SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 26
Why blame the user?
1
Confusing the victim and the problem
“Users will
click
anything!”
“Users are
careless!”
“Users are
the weak
link!”
PEBKAC
3
If already you know what can and will go wrong...
4
…what’s the next logical step?
Kneejerk response: punish them
“Take away
their access”
“Remove
their rights”
“Lock them
down”
Kneejerk response: results
• Death by Exception
• Support Fatigue
Removing
admin rights
• Death by Exception
• Support Fatigue
App
Whitelisting
• Implementation complexity
• IncompatibilityNAC
6
Learning from posterity
7
App Whitelisting
2011: “By 2015, more than 50% of enterprises will have
instituted 'default deny' policies that restrict the applications
users can install.”
8
App Whitelisting
What went wrong?
• Static lists
• Manual maintenance
• Death by exception
• Users = snowflakes
App whitelisting exception creep: do your
profiles end up looking like this?
• Basic CC user
• Basic CC user + MS Office
• Basic CC user + MS Office + Skype
• Basic CC user + MS Office + Skype –
No Lync
• Basic CC user + MS Office + Skype,
Grande, No Whip, Half Caff…
9
Network Access Control: NAC
10
Network Access Control
What went wrong?
• Too much complexity
• Too many standards
• Integration/Implementation Nightmares
• Confused everyone
11
Meanwhile…
12
Phoenix impressions
13
Phoenix impressions: whitelisting is back
“There are no bad ideas in security, just bad implementations”
“A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity. An optimist sees the
opportunity in every difficulty.”
14
Understand your users
Find empathy
Let the healing begin
15
Respect the pain threshold
16
First do no harm: the security UI/UX impact scale
Best
• Be invisible – completely transparent to the user
Better
• Visible, but zero impact to the user
Okay
• Minor changes to user’s workflow are necessary
Failure
• Emails arrive with subjects like “I can’t do my job”
17
What’s better than best?
18
Adrian’s rules for user-facing security
1. Don’t break the workflow
2. Don’t mess with the browser
3. Security must move with the user
4. Give the user more choices, not less
5. Simplify workflow; reduce complexity
6. Minimize static dependencies
7. Educate, empower and involve users
19
Beyond not disrupting the business
• Security ROI: more than just the cost
of doing business?
• Deputizing users
• Trusting the user
20
What does it mean to trust the
user?
21
What does “trust” mean in this context?
First, we need to adopt a term from the startup industry: MVP
Minimum Viable Product
Drawing and concept by Henrik Kniberg http://blog.crisp.se/2016/01/25/henrikkniberg/making-sense-of-mvp
MVS security example…
23
Security? Huh?
Native VPN Client
Native VPN client, native firewall,
Windows Defender
Native VPN client, native firewall,
Windows Defender, Windows
Bitlocker, UAC
A usable version of Vista
Users need a Minimum Safe Environment
So “Trust” in this context is the minimum safe environment necessary for the
average user to be able to do their job safely.
We need to make it difficult for them to make critical security mistakes
without making it difficult for them to do their job.
Don’t confuse “Trust” with the other extreme
• Giving choices doesn’t mean no
control
• What does it mean to trust users
• Allowing users to install applications
doesn’t mean giving local admin
• Users may enjoy freedom, but will
still expect protection
25
Lessons Learned
• When you layer security/defense,
compromise is easier
• Good security doesn’t mean going
to extremes
• Lock controls down too tight and
user will go around
• Shadow business users for a few
days
• learn their jobs
• understand needs and constraints
• appreciate the impact of trying to
use a heavily restricted system
26

More Related Content

What's hot

The Teams Behind DevSecOps
The Teams Behind DevSecOps The Teams Behind DevSecOps
The Teams Behind DevSecOps
Uleska
 
AllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security Differently
AllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security DifferentlyAllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security Differently
AllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security Differently
Aaron Rinehart
 
Nick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs security
Nick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs securityNick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs security
Nick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs security
DevSecCon
 
Chaos engineering for cloud native security
Chaos engineering for cloud native securityChaos engineering for cloud native security
Chaos engineering for cloud native security
Kennedy
 

What's hot (20)

Silver Lining for Miles: DevOps for Building Security Solutions
Silver Lining for Miles: DevOps for Building Security SolutionsSilver Lining for Miles: DevOps for Building Security Solutions
Silver Lining for Miles: DevOps for Building Security Solutions
 
Finding Security a Home in a DevOps World
Finding Security a Home in a DevOps WorldFinding Security a Home in a DevOps World
Finding Security a Home in a DevOps World
 
The Journey to DevSecOps
The Journey to DevSecOpsThe Journey to DevSecOps
The Journey to DevSecOps
 
451 and Cylance - The Roadmap To Better Endpoint Security
451 and Cylance - The Roadmap To Better Endpoint Security451 and Cylance - The Roadmap To Better Endpoint Security
451 and Cylance - The Roadmap To Better Endpoint Security
 
Outpost24 webinar - Why security perfection is the enemy of DevSecOps
Outpost24 webinar - Why security perfection is the enemy of DevSecOpsOutpost24 webinar - Why security perfection is the enemy of DevSecOps
Outpost24 webinar - Why security perfection is the enemy of DevSecOps
 
AllTheTalks Security Chaos Engineering
AllTheTalks Security Chaos Engineering AllTheTalks Security Chaos Engineering
AllTheTalks Security Chaos Engineering
 
DevSecOps in 2031: How robots and humans will secure apps together Log
DevSecOps in 2031: How robots and humans will secure apps together LogDevSecOps in 2031: How robots and humans will secure apps together Log
DevSecOps in 2031: How robots and humans will secure apps together Log
 
AllDayDevOps Security Chaos Engineering 2019
AllDayDevOps Security Chaos Engineering 2019 AllDayDevOps Security Chaos Engineering 2019
AllDayDevOps Security Chaos Engineering 2019
 
Shifting Security Left - The Innovation of DevSecOps - ValleyTechCon
Shifting Security Left - The Innovation of DevSecOps - ValleyTechConShifting Security Left - The Innovation of DevSecOps - ValleyTechCon
Shifting Security Left - The Innovation of DevSecOps - ValleyTechCon
 
S360 2015 dev_secops_program
S360 2015 dev_secops_programS360 2015 dev_secops_program
S360 2015 dev_secops_program
 
The Teams Behind DevSecOps
The Teams Behind DevSecOps The Teams Behind DevSecOps
The Teams Behind DevSecOps
 
AllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security Differently
AllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security DifferentlyAllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security Differently
AllDayDevOps 2020 Aaron Rinehart Security Differently
 
HealthConDX Virtual Summit 2021 - How Security Chaos Engineering is Changing ...
HealthConDX Virtual Summit 2021 - How Security Chaos Engineering is Changing ...HealthConDX Virtual Summit 2021 - How Security Chaos Engineering is Changing ...
HealthConDX Virtual Summit 2021 - How Security Chaos Engineering is Changing ...
 
Nick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs security
Nick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs securityNick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs security
Nick Drage & Fraser Scott - Epic battle devops vs security
 
State of DevSecOps - DevSecOpsDays 2019
State of DevSecOps - DevSecOpsDays 2019State of DevSecOps - DevSecOpsDays 2019
State of DevSecOps - DevSecOpsDays 2019
 
Chaos engineering for cloud native security
Chaos engineering for cloud native securityChaos engineering for cloud native security
Chaos engineering for cloud native security
 
Security as Code owasp
Security as  Code owaspSecurity as  Code owasp
Security as Code owasp
 
DevSecCon KeyNote London 2015
DevSecCon KeyNote London 2015DevSecCon KeyNote London 2015
DevSecCon KeyNote London 2015
 
Ops Happen: Improve Security Without Getting in the Way
Ops Happen: Improve Security Without Getting in the WayOps Happen: Improve Security Without Getting in the Way
Ops Happen: Improve Security Without Getting in the Way
 
DevSecOps Days Istanbul 2020 Security Chaos Engineering
DevSecOps Days Istanbul 2020 Security Chaos EngineeringDevSecOps Days Istanbul 2020 Security Chaos Engineering
DevSecOps Days Istanbul 2020 Security Chaos Engineering
 

Similar to 451 AppSense Webinar - Why blame the user?

LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014
LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014
LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014
Ashlie Steele
 
Vivint Wireless How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP - Luke L...
Vivint Wireless   How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP  - Luke L...Vivint Wireless   How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP  - Luke L...
Vivint Wireless How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP - Luke L...
Lounge47
 

Similar to 451 AppSense Webinar - Why blame the user? (20)

Coexisting with Vulnerabilities
Coexisting with VulnerabilitiesCoexisting with Vulnerabilities
Coexisting with Vulnerabilities
 
The impact of consumerization
The impact of consumerizationThe impact of consumerization
The impact of consumerization
 
Cybersecurity: An FBI perspective: how cyber criminals exploit the goodness o...
Cybersecurity: An FBI perspective: how cyber criminals exploit the goodness o...Cybersecurity: An FBI perspective: how cyber criminals exploit the goodness o...
Cybersecurity: An FBI perspective: how cyber criminals exploit the goodness o...
 
Boosting IoT Protection: An Enterprise Risk Imperative
Boosting IoT Protection: An Enterprise Risk ImperativeBoosting IoT Protection: An Enterprise Risk Imperative
Boosting IoT Protection: An Enterprise Risk Imperative
 
Using Defensive Pessimism to Build Great Software at YML
Using Defensive Pessimism to Build Great Software at YMLUsing Defensive Pessimism to Build Great Software at YML
Using Defensive Pessimism to Build Great Software at YML
 
Ivanti Cloud and Solving User Experience Problems
Ivanti Cloud and Solving User Experience ProblemsIvanti Cloud and Solving User Experience Problems
Ivanti Cloud and Solving User Experience Problems
 
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a BreachThreat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
Threat Exposure Management - Reduce your Risk of a Breach
 
Risks vs real life
Risks vs real lifeRisks vs real life
Risks vs real life
 
Game and apps onboarding portal
Game and apps onboarding portalGame and apps onboarding portal
Game and apps onboarding portal
 
Scot Secure 2019 Edinburgh (Day 2)
Scot Secure 2019 Edinburgh (Day 2)Scot Secure 2019 Edinburgh (Day 2)
Scot Secure 2019 Edinburgh (Day 2)
 
Design Simple but Powerful application
Design Simple but Powerful applicationDesign Simple but Powerful application
Design Simple but Powerful application
 
Best Practices for API Adoption
Best Practices for API AdoptionBest Practices for API Adoption
Best Practices for API Adoption
 
BYOD, BYOA and Consumerization
BYOD, BYOA and ConsumerizationBYOD, BYOA and Consumerization
BYOD, BYOA and Consumerization
 
White Labeling Your Data Analytics
White Labeling Your Data AnalyticsWhite Labeling Your Data Analytics
White Labeling Your Data Analytics
 
LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014
LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014
LSI Spring Agent Open House 2014
 
Plumbr Slide Deck
Plumbr Slide DeckPlumbr Slide Deck
Plumbr Slide Deck
 
OSB140: Want a Safer Network? You Can Remove Local Admin Rights with Ivanti A...
OSB140: Want a Safer Network? You Can Remove Local Admin Rights with Ivanti A...OSB140: Want a Safer Network? You Can Remove Local Admin Rights with Ivanti A...
OSB140: Want a Safer Network? You Can Remove Local Admin Rights with Ivanti A...
 
Best Practices for API Adoption - WIP Factory presentation for AnyPresence we...
Best Practices for API Adoption - WIP Factory presentation for AnyPresence we...Best Practices for API Adoption - WIP Factory presentation for AnyPresence we...
Best Practices for API Adoption - WIP Factory presentation for AnyPresence we...
 
Vivint Wireless How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP - Luke L...
Vivint Wireless   How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP  - Luke L...Vivint Wireless   How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP  - Luke L...
Vivint Wireless How to De-Risk a New Venture & Build a Better ISP - Luke L...
 
Securing Systems - Still Crazy After All These Years
Securing Systems - Still Crazy After All These YearsSecuring Systems - Still Crazy After All These Years
Securing Systems - Still Crazy After All These Years
 

More from Adrian Sanabria

Lies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix Enigma
Lies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix EnigmaLies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix Enigma
Lies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix Enigma
Adrian Sanabria
 

More from Adrian Sanabria (14)

Early Tech Adoption: Foolish or Pragmatic? - 17th ISACA South Florida WOW Con...
Early Tech Adoption: Foolish or Pragmatic? - 17th ISACA South Florida WOW Con...Early Tech Adoption: Foolish or Pragmatic? - 17th ISACA South Florida WOW Con...
Early Tech Adoption: Foolish or Pragmatic? - 17th ISACA South Florida WOW Con...
 
Avoiding Bad Stats and the Benefits of Playing Trivia with Friends: PancakesC...
Avoiding Bad Stats and the Benefits of Playing Trivia with Friends: PancakesC...Avoiding Bad Stats and the Benefits of Playing Trivia with Friends: PancakesC...
Avoiding Bad Stats and the Benefits of Playing Trivia with Friends: PancakesC...
 
Lies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix Enigma
Lies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix EnigmaLies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix Enigma
Lies and Myths in InfoSec - 2023 Usenix Enigma
 
Indistinguishable from Magic: How the Cybersecurity Market Reached a Trillion...
Indistinguishable from Magic: How the Cybersecurity Market Reached a Trillion...Indistinguishable from Magic: How the Cybersecurity Market Reached a Trillion...
Indistinguishable from Magic: How the Cybersecurity Market Reached a Trillion...
 
2019 InfoSec Buyer's Guide
2019 InfoSec Buyer's Guide2019 InfoSec Buyer's Guide
2019 InfoSec Buyer's Guide
 
Equifax Breach Postmortem
Equifax Breach PostmortemEquifax Breach Postmortem
Equifax Breach Postmortem
 
The New Security Practitioner
The New Security PractitionerThe New Security Practitioner
The New Security Practitioner
 
The state of endpoint defense in 2021
The state of endpoint defense in 2021The state of endpoint defense in 2021
The state of endpoint defense in 2021
 
The Products We Deserve
The Products We DeserveThe Products We Deserve
The Products We Deserve
 
Red Team Framework
Red Team FrameworkRed Team Framework
Red Team Framework
 
From due diligence to IoT disaster
From due diligence to IoT disasterFrom due diligence to IoT disaster
From due diligence to IoT disaster
 
Ten security product categories you've (probably) never heard of
Ten security product categories you've (probably) never heard ofTen security product categories you've (probably) never heard of
Ten security product categories you've (probably) never heard of
 
Hybrid Cloud Security: Potential to be the Stuff of Dreams, not Nightmares
Hybrid Cloud Security: Potential to be the Stuff of Dreams, not NightmaresHybrid Cloud Security: Potential to be the Stuff of Dreams, not Nightmares
Hybrid Cloud Security: Potential to be the Stuff of Dreams, not Nightmares
 
Why does InfoSec play bass?
Why does InfoSec play bass?Why does InfoSec play bass?
Why does InfoSec play bass?
 

Recently uploaded

Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Joaquim Jorge
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
?#DUbAI#??##{{(☎️+971_581248768%)**%*]'#abortion pills for sale in dubai@
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
vu2urc
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
 
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century educationpresentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVReal Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
 
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
 
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
 
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt RobisonData Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
 
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
 
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
 
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdfTech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdfUnderstanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
 
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
 

451 AppSense Webinar - Why blame the user?

  • 1. Why blame the user? 1
  • 2. Confusing the victim and the problem “Users will click anything!” “Users are careless!” “Users are the weak link!”
  • 4. If already you know what can and will go wrong... 4 …what’s the next logical step?
  • 5. Kneejerk response: punish them “Take away their access” “Remove their rights” “Lock them down”
  • 6. Kneejerk response: results • Death by Exception • Support Fatigue Removing admin rights • Death by Exception • Support Fatigue App Whitelisting • Implementation complexity • IncompatibilityNAC 6
  • 8. App Whitelisting 2011: “By 2015, more than 50% of enterprises will have instituted 'default deny' policies that restrict the applications users can install.” 8
  • 9. App Whitelisting What went wrong? • Static lists • Manual maintenance • Death by exception • Users = snowflakes App whitelisting exception creep: do your profiles end up looking like this? • Basic CC user • Basic CC user + MS Office • Basic CC user + MS Office + Skype • Basic CC user + MS Office + Skype – No Lync • Basic CC user + MS Office + Skype, Grande, No Whip, Half Caff… 9
  • 11. Network Access Control What went wrong? • Too much complexity • Too many standards • Integration/Implementation Nightmares • Confused everyone 11
  • 14. Phoenix impressions: whitelisting is back “There are no bad ideas in security, just bad implementations” “A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity. An optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.” 14
  • 15. Understand your users Find empathy Let the healing begin 15
  • 16. Respect the pain threshold 16
  • 17. First do no harm: the security UI/UX impact scale Best • Be invisible – completely transparent to the user Better • Visible, but zero impact to the user Okay • Minor changes to user’s workflow are necessary Failure • Emails arrive with subjects like “I can’t do my job” 17
  • 19. Adrian’s rules for user-facing security 1. Don’t break the workflow 2. Don’t mess with the browser 3. Security must move with the user 4. Give the user more choices, not less 5. Simplify workflow; reduce complexity 6. Minimize static dependencies 7. Educate, empower and involve users 19
  • 20. Beyond not disrupting the business • Security ROI: more than just the cost of doing business? • Deputizing users • Trusting the user 20
  • 21. What does it mean to trust the user? 21
  • 22. What does “trust” mean in this context? First, we need to adopt a term from the startup industry: MVP Minimum Viable Product Drawing and concept by Henrik Kniberg http://blog.crisp.se/2016/01/25/henrikkniberg/making-sense-of-mvp
  • 23. MVS security example… 23 Security? Huh? Native VPN Client Native VPN client, native firewall, Windows Defender Native VPN client, native firewall, Windows Defender, Windows Bitlocker, UAC A usable version of Vista
  • 24. Users need a Minimum Safe Environment So “Trust” in this context is the minimum safe environment necessary for the average user to be able to do their job safely. We need to make it difficult for them to make critical security mistakes without making it difficult for them to do their job.
  • 25. Don’t confuse “Trust” with the other extreme • Giving choices doesn’t mean no control • What does it mean to trust users • Allowing users to install applications doesn’t mean giving local admin • Users may enjoy freedom, but will still expect protection 25
  • 26. Lessons Learned • When you layer security/defense, compromise is easier • Good security doesn’t mean going to extremes • Lock controls down too tight and user will go around • Shadow business users for a few days • learn their jobs • understand needs and constraints • appreciate the impact of trying to use a heavily restricted system 26

Editor's Notes

  1. Blaming the user won’t get you anywhere. Sure, you can train them, but they’ll still be a weak point. Instead of blaming them, how about designing for them or even helping them?
  2. Anyone know this acronym? Want to drop it in the comments for the others? Have you ever used it in trouble ticket notes? We’ve all poked fun at users because we needed to blow off some steam and frustration. Seriously though, you still have a problem to deal with, and blaming the user won’t get you any closer to solving it.
  3. Blaming the user is missing the issue It isn’t users’ fault the tools provided to them are vulnerable and fragile. The user isn’t expected to be a security expert. We can’t fix this problem by training the user. Not entirely. The moment you get done training one batch of employees, some of them have left and you have new ones. I believe training the user can help, but security awareness is just one imperfect layer of defense. You need more layers.
  4. Of course, the kneejerk response is to lock down users and take away access. None of this has really been very effective over the years. People are still looking for a solution.
  5. Okay, everyone’s locked down. We’re secure, right? Nope – helpdesk email and phones are blowing up – no one can get their job done.
  6. It all added up to an unmanageable mess. But it isn’t gone, what happened to it? Most of the original app control vendors found a niche in locking down environments that don’t change often: PCs in healthcare and retail, especially. This software has also been successfully used as an alternative to running anti-virus, which is handy when you have a system not connected to the Internet, and the auditor expects it to be up-to-date on AV signatures. A few others, like AppSense continued looking for a way to make app control work for the broader user base outside the niches.
  7. Look at the dates here! NAC was dead, and people
  8. We’re driving users nuts. Users are punished, and must suffer through our attempts to make the company “safer” by removing the “threat” they present. Who really suffered through all these failed security trends? How do we fix this?
  9. NAC and App Control are back, with better implementation, manageability and user experiences. Whitelisting is back! Find a reference to someone/something to be back. Mobile was able to design for these issues – that’s why there really isn’t a demand for mobile ant—malware – these things aren’t set up where you can make an easy mistake with a malicious executable.
  10. Understand your users. Understand their workflows. Understand their jobs. How much of a delay starts to cause a problem? Know where the security/productivity balance tips.
  11. Aim for Zero (best). Users have a pretty low pain threshold for anything that makes their jobs harder.
  12. There’s actually a level above “Best” called “Unicorn”. That’s where security not only avoids impacting the user, it actually helps them while making them secure. Security products that create non-security ROI deserve the title of unicorns. To avoid confusing these unicorns with startups that have >$1bn valuations, is there a better term we could use? Use the previous slide, but have a unicorn breaking out the top!
  13. #3 – in other words, if the security solution only works on the corporate network and 40% of your employee computing assets leave the corporate office every day… you’ve got a problem. #4 – SaaS apps; mobile or laptop; configurations; mac or pc, etc
  14. Where does this slide go? Talk about ROI potential & examples Deputizing users – if you see something say something; users as sensors New application Control tools create a partnership through enough granular control to empower both sides. Make the user a sensor Make users your first line of defense Why wouldn’t you want your users working for you? Trust and partner with users incorporate user responses into decisions users can be part of the security workflow – users as threat sensors, etc. Self-service opportunities
  15. So how do we apply this to security? Unfortunately, security is nearly always deemed unnecessary for an MVP, and often still doesn’t exist in mature, polished products. That’s why a considerable chunk of the security industry exists – to address these gaps.
  16. Short of completely reckless behavior, users should be able to do their jobs without worrying about losing data or getting hacked. In other words, we need visibility into what they’re doing and we need to make it difficult for them to mess up without making it difficult to do their job.
  17. Giving choices doesn’t mean you don’t monitor or have ability to control Allowing users to install applications doesn’t mean giving local admin Sure, users will enjoy the freedom, but will still expect protection… and they’ll blame you! MC Escher sketch represents chaos and order Really go into the trust but verify and what it means to trust users, but also keep an eye on them
  18. Put yourself in their shoes. Have YOU tried to do their job with whatever crazy security restrictions you put in place???