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Building a CTF
                             ... actually kinda tricky




Wednesday, 21 November 12
WHO


              Me.. Some times known as ‘skapp’, I do various things
              for 44CON, security tester, breaker of things, played
              and run a few CTFs way back

              TTYsig, Some times known as ‘Dean’, also a security
              tester and breaker of things, played and has run
              some before.




Wednesday, 21 November 12
The 2012 Idea

              44CON MWRLabs CTF 2012, Evolution
                     A CTF that tested skills of the contestants
                            to find vulnerabilities in applications and systems

                            defend a system from attack (the other teams)
                            identify other interesting things in the CTF environment

                     We also wanted to see if the player could communicate what
                     they found




Wednesday, 21 November 12
So The Result
              Each team had a VM, with custom services running on
              it

                     Identify what was running on the system

                     Identify any vulnerabilities in those services

                     Try and fix/mitigate these vulnerabilities



              Using this knowledge to attack the other teams


Wednesday, 21 November 12
DETAIL

              Each VM had four services

                     Two in Ruby (REST Service and SMTP/POP3)

                     One in C (Custom Service)

                     Web App in PHP

              Each had a couple of vulnerabilities

              Each required different levels of expertise to exploit



Wednesday, 21 November 12
CTF Network


              5 other standalone systems to attack

              Each with different Operating Systems and Software
              installed

              Each had a known compromise path

              Couple of the systems where ones we used for the
              2011 CTF that no one managed to compromise



Wednesday, 21 November 12
BIG BROTHER
              We were watching

              In 2011 we had a Netwitness (a 2011 Sponsor) Full
              Packet Capture system watching the network.

              In 2012 we went Open Source

                     Security Onion based setup using SNORT +
                     SNORBY + Full Packet Capture (DaemonLogger) +
                     SQUIL to watch and alert on traffic

              Proper enterprise switching that allowed us to
              monitor the CTF VLANs instead of homegrown TAPs
              we’d used previously

Wednesday, 21 November 12
BIG BROTHER
                                     We had attacks
                                       captured by
                                     SNORT rules for
                                         analysis

              High
           level stats
          such as this
           rule break
              down

Wednesday, 21 November 12
BIG BROTHER




                        More ways to visualize the captured
                                       data
Wednesday, 21 November 12
more INFRASTRUCTURE
              Cisco 3xxx series switches for the core and
              distribution of the network

              Wired network to the CTF network and an isolated
              Wireless Network via our Wireless LAN controller

              ESX server running the 5 standalone systems on the
              CTF network, a standalone system running the scoring
              server and a standalone system with lots of disk for
              the monitoring

              Firewall to prevent the players attacking ‘out of
              scope’ systems

Wednesday, 21 November 12
SCORING




Wednesday, 21 November 12
SCORING
             Modified version of an open source CTF Scoring
             Server

                    Defensive points

                            If a player was able to defend their system
                            from attack and prevent the other teams
                            stealing their flags they got defensive points.

                    Offensive points

                            Attack the vulnerabilities on the other players
                            systems and gain offensive points

Wednesday, 21 November 12
SCORING
              Advisory Points

                     Here we accepted advisories for the vulnerabilities
                     within the services, these where marked out of 10 by
                     the Judges

                     Reporting style as well as content was important

                     We used the same system for reporting standalone
                     system compromise

              Good Behavior

                     Everyone was given 100 points, if they breached the
                     rules we deducted points

Wednesday, 21 November 12
RESULTS

              So none of the 2012 Standalone systems got
              compromised, our two 2011 systems didn’t get popped,
              they will be back

              Someone with Nessus managed to get close, but they
              didn’t follow through on their scan....

              The VM got a good bashing, although not all the
              vulnerabilities were identified.




Wednesday, 21 November 12
RESULTS
              We published everything for the CTF here

                            http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012

              Final Scores and Advisories Posted here

              http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012/results/

              http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012/results/
                                  adv/adv.html

              Each Vulnerability in the services has a write up here

                    http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012/
                  mwrlabs-ctf-2012-vulnerable-services-vulnerabilities

Wednesday, 21 November 12

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Building the 44CON CTF

  • 1. Building a CTF ... actually kinda tricky Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 2. WHO Me.. Some times known as ‘skapp’, I do various things for 44CON, security tester, breaker of things, played and run a few CTFs way back TTYsig, Some times known as ‘Dean’, also a security tester and breaker of things, played and has run some before. Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 3. The 2012 Idea 44CON MWRLabs CTF 2012, Evolution A CTF that tested skills of the contestants to find vulnerabilities in applications and systems defend a system from attack (the other teams) identify other interesting things in the CTF environment We also wanted to see if the player could communicate what they found Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 4. So The Result Each team had a VM, with custom services running on it Identify what was running on the system Identify any vulnerabilities in those services Try and fix/mitigate these vulnerabilities Using this knowledge to attack the other teams Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 5. DETAIL Each VM had four services Two in Ruby (REST Service and SMTP/POP3) One in C (Custom Service) Web App in PHP Each had a couple of vulnerabilities Each required different levels of expertise to exploit Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 6. CTF Network 5 other standalone systems to attack Each with different Operating Systems and Software installed Each had a known compromise path Couple of the systems where ones we used for the 2011 CTF that no one managed to compromise Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 7. BIG BROTHER We were watching In 2011 we had a Netwitness (a 2011 Sponsor) Full Packet Capture system watching the network. In 2012 we went Open Source Security Onion based setup using SNORT + SNORBY + Full Packet Capture (DaemonLogger) + SQUIL to watch and alert on traffic Proper enterprise switching that allowed us to monitor the CTF VLANs instead of homegrown TAPs we’d used previously Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 8. BIG BROTHER We had attacks captured by SNORT rules for analysis High level stats such as this rule break down Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 9. BIG BROTHER More ways to visualize the captured data Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 10. more INFRASTRUCTURE Cisco 3xxx series switches for the core and distribution of the network Wired network to the CTF network and an isolated Wireless Network via our Wireless LAN controller ESX server running the 5 standalone systems on the CTF network, a standalone system running the scoring server and a standalone system with lots of disk for the monitoring Firewall to prevent the players attacking ‘out of scope’ systems Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 12. SCORING Modified version of an open source CTF Scoring Server Defensive points If a player was able to defend their system from attack and prevent the other teams stealing their flags they got defensive points. Offensive points Attack the vulnerabilities on the other players systems and gain offensive points Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 13. SCORING Advisory Points Here we accepted advisories for the vulnerabilities within the services, these where marked out of 10 by the Judges Reporting style as well as content was important We used the same system for reporting standalone system compromise Good Behavior Everyone was given 100 points, if they breached the rules we deducted points Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 14. RESULTS So none of the 2012 Standalone systems got compromised, our two 2011 systems didn’t get popped, they will be back Someone with Nessus managed to get close, but they didn’t follow through on their scan.... The VM got a good bashing, although not all the vulnerabilities were identified. Wednesday, 21 November 12
  • 15. RESULTS We published everything for the CTF here http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012 Final Scores and Advisories Posted here http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012/results/ http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012/results/ adv/adv.html Each Vulnerability in the services has a write up here http://44con-networking.net/mwrlabs-ctf-2012/ mwrlabs-ctf-2012-vulnerable-services-vulnerabilities Wednesday, 21 November 12