Speeches1957 65

SPEECHES DELIVERED
by
ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO
Foreign Minister of Pakistan
before the
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY AND ITS
COMMITTEES
1957 –1965
Reproduced in PDF Form
By: Sani H. Panhwar
Member Sindh Council, PPP

Speeches 1957-1965 Copyright © www.bhutto.org 2
Address to the Sixth Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly on October 25, 1957
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation has heard most attentively the statements made thus for.
The task of defining the concept or motion of aggression is indeed a gargantuan
one. We have to face this delicate issue in a spirit of fallability and caution. Sir
Francis Bacon began his essay “Of Truth” by saying, “What is truth? Said jesting
Pilate, and would not stay for an answer”. If Pontius Pilate were confronted with
the task facing this Committee, I seriously doubt if the Roman governor would
even ask the question.
At its 368th
plenary meeting on January 31, 1952, the General Assembly
adopted resolution 599 (VI), which states, inter alia,
“Considering that, although the existence of the crime of aggression may
be inferred from the circumstances peculiar to each particular case it is
nevertheless possible and desirable, with a view to ensuring international
peace and security and to developing International Criminal Law to define
aggression by reference to the elements which constitute it.”
This resolution establishes three conclusions:
(a) that aggression is a crime:
(b) that the existence of this crime can be inferred from the circumstances
peculiar to each particular case without specifically defining the crime
of aggression;
(c) that, notwithstanding this, it is possible and desirable to and to develop
international criminal law.
And with this end in view, the question of defining aggression was
considered thoroughly at various levels all known to this Committee. However, it
is pertinent to observe that the first wave of enthusiasm envisaged in the
passage of resolution 599 (VI) was considerably mellowed and dented on a fuller
analysis; so that the General Assembly was constrained to take cognizance of
the innate catena of complexities by adopting, at its 408th
plenary meeting,
another resolution, being resolution 688(VII), which stipulate inter alia.
“Considering that the discussion of the question of defining aggression at
the sixth and seventh session of the General Assembly and in the
International Law Commission has revealed the complexity of this
question and the need for a detailed study of:

(a) the various forms of aggression;
(b) the connection between a definition of aggression and the
maintenance of international peace and security;
(c) the problems raised by the inclusion of a definition of aggression in the
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind and by
its application within the framework of international criminal jurisdiction;
(d) the effect of a definition of aggression on the exercise of the jurisdiction
of the various organs of the United Nations;
Considering that continued and joint efforts shall be made to formulate a
generally acceptable definition of aggression, with a view to promoting
international peace and security and developing international law, decides to
establish a Special Committee of fifteen members and requests the said Special
Committee;
(a) to submit to the General Assembly at its ninth session draft definitions
of aggression
or draft statements of the notion of aggression;
(b) to study all the problems referred to above on the assumption of a
definition being adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly.”
The concentrated research apparently revealed insurmountable difficulties
necessitating the adoption of this second resolution. The first resolution was
emphatic in tone and intent. It assumed that a definition of aggression would ipso
facto ensure international peace and security. The second resolution was more in
step with realities of the international situation, in that it sought the exact
connection between the definition of aggression and the maintenance of
international peace and security. And, therefore, in view of the doubts
engendered, the General Assembly requested the first Special Committee to
enquire even further into the question.
The deliberations of the first Special Committee necessitated the
formation of another Special Committee to co-ordinate the views expressed by
state members and to submit to the eleventh session of the General Assembly:
1. a detailed report; and
2. a draft definition of aggression.
3.
Among the three proposals submitted for a working plan of the second
Special Committee, the Netherlands proposal suggested inter alia,
“To determine whether or not the outcome of these discussions
warrants the drafting of a definition of aggression and, in case the answer
is the affirmative, to draft a definition of aggression.”

This abundantly indicates that even at so late a stage of study, skepticism
was apparent in the minds of some of the delegates on whether a definition of
aggression was warranted.
It is, therefore, erroneous in my delegation’s view to submit that the
General Assembly’s resolution 599(VI) of January 31, 1952, has irrevocably
settled that it is both possible and desirable to define aggression. If that were so
the General Assembly would not have formed the Special Committee to consider
this case and all its attendant implications at specialized levels. Indeed, the entire
raison d’etre of creating the Special Committees would have become vitiated.
The report of the Special Committee on the question of defining
aggression states that about twenty-six representatives considered a definition
both possible and desirable but out of this category some representatives
declared that they supported the adoption of a “generally acceptable definition”
which, in fact, may be interpreted to mean that they opposed the idea of defining
aggression, because “a generally acceptable definition” could not be found at the
present time. Moreover, even these twenty-six representatives did not form what
the report calls “a homogeneous group”. They differed in opinion as to the
function, the content, and the form of a definition. In order words, they were
classified into one group solely on the ground that they agreed in principle to a
principle, which carries the art of nebulousness to its apogee.
All this obviously shows that it is fundamentally wrong to hold that the
resolution of the General Assembly of January 31, 1952, or any other resolution
of that body on the subject has prejudiced the issue to the point where it can be
pre-supposed that a definition of aggression is possible and desirable.
In this context, a resolution of the general Assembly is not an irrevocable
and an unalterable edict. It is not a judgment of a court of last resort. Hence my
delegation firmly believes it is not ultra vires of this discussion to consider if a
definition of aggression is both possible and desirable.
Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr.
Chairman, Sir, to conclude, so to speak, my obiter dictal by saying that the most
salutary aspect of this discussion is that the “End” or “Objective” of all gathered
here is identical. That end is, if I may be permitted to take a slight liberty with the
wording of the preamble, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
aggression. All are sedulously seeking to find lasting guarantees for the
insurance of perpetual peace. This factor is of considerable significance. It
establishes an indissoluble link. This spirit and unity of purpose may well be the
most important single factor in the achievement of our aspiration.
On the first day of this debate, the distinguished and eminent
Representative of Belgium referred to the miraculous achievements of modern
science and fell, if I am correct, that this phenomenal progress is evidence of the

undesirable fact that homo sapiens can attain his objectives if he labors
tenaciously and industriously to that end; and that it is imperative to keep our
social sciences in rhythm with the development of world movements; else, our
concepts and institutions will face the danger of becoming effete. This is true, but
it is a double edged argument. If modern man can launch a sputnik, to use the
terminology of the successor, into outer space, he can also define aggression.
However, if man’s ingenuity is limitless and if his resources and capabilities know
no frontiers; then he is, and indeed must be ingenious enough not only to define
aggression but also to circumvent, subvert, and abuse it. A definition, under
these circumstances, would literally mean the presentation of our civilization on a
uranium platter to a would-be aggressor, to a twentieth century Gengis Khan or
Attila; a would-be world dictator who would most certainly find the means to
distort and mutilate the definition for his own wicked and gruesome ambitions.
Let us now examine, if under the present state of International Law’s
development, it is possible to define aggression. International Law has made
tremendous strides since the far flung days of the ancient Greek City States era,
and even since the relatively more recent time of Hugo Grotius, From a primitive
law, dependent mainly on the sanction of self-help, it has developed into a body
of recognized norms. It has institutionalized itself, and at Nurenburg, it asserted
itself to that pitch of centralization which made it possible for it to take sanctions
against individuals. Nonetheless, in comparison with the highly centralized and
galvanized municipal law, it is still in its infancy. It does not have the force
monopoly of the international community to enforce effectively all its sanctions.
Its efficacy is entirely depended upon the caprice of national sovereignty. In
1935, a decade before the auspicious gathering at San Francisco, that
celebrated jurist Hans Kelsen characterized the status of International Law in
words which, despite the substantial progress since achieved, to this day
remains essentially the same; he said:
“The present state of international law is characterized by the fact
that international common law –considered from a technical standpoint –is
still in the stage of a primitive system of law, that is to say, it is at a stage
from which the legal system of the individual States originally developed.
This is a condition of extensive decentralization. There are not –as in a
technically developed system of law –central organisms dividing among
themselves the functions of making and executing law. The general rules
valid for the whole community have not been consciously laid down by a
legislator in an exact and regulated procedure, but –as in the beginning of
the development of law within the individual State –they have been
evolved by custom, that is to say, by the practice of the persons
concerned with that law –the members of the community.
“Within the framework of international common law there are no
central tribunals whose business it is to apply general rules of law to
particular cases. A State inured by another State is the one to decide

whether a violation of international law has taken place, and if the other
State denies the breach which is imputed to it, there is, under international
common law, no objective procedure by which the dispute can be
determined. Thus the State whose rights are impugned itself retaliates at
its own discretion for the wrong perpetrated, in its opinion, with the
measures of coercion peculiar to international law, war or reprisal.”
I hasten to admit that since 1935, International Law has developed by
leaps and hounds. However this notwithstanding, International Law, in marked
contradistinction to municipal law, is still decentralized law, and the dichotomy
between the two laws is enormous. I am aware of the International Court of
Justice’s existence but also of the subjective reservations of the states accepting
its jurisdiction. I am aware of the existence of the Security Council and of its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, but I am also
aware of article 27(3) of the Charter, an article that looms over all matters of
consequence.
My delegation deeply respects the Charter of the United Nations.
However, my delegation believes that no disrespect is shown or intended to this
august organization if reality is mirrored accurately. Here, my delegation is
fortified by the erudite statement of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom
who, during the course of his brilliant speech on September 24, 1957, in the
General Assembly said, and I quote:
“This debate is an appropriate opportunity for frank discussion of
the state of the Organization –its achievements, its failures, its strength, its
weaknesses, its standing in the world, the hopes for its development in the
future.
“The United Nations is not a super-state. It is not a world authority
enforcing its law upon the nations. The General Assembly is not a
parliament of individually elected members legislating for the world. The
United Nations is an instrument of negotiation between Governments. It
can blunt the edges of conflict between nations. It can serve diplomacy of
reconciliation. Its tendency is to wear away or break down differences and
thus help towards solutions. In the Secretary-General’s view, the real
limitations upon the actions of the Organization do not derive from the
provisions of the Character or from the system of one vote for one nation
irrespective of strength or size. They result from the facts of international
life at the present time. The balance of forces in the world sets the limits
within which the power of the world organization can develop.”
These words represent reality so completely that even the most devout
worshipper of the United Nations must accept them. For, to conceal such self-
evident truth is to do an irredeemable disservice to the United Nations and the
cause for which it stands.

There is no escape from the fact that International Law at the present
moment bows at the altar of national sovereignty. Indeed the Charter itself is a
political instrument. It is inevitable, therefore, that any discussion on the question
of the definition of aggression must revolve around both political and legal issues,
that is, on metajuristic considerations, on factors contaminated by the virus of
subjective value judgment. In isolation, and on its own, the attempt to define
aggression is, from a pragmatic standpoint, utterly futile.
It is an axiomatic fact that this endeavor cannot possibly be detached from
socio-political influences. It gets inevitably recoiled in the web of politics. In these
circumstances, are we to have two definitions of aggression, one political, and
the other juridical? One based on the foundation of thermo-nuclear strength and
the other, an analytical and objective definition, poised rather uncomfortably on
the fragile edifice of an international legal tribunal functioning on the sufferance of
national sovereignty? If that were to be permitted it would achieve for almost all
times the ascendancy of politics over law. It would gravely endanger International
Laws’ struggle for the realization of its autonomy to enable it to establish
permanent international peace through the rule of law; a system we cherish so
dearly. Time and again, men of goodwill have solemnly appealed to sovereign
states to submit their legal disputes to the International Court of Justice; but in
spite of such pleadings, w find states resorting to other measures in the
determination of disputes. In the present circumstances, such conduct is not
really a matter for alarm or surprise. The Charter itself places the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on a
political organ of the United Nations. By virtue of article 94 (2) it places the
International Court of Justice under the domain of politics. Article 94(2) states:
“If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to
the judgment.”
In support of my submission I would like to quote from Hans Kelsen’s
monumental treatise on the law of the United Nations:
“The Statute does not contain a provision guaranteeing the
execution of the decision of the Court against a recalcitrant State. Article
94(2) does not impose upon the Security Council the obligation to enforce
the judgments of the Court against recalcitrant parties. It provides for a
procedure of appeal in case of non-compliance with the judgment of the
Court and makes the action of the Security Council to be taken as the
result of the procedure dependent upon the council’s discretion by
authorizing this body to chose between two different actions: Either to
make recommendations or to decide upon measures to be taken to give

effect to the judgment of the court. In case the Security Council chooses to
make recommendations, it may recommend to comply with the judgment
of the Court. But, in making a recommendation under Article 94(2), the
Security Council is not bound to conform with the judgment of the Court
with which the party concerned did not comply. The Security Council may
recommend a solution of the dispute totally different from that decided by
the Court. If Article 25 of the Charter is interpreted to apply to
recommendations of the Security Council, recourse to the Security Council
under Article 94(2) has the effect of an appeal to a higher authority. Even
if it is assumed that recommendations made by the Security Council are
not binding upon the parties, a recourse under Article 94(2) may have the
effect of an appeal. For the Council may consider non-compliance with a
recommendation made under Article 94(2), a threat to the peace and take
enforcement action under Article 39 against the State which does not
comply with the Council’s recommendation. That means that the Security
Council may enforce its recommendation instead d of enforcing the
Court’s judgment. Article 94(2) confers upon the Security Council the
power to substitute its recommendation for the Court’s judgment. This
means further, that the obligation imposed upon the Members by Article
94(1) and by the Statute of the Court: to comply with the decisions of the
Court, may be restricted by application of Article 94(2). By having recourse
to the Security Council under Article 94(2), the party places the Court
under the control of the Council. Since under the Charter self-help (except
in the case of an armed attack as self-defense is prohibited, non-
compliance with the Court’s judgment may compel the other party to have
recourse to the Security Council under Article 49(2). Such recourse may
have the effect of transforming a legal dispute, decided by the Court in
accordance with existing law, into an issue to be settled a new by the
Council according to political principles.”
In these circumstances it would be the quintessence of irony to have only
a legal definition of aggression, the interpretation of which may not even by
determined by a juridical tribunal, and if determined, not enforced by it. A legal
definition would acquire empirical utility only when the International Court
assumes an exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes without exception and
reservation. However, the international community will have to traverse quite a
distance to reach this destination. That would be the first effective step to the
super-state as it may be called in a legal sense, and not merely in the language
of demagogic politics.
It would, therefore, be a melancholy defeat of the object of defining
aggression if we were to try it at the present moment, at a time when it is not
possible. It would mean the application of double standards to all international
issues and the cruel incarceration of law by politics. Hence, my delegation fears
that under the existing conditions of International Law, it is not possible to have a
legal definition of aggression. It is only possible to have to political definition. Of

course, it can be called legal but in effect, it will have a political connotation,
emphasis, and outlook.
Even if my delegation were to concede that a legal definition is possible in
a juridical sense, we would still be far away from the solution of the problem. We
would immediately encounter a crisis of words, and get involved in a interminable
semantic warfare. There would be disagreement on the scope, content, and
function of the definition. Should it be in strict conformity with Article 51, or should
it be a more comprehensive definition in which the expression “armed attack” as
used in Article 51 is merely one from of aggression? Clarification and agreement
will also be needed on Article 39 of the Charter, which speaks of “act of
aggression”. Would an “act of aggression” mean an armed attack only or would it
mean aggression direct and indirect, aggression as envisaged by the Soviet draft
resolution, in document A/C 6/L/399? A rigid and a limited definition may well
defeat the object of defining aggression, and, on the other hand, an all-
embracing definition including “aggressive intent”, “the notion of indirect
aggression”, “the notion of economic aggression”, “ideological aggression”, and
other forms of indirect aggression may create an anomalous state of affairs in
which aggression may become a regular and normal feature of human conduct
and thereby lose its dreadfully abnormal, fearful, and emergent meaning. From
an abnormal notion it would be turned into a natural notion. This half-exhausted
twentieth century is in the grips of the most dramatic ideological battle. In every
part of the world there is a clash of ideas, ideas that cannot be easily controlled
or liquidated. In so pregnant a setting ideological aggression can be detected in
almost every are of the globe. Normalcy would be characterized by the word
aggression if ideological aggression were to form a part of it. However, basically,
a definition whether narrow or broad is without an obol of doubt, explosively
loaded with far-reaching implications, and is fraught with a host of dangers.
Assuming a definition is possible, is it desirable? A definition’s immediate
effect would be to stultify and hamper the progressive growth of International
Law. In this respect, my delegation noted with approval the distinguished
representative of Ceylon’s reference to the Law of Torts, when he made his lucid
statement during the course of the discussion on the Report of the International
Law Commission.
Because of the enormous dichotomy in the degree of centralization, the
only branch of Municipal Law that can be profitably compared with International
Law is the Law of Torts. Like General International Law, the Law of Torts is in a
stage of dynamic growth. If the Law of Torts had been codified at a premature
juncture, an irreparable harm would have been done to the province of
jurisprudence as a whole. The Tort of Negligence would not have emerged and
bloomed to its fullness. Out of the historic judgment of Lord Atkin in Donohue v.
Stevenson emerged not only a Tort of Negligence but also a philosophy of law
establishing beyond all reasonable doubt, the virtue of undefined norms. “The
categories of negligence are never closed”, said the sagacious law Lord, and so

it truly was; with the result that redress and relief is now readily available to all
who suffer and groan physically and financially for the negligence of their fellow
citizens. If the Law of Torts had been stultified and cramped within the four walls
of a definition, it would not have been possible for thousands of individuals to
seek and receive relief according to their due. And certainly it would not have
been possible for the distinguished representative of India to extend the Principle
of the General Duty of Care to the ambit of International Law and argue, as he
rightly did, that the principle enunciated in Donohue v. Stevenson imposes a duty
of care on every state in its international conduct.
The virtue of undefined legal terms has been well described by an eminent
American authority and to summarize the thought of my delegation in this
respect, it would perhaps be beneficial to quote an extract from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Davidson v. Board of Administrators of the City of New
Orleans (96. U.S. 97 1878 p.103, 104) for in this case the Supreme Court
expressed its reluctance to define the exact meaning of the term “ Due Process”
for much the same reasons that compel us to shy away from a definition of
aggression. I now quote the relevant passage: -
“… if, therefore, it were possible to define what it is for a State to deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in terms
which would cover every exercise of power thus forbidden to the State,
and exclude those which are not, no more useful construction could be
furnished by this or any other court to any part of the fundamental law.
But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition which
would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive and satisfactory, there is
wisdom … in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an
important phase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall
require…”
If it is wise to keep the door open for the development of law in the highly
centralized system of Municipal Law by avoiding a priori definitions, how much
more wise and beneficial it would be to emulate this policy in the highly
decentralized system of International Law. Are we so certain, so dogmatically
committed to the belief that the categories of aggression are closed and therefore
fit for definition?
Those nurtured in the system of the Common Law have seen through
experience the inherent weaknesses of defined terms. It is true that even in
countries where the Common Law prevails, the dictates of modern society have
compelled to some extent the codification of laws. No effort has, however, been
made to codify laws that are in the process of development. The Common Law
countries present an excellent opportunity for judging simultaneous and side by
side the workings of both codified and uncodified laws in one legal framework.
Suffice it to say that codification gives rise to a host of new problems, particularly

those pertaining to interpretation. Most certainly it is no automatic machine that
produces the required results on the insertion of the proper coin. At times not
infrequent it gives rise to problems far more complicated and difficult that those
that existed prior to codification.
Law is a coercive order. This is a characteristic of law recognized from
time immemorial. Without the element of force, law is reduced to naught, instead
of maintaining order it becomes a part of anarchy, For this very reason it is not
infrequently asked if International Law is true law. If International Law possesses
the ingredients of coercion, it is true law; if it can take effective remedial and
prohibitive sanctions against civil and criminal delicts, it is true law. As the
distinguished Representative of Colombia so aptly said, and I quote. “There
could be no society without law, and no law without penalties”.
Those who regard International Law as true law consider that the most
effective and potent sanction of International Law is WAR, both defensive and
aggressive. According to the protagonists of this school of thought, the theory of
bellum justum is an inextricable part of International Law. My delegation does not
express any views on the merits of this theory. We only say that it is necessary to
reckon with this theory and its manifold implications, if we are to define and
declare aggression an international crime. A situation may arise, as has
happened so often in the past, calling for the application of this doctrine. The
theory of Just War is not confined to the right of self-defense. Aggressive
collective action is conceivable. “Counter-war” is the only effective reaction
against an unpermitted war. If war is a delict, counter war must be a sanction.
The theory of bellum justum fell into eclipse during the era of unbridled and
unfettered national sovereignty. But, once again, it is reasserting itself in the field
of International Law. So argue those who subscribe to this theory. They also say
that it forms the basis of many important landmarks in Positive International Law,
such as the Peace Treaty of Versailles, the Covenant of the League of Nations,
and the Kellogg Pact. It is even traceable in Article 51 of the Charter.
This doctrine creates complications of very great magnitude not so much
in the exercise of legitimate self-defense measures but when aggression,
technically so-called, becomes necessary or is thought necessary as a sanction
of International Law. History is studded with a plethora of cases that blur the line
between measures of self-defense and unmitigated aggression. Legitimate
exercise of the right of self-defense and aggression are concomitantly
interwoven. The latest instance of this is epitomized in the Korean conflict. Each
party accused the other of aggression and each claimed that it was exercising
the inherent right of self-defense, although aggression was so manifestly clear
that the United Nations were able to take peremptory measures.
A situation may arise in which State A accuses State B of organizing or
encouraging the organization of armed bands within its territory or of subversive
infiltration and on this pretence, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-

defense, attacks and subdues State B. In such an event, the victim may appeal
to another state or states, either under treaty obligations or under the rules of
General International Law, to comes to its rescue. Interference by other states
withstanding; the intervention would be a just resort to counter-aggression
against State A.
The distinguished Representative of Colombia has stated, as an instance
of indirect aggression against France and the United Kingdom, the German
attack on Poland in 1939. This may be one interpretation of the chain of events
that unleashed the Second World War. The proponents of the doctrine of bellum
justum would, however interpret the declaration of war by the United Kingdom on
Nazi Germany as an act of just aggression against a violator of International Law.
It may be argued that under prevailing conditions, a state cannot abuse its
right of self-defense beyond a given limit. The latter part of Article 51 of the
Charter would be an effective bar against the abuse. This argument, if advanced,
would be found wanting in actual practice. For, in such a contingency, the veto
right may have the opposite effect. Instead of preventing action, or counter-
action, if would thwart the cessation of hostilities, once hostilities have started in
the case of an abused exercise of the right of self-defense.
In view of the possibility of the occurrence of such abuses under the
existing conditions of International Law and without a radical amendment or
revision of the Charter, is it really desirable to classify aggression as an
international crime? A crime forbidding counter-aggression on occasions when
civilized nations are bound ethically and legally to fulfill their solemn obligations
of individual and collective action against the misdeeds of a naked aggressor, an
aggressor who vainly and shamelessly seeks to conceal his aggression behind
the façade of the abused right of self-defense. International Law would be
relegated to a set of empty norms if it’s most effective coercive sanction is so
circumscribed.
Hence, it is my delegation’s concerted view that at this rather critical
juncture, it is neither possible nor desirable to define aggression. Furthermore,
we believe that we have the machinery, competent, capable, and mobile enough
to take appropriate corrective action against aggressive acts, against other
breaches of the peace, the threats to the peace, and all other disputes and
situations endangering international peace and security, without defining
aggression. On the contrary, a definition may quite conceivably act as a barrier
against quick and decisive counter-action, and bog down the proceedings of the
Security Council by a prolonged and futile discussion on the niceties of
interpreting facts. As a definition would inevitably entail a drastic revision and
amendment of the Charter, perhaps it may be more opportune to explore the
possibility and necessity of a definition at the time when the revision of the
Charter comes up for consideration.

My delegation has voiced its apprehensions vis-à-vis the possibility and
desirability of defining aggression. However, as Pakistan is incontrovertibly
dedicated to the cause of peace, it is a fundamental tenet of our policy to
approach all issues impartially. My delegation does not harbor any preconceived
prejudices. Issues of such paramount importance cannot be tracked in a
dogmatic and doctrinaire manner. We have indicated the more apparent, or what
may appear to us to be the more apparent, impediments in the path of a
definition. But if even one out of this galaxy of jurists is able to dispel our doubts,
we are quite prepared to examine sympathetically and objectively the
suggestions and proposals made to that effect. Society is composed of far too
many imponderables for there to be a finality of decision on such questions.
However, with this qualification my delegation must state categorically that
despite the fast changing pattern of human activity, there are certain immutable
factors. My delegation is fully aware of the character and function of this
committee albeit it cannot be denied that on occasions the terms of reference of
the various committees overlap. The question under consideration is not
exclusively a legal issue. That it is part legal and part political is an incontestable
proposition. If it were strictly a legal issue it would not have caused so much
perplexity. By its very nature, it brings to the fore political and even socio-
economic problems. But even strictly legal issues involve the legitimate
discussion of facts. However, in deference to the apparent sense and feeling of
this Committee, my delegation will state in general terms a matter of fundamental
concern to my country.
If there is a generally acceptable definition of aggression, if we are to
close the categories of aggression, that definition must include economic
aggression. In this respect, paragraph 3(a) and (c) of the Soviet draft resolution is
not specific enough to dispel the fears of my delegation. If we are to adopt a
definition, then that definition must contain a separate article on economic
aggression stating clearly and unambiguously that economic aggression or
indirect aggression is perpetrated if lower riparian’s are deprived of their natural
rights in use of rivers which flow through two or more countries. My delegation
cannot overstate the importance of this issue.
An armed attack is gruesome and odious because of the damage in
inflicts. Hence, everyone agrees that an armed attack is aggression, pure and
simple. If more devastating and deadly damage to life and property can be
inflicted without an armed attack, without the use of force, by means far more
callous and perfidious, then such means must constitute a part of aggression as
much as an armed attack.
If there is any interference in the normal and assured supply of irrigation
waters, my country would face the threat of total annihilation. It would be the
most invidious form of aggression. It would turn green alluvial and fertile fields
into a scorching desert. It would create wide-spread famine, frustration, and fear.

It would make it virtually impossible for any authority to control civil strife and
bloodshed. Starvation would compel civilized human beings to resort to
cannibalism. It would shatter all concepts of decency and morality. This indeed
would be the outcome of such an aggression.
This is a situation not peculiar to my country. There are other states that,
due to their geographical position and their economic reliance on supply of
irrigation waters from an international river must take cognizance of such a form
of aggression.
Economic blockade of land-locked countries may, likewise, have similar
results and, therefore, my delegation will support the proposal of the
distinguished Representative of Afghanistan made in this connection provided
there is a generally acceptable definition of aggression and provided on merit, my
country’s great neighbors recognize our legitimate fears and are prepared to
admit that violation of riparian rights can cause as much if not more economic
havoc as an economic blockade of a land-locked country. There could be no
better demonstration of my delegation’s bona fides than this voluntary
acceptance of facts based on merits.
I have taxed a great deal of your time and patience but before I close I
must appeal to you, my distinguished colleagues, that we must strive tirelessly
and continuously for the search of the necessary political equilibrium and
adjustments guaranteeing the maintenance of perpetual peace. This is a duty we
owe not only to our own war sick generation, but to our progeny. We are
impounded by our Charter not only to save ourselves, but also the succeeding
generations from the scourge and carnage of war. I have often heard it said that
in the event of world conflagration, there will be neither victor nor vanquished.
This seems obvious, but even if there is a sham and farcical victory, it will be that
of the dying over the dead, and the dying will have the dubious thrill of glory by
witnessing the utter demolition of civilization; the destruction of our homes and
universities, our centers of art and science, our mosques and temples and
churches, our Taj Mahals and Westminster Abbeys; and among the wailing of
orphaned infants and crippled widows, the victors will breathe their last breath.
So it is our sacred duty to work for a lasting peace and to give a ring of reality
and not merely that of hope to the words of an English poet who visualized the
day –
“… when the war drums beat no longer and the battle flags are furled, in a
Parliament of Man, in a federation of the World…”

Address to the First Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly on March 17, 1958
Mr. Chairman,
In the very first speech in the general debate, the distinguished Delegate
of Saudi Arabia paid a rich and well merited tribute to your ability, by using one of
the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule of the Law of Evidence. If I may be permitted
to emulate the renowned jurist from Saudi Arabia, too, would like to draw on the
same body of law by urging this Committee to take Judicial Notice of your
erudition and eminence. I say this because I most sincerely mean it and not
because it is the unwritten law of such conferences to indulge in courteous
preliminaries. Nor, indeed, to win your sympathy, for, Sir, my delegation has
much too much of faith in your impartiality to sway sway you by semantics.
Having said this, I pray that my delegation, like that of the United Kingdom, has
made a really successful bid for your sympathy.
As a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, Pakistan takes particular
pride in your election, and as Asians, we feel elated in seeing an Anglo-Saxon
Asian in the Chair. My delegation also welcomes the election of the Vice-
Chairman and the Rapporteur. Together you form a impressive trinity of scholars.
My delegation would also like to voice its admiration and appreciation for
the balanced and empirically constructive draft code on the Law of the Sea. It is
the product of a great labor. Each member of the Commission is to be applauded
for the individual and collective contribution made towards the accomplishment of
this learned and coherent maritime code. Special tribute is, however, due to
Professor Francois. We all know that without his painstaking effort, without his
juristic wisdom and experience, this draft code would not have been as complete
as it is. This document seeks to reflect the realities of the International
Community as faithfully as possible. It seeks to strike the cord of compromise by
skillfully associating recent trends and developments with the rules of the past,
rules that have acquired a character of permanence despite the relentless grind
of time and space.
However, my delegation would like to make it abundantly clear that our
appreciation of the report does not in any way bind or commit us to the draft
articles in their entirety. According to the object of this general debate, my
delegation will, at this stage, confine itself, as far as possible, to the enunciation
of principle and policy. When a detailed discussion of the articles takes place, my
delegation will intervene whenever the3 discussions so warrant.
This report of the International Law Commission is indeed an all
embracing one. It covers all aspects of the law pertaining to the sea. In addition

to the vast canvas that has to be covered by this Conference of Plenipotentiaries
in so short a period of nine weeks., the General Assembly has, by resolution
1105(XI), called upon us to study the question of free access to the sea of land-
locked countries. As it is, the truly germaine issues are complicated enough to
take up the entire time of this conference. Despite this we have been assigned
additional burdens.
It is my delegation’s conviction that if we are to achieve some measure of
success, we must discipline our deliberations in such a fashion as to tackle only
those issues that form the subject matter of the report “per se”. It is far better and
far more constructive to achieve limited and modest results than to dabble in
each and every controversial issue without any result.
We have to arrive at solutions to problems that cover the surface of vast
oceans and the space beneath and above them, measure the breadth of the sea
and examine its freedom, and give attention to the Continental Shelf and the
Contiguous Zone. Doctrines and rights relating to Innocent Passage and Hot
Pursuit have to be scrutinized. These and a multitude of other crucial aspects of
the Law of the Sea have to be considered and, if possible, settled. The verdict of
this conference will, without doubt, affect most significantly the conduct of nation-
states vis-à-vis the sea. Too much is at stake and too many vital interests
involved for us to cherish unfettered hope. Nevertheless, hope and faith prompt
us to move forward with guarded optimism. We are conscious of the failures of
the past but are also poignantly aware of the dictates of this thermo-nuclear age
that gives us the ultimatum to either embrace peace with the arms of law, or
perish for ever into the graveyard of a world Carthage.
The law on the subject we are called upon to codify is prolific. There is a
mass of documentation on it. The International Law Commission has, as a result
of its eight years of unremitting labor, collected and correlated all the Law of the
Sea in its draft. The document containing the draft articles greatly facilitates our
task but much ground has still to be covered to complete the work.
Codification as used in Municipal Law cannot be applied to International
Law in its purest context. Only well recognized and settled rules of law are the
subject matter of codification. New laws, laws in their embryonic and formative
stage, cannot be codified. Such an attempt would be injurious both to the norm
itself and the society is seeks to regulate. New rules must be permitted to mellow
and mature before they are tabulated into a code. Whereas old and established
rules of law are codified, new laws are enacted by legislative organs of the state.
Had we gathered here as legislators of a world parliament we could have
formulated new rules of law into a statute. International Law being as
decentralized as it is, can only give us the mandate to codify existing law, and
that too, if we stretch the meaning of the world codification to a point where it all
but soaps. If this proposition is accepted, new rules of International Law, as

contemplated in article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations may be
recognized but not codified.
During the course of this debate we have heard several eloquent and
euphemistic references to the progressive development of International Law.
Times have undoubtedly changed. Institutions and values of yore have become
effete. Invincible states that controlled the destinies of teaming multitudes are
now weak and vulnerable. Those held in bondage are now free, and with that
freedom, have changed the path of history. Revolutionary changes, to achieve
normalcy, call for revolutionary laws. That the pattern of humanity has undergone
a radical change is admitted; only those who are spiritually and culturally barren
will deny it. It is also agreed that law must mirror most faithfully the pace of
human activity and conduct. However, by its very infinite nature, new law can be
created and recognized but not codified until it is fully developed.
Pakistan is deeply concerned with all the Law of the Sea. Each part of this
law is so wedded with the other as to form a composite whole. Both wings of
Pakistan have fairly large coastlines. Its fisheries are of considerable economic
importance, both from the point of view of consumption in the country and of
export. Our fisheries industry is developing rapidly and its potential advancement
carries a great promise not only for the many citizens directly concerned with this
industry but also for the prosperity of the nation as a whole. The wealth of the
sea-bed and its subsoil, both of the Territorial Sea and of the Continental Shelf,
are being explored by modern techno-logical means. Most important of all, it is
the sea that connects East and West Pakistan and through this mighty force of
nature we maintain the geographical indivisibility of our state. Perhaps for this
reason, the concept of the Freedom of the High Seas has far greater meaning for
us than for many other states, including the great maritime powers.
There are two paramount aspects of the Law of the Sea that must by
synthesized. In dialectical terms the thesis is the doctrine of Freedom of the High
Seas and the antithesis, the Right of the Coastal State to a Territorial Sea. The
clash of these two fundamental rules does not only suggest a clash of norms but
also a keen and critical rivalry between International Law and National Law,
between the sovereignty of states and that of International Law.
Our primary duty is to reconcile this conflict. Each of these important
aspects of the Law of the Sea carries with it a set of rights and obligations. The
breadth of the Territorial Sea has an immense bearing on the coastal state,
indeed it is within its sovereign domain. This view has remained by and large
unchallenged since the time of Bartholus. It is indispensable for the security and
socio-economic well-being of the coastal state to exercise sovereign rights over
its Territorial Sea. This right, though sovereign, is not absolute, No right is
absolute, not even the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitutions of
municipal states. The limitations on this right over territorial waters have been
mentioned often enough in this debate and do not require repetition. Similarly,

the concept of Freedom of the High Seas permits no one to make the High Seas
an arena for anarchy and chaos. The Freedom of the High Seas means that they
are open to all nations without discrimination and without let or hindrance.
It is so important a freedom that in 1918 President Woodrow Wilson
proclaimed it as the first principle of his fourteen points. Its importance over the
years has not diminished. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mr.
Churchill reiterated and re-emphasized this freedom in the Atlantic Charter.
Important though this freedom is to all nations, it is not absolute in form or
content. For example, ships on the High Seas are subject to the jurisdiction of the
flag state, and likewise, piracy and slave trade are subject to international
jurisdiction. In recent times some authorities have contended that the Doctrines
of the Contiguous Zone and the alleged right to explore without limit the
Continental Shelf have made further inroads into this freedom. None can
therefore question the truism that neither the sovereign rights of the coastal state
over Territorial Waters nor the Freedom of the High Seas are absolute. One can,
however, challenge with cogency the degree of legitimate interference with the
right over Territorial Waters and with the Freedom of the High Seas.
Numerous interesting arguments have been advanced in favor of and
against the three mile rule. The defenders of the classical standard have in the
main contended that the three mile limit is the only recognized limit permissible
under International Law and that article 3 of the draft code of the International
Law Commission confirms this vies. The conclusions drawn from article 3 and
the commentary thereon are that as long as certain territorial claims are not
based on a generally recognized rule of International Law they cannot be valid
erga Cummcs. Article 38(1) b of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
is quoted in support of this contention. These are forceful contentions and my
delegation has heard and studied them with care.
My delegation has given equal attention to the arguments advanced
against the classical rule. Those who claim a ceiling of twelve miles have sought
to rest their contention chiefly on the ground that the maximum limit of twelve
miles is the recognized norm of International Law as spelt out in article 3 of the
draft code. This clearly indicates that article 3 is subject to conflicting
interpretation. I would like to mention that my delegation has also taken
cognizance of the views of delegations that have chosen to ignore article 3
altogether and demand an extensive territorial limit stretching to hundreds of
miles. They claim that they cannot be bound by those rules of law in the
formulation of which they played no part. They thus, have an honest approach to
the subject. They reject totally the old norm on the ground that rules formulated
way back in 1703 cannot remain valid in the fast changing and dynamic
conditions of the present. For them, the three mile rule founded on the range of
cannot shot is clearly a relic of the past and therefore cannot find any place in the
panoply of modern international affairs. They vehemently denounce the classical
rule for the following, amongst other, reasons:

(1) That when these rules were formulated, they were under colonial
domination and had no voice in their creation.
(2) That for reasons of security the three mile rule must be abandoned.
(3) That economic needs demand, in the interest of conservation, an
extension of the Territorial Sea.
(4) That regional needs and circumstances require such action.
These are all extremely attractive arguments. But I would like to say, not
by way of a rebuttal, but for the purpose of exploring these arguments, that some
authorities hold that when a nation is under colonial domination, the ‘WILL’ of that
nation is expressed through and by the country exercising sovereignty over it.
They add that only when the nation in question acquires its independence does it
become a member of the international community with a distinct and separate
personality and that all the rules of International Law existing at the time are
binding on it. Should it be opposed to certain rules, it must follow the procedure
laid down by International Law for the repeal amendment, and modification of
such rules. It cannot unilaterally repudiate them on the ground that it was not a
member of the international community at the time when they were formulated. If
such a course of action were legally permissible, there would be widespread
uncertainty in International Law. There is, however, no need to enter into this
controversy. At the time of this conference, the states that hold the aforesaid
views are free independent sovereign states. Among others, they have been
called upon to pronounce the limit on territorial waters. They are now free, wholly
free, to pronounce their verdict in favor of Article 3 as interpreted by them.
Much has been made of the argument that the three mile limit is obsolete
and that its raison deter, the artillery range of the cannon shot, has vanished
altogether, and that advances of modern science call for much greater breadth of
the Territorial Sea for the protection and security of the states concerned.
Whether the three mile rule has its origins in the cannon shot range is, from
historical considerations, rather uncertain. Reference to a learned article on this
subject in the American Journal of International Law for October, 1954, under the
title “The historical origin of the three mile limit” will reveal that the real origin of
the three mile rule lies in the principle of the marine league.
The range of artillery increased far beyond three miles in the early phases
of the 19th
century without affecting the principle of the three mile limit. If, for
security reasons alone, the three mile limit was fixed within the range of the
cannon shot extensions would have automatically followed in the breadth of the
Territorial Sea. But we have seen that while artillery range progressed
tremendously, the three mile rule remained unchanged. Furthermore, even when
the range of the cannon was well within three miles, and indeed even before that,
there were cases in which territorial limits were fixed beyond three miles. For
example, in the Middle Ages, the Italian states claimed a Territorial Sea of 100
miles on the basis of Sassoferrato’s theory. The three mile rule, therefore, cannot

be condemned and discarded on the ground that its utility from the point of view
of security has disappeared. Even if there was some vague historical connection
between the three mile limit and the artillery range, that connection was lost
many many years ago. Hence, it is respectfully submitted that this relationship
has been grossly exaggerated. However if the sole purpose or even the chief
purpose of the Territorial Sea is based on the need of defense and security under
modern conditions, in this age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, even an
extension of 200 miles would be hopelessly inadequate.
Much has also been said on the anachronism of the traditional breadth. I
have already stated that we are in full accord with the view that new conditions
demand new laws. Albeit, these new rules must, however, stem from recognized
norms. In the hierarchy of norms the basically sound and pragmatic norms of
Customary International Law form the base of the pyramid. Without this base you
cannot have a legal edifice. By all means discard useless and moribund norms
but for the sake of progressive development of International Law do not tamper
with old, recognized, and highly beneficial laws on the ground that they are old.
Perhaps it may be useful to recall the words of the Representative of the
United States of America in the 6th
Committee of the 11th
session of the General
Assembly contained in document A/Conf, 13/19 at page 485, and I quote;
“It is, of course, correct to argue that we should not blindly follow a rule
merely because it has persisted for many years. We agree that a law
should not be retained because it is old but neither do we believe that a
law must be regarded as obsolete and should be abandoned just because
it is ancient. On the contrary, there is a strong presumption that a long
accepted rule of law has valid and sound reasons for persisting throughout
the years. The rules of the world are examples of rules of conduct which
have an ancient origin but which continue to have validity in modern times.
The Ten Commandments are ancient, but that does not mean that they
are obsolete. The teachings of the Korean are old, but that does not make
them invalid today. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that the 3 mile
rule is on the plane with the laws laid down in the Ten Commandments or
in the Koran, or that it is of the same character. But I do strongly urge that
those who advocate changing a rule that has been upheld through the
years have the very heavy burden of demonstrating that the rule has
outlived its usefulness and can no longer be upheld.”
Far be it from me to compare the immutable laws of God with the
transitory laws of man. However, I would maintain that ancient laws are
not always redundant merely because they are old. The onus of proving
their redundance rests on those who challenge their validity and it is so
heavy an onus that it cannot be discharged by mere platitudes.

Extensions in breadth of the Territorial Sea have also been justified
on economical grounds. With respect to conservation of fisheries, the
Pakistan delegation intends to express its views on the economic
problems in the 3rd
Committee. Here I will only say that if conservation of
fisheries prompts incursions into the Freedom of the High Seas, that
object cannot thus be fulfilled, at least in our part of the World. If
extensions are made for the purpose of exclusive exploration and
exploitation, then, not only is the aim of conservation defeated but also the
desire for exploitation. The High Seas are free to all. Every nation large
and small, old and new has the right to take the fullest advantage of the
resources provided by this freedom. The argument that this freedom is
illusory in that only the great maritime powers can take real advantage of it
is a defeatist attitude. The life of a nation cannot be measured in terms of
decades or generations. Nations that have faith and confidence in their
intrinsic strength must have the vision to think of their interests in terms of
centuries. After all, what are fifty years or even a hundred in the histories
of countries that hold the legacy of civilizations dating back to Mohen-jo-
daro and Pompeii. If the United States of America could subscribe to the
doctrine of the Freedom of the High Seas at a time when she was not able
to take full advantage of that freedom, at a time when she was too young
to compete with the then great maritime powers, why cannot the other
young and virile nations do the same? The United States of America
accepted this freedom because it had absolute faith in its manifest destiny.
We too have or ought to have faith in our greatness and accept this
freedom today although we may not be in a position at present to compete
with the more advanced states in the maximum utilization of the Freedom
of the High Seas. In this spirit, we accept the concept of the freedom of
the High Seas.
It has been contended in certain quarters that regional conditions
necessitate the extension of territorial limits. Such a course would,
however, defeat the principle of uniformity which is of supreme importance
to law. One of the cardinal objects of the rule of law is to maintain equality
before the law or the equal subjection of all classes to the established law.
The rule of law in this sense excludes the idea of exemptions from the
duty of obedience to the law which governs the others. Under the rule of
law as opposed to arbitrary power, one rule cannot be prescribed for me
and another for you. Therefore, it would be a violation of the rule of law if
subjective and arbitrary claims were made as exceptions to the
recognized law on the ground of regional requirements.
The proponents of the 12 mile limit and those who claim that the
law recognizes a minimum limit of 3 and a maximum of 12 and permits the
fixation of territorial limits within this margin have to some extent adopted
a fair portion of the arguments of those who base their claims on limitless
extension of territorial rights. Hence the apparent objections to the

submissions put forward by those who stand for unlimited extension hold
valid for those who claim the breadth of 12 miles and also for those
contending that it ranges between 3 and 12 miles. In addition to the
common arguments the proponents of this view hold that Article 3 of the
draft code of the International Law Commission recognizes a minimum of
3 and a maximum of 12 miles. As I have said earlier, Article 3 is open to
conflicting interpretation. This is indeed regrettable as this is the pivotal
article of the whole draft.
According to the rules of interpretation a statute is to be expounded
“according to the intent of them that made it”. If the words are in
themselves precise and unambiguous on more is necessary than to
expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense but apparently
the debates in this Committee and even the discussions in the 6th
Committee of the 11th
session of the General Assembly indicate that the
draft article under consideration has caused some difficulty as to its
intention. It is not my delegation’s object to criticize the draft of so eminent
a body. We merely observe that the interpretation given to Article 3 has
not been uniform. In this even it is necessary to draw on external and
historical facts to convey the true intentions. Among the external facts one
may call to aid the records and proceedings of the discussions that
preceded the draft. The record of the International Law Commission
seems to indicate that in 1955, the 3 miles rule was implicitly recognized
as the only binding rule of International Law, as this rule was the only rule
the commission held erga omnes.
There are at least two other rules of interpretation that support this
submission: -
(1) the rule of avoidance of some absurdity, repugnance, or
inconsistence with the rest of the instrument; and
(2) the presumption against intending what is inconvenient or
unreasonable.
If we interpret Article 3 to mean that it permits a minimum of 3 miles and a
maximum of 12, we would be admitting an interpretation that would lead to
uncertainty and confusion. It would be repugnant to the very object of law. The
prime object of law is to establish certainty and thereby create an orderly
regulation of society. If every state is given the license to fluctuate and oscillate
at its whim and fancy between 3 and 12 miles. International Law would abound in
uncertainty followed by immeasurable inconvenience. Such a procedure would
be highly detrimental to all concerned. Its obvious repugnancy is clear from the
fact that instead of creating stability it would foster chaos. With each periodical
change in the limits of Territorial Waters the Law of the Sea would undergo a
drastic change. Such alterations would indubitably have their serious
ramifications in each and every aspect of the Law of the Sea with the result that

the entire body of law would be in a state of flux. Frequent changes between 3
and 12 miles would, for instance, affect the Contiguous Zone and the Freedom of
the High Seas. So also the fisheries rights. However, even if frequent changes
were not permitted or made within this range, it would be nonetheless contrary to
the rule of law for it would lead to inequality of opportunity and status before the
law. This inconvenience and absurdity must be avoided.
However, in my humble submission, Article 3 does not raise a question of
interpretation as it does not propound a legal proposition. It is a bare statement of
fact. It restates a factual position and leaves it to this conference to determine the
legal position according to the rules of Customary International Law.
Pakistan recognizes the customary rule of International Law to be that of 3
miles. In so doing my delegation does not rest its case on an interpretation of
Article 3 or on any other reason advanced hitherto by the supporters of the 3 mile
limit. My delegation does not want to go into the rights or wrongs of the cannon
shot rule, or into the historical origins of the 3 mile rule. Nor does it want to base
its case on geographical considerations. My delegation adheres to the 3 mile rule
for one fundamental reason. We view this issue as a clash between National and
International Law. Those who want the maximum limit to the Territorial Sea are in
fact trespassing on, and even usurping, the rights of International law in that they
are making serious inroads into the concept of the Freedom of the Seas. Those
who want to exercise the minimum breadth of sovereignty over the seas are
actually subordinating municipal interests to those of International Law. The High
Seas lie in the exclusive jurisdiction of International Law, whereas the Territorial
Waters are in the exclusive jurisdiction of National Law. In order to make a
genuine contribution to the progressive development of International Law, my
delegation holds that the minimum of 3 miles limit ought to be, and is, the only
valid limit legally recognizable by the comity of nations. Herein we have shown
our bona fide intentions to uphold the supremacy of International Law. We invite
other delegations to make the same contribution to the progressive development
of International Law by recognizing this limit.
We do not believe in the policy of grab. In the past imperial powers
grabbed as much land as possible. Now that those lands are free they, more
than others, should recognize the innate wickedness of this policy by refraining
from grabbing large areas of the ocean to satisfy the appetite for appropriation.
We do not believe in the concept of a maritime “Lebensraum”. We will hold and
take what is legitimately ours and not an inch more of anything, be it land, air,
sea, or outer space.
My delegation would like to state quite clearly that we do not recognize
unilateral declarations purporting to extend Territorial Waters beyond 3 miles. We
can never acquiesce in a measure that strikes International Law so squarely in
the face. This should be known to all and particularly to those who are situated in
our geographical region. Insofar as the Contiguous Zone is concerned, my

delegation is impressed by the proposal that a Contiguous Zone of 12 miles, as
recommended by the International Law Commission, be accepted but with the
modification that it covers fisheries as well. This proposal is commendable as it
endeavors’ in a most equitable way to enshrine a compromise between
conflicting views. It will therefore receive my delegations most sympathetic
consideration.
The distinguished Representative of Panama has proposed that a sub-
committee of this committee be established to examine the question of Historic
Bays. My delegation has also heard the objections of the United Kingdom
delegation to it and considers that the objections have merit. This
notwithstanding, if the majority of Latin American countries want such a sub-
committee my delegation will make its modest contribution by lending its support
to it in the interest of friendship and amity.
A dogmatic approach to the problems affecting the world is repugnant to
my delegation. We have come here with an open mind and are anxious to listen
and learn. We believe that the last word has not been uttered on this subject and
indeed from higher consideration every answer in its turn leads to a new
question. Therefore, we are always subject to correction and change if correction
and change are really due. God in His infinite wisdom did not arrogate all wisdom
to one people or one nation. We can all learn from one another and the more we
pool our resources for the common good of mankind, for the progress of the
common weal, the more we are likely to benefit. Humanity, irrespective of
artificial barriers and unfounded prejudices, is essentially indivisible and the
sooner we work with faith and zeal for the greater good of this indivisible human
force the better it is not only for humanity as a whole but also for each individual
that forms a part of this mighty colossus.

Address to the First Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly on October 28, 1959
Mr. Chairman,
We are carrying into the fourteenth year of the life of the United Nations
our discussions on disarmament. Solutions to the problem have so far eluded us.
The perfection of nuclear weapons and the development of rockers and
satellites, while lending even greater urgency to the problem, have interposed
what appear to be insurmountable barriers to its solution.
To these deep frustrations has been added the two year dead-lock on
both the procedure and substance of disarmament negotiations, Unmoved by the
mortal danger to the human race from the fierce competition in the accumulation
of new weapons the great powers have not shown that awareness of time which
is of such critical importance in the problem.
It is, therefore, with no small measure of relief that we welcome the break
in the double deadlock which makes it possible to discuss the substantive
aspects of disarmament in the Ten-Power negotiating committee, set up as a
result of the decision of the foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers.
We note that the Committee will present reports on its work to the United
Nations Disarmament Commission, and through it to the General Assembly and
the Security Council, in recognition of the ultimate responsibility for general
disarmament measures vested in the United Nations by its Charter.
The distinguished Representative of the United Kingdom has suggested
that it would be appropr4iate if the Secretary-General were to appoint a
representative at the proceedings of the Ten-Powe3r group. We endorse this
suggestion, as it will establish a direct link between the United Nations and the
Ten-Power group which was established outside the framework of the
organization.
In this context, the Pakistan delegation warmly welcomes the proposal of
the distingui9shed Representative of Greece that the Chairman of the
Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Padilla Nervo, should represent the
United Nations at the meetings of the Ten-Power Committee. Both by virtue of
his personal qualifications and the office he holds, the distinguished Permanent
Representative of Mexico would be the most suitable choice for this purpose.
The proposals for general and complete disarmament of all states,
outlined to the General Assembly on September 18 by Prime Minister
Khrushehev, and the scheme of comprehensive disarmament submitted by the

Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, a day earlier,
promise, in the view of my delegation, the prospect of further loosening of the
deadlock which has existed among the great powers, on the substantive aspects
of the disarmament question, since the twelfth session of the General Assembly.
The two sets of proposals may well open real possibilities of agreement between
the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on important measures of
disarmament. We feel uplifted by new hopes of significant progress towards the
ultimate objective of a disarmed and war-less world –an objective which all
nations and all peoples must attain by their collective efforts if they are to escape
from the ultimate catastrophe which the arms race portends.
The Pakistan delegation agrees with the distinguished Representative of
Argentina that the Soviet and British proposals should be examined in the first
instance by the Ten-Power group. We hope that every effort will be made by this
body to resolve differences and to evolve an agreed plan embodying the greatest
possible measure of controllable disarmament to be implemented in stages. The
Members of the United Nations will best be able to evaluate the merits of the
stands of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union after the report of the group
is transmitted to the Disarmament Commission. At the present time, neither of
the two plans has been set forth in such fullness as to enable the First
Committee to do more than make observations of a general nature in regard to
them, and the views expressed by the parties primarily concerned at this stage.
Even a cursory comparison of the two plans reveals marked progress in
the thinking of the two sides, as compared with that reflected in the discussions
of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in 1957. In this respect,
the following advances from previous positions must be regarded as significant:
First, the reinstatement of comprehensive disarmament by both sides as
the objective of negotiations in the place of partial measures;
Second, the implicit abandonment by the West of its insistence on linking
progress in the reduction of armed forces and conventional disarmament
to political conditions and to the preliminary solution of certain political
problems;
Third, the loosening of the Western ‘package’ proposals making it
possible to implement individual measures of disarmament which may be
agreed upon without making this dependent upon implementation of other
disarmament measures in the whole complex;
Fourth, the abandonment by the Soviet Union of its demand for the
renunciation of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons before any start
can be made with conventional disarmament;
Fifth, the relegation by the Soviet Union of its demand for the abolition of
foreign military bases from priority status to the stage when conventional
disarmament is complete. These, we believe, are delimte forward steps
towards the goal of disarmament, whether total or partial.

On the question of an inspection and control system, which must always
remain the keystone of the structure, it is not possible at the present moment to
say to what degree the respective positions may be expected to converge. The
statements of the Soviet representatives on this all important aspect of the
pro0blem have been generally construed as implying that a control body is to be
established in the third and final phase of disarmament and that complete
inspection will be permitted only after major steps in disarmament are already
accomplished.
The clarification given by the distinguished Representative of the Soviet
Union in his intervention yesterday should dispel our fears that this may in fact be
the real thinking of the Soviet Union. He expressed himself in favour of control
being commensurate with concrete action on disarmament. We hope we are
correct in taking it that the Soviet proposals envisage the effective enforcement
of inspection and control over every step of actual disarmament from the first to
the last stage. The new emphasis on effective and comprehensive controls,
which we find in the Soviet statements, has raised our expectations of a meeting
of minds between the great powers on this question which has so far kept them
wide apart. Would it be too much to hope that now at last the Soviet Union may
be prepared to elaborate, with the same boldness that characterizes its
proposals for general and complete disarmament, the responsibilities, functions,
rights and powers of the control organ appropriate to each stage of disarmament.
It is only then that all parties will be able to judge whether the controls to
be instituted will be real and not illusory.
It will be the task of the Ten-Power Committee to work out comprehensive
measures of international inspection and control to be applied to the extent
necessary to each phase of an agreed disarmament plan that it may be possible
to evolve from the proposals of Mr. Khrushehv and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.
We are assured by the Western Powers that they will not take up firm
positions in regard to their own proposals without giving time for patient
consideration; and that they are prepared to take equal steps together, large or
small, toward comprehensive or partial disarmament. The Soviet Union, for its
part, has expressed its readiness to consider amendments to its own plan and to
discuss other proposal.
This open mindedness augurs well for the forthcoming negotiations. If the
spirit of compromise rules the talks, it should not prove an insurmountable task to
iron out the differences which remain and integrate the two sets of proposals into
a single balanced plan of comprehensive and controlled disarmament, to be
implemented by stages in such a manner that at no stage will one side be placed
in a situation of relative military advantage over the other –in other words, a plan
that would ensure that each step in disarmament will enhance the security of not
only of one of the parties, but of all the parties.

As Pakistan is not a member of the Ten-Power group, my delegation
would like to take advantage of this opportunity to make a few observations on
certain provisions of the Soviet as well as the British proposals.
In respect of the former, my colleague, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan,
Mr. Manzur Qadir, stated as follows in his statement to the General Assembly on
September 25:
“The record of the disarmament negotiations shows that control system to
ensure the complete elimination of stock-piles of nuclear weapons of mass
destruction is not yet feasible. If it be true that any kind of inspection which
it may be possible to agree upon in this field would leave a margin of error
which would expose one side to the risk of evasion by the other, I would
seem that the prospects of total disarmament are not nearer than before.
In that case, it would be more realistic to proceed to negotiate initially on
the basis of comprehensive disarmament outlined to us by the British
Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Llyod, last week, The scope of the
negotiations could then be enlarged to include complete and general
disarmament with the development of techniques to bring the question of
hidden nuclear stockpiles within the range of detection and control.”
The United Kingdom plan is based upon the principle that measures of
conventional and nuclear disarmament must be related and proceed hand in
hand so that when nuclear disarmament deprives the West of its nuclear
deterrent, the Soviet Union may not retain its heavy preponderance in
conventional armaments. None can take exception to the principle that
disarmament measures, whether conventional or nuclear, should be so carried
out as not to upset the present military balance between the great powers.
The fact, however, that the Khrushehev proposals do not contemplate
restrictions on nuclear arms in the first and second stages and concentrate on
the reduction and liquidation of armed forces and conventional armaments
should not in the view of my delegation, detract from their merits or be regarded
as conflicting with the basic principle of maintaining intact the balance of power
while disarmament is taking place. If the side which has the advantage in
conventional armaments is willing to forego it, without maki9ng this conditional
upon the other party giving up its superiority in nuclear weapons, surely such a
proposal can in no manner have the effect of altering the balance of strength to
the disadvantage of the other party.
For this reason, we consider that the constructive elements in the
Khurushehev proposals for the reduction of armed forces and conventional
armaments should not be lost sight of. They may well hold out the prospect of a
substantial measure of real disarmament in the near future.

It was with this hope in mind that the Pakistan Foreign Minister expressed
himself as follows on this aspect disarmament in his statement of September 25:
“……We would venture to suggest that the Ten-Power Committee should
make every effort to reach agreement on the reduction of the armed
forces and conventional armaments of the great powers and also give
consideration to the convening of a special session of the General
Assembly within two years to effect a reduction of the standing armies and
armaments of all other member states to appropriate levels.”
The Pakistan delegation hopes that the Ten-Power Committee will give
consideration to the convening of such a conference.
It was the stand of the Western Powers in the negotiations in 1957 that
conventional disarmament cannot be limited in the later stages to the four
principal powers, but that other essential states should also accept reduced
levels for their forces and armaments We believe that while the relaxation of this
position should facilitate the forth coming negotiations between the great powers,
the principle of limitation of armed forces and armaments must be made
universally applicable so as to include the great as well as the small powers by
means of a multilateral convention, which would also ensure that the security of
all states parties is thereby not impaired but enhanced in relation to one another.
In regard to the four-year period within which general and complete
disarmament is to be carried out, we doubt whether it would be realistic, in the
light of past experience, to expect that this kind of disarmament can be carried
out in the manner of a crash programme. When, in the case of such peripheral
issues as the discontinuance of testing, a whole year has not proved sufficient for
the conclusion of an agreement, is it not too much to hope that all those
formidable difficulties that lie at the heart of the central problem can be resolved
within a period of 4 years. If the Soviet Union can demonstrate its ability to
conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of testing before the end of the
present session of the General Assembly, our skepticism will yield to rising
expectations of attaining the objective of total disarmament within this time limit.
The economic burden of raising military expenditures, in consequence of
the arms race, bears heavily on all the peoples of the world. It is having the result
of increasing taxes and reducing the percentages of national budgets devoted to
health, education and social welfare. Even the two colossi among the great
armed Powers must recognize that the inexorable necessity to develop and
maintain competing weapons-systems to ensure the operational maturity of one
of them at any given moment, and also the means of defense against them
ultimately, must lead to mutual bankruptcy and exhaustion.
For many of the smaller nations, the cost of their military establishments is
becoming prohibitive, draining away 50 to 60 percent of their annual revenues.

A reduction of armaments is the only hope which these countries have of
economic viability and especially those among them which are underdeveloped.
They cannot reduce their armaments unless corresponding reductions are made
in the military strengths of their neighbors. They do not possess nuclear
weapons. For them, therefore, meaningful disarmament connotes a general and
universal reduction of conventional armaments so as to release enough of their
own economic and financial resources for the purpose of attaining a rate of
growth which will carry them forward from their present stage of low productivity
to that of the “take off” when economic development tends to become self-
generating.
The present rate of flow of foreign assistance from all sources,
governmental, private as well as from the international agencies, is inadequate to
carry the under-developed countries to this critical stage. The incidence of this
assistance is to a large extent purely compensatory, as the terms of trade have
moved steeply against underdeveloped countries, mainly because of the fall and
fluctuations in the prices of primary commodities. Given their present military
expenditures, it would require 3 to 4 times the current rate of annual foreign
assistance over the period of a decade to enable them to achieve self-sustaining
economics.
Unless general, multilateral and enforceable disarmament is
accomplished, the under-developed countries will not acquire the means from
either domestic or foreign sources to meet the challenge of the revolution of
rising aspirations of their poverty-stricken peoples.
The distinguished Representative of the United States, Mr. Cabot Lodge,
has rightly pointed out that if all nations lay down their arms, there must be
institutions to preserve international peace and security and promote the rule of
law.
A number of delegations have spoken on the means of dealing with the
new situation that would emerge following the adoption of a plan of
comprehensive disarmament. Among them, the distinguished Representatives of
Argentina, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and Greece have made constructive
suggestions to prevent aggression, protect small states, safeguard against
violations of a disarmament treaty, strengthen the machinery of peaceful
settlement of disputes and the International Court of Justice and for these ends,
to study the political, legal and constitutional issues concerning the organization
of the international community in a world without arms.
The Pakistan delegation welcomes and supports the proposals of the
United States that the Disarmament Commission should study the three
questions which it has formulated to enable us to meet the challenge of what we
hope will be a new era in international relations.

Pakistan has always been a staunch supporter of the concept of an
international police force to preserve world peace and security. We have also on
several occasions urged that the charter machinery for the peaceful settlement of
disputes should be strengthened and the scope of compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court enlarged to make our organization a more effective
instrument for the attainment of its purposes.
What we are seeking to do on the question of disar5mament is without
precedent in human history.
“New relationships of forces are reshaping the world. The search is for
methods by which nations can accommodate themselves to living with
each other in the new and more dangerous world. The achievement of this
peaceful accommodation presently is more difficult than the conquest of
space.”
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Address to the Second Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly on November 11, 1959.
Mr. Chairman,
May I begin by congratulating our distinguished Under Secretary for
Economic and Social Affairs, Mr. Phiulippe de Seynes, for his extremely lucid
and penetrating appraisal of the problem of economic development of the under-
developed countries.
My delegation has also read with deep interest the report presented by the
Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council, analyzing the various
suggestions and proposals made in the United Nations economic bodies during
the recent years on topics relating to economic development, such as primary
commodities and international commodity trade, the development of resources
industrialization, technical assistance, financing, etc. I may say that we find
ourselves in general agreement, both with the analysis and the conclusions of
the Secretary-General, as well as with the recommendations made by the
Economic and Social Council to intensify development efforts.
Mr. Chairman, all these statements and analyses, all the conclusions and
recommendations serve to highlight the following broad features of the situation:
(a) the vast magnitude and complexity of the problem;
(b) the close inter-dependence of the developed and the under-developed
countries in this context; and
(c) the urgency of finding appropriate solutions to these problems.
I do not propose to embark upon a detailed survey of the factor which go
to make up what is undoubtedly a depressing picture of the present economic
situation and the even gloomier long-term prospects of under-developed
countries. Other speakers before me have no doubt adequately dealt with the
subject. Moreover, I understand that this Committee is working against time. I
would, therefore, confine myself to a few observations emphasizing the urgency
of finding solutions to our problems.
Mr. Chairman, no one who has taken a moderately intelligent interest in
the contemporary history of the post-war years can fail to recognize the vital role
that the under-developed countries have come to play in the complex of
international relations. This importance is not due only to the fact that an
over4whelmingly large percentage of worlds’ population lives in these areas, nor
even because they form majority of membership in this great world organization,
but mainly because they represent enormous “Power vacuums”. When rival
economic systems are advertising their wares, these vast populations stand
fascinated and expectant at the threshold of a glorious tomorrow, but they also

stand extremely perplexed. In this posture, one false step from any one of them
and the world could be plunged into devastating conflict.
It is true that at present the statesmen of the leading nations are striving to
bring about a relaxation of tension by limiting armaments. This must not,
however, be allowed to full us into a false sense of security, for, disarmament,
even if it should be achieved, will not by itself remove the deeper causes of war.
One of the root causes of war is the economic disequilibrium in the world. We
think that as long as these dangerous vacuums of power, these yawning chasms
of grinding poverty, ill-health and ignorance remain unabridged, all hopes of a
lasting peace in our times must prove chimerical. And, be it noted that while
these negotiations go on, time will not be standing still in the under-developed
countries. If things do not go forward, they must go backwards; such is the
inexorable law of life. Strong and compelling pressures are constantly building up
within these countries for better or for worse, pressures which will not resisted for
long. During the last 18 months, a number of regimes in Asia and Africa,
including that in my country, have been swept away because they were not able
to respond effectively top these pressures. The weak and fumbling regimes have
been replaced by politically strong and stable ones which appear to be well
equipped for setting the course of these countries on the right track. For
example, my country’s government has, within a very short period of time,
launched a number of far-reaching programmes of reform and has already
succeeded in reshaping the pattern of our internal political, economic and social
life. We are determined to overcome all obstacles in our way to progress so far
as it lies in our power. But there are things which do not lie in our power. Among
them the most important are the international economic forces. They are beyond
our control and yet they have a most powerful impact on the lives of each one of
us,. If these economic forces continue to act unfavorably, people in these
countries may well begin asking themselves the question; “What next?” And who,
Mr. Chairman, can answer it today.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let us look at these problems a little more closely. A
basic problem of economic development of the underdeveloped countries is that
of finding adequate investment. The rate of domestic savings is too low and even
what there is, is swallowed up by the enormous rate of population increase. The
introduction of measures to control growth of population in itself requires
considerable investment in raising educational as well as general standards of
living. Here we come face to face with one of the several vicious circles with
which our problem is hemmed in. To break it we need international assistance
and, indeed, this has been forthcoming in generous measure, both bilaterally and
multi-laterally. Nevertheless, the problem still remains. The role of the United
Nations is to devise effective measures to combat whatever may be obstructing
the realization of our aims.
As my delegation sees it, the central problem of under-developed
countries can be examined in three different aspects, as, indeed, it has been in

the past. First, we must ask ourselves if the means at present available to
finance economic development are sufficient, and, if not, to find out more
effective ways and means of increasing international flow of private and public
capital to under-developed countries. Secondly, there is the question of
adequacy or otherwise of means to make available the necessary measure of
technical assistance to these countries in order to raise the low level of the skills
of the population. Lastly, there is the paradoxical problem created by the
dependence of under-developed countries on exports of primary commodities,
the prices of which have not only fallen but fluctuated widely, while the prices of
industrial manufactures have continued to rise steadily.
With regard to the availability of finance, Mr. Chairman, my delegation is
happy to note that a new multilateral organization, the International Development
Association, is being brought into being shortly as an adjunct of the International
Bank. We believe that this new institution with its programme of “soft” loans will
fill a much needed place in the existing pattern of international assistance
programmes. It is, however, too early to form any definite assessment of its
scope of activities. Judging from the initial proposed capital it seems that the
loans to be given by the International development Association would go only
part of the way in meeting the needs of the under-developed countries. For this
reason my delegation feels that there is still a place for a United Nation Capital
Development Fund, the creation of which we have always supported. Apart from
certain inherent psychological advantages that a universal Fund of this kind,
operated under the aegis of the United Nations, possesses, my delegation feels
that it would enable those nations to make their contribution to international
economic co-operation which, for reasons of policy or scruple, do not find
themselves able to participate in the newly formed International Development
Association.
The situation of the flow of private international investment into the under-
developed countries remains unsatisfactory despite the fact that most of the
countries concerned have considerably liberalized their fiscal and industrial
policies to make them more attractive to foreign investors. My own country, for
example, has provided several new incentives and facilities for foreign investors.
One of the important concessions is that participation of local capital in any fixed
proportion is no longer insisted upon. Bilateral agreements for avoidance of
double income-tax have been concluded with many countries. The mining
industry has been granted a special tax relief. An Investment Promotion Bureau
has been set up by the Central Government with branches in both the Provinces
for providing the fullest possible information and assistance to foreign investors.
My delegation is also pleased to note that in the last few years significant
progress has been made in the sphere of rendering technical assistance to the
under-developed countries, both as regards the availability of funds and the
improvements of institutional machinery for international action. It is needless to
stress how desperately the under-developed countries stand in need of

industrialization. Whatever brings this objective nearer to realization is worthy of
our whole-hearted support. The recently created United Nations Special Fund
has been rightly described as “a strategic break-through of incomparable
significance” for economic development. It has an imp0rtant role to play,
especially in infra-structure improvements and in building up the capacity for
absorption for capital in the under-developed countries. Equally gratifying has
been the role played in the last few years by the Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance. It must, however, be stated that the availability of funds for
both the Special Fund and Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance falls
short of the minimum needs.
This, Mr. Chairman, brings me to the last and in the view of my delegation,
the most important aspect of all, namely, that relating to the instability of
commodity prices. For, upon a satisfactory solution of this problem depends our
most reliable and effective instrument of economic development, namely, the
capacity of the under-developed countries themselves to contribute to their own
development. No lasting success can be achieved in the field of economic growth
unless and until, as the report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development has pointed out, the under-developed countries are enabled to
mobilize their own capital resources. In any case, we cannot go on relying
indefinitely upon international assistance as a permanent feature of our economic
life.
The capacity of the under-developed countries to contribute to their own
development depends largely on their export earnings as the plant and
machinery and the technical facilities required for the purpose of development
have to be imported from industrialized countries. The under-developed countries
have, under the present circumstances, to rely on the sale of their primary
commodities for their export earnings. It is a matter of considerable concern to us
that the returns on the sale abroad of primary commodities have diminished very
considerably over the last several years. This fact has been brought out
emphatically in almost every survey of world economic conditions. I shall limit
myself to inviting attention, by way of illustration, to the fact that the fall in the
price index of primary commodities in the course of one single year from mid-
1957 to mid-1`958 has reduced export earning of the under-developed countries
by about 8% representing a loss in their import capacity equivalent to about six
years’ loans to them by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development at the 1956-57 levels. It may also be pertinent to mention here that
in the case of my own country, the total financial aid which we have received
from different sources up until now, has been less than half of the total loss which
we have suffered on account of the fall in the price of our primary commodities.
The situation created by the wide-spread decline in the price of primary
commodities has been aggravated by a rise in the price of manufactured goods
thus reducing still further the ability of the under-developed countries to procure
the means of their economic progress. This again is a phenomenon well

Speeches1957 65

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