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ЛЕКЦ 5,6
IPsec ажиллагаа:Internet
Key Exchange
НУУЦЛАЛЫН ПРОТОКОЛУУД
EC-Council
Агуулга
 IPSec key management
 VPN сүлжээний тохиргоо
 GRE туннел
 IPsec болон SSL харьцуулалт
 Дүгнэлт
© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 3
IPsec
EC-Council
IPsec Protocol Framework
AH ESP
ESP
+ AH
DES
3
DES
AES SEAL
MD5 SHA
PSK RSA
DH1 DH2 DH5 DH7
EC-Council
IPsec Protocol Framework
EC-Council
Confidentiality
EC-Council
Integrity
EC-Council
Authentication
EC-Council
AH ESP
ESP
+ AH
DES
3
DES
AES SEAL
MD5 SHA
PSK RSA
DH1 DH2 DH5 DH7
768 bits 1024 bits 1536 bits
Used by DES and 3DES Used by AES
Secure Key Exchange
EC-Council
 AH provides authentication and optional replay-detection
services.
• It authenticates the sender of the data.
• AH operates on protocol number 51.
• AH supports the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1
algorithms.
Authentication Header (AH)
EC-Council
 ESP provides the same security services as AH (authentication
and integrity) AND encryption service.
• It encapsulates the data to be protected.
• It operates on protocol number 50.
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 12
Key Exchange
EC-Council
SA Security Parameters
EC-Council
How IPsec uses IKE
1. Outbound packet is sent
from Alice to Bob. No IPsec
SA.
4. Packet is sent from Alice to
Bob protected by IPsec SA.
IPsec IPsec
EC-Council
 There are two phases in every IKE negotiation
• Phase 1 (Authentication)
• The first phase establishes an ISAKMP SA
– based on pre-shared keys (PSK),
– RSA keys and X.509 certificates, even via Kerberos.
• Phase 2 (Key Exchange)
– In the second phase the ISAKMP SA is used to negotiate and setup the
IPsec SAs.
 IKE negotiation can also occur in:
• Main Mode
• Aggressive mode
 The difference between the two is that Main mode requires the
exchange of 6 messages while Aggressive mode requires only 3
exchanges.
IKE - Internet Key Exchange
EC-Council
 IKE Phase One:
1. Negotiates an IKE protection suite.
2. Exchanges keying material to protect the IKE session (DH).
3. Authenticates each other.
• Establishes the IKE SA.
• Main Mode requires the exchange of 6 messages while Aggressive
mode only uses 3 messages.
 IKE Phase Two:
1. Negotiates IPsec security parameters, known as IPsec transform
sets.
• Establishes IPsec SAs.
• Periodically renegotiates IPsec SAs to ensure security.
• Quick mode exchange which is realized with 3 messages
IKE 1 and 2 Phases
EC-Council
Main Mode
 Main mode negotiates an ISAKMP SA which
will be used to create IPSec Sas
 Three steps
• SA negotiation
• Diffie-Hellman and nonce exchange
– Oakley Key Determination Protocol - RFC2412
• Authentication
EC-Council
IKE -1 Main Mode (Kerberos)
Initiator Responder
Header, SA Proposals
Header, Selected SA Proposal
Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei,
Kerberos Tokeni Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer,
Kerberos Tokenr
Header, Idi, Hashi
Header, Idr, Hashr
Encrypted
EC-Council
IKE -1 Main Mode (Certificate)
Initiator Responder
Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei
Header, Idi, Certificatei, Signaturei,
Certificate Request
Header, D-H Key Exchange,
Noncer,Certificate Request
Header, Idr, Certificater,
Signaturer
Encrypted
Header, SA Proposals
Header, Selected SA Proposal
EC-Council
M IKE -1 Main Mode (Pre-shared Key)
Initiator Responder
Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei
Header, Idi, Hashi
Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer
Header, Idr, Hashr
Encrypted
Header, SA Proposals
Header, Selected SA Proposal
EC-Council
IKE -2 Quick Mode
 All traffic is encrypted using the ISAKMP
Security Association
 Each quick mode negotiation results in two
IPSec Security Associations (one inbound, one
outbound)
EC-Council
Quick Mode Negotiation
Header, Hash
Header, Connected Notification
Encrypted
Initiator Responder
Header, IPSec Selected SA
Header, IPSec Proposed SA
EC-Council
IKE Phases
EC-Council
Main Mode (Pre-shared Key)
Initiator Responder
Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei
Header, Idi, Hashi
Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer
Header, Idr, Hashr
Encrypted
Header, SA Proposals
Header, Selected SA Proposal
EC-Council
Main Mode (Certificate)
Initiator Responder
Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei
Header, Idi, Certificatei, Signaturei,
Certificate Request
Header, D-H Key Exchange,
Noncer,Certificate Request
Header, Idr, Certificater,
Signaturer
Encrypted
Header, SA Proposals
Header, Selected SA Proposal
EC-Council
Quick Mode
 All traffic is encrypted using the ISAKMP
Security Association
 Each quick mode negotiation results in two
IPSec Security Associations (one inbound, one
outbound)
EC-Council
Quick Mode Negotiation
Header, Hash
Header, Connected Notification
Encrypted
Initiator Responder
Header, IPSec Selected SA
Header, IPSec Proposed SA
EC-Council
Main mode
 Protect DoS attack
EC-Council
IKE session key computation
 4 төрлийн түлхүүр ашиглана
 SKEYID – master key (DH)
 SKEYID_d – for IKE SAs
 SKEYID_a – authentication key for message
 SKEYID_e – encryption key for message
EC-Council
Five Steps of IPsec
IKE Phase 1 authenticates IPsec peers and negotiates IKE SAs to create a secure
communications channel for negotiating IPsec SAs in Phase 2.
Host A sends interesting traffic destined for Host B.
IKE Phase 2 negotiates IPsec SA parameters and creates matching IPsec SAs in the
peers to protect data and messages exchanged between endpoints.
Data transfer occurs between IPsec peers based on the IPsec parameters and keys
stored in the SA database.
IPsec tunnel termination occurs by SAs through deletion or by timing out.
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
EC-Council
Step 1 – Interesting Traffic
EC-Council
IKE Policy Negotiation
Step 2 – IKE Phase 1
EC-Council
DH Key Exchange
Step 2 – IKE Phase 1
RouterB hashes the received
string together with the pre-
shared secret and yields a hash
value.
RouterA randomly chooses a
string and sends it to RouterB.
RouterB sends the result of
hashing back to RouterA.
RouterA calculates its own hash
of the random string, together
with the pre-shared secret, and
matches it with the received
result from the other peer.
If they match, RouterB knows the
pre-shared secret, and is
considered authenticated.
EC-Council
DH Key Exchange
Step 2 – IKE Phase 1
Now RouterB randomly chooses a
different random string and sends
it to RouterA.
RouterA also hashes the received
string together with the pre-
shared secret and yields a hash
value.
RouterA sends the result of
hashing back to RouterB.
RouterB calculates its own hash
of the random string, together
with the pre-shared secret, and
matches it with the received
result from the other peer.
If they match, RouterA knows the
pre-shared secret, and is
considered authenticated.
EC-Council
Peer Authentication
Step 2 – IKE Phase 1
EC-Council
IPsec Negotiation
Step 3 – IKE Phase 2
EC-Council
Transform Set Negotiation
Step 3 – IKE Phase 2
EC-Council
Security Associations
Step 3 – IKE Phase 2
EC-Council
IPsec Session
Step 4
EC-Council
Tunnel Termination
Step 5
© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 41
GRE
Tunnel
EC-Council
 There are 2 popular site-to-site tunneling protocols:
• Cisco Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
• IP Security Protocol (IPsec)
 When should you use GRE and / or IPsec?
Layer 3 Tunneling
User Traffic
IP
Only?
Use GRE
Tunnel
No
Yes
No Yes
Unicast
Only?
Use IPsec
VPN
EC-Council
 GRE can encapsulate almost any other type of packet.
• Uses IP to create a virtual point-to-point link between Cisco routers
• Supports multiprotocol (IP, CLNS, …) and IP multicast tunneling
(and therefore routing protocols)
• Best suited for site-to-site multiprotocol VPNs
• RFC 1702 and RFC 2784
Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
GRE header adds 24 bytes
of additional overhead
EC-Council
 GRE can optionally contain any one or more of these fields:
• Tunnel checksum
• Tunnel key
• Tunnel packet sequence number
 GRE keepalives can be used to track tunnel path status.
Optional GRE Extensions
EC-Council
 GRE does not provide encryption!
• It can be monitored with a protocol analyzer.
 However, GRE and IPsec can be used together.
 IPsec does not support multicast / broadcast and therefore does
not forward routing protocol packets.
• However IPsec can encapsulate a GRE packet that
encapsulates routing traffic (GRE over IPsec).
Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
EC-Council
1. Create a tunnel interface: interface tunnel 0
2. Assign the tunnel an IP address.
3. Identify the source tunnel interface: tunnel source
4. Identify the tunnel destination: tunnel destination
5. (Optional) Identify the protocol to encapsulate in the GRE
tunnel: tunnel mode gre ip
• By default, GRE is tunneled in an IP packet.
Five Steps to Configuring a GRE
Tunnel
EC-Council
Five Steps to Configuring a GRE
Tunnel
R1(config)# interface tunnel 0
R1(config–if)# ip address 10.1.1.1 255.255.255.252
R1(config–if)# tunnel source serial 0/0
R1(config–if)# tunnel destination 209.165.200.225
R1(config–if)# tunnel mode gre ip
R1(config–if)#
R2(config)# interface tunnel 0
R2(config–if)# ip address 10.1.1.2 255.255.255.252
R2(config–if)# tunnel source serial 0/0
R2(config–if)# tunnel destination 209.165.201.1
R2(config–if)# tunnel mode gre ip
R2(config–if)#
EC-Council
GRE Tunnel Example
© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 49
Comparison
between IPsec
and SSL
EC-Council
SSL
EC-Council
IPsec
EC-Council
IPsec vs SSL
EC-Council
Comparison - 1
EC-Council
Comparison - 2
EC-Council
Харьцуулалт
PGP SSL IPSec
Application Layer Transport Layer (above
TCP)
Network Layer(above IP)
Offline Online/Realtime Online/Realtime
Connectionless
-Single data message
-Data order (n/a)
-Replay attack
(timestamp)
Connection-oriented
- A data stream
- Data order (via tcp)
- defense against replay
attack
Connectionless
- defense against replay
attack
Protect application
payload (only)
Protect application
payload (only)
Transport: Protect tcp hdr
+ application payload
Tunnel: Protect IP hdr +
tcp hdr + payload
Authentication Entity:
User(Key ID)
Protected Unit: entire data
message
Authentication Entity:
SSL Session (certificate)
Protected Unit: SSL
connection/TCP/Port
Entity: Security
association
EC-Council
АНХААРАЛ ТАВЬСАНД
БАЯРЛАЛАА

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05 06 ike

  • 1. ЛЕКЦ 5,6 IPsec ажиллагаа:Internet Key Exchange НУУЦЛАЛЫН ПРОТОКОЛУУД
  • 2. EC-Council Агуулга  IPSec key management  VPN сүлжээний тохиргоо  GRE туннел  IPsec болон SSL харьцуулалт  Дүгнэлт
  • 3. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 3 IPsec
  • 4. EC-Council IPsec Protocol Framework AH ESP ESP + AH DES 3 DES AES SEAL MD5 SHA PSK RSA DH1 DH2 DH5 DH7
  • 9. EC-Council AH ESP ESP + AH DES 3 DES AES SEAL MD5 SHA PSK RSA DH1 DH2 DH5 DH7 768 bits 1024 bits 1536 bits Used by DES and 3DES Used by AES Secure Key Exchange
  • 10. EC-Council  AH provides authentication and optional replay-detection services. • It authenticates the sender of the data. • AH operates on protocol number 51. • AH supports the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 algorithms. Authentication Header (AH)
  • 11. EC-Council  ESP provides the same security services as AH (authentication and integrity) AND encryption service. • It encapsulates the data to be protected. • It operates on protocol number 50. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
  • 12. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 12 Key Exchange
  • 14. EC-Council How IPsec uses IKE 1. Outbound packet is sent from Alice to Bob. No IPsec SA. 4. Packet is sent from Alice to Bob protected by IPsec SA. IPsec IPsec
  • 15. EC-Council  There are two phases in every IKE negotiation • Phase 1 (Authentication) • The first phase establishes an ISAKMP SA – based on pre-shared keys (PSK), – RSA keys and X.509 certificates, even via Kerberos. • Phase 2 (Key Exchange) – In the second phase the ISAKMP SA is used to negotiate and setup the IPsec SAs.  IKE negotiation can also occur in: • Main Mode • Aggressive mode  The difference between the two is that Main mode requires the exchange of 6 messages while Aggressive mode requires only 3 exchanges. IKE - Internet Key Exchange
  • 16. EC-Council  IKE Phase One: 1. Negotiates an IKE protection suite. 2. Exchanges keying material to protect the IKE session (DH). 3. Authenticates each other. • Establishes the IKE SA. • Main Mode requires the exchange of 6 messages while Aggressive mode only uses 3 messages.  IKE Phase Two: 1. Negotiates IPsec security parameters, known as IPsec transform sets. • Establishes IPsec SAs. • Periodically renegotiates IPsec SAs to ensure security. • Quick mode exchange which is realized with 3 messages IKE 1 and 2 Phases
  • 17. EC-Council Main Mode  Main mode negotiates an ISAKMP SA which will be used to create IPSec Sas  Three steps • SA negotiation • Diffie-Hellman and nonce exchange – Oakley Key Determination Protocol - RFC2412 • Authentication
  • 18. EC-Council IKE -1 Main Mode (Kerberos) Initiator Responder Header, SA Proposals Header, Selected SA Proposal Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei, Kerberos Tokeni Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer, Kerberos Tokenr Header, Idi, Hashi Header, Idr, Hashr Encrypted
  • 19. EC-Council IKE -1 Main Mode (Certificate) Initiator Responder Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei Header, Idi, Certificatei, Signaturei, Certificate Request Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer,Certificate Request Header, Idr, Certificater, Signaturer Encrypted Header, SA Proposals Header, Selected SA Proposal
  • 20. EC-Council M IKE -1 Main Mode (Pre-shared Key) Initiator Responder Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei Header, Idi, Hashi Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer Header, Idr, Hashr Encrypted Header, SA Proposals Header, Selected SA Proposal
  • 21. EC-Council IKE -2 Quick Mode  All traffic is encrypted using the ISAKMP Security Association  Each quick mode negotiation results in two IPSec Security Associations (one inbound, one outbound)
  • 22. EC-Council Quick Mode Negotiation Header, Hash Header, Connected Notification Encrypted Initiator Responder Header, IPSec Selected SA Header, IPSec Proposed SA
  • 24. EC-Council Main Mode (Pre-shared Key) Initiator Responder Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei Header, Idi, Hashi Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer Header, Idr, Hashr Encrypted Header, SA Proposals Header, Selected SA Proposal
  • 25. EC-Council Main Mode (Certificate) Initiator Responder Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncei Header, Idi, Certificatei, Signaturei, Certificate Request Header, D-H Key Exchange, Noncer,Certificate Request Header, Idr, Certificater, Signaturer Encrypted Header, SA Proposals Header, Selected SA Proposal
  • 26. EC-Council Quick Mode  All traffic is encrypted using the ISAKMP Security Association  Each quick mode negotiation results in two IPSec Security Associations (one inbound, one outbound)
  • 27. EC-Council Quick Mode Negotiation Header, Hash Header, Connected Notification Encrypted Initiator Responder Header, IPSec Selected SA Header, IPSec Proposed SA
  • 29. EC-Council IKE session key computation  4 төрлийн түлхүүр ашиглана  SKEYID – master key (DH)  SKEYID_d – for IKE SAs  SKEYID_a – authentication key for message  SKEYID_e – encryption key for message
  • 30. EC-Council Five Steps of IPsec IKE Phase 1 authenticates IPsec peers and negotiates IKE SAs to create a secure communications channel for negotiating IPsec SAs in Phase 2. Host A sends interesting traffic destined for Host B. IKE Phase 2 negotiates IPsec SA parameters and creates matching IPsec SAs in the peers to protect data and messages exchanged between endpoints. Data transfer occurs between IPsec peers based on the IPsec parameters and keys stored in the SA database. IPsec tunnel termination occurs by SAs through deletion or by timing out. Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
  • 31. EC-Council Step 1 – Interesting Traffic
  • 33. EC-Council DH Key Exchange Step 2 – IKE Phase 1 RouterB hashes the received string together with the pre- shared secret and yields a hash value. RouterA randomly chooses a string and sends it to RouterB. RouterB sends the result of hashing back to RouterA. RouterA calculates its own hash of the random string, together with the pre-shared secret, and matches it with the received result from the other peer. If they match, RouterB knows the pre-shared secret, and is considered authenticated.
  • 34. EC-Council DH Key Exchange Step 2 – IKE Phase 1 Now RouterB randomly chooses a different random string and sends it to RouterA. RouterA also hashes the received string together with the pre- shared secret and yields a hash value. RouterA sends the result of hashing back to RouterB. RouterB calculates its own hash of the random string, together with the pre-shared secret, and matches it with the received result from the other peer. If they match, RouterA knows the pre-shared secret, and is considered authenticated.
  • 41. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 41 GRE Tunnel
  • 42. EC-Council  There are 2 popular site-to-site tunneling protocols: • Cisco Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) • IP Security Protocol (IPsec)  When should you use GRE and / or IPsec? Layer 3 Tunneling User Traffic IP Only? Use GRE Tunnel No Yes No Yes Unicast Only? Use IPsec VPN
  • 43. EC-Council  GRE can encapsulate almost any other type of packet. • Uses IP to create a virtual point-to-point link between Cisco routers • Supports multiprotocol (IP, CLNS, …) and IP multicast tunneling (and therefore routing protocols) • Best suited for site-to-site multiprotocol VPNs • RFC 1702 and RFC 2784 Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) GRE header adds 24 bytes of additional overhead
  • 44. EC-Council  GRE can optionally contain any one or more of these fields: • Tunnel checksum • Tunnel key • Tunnel packet sequence number  GRE keepalives can be used to track tunnel path status. Optional GRE Extensions
  • 45. EC-Council  GRE does not provide encryption! • It can be monitored with a protocol analyzer.  However, GRE and IPsec can be used together.  IPsec does not support multicast / broadcast and therefore does not forward routing protocol packets. • However IPsec can encapsulate a GRE packet that encapsulates routing traffic (GRE over IPsec). Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
  • 46. EC-Council 1. Create a tunnel interface: interface tunnel 0 2. Assign the tunnel an IP address. 3. Identify the source tunnel interface: tunnel source 4. Identify the tunnel destination: tunnel destination 5. (Optional) Identify the protocol to encapsulate in the GRE tunnel: tunnel mode gre ip • By default, GRE is tunneled in an IP packet. Five Steps to Configuring a GRE Tunnel
  • 47. EC-Council Five Steps to Configuring a GRE Tunnel R1(config)# interface tunnel 0 R1(config–if)# ip address 10.1.1.1 255.255.255.252 R1(config–if)# tunnel source serial 0/0 R1(config–if)# tunnel destination 209.165.200.225 R1(config–if)# tunnel mode gre ip R1(config–if)# R2(config)# interface tunnel 0 R2(config–if)# ip address 10.1.1.2 255.255.255.252 R2(config–if)# tunnel source serial 0/0 R2(config–if)# tunnel destination 209.165.201.1 R2(config–if)# tunnel mode gre ip R2(config–if)#
  • 49. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 49 Comparison between IPsec and SSL
  • 55. EC-Council Харьцуулалт PGP SSL IPSec Application Layer Transport Layer (above TCP) Network Layer(above IP) Offline Online/Realtime Online/Realtime Connectionless -Single data message -Data order (n/a) -Replay attack (timestamp) Connection-oriented - A data stream - Data order (via tcp) - defense against replay attack Connectionless - defense against replay attack Protect application payload (only) Protect application payload (only) Transport: Protect tcp hdr + application payload Tunnel: Protect IP hdr + tcp hdr + payload Authentication Entity: User(Key ID) Protected Unit: entire data message Authentication Entity: SSL Session (certificate) Protected Unit: SSL connection/TCP/Port Entity: Security association