistakes without hindering their ability to generate value (today) for their customers and shareholders. Many of these companies with the capacity to suffer make investments that do not generate an immediate return. Some of these investments will fail —and they are able to assume these— while others will involve new lines of business that will generate additional sources of wealth for their owners. This is the type of business we want to include in our portfolios. They are stable and profitable today (thanks to their past investments) and so have the wherewithal (because they can) and the willingness (thanks to their corporate culture) to think and invest long or very long term. This ability to maximise profits today, without mortgaging value creation in the future is the fine line separating decent companies from marvellous ones. So, how does one evaluate what cannot be seen but that one suspects will (eventually) be visible? This is the sort of question we long-term investors ask ourselves. They do not have any easy answers but they are very relevant when analysing currently profitable businesses that take a long-term view and are therefore able to try, fail and potentially succeed. Fortunately, we have a brilliant team of analysts who help us in this regard. Without the contributions of Senior TMT Sector Analysis, Vighnesh Padiachy, it would be a lot more difficult to understand Samsung's long-term ability to invest and the formidable barriers to entry that have been built up over the years. The same is true with Jaime Vázquez, Senior Consumer Sector Analysts, and Miguel Dolz, Consumer and TMT Analyst, who have enabled us to understand why the business models of HelloFresh or Booking, to cite just two examples, are class leading. Both boast dominant positions in their sectors and are so profitable today because of the competitive advantages they have been forging for a long time. They chose not to follow the herd, to channel current profits into the search for future competitiveness (and profitability). This vision and capacity (to suffer) have shaped what they are today. We pursue the same goal when building our portfolios. We are talking about having the capacity to suffer in our management role. We will therefore search for companies that offer the recourse and profitability needed to fund potentially far more lucrative ideas. This approach entails being able to assume occasional failures in our most risky investments without the profitability of our portfolios taking a major (or permanent) hit. To achieve this, it is therefore necessary to have a certain weight of proven businesses that are well prepared for when the cycle turns against them, do not have a terrific opportunity to grow but, on the other hand, offer us stability and predictability. Berkshire Hathaway Berkshire Hathaway is a prime example of what we mean. It is not easy to find a firm that is more honestly and intelligently managed as Berkshire. It owns a large number of profitable companies generating huge volume of free Investment funds
  • 19. 20 cash. Its capital structure is a strength, its accounting conservative, and its shareholders are seen and treated as exactly what they are: owners. The heart of Berkshire is still its insurance arm. The raft of insurance companies operating under its wings boast the most solvent capital position in the sector, and have historically been able to assume risk while turning a very decent profit. In other words, the sum of claims for the cover they have provided plus the expenses incurred running their businesses has been substantially lower than the premiums charged to their policyholders. These profits, plus the additional investment capacity they have due to the time lag between receiving premiums and having to pay out on policies they have sold —the so-called "float"— have enabled Warren Buffett to buy over the years companies in such diverse sectors as: railways (BNSF); electricity distribution and generation (Berkshire Hathaway Energy); and manufacturing and retail (Precision Castparts, Lubrizol, Clayton Homes, Marmon, ISCAR, etc.). And of course, a portfolio of listed securities with names as well known as Apple, Coca-Cola, American Express and Bank of America. We have been monitoring and analysing Berkshire for a long time and cannot recall when its shares were as cheap as they are today. We have been building up a significant position in the funds since the summer because we believe Berkshire is a great place for our capital. The fact that many of its businesses are not linked to the economic cycle along with the prudent way they are managed protect Berkshire's long-term intrinsic value. We are aware that the impressive growth in other decades is irrepeatable, but its book value (and intrinsic value) has risen by a cumulative 10% over the last 10 years. We see no reason why it may not continue along the same path over the next decade. Perhaps we can make one small observation in this respect. You might call us old-fashioned, but we refer to book value because, in this case (and so many others), it is significant. There is a strong desire to delegitimise the validity of this metric for valuing a company that we cannot understand. This may be because of the recent discovery of the value of intangible assets in some corners of the market, or perhaps the result of the use of labels that simplifies everything to the point of the absurd. It is worth remembering that intangible assets were not invented the day before yesterday, and that not all listed companies only have this type of asset on their balance sheets. We know that investing in intangible assets normally goes through profit and loss and is not reflected in the cash flow statement. Consequently, it does not appear on the balance sheet. We are well aware that it is possible, even desirable, for a company investing heavily during a favourable point in the economic cycle to have an income statement that shows massive losses – losses that are totally irrelevant when it comes to valuing the business. Thus, these "traditional" valuation metrics are irrelevant in some cases. However, this is not true for Berkshire or for a large number of listed companies in Europe (and equally some of those on our books such as Delivery Hero, to cite one example). Warren Buffett has lamented that the lack of decent investment opportunities in recent years has led Berkshire accumulating huge sums of cash on its balance sheet (close to USD 150 billion at the end of September). The fact that it does not pay dividends and share buybacks have been very few and far between over the years is an indication of its disciplined investment approach. We see this vast cash pile as being very valuable in Warren Buffett's hands. We see it as “antifragile”, to quote Nassim Taleb, where, it is worth remembering, the concept of antfragility involves looking for assets or investments that not only shield us from adverse events (such as cash) but also enable us to benefit from the disorder, stress or chaos associated with such headwinds (such as cash in Buffet's hands). As we have pointed out to you, Berkshire offers a fabulous option should the markets slump —which they will do eventually— and until then, we expect it will buy back significant quantities of its shares as it has already started to do (USD 9 billion in the third quarter, taking total buybacks in the first nine months of 2020 to USD 15.7 billion). These Investment funds
  • 20. 21 buybacks suggest its treasury shares are now the greatest investments in Berkshire's history, which may indicate that Warren Buffett also considers they have value at today's prices. According to our calculations, it is trading at 1.10x its book value and 30-40% below its intrinsic value. All this without giving credit to its immense anti-fragility. Of course, there may be reasons justifying these low valuations. There is a groundswell of opinion criticising the merits of the investments made by Berkshire —or, more accurately, the lack of investments— in recent years. Warren Buffett has lost his “touch”, they say. There is a past precedent when at the end of the dotcom boom, he was criticised for a lack of exposure to technology shares and focus on banks and consumer non-durables companies. That approach did not do him any harm then, and it cannot be discounted that it won't stand him in good stead again if the stock market cycle changes. Nevertheless, more than this, people forget that in just two years, he has tripled Berkshire's investment in Apple: the greatest investment in the company's history. Nobody has Buffett's experience, wisdom and track record, and his advanced age (he is 90 years old) may explain why part of the market is not interested in Berkshire shares. Buffett is irreplaceable and will be a big loss when he leaves the helm of the company. He himself has been telegraphing this in considerable detail in the road map for his succession. We therefore have little doubt about who his successors or who the right people to occupy his positions will be. Berkshire will be headed up by a CEO, probably Greg Abel or Ajit Jain, and will also have a chief investment officer, most likely Todd Combs or Ted Weschler —both excellent investors. We are not going to delve further into the valuation because there is not enough space in this report, but we urge you to find out about these and other qualities of the Berkshire investment case in a forthcoming blog article by the investment team, which we are sure you will find interesting. Main movements in the portfolio We added some new companies to the portfolio over the quarter. This includes Peugeot, which we expect to generate considerable value thanks to its merger with FCA. Stellantis (the name of the new group) will be headed up by Carlos Tavares, one of the best if not the best, CEO in the automotive industry (a sector we have covered in our investment blog you can read on our website). Another addition to our portfolio is Smurfit Kappa. We have taken advantage of a liquidity event (capital increase) to obtain an equity stake in a group that is fabulously managed by the Smurfit family and, undoubtedly, offers one of the most interesting solutions to replacing single-use plastics in our daily lives. Another new acquisition is Univar, a restructuring idea in a sector we know well, thanks to Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, Carlos Arenillas: chemical products distribution. We have increased our stake in Berkshire Hathaway, as we have done with GSK, given that the market is still not giving any credit to the forthcoming spin-off of the latter's consumer and pharma divisions, and HelloFresh where we foresee that very notable growth (albeit not explosive like in 2020) will provide a much clearer view of the real profitability of this business. HeidelbergCement is another new play, despite its magnificent performance since the March lows. We still see the German cement producer as cyclical with defensive qualities at an extremely attractive price (a valuation we will explain in the forthcoming investment team blog). We have also continued to increase our positions in Grifols, Inditex and Naturgy; all of which we continue to view as frankly interesting at the current prices. On the contrary, we have wound up our position in JustEat. The takeaway home delivery giant has brought us much to celebrate, but its competitive position is beginning to weaken in some markets, and at a strategic level we do not understand its reticence to explore new vertical propositions in distribution. We also do not think its acquisition of its competitor, Grubhub, was ideal. We have also sold Andritz. We are not comfortable with the Austrian company's lack of growth, particularly given the challenges it has faced in recent years to convert reported profits into cash. We have more appealing propositions in which to invest our capital. Lastly, we have exited AP Moeller-Maersk after its Investment funds
  • 21. 22 Investment funds Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver ADDITIONS INCREASES SMURFIT KAPPA PEUGEOT UNIVAR HEILDERBERG CEMENT GLAXO BERSKSHIRE HATHAWAY HELLO FRESH INDITEX NATURGY EXITS REDUCTIONS ZOOPLUS UNICFREDITO AP MOLLER MAERSK JUST EAT RIO TINTO STANDARD CHARTERED BNP Movements in the portfolio shares gained 40% over the quarter. The clear improvement in its profitability is well reflected by the prices at which it is currently trading and we do not discount its cash generation profile taking a hit due to greater investments in the coming years. We have reduced our exposure in Rio Tinto, which has benefited from the hike in iron ore prices that we do not foresee is sustainable. We have also continued to reduce the weight of the banking sector; specifically, by selling our position in Unicredito. The departure of its CEO, Mustier, who had prioritised return on equity to shareholders over mergers, has clouded the investment thesis for the Italian bank, especially in light of the talks it is having with the Italian Treasury to purchase Monte dei Paschi. As we said at the start of this report, the fund enjoyed a frankly decent quarter of the year. Since the current team took over management at the start of April, the fund has posted a cumulative return 14.1% higher than the general European index – the MSCI Europe, including dividends, and 7.33% higher than the MSCI Global Index, including dividends. This decent performance partially offsets the challenges during the year that would have been difficult to avoid without the team's patience and knowledge of the world of investments. We will sign off now wishing you a magnificent 2021. We will continue to strive to offer you a more liquid, better balanced portfolio with wide margins of safety and greater upside potential. A major shareholder that provides solidity and permanence, an eclectic investment team committed to finding value, and knowledgeable, prudent and patient clients —who are our greatest asset— form a formidable combination to exploit existing opportunities and those that come our way in the future.
  • 22. 23 Investment funds BESTINVER INTERNACIONAL Invests globally, although it mainly focuses on listed companies in Europe, excluding Spain and Portugal. Tabla de Annualised returns 2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch Bestinver Internacional -1,38% 23,34% 1,46% 5,37% 7,58% 7,44% 9,27% Reference index* 6,33% 30,02% 10,02% 9,64% 9,77% 5,63% 4,69% DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution Europe 73,4% Iberia 0,0% Other 21,3% Liquidity 5,2% Consumer 25,7% Financial 9,4% Industrial 40,4% Communication & Technology 19,3% Liquidity 5,2% Fund managers Tomás Pintó International Equities Director Jorge Sources International Equities International Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 19/11/1997. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. *The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data obtained for the index in force at any given time. Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral concentration risk. The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es. Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years. Annualised returns Bestinver internacional Reference index 2020 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch -20% 2019 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% -10% -15% -5% 0%
  • 23. 24 Investment funds FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL B 2,95% ING GROUP 1,97% INTESA SANPAOLO 1,30% COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO INFORMA 3,55% SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 3,38% AMS 2,99% INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO ASHTEAD GROUP 2,85% KONECRANES 2,67% SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP 2,23% CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO HELLOFRESH 4,37% DELIVERY HERO 4,07% GLAXOSMITHKLINE 2,81% Main positions by sector Bestinver Internacional ended the year clearly outperforming the main benchmark indexes. Many of our companies, which had been left behind since the March recovery, made up a lot of ground in the last quarter thanks to the development of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Their high degree of efficacy against the virus paves the way for a quicker economy recovery, benefiting to a greater extent the businesses and sectors worst affected by the pandemic. It is strange that it was the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine, a day after the US election result was declared, that diverted the market's gaze to this group of companies trading at never-before-seen extreme relative valuations. We say strange because until not so long ago, the market was seen as a mechanism that discounted events. Now, though, it appears to be a mechanism that reacts to them. Whatever the case, over the final quarter of last year, the fund racked up significant gains (+21.28%), which brightened —but not disguised— a challenging year during which we lost money (-1.38%). It has been an extremely complicated time for everyone, but we have learned several lessons that will bear fruits for you in the future thanks to your patience and trust. As we said, a bitter-sweet 2020 for many reasons. One of these is the fact that three of our companies have been the subjects of takeover bids in recent weeks. It is always satisfying when this happens as, to a certain degree, it validates our investment philosophy. However, this is definitely not the case when the premium offered by the buyers is inadequate. This is the case with the copper mining company, KAZ Minerals, or the producer of silicon wafers for microchip manufacturing, Siltronic. We believe the offers made do not reflect the true value of these companies' assets, although it is the case that they are 70-75% above the price at which we began to invest in both firms last April. The situation is different regarding the third point of contention: Tikkurila. The purchase offer for the North American company, PPG, with an 85% premium, puts the price above the intrinsic value we had set internally for this Finnish paint manufacturer. Our public thanks go to Colin Gibson, Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, who discovered and promoted this investment idea that has generated such decent returns for the portfolio. Value investing and "the ability to suffer" In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund. We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a whole makes the best use of our capital. Incorporating this methodology into our daily work does not change our nature as value investors, it enhances it. Manager’s round-up
  • 24. 25 Investment funds We also told you that the pandemic has given us a moment to review some of our priorities. Social networks and the digital world have markedly raised the awareness of society, which is now demanding a long-term action plan on matters that are commonly accepted as not only advisable but essential. This new reality should, among other things, question the short-sightedness some companies are guilty of (as well as some investors) that generates such little value for society. In the business world, generating long-term value requires careful planning and investments over an extensive time horizon. Businesses adopting these strategies tend to have three characteristics: they generate a lot of cash, they are prudently financed and they have an owner (or management team) that is prepared to sacrifice gains today for (greater) returns tomorrow. Perhaps this is the best hallmark of quality when judging a company. Tom Russo called it "the capacity to suffer". There are companies that invest with a twenty-year view, primarily because they can. They have the capacity to make mistakes without hindering their ability to generate value (today) for their customers and shareholders. Many of these companies with the capacity to suffer make investments that do not generate an immediate return. Some of these investments will fail —and they are able to assume these— while others will involve new lines of business that will generate additional sources of wealth for their owners. This is the type of business we want to include in our portfolios. They are stable and profitable today (thanks to their past investments) and so have the wherewithal (because they can) and the willingness (thanks to their corporate culture) to think and invest long or very long term. This ability to maximise profits today, without mortgaging value creation in the future is the fine line separating decent companies from marvellous ones. So, how does one evaluate what cannot be seen but that one suspects will (eventually) be visible? This is the sort of question we long-term investors ask ourselves. They do not have any easy answers but they are very relevant when analysing currently profitable businesses that take a long-term view and are therefore able to try, fail and potentially succeed. Fortunately, we have a brilliant team of analysts who help us in this regard. Without the contributions of Senior TMT Sector Analysis, Vighnesh Padiachy, it would be a lot more difficult to understand Samsung's long-term ability to invest and the formidable barriers to entry that have been built up over the years. The same is true with Jaime Vázquez, Senior Consumer Sector Analysts, and Miguel Dolz, Consumer and TMT Analyst, who have enabled us to understand why the business models of HelloFresh or Booking, to cite just two examples, are class leading. Both boast dominant positions in their sectors and are so profitable today because of the competitive advantages they have been forging for a long time. They chose not to follow the herd, to channel current profits into the search for future competitiveness (and profitability). This vision and capacity (to suffer) have shaped what they are today. We pursue the same goal when building our portfolios. We are talking about having the capacity to suffer in our management role. We therefore search for companies that offer the recourse and profitability needed to fund potentially far more lucrative ideas. This approach entails being able to assume occasional failures in our most risky investments without the profitability of our portfolios taking a major (or permanent) hit. To achieve this, it is therefore necessary to have a certain weight of proven businesses that are well prepared for when the cycle turns against them, do not have a terrific opportunity to grow but, on the other hand, offer us stability and predictability. Berkshire Hathaway Berkshire Hathaway is a prime example of what we mean. It is not easy to find a firm that is more honestly and intelligently managed as Berkshire. It owns a large number of profitable companies that generate huge volume of
  • 25. 26 free cash. Its capital structure is a strength, its accounting conservative, and its shareholders are seen and treated as exactly what they are: owners. The heart of Berkshire is still its insurance arm. The raft of insurance companies operating under its wings boast the most solvent capital position in the sector, and have historically been able to assume risk while turning a very decent profit. In other words, the sum of claims for the cover they have provided plus the expenses incurred running their businesses has been substantially lower than the premiums charged to their policyholders. These profits, plus the additional investment capacity they have due to the time lag between receiving premiums and having to pay out on policies they have sold —the so-called "float"— have enabled Warren Buffett to buy over the years companies in such diverse sectors as: railways (BNSF); electricity distribution and generation (Berkshire Hathaway Energy); and manufacturing and retail (Precision Castparts, Lubrizol, Clayton Homes, Marmon, ISCAR, etc.). And of course, a portfolio of listed securities with names as well known as Apple, Coca-Cola, American Express and Bank of America. We have been monitoring and analysing Berkshire for a long time and cannot recall when its shares were as cheap as they are today. We have been building up a significant position in the funds since the summer because we believe Berkshire is a great place for our capital. The fact that many of its businesses are not linked to the economic cycle along with the prudent way they are managed protect Berkshire's long-term intrinsic value. We are aware that the impressive growth in other decades is irrepeatable, but its book value (and intrinsic value) has risen by a cumulative 10% over the last 10 years. We see no reason why it may not continue along the same path over the next decade. Perhaps we can make one small observation in this respect. You might call us old-fashioned, but we refer to book value because, in this case (and so many others), it is significant. There is a strong desire to delegitimise the validity of this metric for valuing a company that we cannot understand. This may be because of the recent discovery of the value of intangible assets in some corners of the market, or perhaps the result of the use of labels that simplifies everything to the point of the absurd. It is worth remembering that intangible assets were not invented the day before yesterday, and that not all listed companies only have this type of asset on their balance sheets. We know that investing in intangible assets normally goes through profit and loss and is not reflected in the cash flow statement. Consequently, it does not appear on the balance sheet. We are well aware that it is possible, even desirable, for a company investing heavily during a favourable point in the economic cycle to have an income statement that shows massive losses – losses that are totally irrelevant when it comes to valuing the business. Thus, these "traditional" valuation metrics are irrelevant in some cases. However, this is not true for Berkshire or for a large number of listed companies in Europe (and equally some of those on our books such as Delivery Hero, to cite one example). Warren Buffett has lamented that the lack of decent investment opportunities in recent years has led Berkshire accumulating huge sums of cash on its balance sheet (close to USD 150 billion at the end of September). The fact that it does not pay dividends and share buybacks have been very few and far between over the years is an indication of its disciplined investment approach. We see this vast cash pile as being very valuable in Warren Buffett's hands. We see it as “antifragile”, to quote Nassim Taleb, where, it is worth remembering, the concept of antfragility involves looking for assets or investments that not only shield us from adverse events (such as cash) but also enable us to benefit from the disorder, stress or chaos associated with such headwinds (such as cash in Buffet's hands). As we have pointed out to you, Berkshire offers a fabulous option should the markets slump —which they will do eventually— and until then, we expect it will buy back significant quantities of its shares as it has already started to do (USD 9 billion in the third quarter, taking total buybacks in the first nine months of 2020 to USD 15.7 billion). These Investment funds
  • 26. 27 buybacks suggest its treasury shares are now the greatest investments in Berkshire's history, which may indicate that Warren Buffett also considers they have value at today's prices. According to our calculations, it is trading at 1.10x its book value and 30-40% below its intrinsic value. All this without giving credit to its immense anti-fragility. Of course, there may be reasons justifying these low valuations. There is a groundswell of opinion criticising the merits of the investments made by Berkshire —or, more accurately, the lack of investments— in recent years. Warren Buffett has lost his “touch”, they say. There is a past precedent when at the end of the dotcom boom, he was criticised for a lack of exposure to technology shares and focus on banks and consumer non-durables companies. That approach did not do him any harm then, and it cannot be discounted that it won't stand him in good stead again if the stock market cycle changes. Nevertheless, more than this, people forget that in just two years, he has tripled Berkshire's investment in Apple: the greatest investment in the company's history. Nobody has Buffett's experience, wisdom and track record, and his advanced age (he is 90 years old) may explain why part of the market is not interested in Berkshire shares. Buffett is irreplaceable and will be a big loss when he leaves the helm of the company. He himself has been telegraphing this in considerable detail in the road map for his succession. We therefore have little doubt about who will be his successors or who the right people to occupy his positions. Berkshire will be headed up by a CEO, probably Greg Abel or Ajit Jain, and will also have a chief investment officer, most likely Todd Combs or Ted Weschler —both excellent investors. We are not going to delve further into the valuation because there is not enough space in this report, but we urge you to find out about these and other qualities of the Berkshire investment case in a forthcoming blog article by the investment team, which we are sure you will find interesting. Main movements in the portfolio We added some new companies to the portfolio over the quarter. This includes Peugeot, which we expect to generate considerable value thanks to its merger with FCA. Stellantis (the name of the new group) will be headed up by Carlos Tavares, one of the best if not the best, CEO in the automotive industry (a sector we have covered in our investment blog you can read on our website). Another addition to our portfolio is Smurfit Kappa. We have taken advantage of a liquidity event (capital increase) to obtain an equity stake in a group that is fabulously managed by the Smurfit family and, undoubtedly, offers one of the most interesting solutions to replacing single-use plastics in our daily lives. Another new acquisition is Univar, a restructuring idea in a sector we know well, thanks to Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, Carlos Arenillas: chemical products distribution. We have increased our stake in Berkshire Hathaway, as we have done with GSK, given that the market is still not giving any credit to the forthcoming spin-off of the latter's consumer and pharma divisions, and HelloFresh where we foresee that very notable growth (albeit not explosive like in 2020) will provide a much clearer view of the real profitability of this business. HeidelbergCement is another new play, despite its magnificent performance since the March lows. We still see the German cement producer as cyclical with defensive qualities at an extremely attractive price (a valuation we will explain in the forthcoming investment team blog). On the contrary, we have wound up our position in JustEat. The takeaway home delivery giant has brought us much to celebrate, but its competitive position is beginning to weaken in some markets, and at a strategic level we do not understand its reticence to explore new vertical propositions in distribution. We also do not think its acquisition of its competitor, Grubhub, was ideal. We have also sold Andritz. We are not comfortable with the Austrian company's lack of growth, particularly given the challenges it has faced in recent years to convert reported profits into cash. We have more appealing propositions in which to invest our capital. Lastly, we have exited AP Moeller-Maersk after its shares gained 40% over the quarter. The clear improvement in its profitability is well reflected by the prices at which Investment funds
  • 27. 28 it is currently trading and we do not discount its cash generation profile taking a hit due to greater investments in the coming years. We have reduced our exposure in Rio Tinto, which has benefited from the hike in iron ore prices that we do not foresee is sustainable. We have also continued to reduce the weight of the banking sector; specifically, by selling our position in Unicredito. The departure of its CEO, Mustier, who had prioritised return on equity to shareholders over mergers, has clouded the investment thesis for the Italian bank, especially in light of the talks it is having with the Italian Treasury to purchase Monte dei Paschi. As we said at the start of this report, the fund enjoyed a frankly decent quarter of the year. Since the current team took over management at the start of April, the fund has posted a cumulative return 17.35% higher than the general European index – the MSCI Europe, including dividends, and 10.58% higher than the MSCI Global Index, including dividends. This decent performance partially offsets the challenges during the year that would have been difficult to avoid without the team's patience and knowledge of the world of investments. We will sign off now wishing you a magnificent 2021. We will continue to strive to offer you a more liquid, better balanced portfolio with wide margins of safety and greater upside potential. A major shareholder that provides solidity and permanence, an eclectic investment team committed to finding value, and knowledgeable, prudent and patient clients —who are our greatest asset— form a formidable combination to exploit existing opportunities and those that come our way in the future. ADDITIONS INCREASES SMURFIT KAPPA PEUGEOT UNIVAR GLAXO BERSKSHIRE HATHAWAY HELLO FRESH HEILDERBERG CEMENT EXITS REDUCTIONS ZOOPLUS UNICFREDITO AP MOLLER MAERSK JUST EAT RIO TINTO STANDARD CHARTERED BNP Movements in the portfolio Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver Investment funds
  • 28. 29 BESTVALUE Invests in global equities, especially in European companies. Investment funds Tabla de Annualised returns 2020 2019 3 years 5 years Launch Bestvalue -4,29% 20,95 0,09% 4,37% 6,68% Index (70% IGBM / 30% PSI) 6,33% 30,02% 9,40% 9,30% 9,99% Fund managers Tomás Pintó International Equities Director Annualised returns Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 02/12/2010. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. *The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data obtained for the index in force at any given time. Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral concentration risk. The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years. 0% 5% -5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 25% 2019 3 years 5 years Launch Bestvalue Reference index -20% -25% -15% -10% 2020 DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution Consumer 23,7% Financial 10,5% Industrial 42,8% Communication & Technology 17,9% Liquidity 5,2% Europe 63,4% Iberia 13,1% Other 18,3% Liquidity 5,2% Ricardo Seixas Iberian Equities Director
  • 29. 30 FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 2,52% ING GROUP 1,68% INTESA SANPAOLO 1,11% COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO INFORMA 3,03% SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 2,89% AMS 2,55% INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO ASHTEAD GROUP 2,44% KONECRANES 2,32% BEFESA MEDIO AMBIENTE 1,93% CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO HELLOFRESH 3,74% DELIVERY HERO 3,48% GLAXOSMITHKLINE 2,40% Main positions by sector BestValue ended the year clearly outperforming the main reference indexes. Many of our companies, which had been left behind since the March recovery, made up a lot of ground in the last quarter thanks to the development of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Their high degree of efficacy against the virus paves the way for a quicker economy recovery, benefiting to a greater extent the businesses and sectors worst affected by the pandemic. It is strange that it was the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine, a day after the US election result was declared, that diverted the market's gaze to this group of companies trading at never-before-seen extreme relative valuations. We say strange because until not so long ago, the market was seen as a mechanism that discounted events. Now, though, it appears to be a mechanism that reacts to them. Whatever the case, over the final quarter of last year, the fund racked up significant gains (+21%), which brightened —but not disguised— a challenging year during which we lost money (-4.3%). It has been an extremely complicated time for everyone, but we have learned several lessons that will bear fruits for you in the future thanks to your patience and trust. As we said, a bitter-sweet 2020 for many reasons. One of these is the fact that three of our companies have been the subjects of takeover bids in recent weeks. It is always satisfying when this happens as, to a certain degree, it validates our investment philosophy. However, this is definitely not the case when the premium offered by the buyers is inadequate. This is the case with the copper mining company, KAZ Minerals, or the producer of silicon wafers for microchip manufacturing, Siltronic. We believe the offers made do not reflect the true value of these companies' assets, although it is the case that they are 70-75% above the price at which we began to invest in both firms last April. The situation is different regarding the third point of contention: Tikkurila. The purchase offer for the North American company, PPG, with an 85% premium, puts the price above the intrinsic value we had set internally for this Finnish paint manufacturer. Our public thanks go to Colin Gibson, Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, who discovered and promoted this investment idea that has generated such decent returns for the portfolio. Value investing and "the ability to suffer" In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund. We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a whole makes the best use of our capital. Incorporating this methodology into our daily work does not change our nature as value investors, it enhances it. We also told you that the pandemic has given us a moment to review some of our priorities. Social networks and the digital world have markedly raised the awareness of society, which is now demanding a long-term action plan on Manager’s round-up Investment funds
  • 30. 31 matters that are commonly accepted as not only advisable but essential. This new reality should, among other things, question the short-sightedness some companies are guilty of (as well as some investors) that generates such little value for society. In the business world, generating long-term value requires careful planning and investments over an extensive time horizon. Businesses adopting these strategies tend to have three characteristics: they generate a lot of cash, they are prudently financed and they have an owner (or management team) that is prepared to sacrifice gains today for (greater) returns tomorrow. Perhaps this is the best hallmark of quality when judging a company. Tom Russo called it "the capacity to suffer". There are companies that invest with a twenty-year view, primarily because they can. They have the capacity to make mistakes without hindering their ability to generate value (today) for their customers and shareholders. Many of these companies with the capacity to suffer make investments that do not generate an immediate return. Some of these investments will fail —and they are able to assume these— while others will involve new lines of business that will generate additional sources of wealth for their owners. This is the type of business we want to include in our portfolios. They are stable and profitable today (thanks to their past investments) and so have the wherewithal (because they can) and the willingness (thanks to their corporate culture) to think and invest long or very long term. This ability to maximise profits today, without mortgaging value creation in the future is the fine line separating decent companies from marvellous ones. So, how does one evaluate what cannot be seen but that one suspects will (eventually) be visible? This is the sort of question we long-term investors ask ourselves. They do not have any easy answers but they are very relevant when analysing currently profitable businesses that take a long-term view and are therefore able to try, fail and potentially succeed. Fortunately, we have a brilliant team of analysts who help us in this regard. Without the contributions of Vighnesh Padiachy, it would be a lot more difficult to understand Samsung's long-term ability to invest and the formidable barriers to entry that have been built up over the years. The same is true with Jaime Vázquez and Miguel Dolz, who have enabled us to understand why the business models of HelloFresh or Booking, to give just two examples, are class leading. Both boast dominant positions in their sectors and are so profitable today because of the competitive advantages they have been forging for a long time. They chose not to follow the herd, to channel current profits into the search for future competitiveness (and profitability). This vision and capacity (to suffer) have shaped what they are today. We pursue the same goal when building our portfolios. We are talking about having the capacity to suffer in our management role. We will therefore search for companies that offer the recourse and profitability needed to fund potentially far more lucrative ideas. This approach entails being able to assume occasional failures in our most risky investments without the profitability of our portfolios taking a major (or permanent) hit. To achieve this, it is therefore necessary to have a certain weight of proven businesses that are well prepared for when the cycle turns against them, do not have a terrific opportunity to grow but, on the other hand, offer us stability and predictability. Berkshire Hathaway Berkshire Hathaway is a prime example of what we mean. It is not easy to find a firm that is more honestly and intelligently managed as Berkshire. It owns a large number of profitable companies that generate huge volume of free cash. Its capital structure is a strength, its accounting conservative, and its shareholders are seen and treated as exactly what they are: owners. The heart of Berkshire is still its insurance arm. The raft of insurance companies operating under its wings boast the most solvent capital position in the sector, and have historically been able to assume risk while turning a very decent Investment funds
  • 31. 32 Investment funds profit. In other words, the sum of claims for the cover they have provided plus the expenses incurred running their businesses has been substantially lower than the premiums charged to their policyholders. These profits, plus the additional investment capacity they have due to the time lag between receiving premiums and having to pay out on the policies they have sold —the so-called "float"— have enabled Warren Buffett to buy over the years companies in such diverse sectors as: railways (BNSF); electricity distribution and generation (Berkshire Hathaway Energy); and manufacturing and retail (Precision Castparts, Lubrizol, Clayton Homes, Marmon, ISCAR, etc.). And of course, a portfolio of listed securities with names as well known as Apple, Coca-Cola, American Express and Bank of America. We have been monitoring and analysing Berkshire for a long time and cannot recall when its shares were as cheap as they are today. We have been building up a significant position in the funds since the summer because we believe Berkshire is a great place for our capital. The fact that many of its businesses are not linked to the economic cycle along with the prudent way they are managed protect Berkshire's long-term intrinsic value. We are aware that the impressive growth in other decades is irrepeatable, but its book value (and intrinsic value) has risen by a cumulative 10% over the last 10 years. We see no reason why it may not continue along the same path over the next decade. Perhaps we can make one small observation in this respect. You might call us old-fashioned, but we refer to book value because, in this case (and so many others), it is significant. There is a strong desire to delegitimise the validity of this metric for valuing a company that we cannot understand. This may be because of the recent discovery of the value of intangible assets in some corners of the market, or perhaps the result of the use of labels that simplifies everything to the point of the absurd. It is worth remembering that intangible assets were not invented the day before yesterday, and that not all listed companies only have this type of asset on their balance sheets. We know that investing in intangible assets normally goes through profit and loss and is not reflected in the cash flow statement. Consequently, it does not appear on the balance sheet. We are well aware that it is possible, even desirable, for a company investing heavily during a favourable point in the economic cycle to have an income statement that shows massive losses – losses that are totally irrelevant when it comes to valuing the business. Thus, these "traditional" valuation metrics are irrelevant in some cases. However, this is not true for Berkshire or for a large number of listed companies in Europe (and equally some of those on our books such as Delivery Hero, to cite one example). Warren Buffett has lamented that the lack of decent investment opportunities in recent years has led Berkshire accumulating huge sums of cash on its balance sheet (close to USD 150 billion at the end of September). The fact that it does not pay dividends and share buybacks have been very few and far between over the years is an indication of its disciplined investment approach. We see this vast cash pile as being very valuable in Warren Buffett's hands. We see it as “antifragile”, to quote Nassim Taleb, where, it is worth remembering, the concept of antfragility involves looking for assets or investments that not only shield us from adverse events (such as cash) but also enable us to benefit from the disorder, stress or chaos associated with such headwinds (such as cash in Buffet's hands). As we have pointed out to you, Berkshire offers a fabulous option should the markets slump —which they will do eventually— and until then, we expect it will buy back significant quantities of its shares as it has already started to do (USD 9 billion in the third quarter, taking total buybacks in the first nine months of 2020 to USD 15.7 billion). These buybacks suggest its treasury shares are now the greatest investments in Berkshire's history, which may indicate that Warren Buffett also considers they have value at today's prices. According to our calculations, it is trading at 1.10x its book value and 30-40% below its intrinsic value. All this without giving credit to its immense anti-fragility. Of course, there may be reasons justifying these low valuations. There is a groundswell of opinion criticising the merits of the investments made by Berkshire —or, more accurately, the lack of investments— in recent years. Warren Buffett has lost his “touch”, they say. There is a past
  • 32. 33 Investment funds precedent when at the end of the dotcom boom, he was criticised for a lack of exposure to technology shares and focus on banks and consumer non-durables companies. That approach did not do him any harm then, and it cannot be discounted that it won't stand him in good stead again if the stock market cycle changes. Nevertheless, more than this, people forget that in just two years, he has tripled Berkshire's investment in Apple: the greatest investment in the company's history. Nobody has Buffett's experience, wisdom and track record, and his advanced age (he is 90 years old) may explain why part of the market is not interested in Berkshire shares. Buffett is irreplaceable and will be a big loss when he leaves the helm of the company. He himself has been telegraphing this in considerable detail in the road map for his succession. We therefore have little doubt about who will be his successors or who the right people to occupy his positions. Berkshire will be headed up by a CEO, probably Greg Abel or Ajit Jain, and will also have a chief investment officer, most likely Todd Combs or Ted Weschler – both excellent investors. We are not going to delve further into the valuation because there is not enough space in this report, but we urge you to find out about these and other qualities of the Berkshire investment case in a forthcoming blog article by the investment team, which we are sure you will find interesting. Main movements in the portfolio We added some new companies to the portfolio over the quarter. This includes Peugeot, which we expect to generate considerable value thanks to its merger with FCA. Stellantis (the name of the new group) will be headed up by Carlos Tavares, one of the best if not the best, CEO in the automotive industry (a sector we have covered in our investment blog you can read on our website). Another addition to our portfolio is Smurfit Kappa. We have taken advantage of a liquidity event (capital increase) to obtain an equity stake in a group that is fabulously managed by the Smurfit family and, undoubtedly, offers one of the most interesting solutions to replacing single-use plastics in our daily lives. Another new acquisition is Univar, a restructuring idea in a sector we know well, thanks to Senior Industrial Sector Analyst, Carlos Arenillas: chemical products distribution. We have increased our stake in Berkshire Hathaway, as we have done with GSK, given that the market is still not giving any credit to the forthcoming spin-off of the latter's consumer and pharma divisions, and HelloFresh where we foresee that very notable growth (albeit not explosive like in 2020) will provide a much clearer view of the real profitability of this business. HeidelbergCement is another new play, despite its magnificent performance since the March lows. We still see the German cement producer as cyclical with defensive qualities at an extremely attractive price (a valuation we will explain in the forthcoming investment team blog). On the contrary, we have wound up our position in JustEat. The takeaway home delivery giant has brought us much to celebrate, but its competitive position is beginning to weaken in some markets, and at a strategic level we do not understand its reticence to export new vertical propositions in distribution. We also do not think its acquisition of its competitor, Grubhub, was ideal. We have also sold Andritz. We are not comfortable with the Austrian company's lack of growth, particularly given the challenges it has faced in recent years to convert reported profits into cash. We have more appealing propositions in which to invest our capital. Lastly, we have exited AP Moeller-Maersk after its shares gained 40% over the quarter. The clear improvement in its profitability is well reflected by the prices at which it is currently trading and we do not discount its cash generation profile taking a hit due to greater investments in the coming years. We have reduced our exposure in Rio Tinto, which has benefited from the hike in iron ore prices that we do not foresee is sustainable. We have also continued to reduce the weight of the banking sector; specifically, by selling our position in Unicredito. The departure of its CEO, Mustier, who had prioritised return on equity to shareholders over mergers, has clouded the investment thesis for the Italian bank, especially in light of the talks it is having with the Italian Treasury to purchase Monte dei Paschi.
  • 33. 34 Investment funds ADDITIONS INCREASES SMURFIT KAPPA PEUGEOT UNIVAR ACS AMADEUS GLAXO BERSKSHIRE HATHAWAY HELLO FRESH ENCE CAF HEILDERBERG CEMENT EXITS REDUCTIONS ZOOPLUS UNICFREDITO AP MOLLER MAERSK JUST EAT LOGISTA NOS RIO TINTO STANDARD CHARTERED BNP CELLNEX ROVI Movements in the portfolio Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver Our most notable moves in the Iberian market are to reduce the weight of Cellnex and Rovi, which performed exceptionally in 2020, to increase the weight of Acerinox and take a stake in the holding company ACS: more cyclical securities that we see have greater potential. We have also sold our stake in Logista. As we said at the start of this report, the fund enjoyed a frankly decent quarter of the year. Since the current team took over management at the start of April, the fund has posted a cumulative return 13.9% higher than the general European index – the MSCI Europe, including dividends, and 7.2% higher than the MSCI Global Index, including dividends. This decent performance partially offsets the challenges during the year that would have been difficult to avoid without the team's patience and knowledge of the world of investments. We will sign off now wishing you a magnificent 2021. We will continue to strive to offer you a more liquid, better balanced portfolio with wide margins of safety and greater upside potential. A major shareholder that provides solidity and permanence, an eclectic investment team committed to finding value, and knowledgeable, prudent and patient clients —who are our greatest asset— form a formidable combination to exploit existing opportunities and those that come our way in the future.
  • 34. 35 BESTINVER BOLSA Invests in listed companies in Spain and Portugal. Investment funds Tabla de Annualised returns 2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch Bestinver Bolsa -14,01% 10,51% -4,61% 0,81% 3,64% 4,24% 9,13% Index (70% IGBM / 30% PSI) -5,20% 16,40% -0,40% 2,51% 0,86% -0,07% 2,80% DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution Consumer 14,1% Financial 16,4% Industrial 55,4% Communication & Technology 9,8% Liquidity 4,4% Spain 79,6% Portugal 13,1% Europe 2,9% Liquidity 4,4% Fund managers Ricardo Seixas Iberian Equities Director Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 01/12/1997. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, and geographical and sectoral concentration risk. The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years. Annualised returns Bestinver bolsa Index (70% IGBM / 30% PSI) 5% 10% 15% 20% 2020 2019 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% -30% 0%
  • 35. 36 FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO BANCO SANTANDER 5,97% CAIXABANK 5,63% UNICAJA BANCO 2,50% COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO AMADEUS IT GROUP 2,84% INDRA SISTEMAS 2,16% TELEFONICA 2,07% INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO ARCELORMITTAL 5,53% ACERINOX 4,99% ACS ACTIVIDADES CONS Y SERV 4,89% CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO IBERSOL 5,05% INDUSTRIAL DE DISENO TEXTIL 3,80% LABORATORIOS FARMAC. ROVI 3,56% Main positions by sector Bestinver Bolsa is a fund for investors with a long-term view that aims to generate returns by identifying undervalued companies in Spain and Portugal. We therefore have a team of four specialists focusing exclusively on the Iberian market who, along with the specific knowledge of our sector experts from the international team, provides us with a unique competitive advantage to invest in the region. The widespread gains in the stock markets at the back end of the year were especially pronounced in Spain, where the IBEX 35 posted the highest returns among Europe's leading indexes. If there was any doubt, the last quarter clearly showed that the Spanish market is one of the best options to exploit the valuation mismatches caused by the pandemic. The fund ended the quarter following the steep rise enjoyed by its reference markets, gaining 18.28%. This left the fund's annual return at -14% compared to the -12.7% and -2.7% (including dividends) posted by the IBEX 35 and PSI 20, respectively. Despite the sharp rise and speed of it, the ongoing recovery of business profits and attractive prices have led us to remain very deeply invested. The rebound of the sectors that were completely paralysed last year and investment of the recovery funds from Europe should give growth a big boost in Spain in 2021. The most notable changes in the portfolio are the reduction in the weight of Cellnex and Rovi, which performed exceptionally in 2020, to increase the weight of Acerinox and take a stake in the holding company ACS: more cyclical securities that we see have greater potential. We have also sold our stake in Logista. There are several reasons for increasing the weight of Acerinox. The company has posted very reasonable results, even during such a complicated period as the second quarter of last year. This allowed it to pay out a dividend of 7% without having to borrow in 2020. We also expect a significant operational improvement given its geographical exposure and the performance of its end markets (automotive, electrical appliances, construction, etc.). In this respect, we see Acerinox as an obvious candidate because it is set to benefit from the fiscal stimulus plans being rolled out in the US and Europe. Lastly, it recently completed a transformational purchase enabling it to enter segments with greater value-added products and where we expect to see substantial synergies once demand normalises. In addition to these arguments, we believe the differentiating factor was the unusual margin of safety we found in the security at the time of buying. The theory goes that one should buy industrial businesses when they are struggling – provided they have an adequate liquidity position and healthy balance sheet to weather the storm – and wait until things improve. In this context, relying on earnings picking up requires one to base an investment decision on valuations normalised long-term as this exercise tends to also entail paying very high multiples on current-year earnings. In Acerinox's case, it was trading cheaply, even compared to the gloomy snapshot of earnings and cash generation in 2020, and so the risk of our investment was actually low. Manager’s round-up Investment funds
  • 36. 37 It is always difficult to value a company such as Acerinox, which operates in a sector that has surplus capacity, is exposed to different economic (and geographic) cycles, and is continuously implementing efficiency plans, not to mention its recent acquisition of VDM. It is not an easy task to normalise its earnings. What we do though is to put a replacement value on its assets, which we have estimated to be around EUR 7 per share. These represent approximately half of a long-term valuation of the business we calculate using a series of very reasonable assumptions for its most complex market (Europe) and without factoring in the synergies that will come from the aforesaid purchase of VDM. It is also worth mentioning that its exposure to a robust US market continues to bear fruit, providing a stable footing – and a 4% dividend at current prices – until its more cyclical operations (Europe and alloys in particular) see their activity and profitability return to normal in the coming quarters. In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund. We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a whole makes the best use of our capital. We would like to end by highlighting the opportunity we see in our fund to benefit from the economic recovery in Spain and unquestionable attractiveness of the prices at which it is trading in our market. An opportunity that we at Bestinver know how to exploit thanks to our patience and, above all, your faith in us. ADDITIONS INCREASES AMADEUS TELEFONICA ACS SANTANDER ENCE CIE CAF ACERINOX EXITS REDUCTIONS LOGISTA TECNICAS REUNIDAS NOS CELLNEX ROVI EDP Movements in the portfolio Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver Investment funds
  • 37. 38 Investment funds 2020 2019 3 years 5 years Launch Bestinver Grandes Compañías 12,66% 23,37% 8,06% 8,45% 10,30% Reference index* 6,33% 30,02% 9,12% 9,12% 10,90% Tabla de Annualised returns BESTINVER GRANDES COMPAÑÍAS Focuses on our selection of large companies. Reflects all of our investment ideas. DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution Consumer 45,8% Financial 0,0% Industrial 24,2% Communication & Technology 15,5% Liquidity 14,5% Europe 58,0% Iberia 2,9% Other 24,6% Liquidity 14,5% Tomás Pintó International Equities Director Carlos Arenillas Industrial Sector Analyst Co-manager of Large Companies Fund managers Annualised returns Figures as at close of business: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 19/12/2011. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. *The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data obtained for the index in force at any given time. Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral concentration risk. The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years. 2020 2019 3 years 5 years Launch 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 35% 25% Grandes Compañías Reference index -5% -10% 0%
  • 38. 39 COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO TENCENT HOLDINGS 3,53% RELX 2,99% SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 2,83% INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO EPIROC 3,89% SAF HOLLAND 3,45% LEGRAND 3,14% CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO PRADA 4,03% BOOKING HOLDINGS 3,86% DELIVERY HERO 3,25% Main positions by sector Bestinver Grandes Compañías invests in extraordinary companies at reasonable prices guided by the investment team’s fundamental analysis. By extraordinary businesses we mean those that combine robust corporate governance with a business model that offers long-lasting competitive advantages. We work very hard to identify this type of business and once we find them, patience becomes one of our allies, enabling us to benefit from the high returns on our stakes in them and compound growth in their profits for many years. Stryker and Booking During the year, we identified two businesses with these characteristics. The first is Stryker: a leader in the medical and surgical equipment sector founded in 1941 by the orthopaedic surgeon, Homer Stryker. His granddaughter, Ronda Stryker, is still the biggest shareholder of a fantastically well managed group that still has its founder's spirit of innovation. It is not a coincidence that in 2016, Stryker was the first to bring to market a robot that could assist with knee surgery, which has been a big commercial success. Customers have seen the initial major outlay compensated by more precision in operations and a subsequent reduction in the number of post-surgery complications. Being the first to offer a solution of this nature has given Stryker a notable competitive advantage; an advantage it has known how to strengthen and exploit by adding functionalities to and enhancing a product that already has a large base of satisfied customers. There is a long-term risk we have identified —and are monitoring— that is the potential reform of a North American healthcare system with a cost per patient that is far higher than in other countries. Stryker is aware of the problem and is trying to play its part in solving it. It is therefore developing an extensive programme of technological innovations to boost the productivity of this healthcare spending. The second business is Booking Holdings – an investment we share with all Bestinver's international equity portfolios. Booking is a great example of an extraordinary company trading at reasonable prices. Primarily, it is a business in the leisure or tourism sector, but thanks to its technology it is transforming an analogue world into a digital one. This is a platform that matches supply and demand for accommodation, streamlining the booking process for travellers and offering hotels a powerful global marketing tool (it enables a small hotel in any Spanish city to reach a Korean clientèle for instance). It also offers a top-notch customer service (allowing hotels to focus on guests once they begin their stay), which helps to significantly drive down costs. Booking charges a commission for these services. Its business model includes fabulous barriers to entry and networking effects. Booking is the biggest online travel agency in Europe (despite being listed in the US). Ten percent of all hotel reservations on the European continent are made through its application. It is the case that 20% of its sales are Manager’s round-up Investment funds
  • 39. 40 ADDITIONS INCREASES SEA LIMITED SMURFIT KAPPA UNIVAR RELX LEGRAND TENCENT EXITS REDUCTIONS SAP DÍETEREN BURLINGTON DASSAULT AVIATION SCHINDLER AIR LIQUIDE Movements in the portfolio Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver business trips and it is too soon to know how affected these will be (structurally) by remote working, but it is also the case that demand for its services may be even higher if hotel operators see the need to offset this loss of business. This extreme, never-before-seen crisis has highlighted the variability of its costs (it has generated a positive cash flow) and robustness of its balance sheet. The sector undoubtedly depends on the economic cycle but Booking has a defensive, anti-cyclical profile (when demand weakens, it benefits from a cheaper "inventory"); something we view as valuable. Its governance is perfect. Serving and former employees on the board hold shares valued at over USD 200 million and capital has always been allocated consistently and successfully. In short, it is hard to find businesses with such a long-standing platform on which to grow in a profitable manner while generating as much cash as Booking does. It is obviously not as cheap as a few years ago, but it is trading at attractive prices that will allow us to benefit for many years from its high returns and compound growth of its profits. The fund ended the quarter with a gain of 10.4%, which translates into a return of 12.7% in 2020: quite satisfactory and easily outstripping that of its reference indexes. In the prologue to this report, we announced the inclusion of ESG criteria in our approach to managing your fund. Bestinver Grandes Compañías has been the fund that has served as a pilot project for integrating these criteria in our generalist funds. We believe associating ourselves with companies that strive to create value for their shareholders and society as a whole makes the best use of our capital. Investment funds
  • 40. 41 BESTINVER LATAM Equity investment fund that primarily invests in Latin America. Investment funds Tabla de Annualised returns 2020 2019 3 years Launch Bestinver LatAm -6,91 % - - 2,47 % BESTINVER LATIN AMERICA SICAV -6,02 % 32,67 % 7,59 % 10,06 % SP LATIN AMERICA 40NR -18,82 % 15,90 % -2,57 % -0,37 % DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution Consumer 29,6% Financial 15,9% Industrial 22,4% Communication & Technology 23,0% Liquidity 9,0% Brazil 60,3% Argentina 1,9% Chile 12,8% Colombia 2,1% Mexico 8,0% Peru 5,9% Liquidity 9,0% Fund managers Ignacio Arnau Bestinver LatAm Manager Figures as at close of business on 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver. Date of launch of Bestinver Latam FI: 18/01/2019. Date of launch of Bestinver Latin America SICAV: 05/07/2017. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. The full prospectus, periodic reports and KIID for the fund Bestinver Latam FI are available at www.bestinver.es and www.cnmv.es. Bestinver Latin America belongs to Bestinver SICAV (registered in Luxembourg). It is not registered with the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) and is therefore not commercialised in Spain. Investments could entail, among others, equity-market risk, interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk, risk of investing in emerging economies risk, and geographical and sectoral concentration risk. Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 7 years. Annualised returns Bestinver Latam Reference index Bestinver Latin America Sicav -20% 0% -10% 10% 30% 40% 20% 2020 Launch 3 years 2019
  • 41. 42 FINANCIAL % OF PORTFOLIO BANCO DO BRAZIL ON 3,63% IGUATEMI EMP DE SHOPPING 3,48% MRV ENGENHARIA E PARTICIPACOES 2,82% COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY % OF PORTFOLIO LOCAWEB SERVICOS DE INTERNET 6,19% ARCO PLATFORM LTD - CLASS A 4,95% TOTVS ON 4,27% INDUSTRIAL % OF PORTFOLIO COMPANHIA DE LOCACAO 4,27% CIA SUD AMERICANA DE VAPORES 3,59% QUIMICA Y MINERA DE CHILE 3,21% CONSUMER % OF PORTFOLIO VIA VAREJO 4,96% CIA BRAZILEIRA 3,94% HYPERMARCAS 3,46% Main positions by sector BI LatAm primarily invests in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru, following the same investment process and philosophy as the rest of our international equity funds. The aim of the strategy is to be very different from the reference indexes and other investment alternatives in the region – all highly exposed to commodities, infrastructures and banking. Our strategy is primarily centred on all aspects related with consumption and the expansion of the middle classes in these countries. After months of being overlooked by the investor community and providing far lower returns that most of the international markets, the main indexes in the region posted record highs over the last quarter of both cash inflows (primarily passive through ETFs) and price gains (the S&P Latin America 40 was up 34% over the quarter). In spite of this big rebound, Bestinver LatAm clearly outperformed the market in 2020. Thanks to our unique approach, it performed notably during the market downturns. We therefore ended the year down 6.9% compared to the S&P Latin America 40, which suffered a loss of 18.8%. This better performance, which since the fund started has resulted in a return 40% higher than that of the reference index, can be partly explained by the adoption of ESG principles from the beginning. These, especially regarding governance in emerging markets, have enabled us to mitigate the risk to which our investments are exposed in the short, medium and long term. The portfolio currently comprises 35 companies that, in our opinion, are the best investment opportunities in the region. One of these great opportunities we found recently in the form of Iguatemi, which owns the most exclusive shopping centres in Brazil. Founded and controlled by the Jereissati family, Iguatemi's shopping centres are like Fifth Avenue in New York: aspirational, safe places to meet, dine and have a great time. 2020 has been a really hard year for Latin America. Markets in the region have been the hardest hit by the Covid-19 crisis but, in our opinion, they could become some of the greatest beneficiaries of the recovery. This is because of a raft of factors such as the potential rebound of their currencies due to a weaker dollar (US foreign exchange policy) or the massive global stimulus packages that favour global growth that is particularly beneficial for economies in the region, without forgetting a return to the structural reforms being implemented and fiscal orthodoxy in many countries on the continent. And of course, the unarguable attractiveness of their prices in absolute and relative terms, plus global investors' historically low levels of exposure to LatAm. These expectations mean we are very optimistic about the possibility of the leading Latin American economies rebounding soon and also our ability to continue extracting higher absolute positive returns in the long term. Manager’s round-up Investment funds
  • 42. 43 ADDITIONS INCREASES IGUATEMI HYPERMARCAS TOTVS COMPANHIA LOCACAO EXITS REDUCTIONS DESPEGAR.COM PAGSEGURO DIGITAL CEMEX LATAM HOLDINGS BANCO ABC BRAZIL ALICORP Movements in the portfolio Investment funds Date: 31/12/2020. Source: Bestinver